

Symptoms and causes

Insecurity and underdevelopment in Eastern Equatoria

Eastern Equatoria state (EES) is one of the most volatile and conflict-prone states in Southern Sudan. An epicentre of the civil war (1983–2005), EES saw intense fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), as well as numerous armed groups supported by both sides, leaving behind a legacy of landmines and unexploded ordnance, high numbers of weapons in civilian hands, and shattered social and community relations.

EES has also experienced chronic food insecurity, a lack of basic services, and few economic opportunities. Cattle rustling, armed robbery, and banditry are endemic. With little or no official security presence in many areas of the state, protracted cycles of revenge attacks over natural resources, and land in particular, are common. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the civil war, did not result in a tangible peace dividend for most EES communities; in fact, the return of war-era refugees to ancestral villages and the recent arrival of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from other parts of Sudan have exacerbated tensions over land and resources.

To assess perceptions of development, governance, and security challenges in EES, the Small Arms Survey and Danish Demining Group undertook a household survey of almost 2,400 households in Torit, Magwi, and Ikotos counties in November and December 2009.¹ The survey gauged respondent views on pressing security and development issues, with a particular focus on armed violence; victims and perpetrators; motivations; weapons; disarmament; and security providers.²

The survey was supplemented by qualitative interviews and focus group discussions with key stakeholders in EES and Juba in January 2010.

Key findings include:


- Across the entire sample, respondents ranked education and access to adequate health care as their most pressing concerns, followed by clean water. Food was also a top concern in Torit and Ikotos. Security ranked at or near the bottom of overall concerns in all counties.
- When asked about their greatest security concerns, respondents in Torit and Ikotos cited cattle rustling, natural threats (primarily drought), and instability arising from armed groups. Magwi county residents expressed concern about disputes over natural resources, followed by natural threats.
- Killings—including spontaneous, intentional, and revenge killings—accounted for 40 per cent of all crimes reported in the last 12 months. Based on weighted data, an estimated 5,587 households (± 470) in three counties experienced one killing over the period.
- The most frequently reported weapon used to commit a crime—including killings—was the AK-47 or other automatic rifle. However, an equal percentage of crimes—including killings—were committed with no weapon at all.
- Almost 40 per cent (38 per cent) of all surveyed households reported firearm ownership, with much higher rates in Ikotos (63 per cent) and Torit households (53 per cent) than in Magwi (15 per cent). Based on these responses, an estimated

24,789 (± 965) households in the three counties contain at least one firearm.

- Respondents cited traditional leaders (clan elders and village chiefs) as the primary security providers in their areas (90 per cent), followed by neighbours (48 per cent) and religious leaders (38 per cent). Police presence was only cited by 27 per cent of respondents and the SPLA by even fewer (6 per cent).
- Attitudes towards disarmament were positive, with around 68 per cent of the total sample reporting a willingness to give up their firearms, and 63 per cent anticipating that disarmament would significantly increase security in their area. However, attitudes vary considerably depending on local perceptions of security.

Context

Located in the south-eastern corner of Southern Sudan, EES shares borders with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda (see Map). Like the communities across those borders, EES is populated primarily by agro-pastoralists who have long suffered from a range of development and governance problems, including 'a lack of basic services, unreliable water supplies, poor leadership, depressed local economies, insufficient responses to drought, widespread poverty, and extremely poor health and education'.³ Within the East and Horn of Africa region, EES is noticeably prone to conflict, which is exacerbated by a culture of cattle rustling and widespread access to and use of firearms.⁴ Governments



have periodically attempted to ‘pacify’ these marginalized communities using aggressive, militarized tactics—including forcible disarmament—generally without addressing underlying grievances or improving access to services.

Livelihoods in EES consist of subsistence agriculture (mainly sorghum and millet) and livestock, and to a lesser extent fishing, natural resource exploitation, and mining and trade.⁵ Very few alternative opportunities exist. The region is beset by chronic insecurity, a lack of tenure rights, a total lack of infrastructure, and the absence of a legal framework or institutions to encourage investment. Among the vast majority of the population, chronic poverty is the norm.⁶

The state is also home to a number of IDPs and a large number of returnees who had fled the violence and insecurity of the civil war. It experienced regular aerial bombardments, attacks by ground forces, and protracted fighting not only between the SAF and the SPLA, but also involving armed militia, such as the Equatorial Defence Forces (EDF), EDF II, Boya Forces, Didinga Forces, Lafon Forces, and Toposa and Mundari militias.⁷ Arms from both armies flowed to the region,

militarizing pastoralists and increasing their reliance on weapons in inter-communal conflicts.

EES was also deeply affected by the presence of the notorious Ugandan rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA entered Sudan in 1991 and by 1994 was an organized proxy force on the government side against the SPLA and its allies. Its brutal operations isolated the region from humanitarian assistance; thousands fled the force’s almost daily ambushes and abductions, often of children.⁸ For part of the latter phase of the civil war, the LRA effectively controlled Magwi county, among other areas, and terrorized its communities.⁹ The effect of the LRA’s domination differentiates Magwi from both Torit and Ikotos.

About the survey

In November and December 2009, the Small Arms Survey and Danish Demining Group undertook a household survey to gauge community perspectives on pressing security and development concerns.¹⁰ Due to EES’s large area, covering over 85,000 km², it

was not possible to sample from every county; Magwi, Torit, and Ikotos counties were considered representative of the south-western region of the state.

In this study, 2,392 households were surveyed, with one individual queried per household. The sample included 1,186 men and 1,201 women, achieving intended gender parity between the ages of 14 and 98. Respondents came from the Latuka (30 per cent), Acholi (23 per cent), Madi (21 per cent), Lango (20 per cent), and other clans (6 per cent). The survey methodology and sampling frame is outlined in Box 1.

The survey reveals that sources of insecurity and violent conflict in the three counties are multi-faceted and complex. Respondents reported widely different causes, frequencies, and types of violent crimes. In particular, there were clear distinctions between Magwi’s security environment and those of Torit and Ikotos. For this reason, Magwi is considered separately.

Crime and violence in Torit and Ikotos

Almost one-third of both Torit (28 per cent) and Ikotos (31 per cent) house-

Sampling

Data from the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) and UN planning figures produced a population of 354,215 in the counties of Torit, Ikotos, and Magwi, composed of 64,520 households with an average of 5.49 members. Magwi county contained an estimated 30,934 households (48 per cent of the entire sample), Torit county 18,168 households (28 per cent), and Ikotos 15,418 households (24 per cent). Using a confidence level of 95 per cent and a confidence interval of 2, two-staged sample size calculations yielded a sample size of 2,315 households.

Populations were grouped according to socio-economic status, experience of violent events, and ethnic membership. Ethnicity was defined according to tribal (clan) membership and language spoken. Each county was defined by its ethnicity. Because of the relative homogeneity of the three counties, however, it was not meaningful to treat each as a separate, unique cluster. A two-stage random stratified sampling plan was applied; the first stratum was the county level, the second stratum was the *boma* (village) level. Using probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling, the chances of a *boma* being selected in a particular county reflected its population size. Rural and peri-urban sampling was calculated based on data from the South Sudan Human Rights Council that established the proportion of peri-urban to rural households at 30 per cent to 70 per cent (1:2.3).

Before arriving in the target *boma*, the programme manager and the enumeration supervisor, who oversaw a group of ten enumerators, personally contacted the *boma* chief to receive permission to survey the area. Once granted permission, the entire team of ten enumerators travelled to the *boma* to meet with the chief and to begin sampling. The enumeration team started in the putative *boma* centre, usually defined by the presence of a central marketplace or concentrated market activity. The group then split into pairs and chose a direction randomly;¹¹ every Nth household was designated to be selected.¹²

A number of limitations to the survey design and implementation should be noted. First, one side effect of PPS sampling is that smaller villages had a lower chance of being selected, potentially introducing a bias. Second, a small number—no more than five—selected *bomas* had to be dropped because they required days of hiking to reach. Third, non-response was difficult to quantify but probably constituted 14 to 20 per cent. A number of households declined to participate before formal questioning even began. In other cases, no female respondent was available. Finally, because the survey is drawn from one region of the state, it is not representative of all of Eastern Equatoria.

Data analysis

Prior to analysis, the data was validated and cleaned using stringent filtering criteria. Any cases presenting more than five per cent error were to be identified as invalid and removed.¹³ Using this threshold, no cases were removed.

Analysis of the data was conducted by strategic use of weighting, complemented by statistically determined confidence intervals. Two sets of weights were applied to the data. First, the sample was weighted to maintain county-level proportions of those provided by the census data. Second, in order to accurately extrapolate findings to the total population of the three counties, the data was weighted for 1) selection probability within the overall population, 2) non-response bias, and 3) post-stratification adjustments. The combination of these three elements allowed inference, at the population level, of the impact and frequency of certain events or experiences.

Finally, due to non-response and sampling biases the confidence intervals were increased from 2 to 4. This allowed the team to report findings within a greater margin of error, increasing the probability of locating the true value or percentage within the reported interval.

Interpreting bar graphs

In each bar graph presented in this *Issue Brief*, the data includes an error margin, or confidence interval, of 95 per cent confidence. This means that the range within the error margin has a 95 per cent chance of including the true opinion of the sample. This is also important for judging whether different responses to the same question are statistically significant. Depending on the number of responses, even a difference of ten percentage points or more between two answers to a question may not reflect statistical significance. In this case, ranking responses is inappropriate. To determine whether different responses are significant, refer to the confidence interval lines included on each bar graph.

hold members reported incidents of crime and armed violence against one of their household members in the last 12 months. Killings—including spontaneous, intentional, and revenge killings—were the most commonly reported crime across all counties surveyed, accounting for 42 per cent of all reported crimes in Torit and 47 per cent in Ikotos (see Figure 1). Assault, beating, fighting, and shooting (combined into one category in the survey) came second, with 19 per cent of respondents in both Torit and Ikotos reporting such incidents. Automatic rifles (AK-47) were used in 46 per cent of killings in Torit, and 42 per cent of those in Ikotos.

Torit and Ikotos are heavily affected by cattle raiding and ensuing revenge attacks, and to a lesser extent by 'banditry'. Focus groups reported that raids commonly involve three to four perpetrators operating at night. In Torit, cattle raids are perceived to occur on a weekly basis,¹⁴ estimates put the resulting death toll at 15–20 per month.¹⁵ Violence typically takes place only after cattle are discovered to be missing and attempts are made to recover them—and during subsequent revenge attacks.¹⁶ Clashes thus erupt once the village youths (*monyomiji*) track down their assets in a neighbouring village. When recovery is not successful, subsequent revenge and counter-attacks follow. Retaliation may eventually be directed at any member of the perpetrators' village and can escalate into full-blown village warfare. In the heated atmosphere, violence can be triggered by rumours and proceed even if traditional compensation is paid.¹⁷ For example, in Ikotos county in November 2009, revenge attacks between the Logir and the Dongotono escalated into serious clashes between these two Lango sub-clans, leading to two weeks of fighting and serious insecurity between villages, until the SPLA was brought in to stop the fighting.¹⁸ Quick action to recover stolen cattle, based on reliable information and good collaboration with local communities—especially the youth—is thus key to preventing violence.

Notably, whereas conflict over cattle previously involved separate ethnic groups and villages separated by great distances, in Torit and Ikotos they


increasingly involve neighbouring villages. For example, in Hyala *payam*, Torit county, residents of the villages of Hyala Central, Ileu, Iole, Lofi, and Lugurunj are now reportedly raiding and killing each other, despite being from the same tribe (Latuka) and inter-marrying.¹⁹ Many interviewed villagers pointed to a complete breakdown of inter-village relations, their fear of being shot when walking to another village even during the daytime, and mounting divorce cases as families made up of members from different villages are unable to stay together in a hostile environment.²⁰ Similar evidence was found in Ikotos Central village, where increased raiding and attacks among neighbouring villages was also reported as a new phenomenon that was putting significant strain on local social relations.²¹

In addition to violence associated with cattle raiding, villagers also reported significant levels of killings due to banditry and armed robbery, committed by small criminal gangs, occurring both inside and outside the community. Attacks reportedly often involve looting of trucks for food and cash, as well as attacks at gunpoint against people travelling between villages. In both Torit and Ikotos banditry and armed robbery seem to have increased significantly over the past year, with a peak of cases recorded towards the end of 2009.²²

The proximity of the attackers and the unpredictability of the attacks greatly enhance people's feeling of insecurity. Across the three counties, a surprisingly high percentage of crimes reportedly take place during the day (55 per cent) as well as in the home (28 per cent), with the exception of Ikotos, where slightly more reported crimes took place in the streets than in the home. These findings imply that attackers are often nearby and familiar with the environment. For example, women in Hyala Central village recounted how attackers had shot two men through a small window in a house while their wives and babies were lying next to them. According to the women interviewed, the attackers clearly knew the place and their victim, yet escaped unidentified.²³

According to focus group discussions and key informant interviews,

Figure 1 Types of reported crime by county



the long-standing practice of cattle raiding has many facets. It involves acts of bravery and the initiation to manhood; it also serves to increase both individual and village wealth. Recently, however, the dynamics of cattle raiding, and the nature of the violence associated with it, have reportedly changed.

Firearms. The widespread possession of firearms allows relatively small and loosely organized groups to raid large numbers of cattle. The absence of a state security presence, and the breakdown of traditional village authority structures—exacerbated by a crisis in the relationship between younger and older generations—contribute to a culture of lawlessness and impunity.

Sponsorship. Respondents believe that relatives of villagers in high-level state and army positions are sponsoring raiding for personal profit and to generate a wider support base, thereby fuelling local cycles of violence. These sponsors reportedly provide weapons and ammunition and guarantee protection from prosecution for the perpetrators.²⁴ Chiefs and other village authorities are said to be just as involved in acts of banditry as other members of the community.

Livelihoods. Lack of employment opportunities, idleness, and increasing desperation and impatience to see tangible peace dividends and a more equal distribution of available resources are

reportedly pushing youths to obtain livelihoods through 'parallel ways'.²⁵

Generational break. The breakdown of old community relations and structures has also had a significant effect on the younger generation's ability to marry. For example, youths used to be able to rely on fathers and uncles to help with the payment of cows as a dowry; since many male relatives died during the war, however, youths have neither cattle nor family support structures. Complicating matters, the destruction of the traditional social fabric has made the gradual payment of dowries much less accepted than before, putting intense pressure on young people to acquire large numbers of cattle all at once.

Food insecurity. Severe drought and food insecurity, affecting large parts of EES since April 2009, was widely reported as another key reason for increasing levels of armed violence and insecurity. Violence peaked at the end of 2009, coinciding with the height of the migratory period for cattle keepers, who in the face of drought have to venture farther into unfamiliar or hostile territory in search of pasture and water points. For example, in Isoke *payam*, Ikotos county, 40 out of 60 reported violent incidents from September to December 2009 involved gunshot injuries. Where one to two gunshot wounds per month was the previous norm, by the end of 2009 the rate had increased to one to two per week.²⁶

Box 2 Magwi county

Causes and dynamics of insecurity in Magwi county are very different from those of Torit and Ikotos. Two historical facts help explain why: Magwi is the only county in EES that is populated primarily by farmers; it also experienced widespread displacement during the war. Magwi was the site of heavy fighting during the civil war as well as after the signing of the CPA, when the LRA was headquartered in Owiny-Kibul until being flushed out in 2007.²⁷ Consequently, it became one of the most inaccessible and underserved areas in the state both during and after the war, while at the same time hosting a large influx of returnees and IDPs in the post-CPA period.²⁸

Interviewed Magwi residents reported that disputes over natural resources, followed by natural threats, are the most prevalent security concerns in the county. Perceived levels of insecurity and in particular armed violence are generally much lower than in Torit and Ikotos. In Magwi, 14 per cent of respondents reported that a household member had been a victim of a crime in the last 12 months, compared to 28 per cent in Torit and 31 per cent in Ikotos. However, the potential for conflict, especially over land, as well as conflict linked to the reintegration of large numbers of returnees, is very high. In Magwi, 22 per cent of households experienced threats or intimidation, compared to 14 per cent in Torit and 5 per cent in Ikotos (see Figure 1). But while respondents in Magwi, like Torit and Ikotos, reported killing as the most frequently occurring crime (30 per cent), the actual numbers were far lower than in the other two counties. Magwi households reported a higher percentage of spontaneous killings than Torit or Ikotos.

Focus group interviews in Magwi suggest that land has become a key source of conflict in the post-CPA period, largely since the influx of returnees and IDPs beginning in 2007²⁹ and exacerbated by the unequal distribution of services and the marginalization of particular communities. Political actors initiate and exploit these conflicts as a means of extending their constituencies into newly created administrative areas. The principle of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement that 'the land belongs to the people' has unleashed a struggle for power and influence, fuelling splits along tribal lines as each group seeks to defend and demarcate its own 'homeland'. The traditionally welcoming attitude towards 'foreigners'³⁰ and the ease with which they used to settle has given way to widespread suspicion regarding possible land encroachment by rival communities.

These conflicts in Magwi take diverse forms. Returnees may find their land occupied by earlier returnees or members of the host community who have taken over the land. In Nimule, for example, mainly Dinka IDPs settled on Madi land during the latter's absence. Tensions remain high despite some fruitful initiatives undertaken by the state and local governments to resolve the issue.³¹ In some areas, especially close to the Aswa river, Madi returnees are prevented from returning from Uganda because their land is occupied. In Nimule town, permanent structures have sometimes been erected by the occupiers of the plots, or the entire plot may have been sold to foreign businessmen, making the peaceful settlement of land disputes extremely complicated. In one instance in 2009, serious fighting erupted and one person was killed when a Madi landowner found that his land had been sold by an SPLA commander to a Somali businessman who planned to construct a petrol station.³² Frequent armed threats are reported when people try to resolve the issues peacefully, in particular when confronting IDPs from SPLA members' families. Locals perceive the relatives of soldiers to be privileged, close to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), and protected by SPLA commanders. Complicating matters, IDPs often reject the authority of the Magwi county administration, relying instead on their own chiefs and court system, as well as a special GoSS police force not drawn from the EES state police and paid directly by Juba.

Border disputes over new or pending administrative boundaries are also a source of conflict, whether at the *boma*, *payam*, county, or state level. Politicians jockeying for power mobilize along tribal and identity lines, even though the underlying grievance is almost always a lack of development and the unequal distribution of services among all groups. For example, the Ijire people, currently under the administration of Obbo *boma*, want to create their own *boma* and move it under the Torit county administration; the conflict is reportedly primarily about the lack of development and facilities in Obbo.³³

While most communities associate the creation of a new *payam* or changes to county boundaries with an increase in service delivery as well as additional administrative positions, politicians are often more interested in widening their political constituencies and exploiting natural resources. Indeed, in many cases, powerful individuals issue contracts to companies without the knowledge of the communities involved.³⁴ Several ongoing local border disputes have the potential to seriously escalate due to the number of parties involved as well as the interests at stake.

Recent reports also point to an increase in mob justice cases, many involving accusations of poisoning, in the Madi corridor of Magwi county.³⁵ Allegations of poisoning are often based on little more than hearsay; youths reportedly mobilize quickly to kill the accused and burn down their homes. For example, on 17 October 2009, a mob burned down 10 *tukuls* (huts) in Iriya village (Loa *boma*, Pageri *payam*) based on rumours that individuals were practising witchcraft. A woman was thrown into her burning *tukul*, and another couple died in the fire.³⁶ In some areas, whole villages have refused to settle on their traditional land because of the presence of a person suspected of poisoning. This complex phenomenon may be an indication of the growing dissatisfaction with the current lack of law enforcement and the absent legal system, with local youths increasingly taking matters into their own hands.³⁷

Victim profiles and gender dimensions

Youths are reportedly the primary victims of crime, with the mean age of victims across the three counties at 26.5 years. Three-quarters of the victims are under 31; roughly 10 per cent are under 16. Across all locations and ages reported, more than two-thirds (67 per cent) are men, reflective of the fact that cattle raiding and predatory armed violence are typically committed by and against men. However, focus groups reported that in recent years women have been increasingly targeted, in particular during revenge attacks. Many people interviewed agreed that this was a recent change that had significantly altered local conflict dynamics. Focus group participants in Torit and Ikotos counties said that women and girls were shot at water points, in fields while cultivating food, while collecting firewood, and when walking between villages.³⁸ They are also increasingly forced to request armed youths to escort them.³⁹ In Hyala Central village (Torit) women reported having to retreat into the house after dark for fear of attack.⁴⁰

Women also play an instrumental role in motivating and encouraging young men to go out on cattle raids. They compose songs to shame those who have not yet gone raiding or who have come back empty-handed. This behaviour increases the pressure on young men to secure the necessary heads of cattle for a dowry.⁴¹ Respondents said that educating girls to reject raided cows as part of their dowries, and to delay their marriages, would prevent violence by reducing the pressure on young boys to find large numbers of cows.⁴²

Rape and sexual assault are seldom reported (3 per cent across all counties), but anecdotal evidence suggests that they occur frequently. In Ikotos, focus groups reported at least several monthly incidents of women being raped and their food stolen when coming to the market from outside villages.⁴³ Investigation and prosecution is rare, even when the attacker is known, for fear of revenge. The SPLA reportedly also harass and sexually abuse women in areas where they are stationed, such as Nimule, where the army barracks are situated within the

settlements of the general population. In Nimule prison, where men and women are held together in one room, there are reported cases of women prisoners 'disappearing' for the night and being brought back the next morning by the police officer in charge.⁴⁴

Early pregnancy ('defilement') cases are common in Magwi, according to focus groups, ranking among the top three issues causing disputes in the county, and often inspiring revenge crimes against the accused or his family.⁴⁵ Because early pregnancy is shameful for the family concerned, disputes are often settled at the family level or with the help of a chief, unlike in Torit and Ikotos, where perpetrators can expect serious punishment. Another consequence is female school dropouts, which are reportedly very high in Magwi.⁴⁶

Domestic violence was reported across all counties, particularly in Magwi, where it accounted for 18 per cent of all reported crimes, compared to 9 per cent in Torit and 6 per cent in Ikotos. Focus groups reported that alcohol consumption by both men and women is a factor, turning house-

hold misunderstandings into violence. In Magwi, the dynamics of resettlement and reintegration of large numbers of people returning from different regions and countries with diverse experiences are also aggravating misunderstandings and conflicts between and within families.⁴⁷

Instruments: small arms and explosive remnants of war

Civilian small arms possession is an important facet of local security dynamics in EES. Because official state security providers are largely absent, or perceived as being inefficient, partial, and corrupt, many communities rely on small arms for protection and security—as well as for crime and violence. At the same time, the survey findings suggest that high levels of firearm ownership coincide with perceptions of low security and increased levels of armed crime and violence.

Almost 40 per cent (38 per cent) of the total sample reported firearm ownership within their household. This means that approximately 24,789 (± 965) households in the three counties contain at least one firearm. Reported ownership was highest in Ikotos, where 65 per cent of all households said they had a gun, compared to 53 per cent in Torit and 15 per cent in Magwi (see Figure 2). Actual ownership rates are probably much higher; interviews suggested that at least every male community member over 20 years of age owns a gun in Ikotos, with some households having as many as eight to nine guns.⁴⁸ There was a significant correlation between the level of arms ownership and crimes committed with a gun. In Ikotos, 33 per cent of all crimes were reportedly carried out with an AK-47 or similar automatic rifle, compared to 28 per cent in Torit and 11 per cent in Magwi. In Ikotos, 42 per cent of all killings were committed with an AK-47 or similar weapons; in Torit the figure was 46 per cent and in Magwi 18 per cent.

Across all three counties, 10 per cent of households surveyed reported possessing explosive remnants of war (ERW). The figures were higher in Torit (15 per cent) and Ikotos (18 per cent) than in Magwi (4 per cent). Extrapo-

lating for the entire population, this study estimates that approximately 7,000 households possess them.⁴⁹ Even though reports of ERW usage in violent incidents are infrequent, private ownership and unsafe storage of these devices is a risk factor for accidents.

Focus groups highlighted several accidents involving official stockpiles of unexploded ordnance (UXO)⁵⁰ collected by demining groups and awaiting destruction by the SPLA in Magwi county. UXOs are often kept for months or longer in official stockpiling areas, unguarded and unprotected. Besides being easily accessible to anyone in the community, they are also susceptible to fires and explosions. For example, in Lobone *payam*, Magwi county, a fire broke out and spread to an UXO stockpile in September 2009, causing an explosion that killed one person.⁵¹ In Obbo *boma*, Magwi county, a 'mentally disturbed' community member took a UXO from a stockpile in October 2009 and placed it in a fire where children were roasting sweet potatoes; the explosion killed one of the children and seriously injured another.⁵² Prompt removal and destruction of UXO stockpiles by SPLA and partner organizations, and increased sensitization of communities to the risks associated with these weapons, could reduce the frequency of these incidents.

Some local residents acquired their firearms in the post-CPA period, but most did so during the war.⁵³ In addition to active arming by the SPLA and the SAF, small arms, ammunition and ERW fell into civilian hands when garrison towns such as Torit or Pajok changed sides⁵⁴ and residents accessed abandoned supplies. Across the three counties, about 50 per cent of respondents reported that the supply of arms has decreased in the last 12 months, while 39 per cent said it has remained the same, with little significant variation in the counties. The reported ease of acquiring a weapon varied, however: 40 per cent of respondents in Ikotos reported difficulty in acquiring firearms, compared to 49 per cent of respondents in Torit and 73 per cent in Magwi.

Purchasing was the most commonly reported method of acquiring small arms (35 per cent over all areas), in particular in Ikotos (44 per cent) and

Figure 2 Firearm possession by county





Figure 3 Firearm acquisition by county



Torit (31 per cent), though less so in Magwi (24 per cent) (see Figure 3). During the war, informal commerce in small arms was common in Eastern Equatoria, with Agoro market (Ikotos county) on the Ugandan border acting as a centre for the trading of black-market arms and ammunition.⁵⁵ While this market was officially closed in 2003, cross-border arms and ammunition trade is reported to continue, though its scale is difficult to establish.⁵⁶ Focus groups in Ikotos county suggested that weapons are still acquired from Uganda in exchange for cows. Until recently, Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) troops stationed in Magwi county to pursue the LRA were also reported to sell arms and ammunitions to the local population. In addition, arms are being traded along traditional pastoralist cattle routes, in particular on the Ethiopian and Kenyan borders. The Buya seasonal movement north to Jonglei state, where they come in close contact with the Murle, is also believed to facilitate arms and ammunition flows allegedly from Khartoum to local militias.⁵⁷

Since the end of the civil war, demobilized or relocated fighters have returned to EES with their personal service weapons; sometimes they also receive new weapons as they join local police, prison, or wildlife services,

which can occur repeatedly. Many soldiers have reportedly stockpiled weapons in this way, anticipating payouts for weapons as part of CPA-mandated disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts,⁵⁸ which have already begun in EES.⁵⁹

The survey found that the SPLA was the second-most commonly reported source of firearms (29 per cent) after purchasing (35 per cent);⁶⁰ however, Magwi residents were significantly more likely to report having received their firearms from the SPLA (55 per cent) than both Torit (30 per cent) and Ikotos residents (16 per cent) (see Figure 3). This may be due to the arming of local communities in Magwi to counter the LRA in the absence of a robust police and army presence. Survey respondents said the SPLA was also the primary source of ERW (42 per cent) in Magwi (49 per cent), Torit (49 per cent), and Ikotos (34 per cent). In addition, Ikotos and Torit residents identified militia groups as significant sources of ERW and small arms (17 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively).

Focus groups reported that political patronage was a factor influencing arms flows from SPLA stocks to local communities.⁶¹ Arms provided are said to be typically recycled from stockpiles collected during civilian disarmament

campaigns,⁶² significantly reducing the legitimacy of such exercises in the eyes of local communities. Focus groups also singled out the continuous flow of ammunition from the SPLA as a key factor fuelling local cycles of violence. Poor controls and irregular salary payments for soldiers were seen as major reasons influencing SPLA members to sell their ammunition at local markets.

Impact and perceptions of small arms and light weapons

As noted, while small arms feature in violence in all three counties, they are by no means the only tool—or necessarily the dominant one—used to threaten or commit violence. In Magwi, the survey found that killings were 44 times more likely to involve a stick than an automatic rifle when compared to Torit, and 20 times more when compared to Ikotos. The majority of Magwi's population fled to Uganda during the war; the county had access to education and avoided involvement in armed conflict, and residents generally do not approve of arms carrying in public places. Even in Torit, where a strong tradition of armed violence exists, more crimes were committed without a weapon (32 per cent) than with an automatic rifle (28 per cent). The implication is that the availability of weapons should not be considered the primary cause of violence, but rather a risk and enabling factor. In the context of potential community security programmes, it also points to the necessity to focus on comprehensive programming that addresses the root causes of local violence.

Among households reporting firearm ownership, the primary reason given was village protection (77 per cent). Personal protection from gangs and criminals was the second most common response (40 per cent), followed by personal protection from wildlife (33 per cent). Variations in this response reflect differing levels of insecurity. In Torit and Ikotos, where both threats to household members and criminal victimization were reported more frequently than in Magwi, 'protection of the village' was also a more frequent reason given for gun possession.

Institutions: formal and informal security providers

Most respondents (85 per cent) reported that some kind of security institution is present in their area. The vast majority of these (90 per cent) said that traditional leaders and *boma* chiefs are their primary security providers, followed by neighbours (48 per cent) and religious leaders (38 per cent). Official security providers were at the bottom of the list: only 27 per cent said the police and 8 per cent said the SPLA were present in their area.


Recognition of certain security groups varied across the three counties: Magwi county respondents reported a stronger police presence (32 per cent) than both Ikotos (18 per cent) and Torit (28 per cent). Conversely, in Ikotos and Torit, 'neighbours' were more often reported (52 per cent and 56 per cent, respectively) than in Magwi (41 per cent). These differences were statistically significant.

Given the negligible presence of official state security providers, the majority of crimes and disputes continue to be reported to traditional authorities. Indeed, 59 per cent of all respondents said they would report a crime to traditional authorities first; 16 per cent would inform the nearest family member; and only 11 per cent would report a crime to the police. The differences in these responses across counties were small. In places where both police and traditional authorities were present, 43 per cent would still report a crime to the traditional authorities, compared to 32 per cent who would go to the police.

Traditional authorities

Focus group interviews revealed that despite their continued presence, traditional authorities have been severely weakened by the civil war, the proliferation of small arms in civilian hands, the breakdown of traditional community relations, and the transition from traditional to modern state authority. Indeed, some chiefs in power today are not traditional leaders but appointees installed by the SPLA (or the Government of Sudan during the war) to control and extract resources, and they lack legitimacy in the eyes of local communities. At the same time, some youths believe that chiefs are an

Figure 4 Ranking police and traditional leaders' approach to crime



obstacle to modernization and democratization of the state, and that the government should involve the youth more.⁶³ In fact, some villages have recently elected relatively young chiefs, but their authority and legitimacy remains questionable to some villagers.⁶⁴

Widespread gun ownership and use among local youths has also contributed to the erosion of traditional authority. There are reports of chiefs hesitating to expose criminals to the authorities or even actively cooperating with them for fear of retaliation.⁶⁵ Some chiefs have even been attacked and shot, something that was unthinkable in years past. Key informants highlighted the need to protect chiefs and establish collective decision-making and local conflict resolution processes.⁶⁶

There is also considerable confusion today over the applicability of traditional and modern authority and justice systems; while traditional authorities have faded, state authority has not effectively filled their place. Whereas chiefs used to be able to judge on all cases during the war, whether civilian or criminal, they now rule only on local disputes, investigating criminal cases in conjunction with police, and referring the most serious cases to the formal county or state courts. Cooperation between chiefs and police is often fraught with problems, as police officers are perceived to be incompetent or corrupt, even setting suspects free in exchange for small bribes.⁶⁷

Exacerbating matters, the formal court system, especially at the county and state level, is not sufficiently developed, so the most serious cases are often delayed considerably. This invites revenge killings as impatient victims take justice into their own hands. The increasing numbers of mob justice cases over allegations of witchcraft, poisoning, and other crimes in Magwi county (see Box 2) is, according to several key informants, a result of growing dissatisfaction with the prevailing justice system and a lack of law enforcement in the state.⁶⁸

The police and the SPLA

When asked to rank the police on a scale of 0 to 4 in terms of trust, efficiency, accessibility, familiarity, and transparency regarding their approach to crimes and disputes, respondents ranked them far below traditional authorities in areas where both are present (see Figure 4). Similarly, focus groups cited a lack of impartiality, corruption, and criminal involvement as some of the reasons for their low opinion of both the police and the SPLA. For example, when police are trucked in to respond to a specific security threat, respondents suggested that certain villages receive preferential coverage and others none, depending on local connections to high-level commanders or politicians. In other cases, residents claimed that unjustified force and punishments are applied.⁶⁹ Focus group interviewees also said

that the police are often too weak or easily overpowered by local armed communities. In Torit county, police allegedly fear confronting cattle raiders, for example, and thus do not investigate cases thoroughly, unless backed up by the SPLA.⁷⁰ While the official security forces are sometimes successful in recovering stolen cattle, known culprits are often left alone, exacerbating what interviewees characterized as endemic lawlessness, lack of follow-up and commitment, and weak governance.⁷¹

Like elsewhere in Southern Sudan, local police in the three counties are primarily former SPLA soldiers who demobilized following the signing of the CPA. Five years later, they still lack transport, communications equipment, arms, and ammunition, as well as trained manpower, and thus remain ill-equipped to face the security challenges in the state.⁷² The Torit police commissioner estimates that there should be 2,000 police officers per state, with around 120 officers deployed in every county.⁷³ In practice, police officers tend to stay close to urban centres, however, mainly because rural areas lack accommodation, food, and transport.⁷⁴ In Ikotos county, for example, there is a total of 100 police officers, of whom 50 are based in Ikotos Central.

Despite the current poor reputation of the police, interviewees revealed that they would welcome better equipped, trained, and more easily accessible and strategically located police as their security provider.⁷⁵

Interviewees said that they fear the SPLA, which currently provides security in some areas. Grievances against the army include the rape and sexual harassment of local women and the extortion of communities' natural resources (such as timber). In a recent incident in Khor Engliz on the Juba–Torit road, a civilian challenged an SPLA soldier cutting down trees, who apprehended the challenger. The arrest sparked the mobilization of the entire village, heavily armed, against the nearby SPLA barracks. A violent clash was avoided only by calling in the local authorities, who prevented the army from attacking.⁷⁶ The SPLA reportedly also reminds people of the civil war, and thus has a limited capacity to resolve disputes or deal with criminal incidents in an impartial manner.⁷⁷

In the absence of any official security provider in many areas, youths currently take over the task of protecting local villages and enforcing the law. While traditional structures such as the *monyomiji* used to have clear rules of engagement, as well as responsibilities for protecting villages, it is perhaps not surprising that in the current security vacuum, traditional structures are also being used for criminal purposes.⁷⁸ This situation points to the urgent need to find interim security solutions that focus on communities' security needs, while integrating both traditional and modern systems and focusing on mutual trust and a division of responsibilities.


Disarmament

While the SPLA and the GoSS remain committed to civilian disarmament, in the current security vacuum the issue is particularly sensitive. Without a guarantee of security after guns are collected, disarmed communities are vulnerable to attacks from neighbouring and cross-border communities. Uneven disarmament of competing communities also incentivizes rearmament. In Torit and Ikotos, communities disarmed in 2009 were reportedly left

unprotected and fell victim to attacks by neighbouring tribes, resulting in them losing their livestock, and turning them further against the state authorities.⁷⁹ Moreover, even government officials acknowledge that the previous campaign yielded only limited results, with most people handing over old, non-functioning guns while hiding serviceable ones in their homes or remote areas.⁸⁰

Nevertheless, survey findings suggest a favourable attitude towards disarmament, with around 68 per cent of the total sample reporting a willingness to give up firearms and a majority of 63 per cent anticipating that future disarmament would very much increase household security. Magwi respondents (71 per cent) were significantly more likely to say they would comply with disarmament than both Torit (63 per cent) and Ikotos respondents (66 per cent) and much less likely to hide some or all of their firearms (8 per cent, as against 26 per cent and 25 per cent for Torit and Ikotos). Ikotos (56 per cent) and Torit (59 per cent) respondents were significantly less optimistic than people in Magwi (68 per cent) about a potential significant increase in household security after a disarmament campaign in their area (see Figure 5).

Figure 5 Anticipated effect of disarmament by county



In Ikotos, where the perception of security is lowest, 42 per cent said security had worsened in the county over the past year compared to 26 per cent in Torit and only 15 per cent in Magwi. Further, 67 per cent of Ikotos respondents said they were concerned about their household members' safety, significantly more than in both Torit (54 per cent) and Magwi (48 per cent). This indicates the degree to which communities rely on guns, especially in the more insecure areas of the state; it also highlights the need for a comprehensive strategy for alternative security provision in these communities, before disarmament takes place.

In focus groups, interviewees said that disarmament should proceed by sensitizing local communities in parallel with simultaneous, voluntary arms collections, and that this should be followed by forceful disarmament if necessary. This would avoid the current problem of neighbouring villagers raiding and attacking disarmed areas.⁸¹ As disarmament is set to restart in EES, there is a small window of opportunity for community engagement to ensure it is peaceful and well-organized.

Reflections

Respondents provided a wealth of specific, well-considered recommendations for mitigating particular sources of violence and insecurity. These include educating girls to reject dowries of stolen cattle; moving swiftly to locate and restore stolen cattle before revenge attacks take place; expediting the removal and destruction of ERW; reorienting traditional clan structures such as the *monyomiji* back to their original community functions; and preventing the recirculation of guns after disarmament efforts. These are all worth pursuing. But without better governance and more development, violence is likely to continue despite these steps. Remedies must therefore address both the symptoms and the causes of insecurity.

As respondents ranked insecurity far below natural resource and development concerns—and given the linkages between violence, cattle, and land issues—it is clear that redressing the marginalization of these communities would reduce the incentives and motivations for violence. Currently, GoSS institutions (at the Juba and state

level) are failing to do this, or are part of the problem—as when local power-brokers get involved in land disputes for personal gain.

Moreover, local government institutions are seriously understaffed and underfunded, without the infrastructure, transport, equipment, or manpower to deliver even the most elementary services. Investment and capacity building in local institutions that can respond to communities' needs is therefore desperately needed and should be an essential part of any effort to tackle insecurity and underdevelopment.

Ultimately, reducing violence and insecurity—both real and perceived—requires eliminating the culture of impunity with which crimes are committed. It is difficult to see how that shift can take place without a more visible and capable law enforcement presence. Deployment is currently limited to towns, while rural areas are devoid of police. Police posts along major cattle and trading routes, and on well-known escape routes, are also lacking. A joint initiative for a 'rapid reaction force' by the Torit county commissioner, the SSRRC, and the police is an innovative starting point.⁸² The periodic rotation of security forces would also help prevent the formation of long-term patronage networks and limit corruption, bias, and profiteering.

Building up the capacity of the police to anticipate and prevent crime and enforce the law is an even greater challenge than their increased deployment. The police force urgently needs not only adequate equipment, transport, and communication facilities, but also training in global standards in law enforcement, conflict prevention, weapons use, and respect for human rights. Support is also needed for the court systems, both official and customary, which are currently incapable of providing justice and compensation to victims or holding perpetrators to account.

These are long-term challenges. In the meantime, the responsibility for village and household security remains in the hands of community members. Supporting communities to exchange information, identify and attempt to preempt conflicts, and liaise more closely with the police would help to provide an important stopgap until state services improve. In fact, supporting 'ground-up' community security efforts could have a positive impact

on community-police relations and ultimately on the effectiveness of local policing. The inclusion of parallel conflict management and local peace and reconciliation initiatives could also help ensure that 'community security' does not become a synonym for vigilantism.

As has been documented in other areas of Southern Sudan, the communities in the three counties viewed the rule of the gun as one forced upon them by necessity. In most cases they expressed a great willingness to give up their weapons if the army and the state government provided security. But even recently, and despite the wider intention of both the army and the GoSS to disarm Southern civilians, the SPLA was arming EES communities against external threats, an implicit admission of its inability to protect them.

Selective civilian disarmament will soon restart in EES. To avoid the bloodshed and community predation that disarmament has caused elsewhere, it should be simultaneous, include meaningful security guarantees, and draw on local community initiatives and civil society networks. Without the latter, the SPLA—which will conduct the disarmament—will not have an adequate understanding of local security dynamics and potential conflicts. Initiatives such as the Eastern Equatoria Action Network on Small Arms, engaged in building a civil society network for sensitization and awareness on small arms, are important.⁸³ Initial reports from ongoing disarmament exercises in Jonglei seem to suggest that similar organizations play a pivotal role in community sensitization and awareness raising both before and during campaigns.

Perhaps the most striking and worrisome finding of this survey was the constantly repeated view that communities had been abandoned by their state, their police, and the Juba government. After decades of war, the CPA has not addressed the profound sense of marginalization among these communities. With the approach of national elections and the close of the interim period in 2011, Eastern Equatorians continue to face chronic underdevelopment, natural resource competition, and pervasive insecurity—indicators of some of the deep internal challenges a newly independent Southern Sudan may face in the future. ■

Notes

This Issue Brief was produced by Irina Mosel and Ryan Murray, based on the 2009 Small Arms Survey–Danish Demining Group Eastern Equatoria Security Perceptions Survey.

- 1 Households in each of the *payams* (administrative districts) of the three counties were surveyed, with the exception of Himodonge *payam* in Torit county.
- 2 This *Issue Brief* presents the survey results using the ‘armed violence lens’ of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee. See OECD (2009).
- 3 Munyes (2007, p. 7). See also Mc Evoy and Murray (2008, pp. 12–21).
- 4 Mc Evoy and Murray (2008, p. 12).
- 5 EES (2007, p. 14).
- 6 EES (2007, pp. 12–13).
- 7 McEvoy and Murray (2008, p. 17).
- 8 Schomerus (2007, pp. 10, 18).
- 9 Schomerus (2007, p. 21).
- 10 Previously, in 2008, the Small Arms Survey had conducted a household survey of selected communities in Eastern Equatoria and Turkana North district in northern Kenya. See McEvoy and Murray (2008).
- 11 Because households were usually situated along a main artery or in a concentrated block, random selection was limited to prevent enumerators from travelling down roads with no households.
- 12 Every Nth household was determined by dividing the total population size of the *boma* by the number of questionnaires needed in the specific *boma*. The former figure was calculated from SSRRC population data, and the latter from the population data and the total sample size.
- 13 Error was defined as the presence of a missing or invalid response (that is, a response that was illegible, incoherent, or did not adhere to the response option limitations of the particular question).
- 14 Interview with police major, Torit county police station, 18 January 2010.
- 15 Interview with United Nations Mission in Sudan official, Torit, 18 January 2010.
- 16 Interview with Torit county commissioner, Torit, 15 January 2010.
- 17 Interview with church official, Diocese of Torit, Isoke *payam*, Ikotos county, 23 January 2010; see also Eaton (2008) for the importance of the dynamics surrounding revenge attacks.
- 18 Interviews with international non-governmental organization (INGO) and church officials, Isoke *payam*, Ikotos county, 23 January 2010.
- 19 Traditionally, the Buya and the Didinga used to raid villages in Hyala *payam*, but attacks between neighbouring villages within the *payam* were less common. See Ochan (2007).
- 20 Focus group discussions with women and youths in Hyala *payam*, Torit county, 16 January 2010.
- 21 Focus group discussion with women Peace Committee members, Ikotos Central, Ikotos, 24 January 2010.
- 22 Interviews with INGO and UN representatives, Torit and Ikotos counties, 15–25 January 2010.
- 23 Interviews with women, Hyala *payam*, Torit county, 16 January 2010.
- 24 Focus group discussions across Torit and Ikotos counties, 15–25 January 2010.
- 25 Interviews with women and youths, Ikotos county, 20–24 January 2010.
- 26 Interview with INGO official, Isoke *payam*, Ikotos county, 23 January 2010.
- 27 The LRA assembled in Owiny-Kibul in late 2006 as a Juba-sponsored peace process got under way. After LRA leader Joseph Kony failed to sign a Final Peace Agreement several times, the peace process fell apart. See Schomerus (2007, pp. 34–39).
- 28 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) documented almost 53,000 officially assisted returnees to the area by March 2010. Email correspondence with UNHCR official, Nimule, 27 March 2010. The actual number is likely to be much higher.
- 29 Interview with Magwi county commissioner, Magwi, 22 January 2010.
- 30 Locally, members of other communities are seen as ‘foreigners’.
- 31 The ‘Nimule Resolution’ of January 2009, the outcome statement of a conference organized by both EES and Jonglei state governments, stipulates that the return of IDPs should be facilitated from Jonglei back to their home communities with their cattle; those preferring to stay in EES are expected to agree to integrate into the local community, lose their cattle, and abide by the regulations of the local administration.
- 32 Vuni (2009).
- 33 Interviews with state officials, youth groups, and civil society leaders, Magwi county, 21–22 January 2010.
- 34 Interview with INGO staff, Juba, 14 January 2010.
- 35 Interview with state officials, youth groups, and civil society leaders, Magwi county, 21 January 2010; interview with church official, Diocese of Torit, Torit, 25 January 2010.
- 36 See Eastern Equatoria Today (2010).
- 37 Interview with church official, Diocese of Torit, Torit, 25 January 2010.
- 38 Focus group discussions with women across Torit and Ikotos counties, 16–25 January 2010.
- 39 Interview with INGO representative, Isoke *payam*, Ikotos county, 23 January 2010.
- 40 Focus group discussions with women in Hyala Central, Torit county, 16 January 2010.
- 41 See Ochan (2007, p. 14) for examples in Ikotos.
- 42 Interview with SSRRC state director, Torit county, on 18 January 2010.
- 43 Interview with *boma* chief, Ikotos Central, 24 January 2010.
- 44 Interview with key informant, Magwi county, 21 January 2010.
- 45 Interview with paramount chief, Magwi county, 19 January 2010.
- 46 Interview with Pajok *payam* administrator, 20 January 2010. A recent International Rescue Committee protection report finds that early pregnancies are the primary cause of girls not graduating from school in EES, where marital life often starts as early as age 14 (IRC, 2010, p. 2).
- 47 Interview with chairlady of St. Monica Women’s Association, Magwi county, 19 January 2010.
- 48 Interview with a youth, Ikotos county, 23 January 2010.
- 49 The precise survey findings indicate that 6,909 ($\pm 1,340$) households may harbour ERW.
- 50 UXOs typically include ERW as well as other forms of ordnance—such as bullets—found in conflict zones.
- 51 Interview with paramount chief, Magwi county, 19 January 2010.
- 52 The accused was subsequently jailed for the incident. Interview with Magwi county commissioner, Magwi, 22 January 2010.
- 53 Interviews with government officials, Torit county, 15 January 2010; see also, Schomerus (2008, p. 49) and Mc Evoy and Murray (2008, p. 19).
- 54 For example, places such as Palotaka in Magwi county have been used as SAF, SPLA, and UPDF as well as LRA headquarters over the past decade, leaving a legacy of arms and ammunitions in the hands of the civilians in the area.
- 55 Schomerus (2008, p. 50).
- 56 See also, Lewis (2009, p. 54).
- 57 Interview with UN Mission in Sudan official, Torit, 18 January 2010.
- 58 Interview with government officials, Torit and Magwi counties, 15–21 January 2010.
- 59 The DDR caseload for EES is expected to be 2,300. Interview with EES DDR bureau officials, 18 January 2010.
- 60 Note that some of the weapons declared as ‘purchased’ may also have been sourced from the SPLA.
- 61 Some of the arms come from successful cattle raids. Interviews with traditional leaders and youths in Torit and Ikotos counties, 15–25 January 2010.
- 62 For details on recent civilian disarmament campaigns in Southern Sudan, see O’Brien (2009).
- 63 Interview with key informants among local youths and civil society, Magwi town, 21 January 2010.
- 64 Field observation by Irina Mosel, January 2010.
- 65 Interviews with county and state government officials, Torit and Ikotos counties, January 2010.
- 66 Interview with Torit county commissioner, Torit, 15 January 2010.
- 67 In Magwi, two formally appointed county judges reportedly left their posts after two months because of a lack of cases. Local police allegedly preferred to solve cases themselves through bribery. Interview with key informants in Magwi town, 21 January 2010.
- 68 Interviews with church official, Torit town, and key informants, Magwi county, 21 January 2010.
- 69 Interviews with youths and authorities in Ikotos county, 14–25 January 2010.
- 70 Interview with a police major, Torit county police station, 18 January 2010.
- 71 Interview with the governor of Eastern Equatoria state, 18 January 2010.

- 72 Interviews with government and police officials, Torit, Magwi, and Ikotos counties, 15–25 January 2010.
- 73 Interview with Torit state police commissioner, Torit, 25 January 2010.
- 74 In Hyala *payam*, Torit county, for example, it was reported that all four recently deployed policemen were based in Torit town because of a lack of food resulting from the ongoing drought.
- 75 Interviews across Magwi, Torit, and Ikotos counties, 14–25 January 2010.
- 76 Interview with community security and small arms control official, Torit, 25 January 2010.
- 77 For an account of the complex relationship between Equatorians and the SPLA during the civil war, see Schomerus (2008, pp. 20–22).
- 78 See, for example, Monyomiji (n.d.) on the outcomes of a conference held in Torit in November 2009 on ‘Engaging the Monyomiji’.
- 79 In Bur, Torit county, for example, some have decided not to participate in the 2010 elections because they perceived the 2009 disarmament campaign as partial and politically motivated.
- 80 Interviews with state government officials, Torit, 18 January 2010.
- 81 Interview with security adviser to the governor, Eastern Equatoria state, Torit, 18 January 2010.
- 82 Though still operating on a very limited scale, police units stationed in some *payams*

have been equipped with mobile satellite telephones and are linked with a ‘quick reaction unit’ at the police headquarters in Torit, which is sent out immediately after notice of a livestock theft has been received. Interview with Torit county commissioner, Torit, 15 January 2010.

83 Interview with UN official, Torit, 18 January 2010.

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HSBA project summary

The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) is a multi-year project administered by the Small Arms Survey. It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and a wide array of international and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely empirical research the project supports violence reduction initiatives, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes; incentive schemes for civilian arms collection; and security sector reform and arms control interventions across Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy-relevant advice on redressing insecurity.

Sudan *Issue Briefs* are designed to provide periodic snapshots of baseline information in a timely and reader-friendly format. The HSBA also generates a series of longer and more detailed *Working Papers* in English and Arabic, available at www.smallarmssurveysudan.org.

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