Under Attack and Above Scrutiny?

Arms and Ammunition Diversion from Peacekeepers in Sudan and South Sudan, 2002–14

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NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey

First published in July 2015

Small Arms Survey
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland

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Printed by nbmedia in Geneva, Switzerland

ISBN 978-2-940548-11-8

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Preface

Over the past 16 years the Small Arms Survey has studied the diversion of weapons from both state stockpiles and international transfers. This Working Paper is part of a concerted effort to systematically collect and assemble information on the seizure of weapons from peace operations, previously recorded only anecdotally. It recognizes peacekeeping's history and potential, as well as the myriad challenges peacekeepers face on the ground. This work sheds light on the prevalence and circumstances of diversion, thus raising awareness about the phenomenon. The study is a continuation of the Survey's research agenda on limiting the diversion of small arms in all its forms, a key concern the Arms Trade Treaty is meant to address.

The paper's intended audience includes the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and other actors that authorize peace operations; troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs, respectively) participating in such missions; governments helping to finance and otherwise support these initiatives; and actors involved in arms control. Organizations and countries undertaking peace operations will find relevant information on an issue that is too often overlooked. The study aims to provide insights into the diversion process and tools to increase the efficiency of undertakings to reduce and help prevent it.

This investigation has benefitted from inputs from its target audiences. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) and the Department of Field Support were fully briefed throughout the data-gathering process. They acknowledged the importance of this research agenda, noting that it shed light on issues that have not been adequately explored in the past and eventually could contribute to the enhanced performance and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. They also provided meaningful feedback within their capacities. The AU Peace and Security Department, which was formally engaged only towards the end of the research phase, has expressed interest in the project and a willingness to explore possible cooperation on subsequent studies. Three peacekeeping training centres in Africa introduced this subject into courses

that they run for civilian and military officials. Several governments asked for or agreed to host briefings on the research project, including one in New York for military advisers at permanent missions to the UN.

The Survey understands the sensitive nature of a report of this kind. While there is a stated willingness among decision makers and practitioners to support this research, there were significant challenges to collecting facts and figures. UN DPKO explained it could not provide information on security incidents involving troops and police provided by member states beyond what was already in the public domain, due to security reasons and existing confidentiality agreements between the UN and TCCs and PCCs. Data from other sources was likewise difficult to come by. Many officials from TCCs and PCCs were contacted in the course of this study and given an opportunity to shed additional light on incidents in which their personnel came under attack. Few chose to do so. Despite the effort made to establish the scale and scope of the problem and the large number of notable incidents of diversion provided, the study almost certainly undercounts the losses incurred—possibly substantially so.

This is the first output in a multi-year project the Survey has planned. The focus is Sudan and South Sudan, not because they were necessarily the most problematic contexts, but due to our long-standing Human Security Baseline Assessment project in the two countries. Ongoing research conducted in the course of this investigation shows that what has occurred in peace operations in Sudan and South Sudan has happened in numerous other missions across the globe. The focus is on AU and UN missions because these two organizations authorized the largest missions in these countries, not because they necessarily present the biggest problems. Other bodies—such as NATO—have also experienced the loss of weapons and ammunition in operations they undertake—sometimes on a large scale.

The Survey is grateful for the assistance it received and looks forward to working with other stakeholders to better understand and address the question of the diversion of materiel from peace operations in the months and years to come.

Eric G. Berman
Managing Director, Small Arms Survey
Geneva, June 2015

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ABC	Abyei Boundaries Commission
AMIB	AU Mission in Burundi
AMIS	AU Mission in the Sudan
AMIS II-E	AMIS II-Enhanced
AMISOM	AU Mission in Somalia
APC	Armoured personnel carrier
AU	African Union
AUHIP	AU High-Level Implementation Panel
Cat.	Category
CFC	Ceasefire Commission
CivPol	Civilian police
COE	Contingent-owned equipment
COH	Cessation of Hostilities (Agreement)
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPMT	Civilian Protection Monitoring Team
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	(UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EDF	Equatoria Defence Force
EU	European Union
FC	Force commander
FPU	Formed police unit
GoS	Government of Sudan
GPMG	General-purpose machine gun
HCFA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
HQ	Headquarters
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HSBA	Human Security Baseline Assessment

ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally displaced person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JMC	Joint Military Commission
JTC	Joint Technical Committee
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
MilOb	Military observer
MVM	(IGAD) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism
MVT	Monitoring and Verification Team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMRD	National Movement for Reconciliation and Development
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OIOS	(UN) Office of Internal Oversight Services
PAE	Pacific Architects and Engineers
PCA	Permanent Court of Arbitration
PCC	Police-contributing country
PDF	Protection and Deterrence Force
PK	Peacekeeper
PSC	(AU) Peace and Security Council
PSSM	Physical security and stockpile management
ROE	Rules of engagement
RPG	Rocket-propelled grenade (launcher or round)
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SLA-AW	Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid
SLA-MM	Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A-N	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Forces
SSDM/A	South Sudan Defence Movement/Army
SSIG	South Sudan Independents Group
SSIM	South Sudanese Independence Movement
TCC	Troop-contributing country

UN	United Nations
UNAMID	AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNISFA	UN Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMEM	UN Military Expert on Mission
UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNPOL	UN Police
VMT	(IGAD) Verification and Monitoring Team

Introduction and key findings

In December 2014 more than one in four uniformed personnel serving in the 16 current UN peacekeeping operations was deployed in South Sudan or Sudan. This figure represents more than 30,000 Blue Helmets—as military or police personnel serving in UN peacekeeping operations are frequently called.[1] Since 2004 more than a quarter of a million police and military personnel from more than 100 states have served in UN and African Union (AU) missions in these two countries. Conducting peace operations, no matter how they are defined, is no easy task—and too often a thankless one. This Working Paper uses 'peace operations' as an umbrella term,[2] but refers to military and police personnel serving in them as 'peacekeepers'. The men and women in uniform who participate in peace operations do so often at great personal risk. Many put themselves in harm's way and make the ultimate sacrifice in conflict zones far from home. More than 200 peacekeepers have died (and many more have been shot and wounded) while serving in just 4 of the 11 peacekeeping missions authorized in Sudan and South Sudan.[3]

This paper reviews the numerous peace operations undertaken in these two countries since 2002. It concentrates on those the AU and UN have authorized, but takes note of four other missions as well. As in other similar types of undertakings, peacekeepers in Sudan and South Sudan have operated in often-unstable environments and in inhospitable terrain where there was little or no peace to keep. These peacekeepers have lost arms and ammunition, given the nature of their work, often being in the 'wrong place at the wrong time' and carrying out their duties ably and professionally.

This study seeks to document the scale and scope of losses of arms and ammunition from peacekeepers in missions in Sudan and South Sudan. It builds on research the Small Arms Survey has undertaken over the past ten years on arms proliferation and arms holdings in these two countries as part of its Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) project.[4] Several HSBA studies have touched on materiel losses from peacekeepers, but until now this has never been

a priority focus. This paper is undertaken with respect for the important role peacekeeping plays in supporting international peace and security and in providing space for the delivery of crucial humanitarian assistance. It seeks to support peacekeeping to be more effective by examining the little-studied issue of the diversion of weapons and ammunition from peace operations (see Berman and Racovita, 2013). The diversion of other materiel such as communications equipment, uniforms, and vehicles can also have negative effects on force protection, and can empower non-state armed groups. Losses of such non-lethal equipment are not insignificant.[5] While recognizing their importance, these losses are not covered here.

Labels and definitions of diversion vary greatly and the lack of specificity or clarity obfuscates the nature and extent of such incidents. Some organizations focus specifically on the type of equipment diverted, giving preference to weapons, without including ammunition or parts. Others define this phenomenon by whether it occurs in the context of stockpile mismanagement or international transfers of weapons. For the purpose of this paper, diversion is defined as 'the unauthorized change in possession or end use of authorized weapons, ammunition, parts, or explosives originating in holdings or transfers, both domestically or internationally'. This definition is comprehensive because it refers to a variety of military equipment involved, and covers both transfer and stockpile diversion.

The study explores the circumstances of diversion from peace operations to learn if it is possible to reduce the number or gravity of such incidents. At its heart, it addresses two questions: first, how many small arms and how much ammunition have peacekeepers in Sudan and South Sudan lost while on mission? Second, are losses of materiel (and of peacekeepers themselves) an unfortunate but unavoidable byproduct of the 'cost of doing business' inherent in accepting often very challenging mandates and operating in difficult environments?

The paper is organized into three parts. Experts on Sudan and South Sudan; on peace operations, force generation, and doctrine; or on the illicit proliferation of small arms may wish to gloss over or skip one or more sub-sections in Part I. These passages were written with a generalist audience in mind. For example, regular readers of HSBA publications and web-based offerings[6] will probably be familiar with the short historical overviews offered of several of the conflicts within one or between both of the two countries in question.

Part I includes background information to provide necessary context and consists of four sections. The first examines many of the underlying armed conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan. The second reviews 11 peace operations in the two countries. The third takes note of the troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs, respectively) and their weapons. The fourth explores how armed groups acquire arms and ammunition, and how licit materiel gets diverted and becomes illicit.

Part II focuses on the diversion of materiel and has two sections. The first lists examples of relevant factors that complicated many missions in Sudan and South Sudan. It examines the strategic, operational, and tactical challenges missions and peacekeepers face, which can affect the risk and incidence of diversion. The second focuses on incidents of diversion. It looks at attacks on peacekeepers and addresses small-scale losses. Its primary aim, however, is to shed light on notable incidents and provides detail and context for many of the 20-plus larger-scale events covered in the dataset.

Part III includes a series of observations on the scale and scope of diversion and identifies areas for further research and engagement. Incidents of diversion in peace operations are not limited to those in Sudan and South Sudan. The focus on missions in these two countries stemmed from work previously undertaken and not because losses incurred from these undertakings were considered to be particularly problematic. Additional case studies are warranted to determine if what happened in Sudan and South Sudan represents an outlier or the norm. This is one of the ten suggested next steps, which are not meant to be exhaustive. Chief among the report's findings are:

- There were more than 100 attacks on peacekeepers in Sudan and South Sudan between 2005 and 2014, not including carjackings and household robberies. At least half of these attacks resulted in the loss of arms and ammunition. The vast majority of the attacks took place in the Darfur region.
- Between 2005 and 2014 there have been at least 20 notable incidents in which at least 10 arms or 500 rounds of ammunition in possession of or destined for peacekeepers in Sudan and South Sudan have been diverted. Seizures of this materiel have occurred both at fixed sites (e.g. mission bases and observation posts) and during transit (e.g. patrols and convoys).

- As a result of the 20-plus notable incidents documented, more than 750,000 rounds of ammunition were likely seized. This includes ammunition for pistols, assault rifles, and machine guns. Peacekeepers have also lost sizable numbers of grenades, rockets, and mortars.
- More than 500 weapons were likely diverted from notable incidents alone. These include pistols, assault rifles, machine guns (including heavy machine guns), grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons, and mortars.
- The Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset documented some 40 cases of 'small-scale' diversion, which, though not described in detail in this report, can add up to meaningful losses.
- The diversion of arms and ammunition from peacekeepers is severely undercounted due to the lack of transparency in reporting losses incurred and suboptimal record keeping of contingent-owned equipment.
- The oversight and reporting of arms and ammunition that peacekeepers recover from various armed actors in the mission area are often lax and can lead to recirculation and inappropriate use. Materiel may, for example, be returned to the person or group from which it was taken, given to a recognized tribal authority, or retained by a TCC for safe keeping. Rarely are such munitions destroyed. (This laissez-faire approach is apparently not limited to the missions covered in this study.)
- While losses from peacekeepers cannot be completely prevented, given the challenging nature of the work undertaken, progress can be made to reduce the incidence of loss through enhanced training, better equipment, fuller accounting, and stronger political will.

Part I: Background

Conflicts

To understand the deployment and functioning of peace operations, the paper begins with a background description of the main conflicts in what are today Sudan and South Sudan, their causes, and evolution.[7] Not every armed struggle or armed group is listed, and neither is every geographical area. In the interest of brevity and for the general purpose of providing a useful background for the narrative on peace operations, this section broadly describes the main conflicts in three geographic regions or broad political settings. It begins with the conflict in Darfur, which later saw the first large-scale peacekeeping deployment, and then explores the 'North–South' and 'intra–South' conflicts. The paper acknowledges that the labels 'North–South' and 'intra-South' do not fully account for the diversity and multiplicity on the ground, and uses them only as generic markers rather than strict boundaries. For the sake of consistency, places are described by present-day names for countries (two: Sudan and South Sudan) and the current states in these countries as of December 2014 (28: 10 and 18, respectively), with the disputed territory of Abyei also highlighted (see Map 1). Since January 2005 there have been three changes to the number of states in Sudan and South Sudan, as well as changes to state names and borders (see Annexe C).[8]

The conflict in Darfur

Western Sudan has been home to disadvantaged ethnic groups for generations. The three principal peoples of this region are the Fur, the Masalit, and the Zaghawa. Generally speaking, the region is widely known as 'Darfur'—literally the 'Realm of the Fur' (see Map 1). In the past a series of sultans effectively ruled this large territory (roughly the size of Spain or Thailand) and its peoples for hundreds of years with no connection to rulers in Khartoum other than to ward off efforts at subjugation. Tensions between many peoples from the region

and the central government have existed since Sudan's independence in 1956. Grievances have centred on political marginalization, underdevelopment, and a tendency of the central government to resort to violent suppression—directly and through proxy forces. Arms flows from Libya to support various sides in the 1965–79 Chadian civil war and migrations of people, including combatants, also contributed to incidents of armed violence and political instability (e.g. see Tanner and Tubiana, 2007, pp. 13–19.)

This tense situation took a turn for the worse in April 2003. Prior to that, in 2001, Fur and Zaghawa activists and military leaders joined in common cause against the government in Khartoum. The group, which later called itself the Darfur Liberation Front and soon thereafter the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), undertook training during 2001 and had attacked government positions by 2002 (see Flint and de Waal, 2005, pp. 76–81; Tanner and Tubiana, 2007, pp. 17–22). In April 2003 the SLA, together with a second Darfur-based armed group calling itself the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), attacked the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) at an airbase in al Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. SAF managed to repel the rebel force, but not before it lost some half a dozen military aircraft and 100 men (Anderson, 2004).[9] SAF's loss of aircraft was unprecedented and the rebels gained a large amount of materiel and followers, as well as adherents (Flint and de Waal, 2005, p. 100).

Khartoum's response to the attack on the airbase in al Fasher was particularly swift and severe. The government undertook sustained military operations on the ground and by air against communities it believed to be sympathetic to the rebels. According to a Chadian Red Cross official, in January 2004 Sudanese aircraft were dropping bombs on civilian positions almost daily (IRIN, 2004). Entire villages were razed, while rape was widespread (see Amnesty International, 2004). The government also armed ethnic groups it believed to be loyal. These herdsmen became popularly known as the 'janjaweed'.[10] Most, but not all, were of Sudanese Arab tribal origin. Amnesty International (2004, p. 4) summed up the effect of these ground and air attacks succinctly:

> *men are killed, women are raped and villagers are forcibly displaced from their homes which are burnt; their crops and cattle, their main means of subsistence are burnt or looted.*


Map 1 **Sudan and South Sudan**
EGYPT
Red Sea
RED SEA
Port Sudan
NORTHERN
Dongola
NILE
Ed Damer
CHAD
NORTH DARFUR
SUDAN
KHARTOUM
Khartoum
KASSALA
Kassala
ERITREA
NORTH KORDOFAN
Wadi Medani
GEZIRA
Gedaref
GEDAREF
WEST DARFUR
Al Geneina
Al Fashir


Zalingei
CENTRAL DARFUR
Nyala
SOUTH DARFUR
El Daein
EAST DARFUR
WEST KORDOFAN
El Fula
El Obeid
SOUTH KORDOFAN
Kadugli
Rabak
WHITE NILE
Singa
SENNAR
Ed Damazin
BLUE NILE
UPPER NILE
Abyei
Abyei Town
NORTHERN BAHR AL GHAZAL
Aweil
Malakal
Bentiu
UNITY
Kwajok
WESTERN BAHR AL GHAZAL
Wau
WARRAP
JONGLEI
Rumbek
LAKES
Bor
SOUTH SUDAN
WESTERN EQUATORIA
Juba
EASTERN EQUATORIA
Yambio
CENTRAL EQUATORIA
Torit
ETHIOPIA
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
UGANDA
KENYA
International boundary
State boundary
Abyei
National capital
State capital
0 km 200

In April 2008 Human Rights Watch reported that, five years into the conflict, government armed forces and 'janjaweed' militias had

> *burned and destroyed hundreds of villages, caused tens of thousands of civilian deaths, displaced millions of people, and raped and assaulted thousands of women and girls* (HRW, 2008).

Rebel groups in Darfur have multiplied and split since the conflict broke out. Initially there were two main rebel groups in the region: JEM and the SLA. In 2004 a third group called the National Movement for Reconciliation and Development (NMRD)—an offshoot of JEM—gained prominence for a time. By the time of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006 the SLA had split into two large factions: one led by Abdul Wahid, a Fur (SLA-AW), the other by Minni Minawi, a Zaghawa (SLA-MM);[11] and several smaller ones (e.g. the Group of 19). By 2008 the two initial Darfurian non-state armed groups active against the government had splintered into some two dozen groups (HRW, 2008).

Numerous international mediation efforts to broker an end to the conflict have one thing in common: lack of success. After the initial ceasefire was concluded in N'Djamena in 2004, negotiations between the government in Khartoum and various Darfur rebel groups were convened in numerous locales (e.g. in Abuja in 2004–06, resulting in the DPA; Arusha in 2007; and Tripoli in 2007), before Doha became the main venue for sustained dialogue, beginning in 2009. The 'Doha Process' resulted in a new ceasefire agreement in July 2011 known as the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) between the government and the rebel group Liberation and Justice Movement. Many armed groups in Darfur refused to sign or respect the terms of the DDPD, and the leader of one faction that subsequently signed the agreement was assassinated shortly after doing so (see HSBA, 2013).

North–South conflict (including Abyei)

For most of its nationhood Sudan has experienced a devastating civil war. The First Sudanese Civil War, which pre-dated formal independence in 1956 and lasted until 1972, is believed to have claimed half a million lives. The Second Sudanese Civil War, which began in 1983, was considerably deadlier. Although there are no reliable casualty estimates, scholars suggest that there were anywhere

between 1.3 and 3 million war-related deaths, mostly civilians who succumbed to disease and starvation due to the conflict (Johnson, 2003, p. 143).

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), concluded in January 2005 between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), officially ended the Second Sudanese Civil War.[12] The CPA comprised eight protocols signed over a 30-month period beginning in July 2002. It called for a six-year transitional period culminating in a referendum on unity or independence for Southern Sudan. Despite the death in the early days of this process of John Garang, the leader of the SPLM—and its armed wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)[13]—and numerous crises both small and large, the referendum took place as envisioned, with the people of Southern Sudan opting for statehood.[14]

The creation of South Sudan failed to resolve three long-standing and deeply rooted conflicts in the North–South context. Two concerned questions of governance in the states of Blue Nile and Kordofan. A third concerned the delineation of borders for the territory of Abyei and its ultimate place within Sudan or South Sudan.[15] They are collectively frequently referred to as 'The Three Areas'. The CPA was meant to resolve all three conflicts, which are addressed in two protocols signed in May 2004. The looming creation of an independent state of South Sudan in July 2011 directly led to flare-ups of armed violence in the two states and territory. Four years later the conflicts continue in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, with the SPLA-North (SPLA-N) (see below) waging war against SAF and paramilitary forces.

Whereas the conflicts concerning Blue Nile and South Kordofan centre on governance, the conflict in Abyei ostensibly focuses on a border dispute and access to resources such as land and oil (Young, 2012). Abyei is home to two principal ethnic groups who do not get along: the resident Ngok Dinka (who are African and farmers) and the Missiriya (who are Arab nomads that transit through the area to graze their cattle each year, and largely pastoralists). Historical grievances, ongoing score settling, increasing desertification, and the politics surrounding the Abyei Protocol and the Abyei Boundary Commission all contribute to political instability and armed violence (Craze, 2011; Young, 2012). The CPA-created Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) determined the border in 2005, but Khartoum did not accept the commission's pronouncement

(in large part because it gave oil fields to South Sudan). The SPLA and Khartoum agreed to submit their dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, which delivered its ruling in 2009 and determined the northern border of the territory to be south of the one the ABC had determined. Neither party to the ruling rejected it, but the Missiriya did so vociferously. The Missiriya's nomadic lifestyle makes the determination of who is a 'resident' of the territory and then able to vote in the referendum contentious. They felt the PCA's ruling did not address their concerns.[16] This development and an impasse on determining who could vote in the referendum on the territory's future political alignment led the AU to empower a High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) to try to find a way forward.[17]

The prospects for a resolution of any of the conflicts in the Three Areas have deteriorated in recent years. The Northern-based ally of the SPLM/A, i.e. SPLM-N and its armed wing known as SPLA-N, took up arms against Khartoum in 2011 in Blue Nile and South Kordofan. It has since gained strength—and significant quantities of sophisticated small arms and light weapons in South Kordofan (see Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2013; Leff and LeBrun, 2014). In August 2011 SPLA-N joined SLA-AW and SLA-MM (the two erstwhile foes having temporarily refound common cause), together with JEM, to form the Sudan Revolutionary Front—although tensions among the groups' leaders persist. The situation in Abyei deteriorated significantly in 2011, with Khartoum attacking the territory on the ground and by air, resulting in significant death, destruction, and displacement. A ceasefire reached in June 2011 has put a lid on hostilities and prevented them from boiling over (see the next section on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei, or UNISFA), but has done little to break the political impasse.

Intra-South conflict

South Sudan is deeply fractured along ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines. Authoritative and comprehensive data on the country's demographics does not exist. Generally speaking, however, the Dinka are recognized as comprising the nation's largest ethnic group, accounting perhaps for one in three or four of South Sudan's roughly 9 million citizens. The Nuer represent the second-largest group. The remaining 30–40 per cent of the population are members of more than 60 other ethnic groups. Many ethnic groups have several clans (see

Map 2), and there are more linguistic groups than ethnic groups in South Sudan. Some form of Christianity is widely practised among South Sudanese, while animist traditions and Islam also claim many adherents.

The political landscape is fraught with intrigue. Although the CPA officially ended the long-standing conflict between 'the north and the south', it would be more accurate to describe it as ending the conflict between the National Congress Party that headed the government in Khartoum and the SPLM/A. Some political, military, and religious leaders in Southern Sudan during the two-decade armed struggle sought independence from the government in the North. Others sought greater autonomy. Still others were motivated primarily by the desire for personal aggrandizement or benefits for their clan or local communities. Khartoum, unsurprisingly, sought to support some of these leaders and their groups as a way of weakening its primary adversary; it did so effectively.

At the time of the CPA the territory that would become South Sudan was home to tens of thousands of armed men and women who were not under the control of either SAF or the SPLA. Garang integrated many, but not all, of the Anyanya II fighters that took up arms against Khartoum in 1978.[18] Some of these Anyanya II rebels joined forces with a group of fighters who broke away from Garang in 1991 (Young, 2006, p. 13). This group took the name SPLA-Nasir and later SPLA-United (Rone, 2003, p. 8). It was led by Riek Machar (a Nuer), Lam Akol (a Shilluk), and Gordon Kong (a Nuer). Machar and Kong then split from Akol in 1995, forming the South Sudanese Independence Movement (SSIM). The SSIM, the South Sudan Independents Group (SSIG), and the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF) were among the armed groups that signed the Sudan Peace Agreement in April 1997[19] (also known as the Khartoum Peace Agreement). The agreement provided the basis for the creation of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), which Machar initially led. The SSDF received support from Khartoum, but was independent of SAF.[20] It remained an important and large, if not cohesive,[21] fighting force even after Machar and Akol rejoined the SPLA in 2002 and 2003, respectively. Kong, who had split from Machar in 1999, later rejoined the SSDF (Rone, 2003, pp. 181, 276).

The Juba Declaration of January 2006[22] succeeded in integrating a large number of these fighters into the SPLA—at least on paper. Generally speaking, many SSDF leaders did better than the men and women under their command. For

Map 2 **Geographical distribution of South Sudan's ethnic groups and clans**

Source: UN OCHA, 2009


UNITY
eng)
Malakal
UPPER NILE
Shilluk
Berta
Dinka (Abiliang)
Burum
Nuer (Jikany)
Dinka (Padeng)
Nuer (Jikany)
(Jegai)
Nuer (Gawaar)
Nuer (Lou)
ETHIOPIA
Nuer (Adok)
Nuer (Nyong)
Nuer (Ado)
Dinka (Hol)
Dinka (Nyarweng)
Dinka (Twic JS)
Dinka (Ciec)
JONGLEI
Anyuak
LAKES
Dinka (Atwot)
Dinka (Aliab)
Dinka (Bor)
Bor
Murle
Ngalam (Kachipo)
Jie
Mundari
Toposa
Moru
Nyanwara
CENTRAL EQUATORIA
Pori
Avokaya
Juba
Lokoya
Lopit
Boya
EASTERN EQUATORIA
Nyangatum
Bari
Makaraka
Pajula
Lotuho
Latuka
Didinga
Torit
Kakwa
Kuku
Madi
Acholi
Lango
Lubwara
KENYA
UGANDA

example, under the agreement, Lt Gen. Paulino Matiep (a Nuer), who had taken over the SSDF in 2001, became the SPLA's deputy commander-in-chief. Many other leaders of the 30-plus groups that fell under the SSDF umbrella (Young, 2006, p. 19) received high-ranking military or political appointments.[23] But the integration of lower-ranking commanders and many of the rank and file of various SSDF militias into the SPLA proved to be more difficult.

Many SSDF commanders, however, never took advantage of the Juba Declaration's call for integration and remained in staunch opposition to the fledgling Government of South Sudan under the CPA. Among the holdouts were Gordon Kong, Gabriel Tang Gatwich Chan, Thomas Maboir, and Atom al Nour (HSBA, 2006, p. 5). Control over local natural resources, political gamesmanship, distrust of the SPLA, and personal aggrandizement were just some of the factors that probably influenced their decisions.

The Juba Declaration also resulted in new groups being formed. Some junior commanders chose not to follow their force's leader. Splits sometimes arose because the senior commander chose to join the SPLA, while at other times fragmentation occurred because the senior commander chose not to do so (see Young, 2006, pp. 30–38).

Additional armed groups were created after the April 2010 elections in the South or after South Sudan became an independent republic in July 2011. George Athor formed the South Sudan Defence Movement/Army (SSDM/A) after his failed bid to become governor of Jonglei state. In the wake of Athor's death in December 2011 (BBC, 2011) the SSDM/A split into two factions: Cobra and Upper Nile, led by David Yau Yau and Johnson Olony, respectively (Small Arms Survey, 2013, pp. 3–7). Peter Gadet established the South Sudan Liberation Army in April 2011 (although he rejoined the SPLA in 2013).

Things went from bad to worse during the second half of 2013. As noted above, several military leaders who had taken advantage of the Juba Declaration and 'integrated' into the SPLA later decided to take up arms against the SPLA once again. In 2012 there was increasing disquiet about Kiir's favouritism displayed towards the Dinka ethnic group, especially towards clans near his birthplace (Buoy, 2012). In July 2013 long-standing tensions between President Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar resulted in renewed armed conflict along largely ethnic lines (Kiir is a Dinka and Machar a Nuer). Kiir dismissed Machar in July

2013 as part of a cabinet reshuffle and in December 2013 accused Machar of attempting a coup d'état. The armed forces split largely along ethnic lines among the two largest ethnic groups. According to various UN agencies, this latest political crisis has resulted in a spate of interethnic violence that as of December 2014 had displaced almost two million people from their homes—more than 100,000 of whom were being cared for at various UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) compounds (USAID, 2015),[24] and resulted in tens of thousands of deaths (Smith, 2014).[25]

Peace missions

The international community has responded to the various political and humanitarian crises throughout Sudan and subsequently in South Sudan in part through creating, funding, and staffing numerous peace operations. Since 2002, 11 distinct peace operations have been established (see Table 1). The seven that the AU and UN have authorized are the largest and best known (see Figure 1).

The AU took the lead in addressing the conflict in Darfur with a series of three missions between 2004 and 2007 (see Box 1). The UN assumed primary

Figure 1 **Timeline of 11 peace operations in Sudan and South Sudan, 2002–14***

* The full names of these missions are given in the list of abbreviations and acronyms at the start of this paper. The four missions in operation as of December 2014 were still ongoing as of June 2015.

responsibility for the mission to help shepherd the CPA to a successful completion and has created two follow-on missions, while the AU and UN undertook a joint mission in Darfur in 2007 (which became operational and formally took over from the AU-led mission there in 2008).[26] Of the remaining four, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) authorized two, and two others were undertaken outside of formal regional organization frameworks (but with broad international support).

This section provides some background information on each of the 11 missions. It is organized broadly into three sub-sections by the geographical or political conflict the missions primarily sought or seek to address: those in Darfur; those between the 'north and the south' (starting when the conflict

Box 1 **What's in a name? The 'three' AU-led peace operations in Darfur**

This study speaks of the AU undertaking three distinct peace operations in Darfur between 2004 and 2007: the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS I), AMIS II, and AMIS II-E. (A case can be made that a fourth mission—"AMIS III"—was discussed, but never materialized.) Whereas the Survey defers to the UN Security Council for designating the existence of a new UN peacekeeping operation, the Survey has not approached AU missions similarly. Sometimes the Security Council will authorize more Blue Helmets for a UN peacekeeping operation or revise that mission's mandate, but not choose to change the mission's name or number. For example, the Security Council has almost doubled the number of peacekeepers for UNMISS, but has not amended the name of the mission. However, in the case of AU missions in Darfur, decisions by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) concerning a mission's strength alone largely determine how this study refers to an AU mission. This is because the PSC initially was very inconsistent in the names it gave to its missions in Darfur. During this period it called an AU operation there the 'AU Observer Mission'. It subsequently spoke of (plans for) a 'MILOBS Protection Element', the (existing) 'AU Mission in Darfur, including the Protection Force', and (later) of the 'African Mission in the Sudan'. Statements by the chairperson of the AU Commission at the time, Alpha Oumar Konaré, and the Assembly of the AU (comprising African heads of state and government) further obscure the matter. During 2004 they called the mission the 'AU Protection Force', the 'AU Monitoring Mission in the Sudan', and the 'African Mission in the Sudan'. The decision to focus on authorized force strength rather than formal declarations of the mission's name reflects how senior AU mission personnel and donors assisting the various AU undertakings in Darfur approached AU peacekeeping operations in Darfur. They distinguished among three separate missions: AMIS I (June–October 2004), AMIS II (October 2004–April 2005), and AMIS II-E (April 2005–December 2007).

Sources: AU (2005); Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset (2015)

was within the single country Sudan and subsequently between Sudan and South Sudan); and those within South Sudan. As noted previously, these categories are imperfect. Each brief write-up focuses on the context in which the mission was established, its composition (broadly speaking, because the study's next section examines TCCs and PCCs in greater detail), and the rationale for new missions or increased deployment.

Addressing the conflicts in Darfur (four missions)

- AU Mission in the Sudan I (AMIS I)
- AU Mission in the Sudan II (AMIS II)
- AU Mission in the Sudan II-Enhanced (AMIS II-E)
- AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)

The first of these four missions supported the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) concluded in N'Djamena on 8 April 2004.[27] The protagonists who signed this agreement—the government in Khartoum and the JEM and SLA rebels groups—met the following month to discuss modalities for the establishment of an AU mission to help implement the agreement. The initial peacekeeping mission, which eventually became known as AMIS (and then, retrospectively, AMIS I), called for the deployment of military observers (MilObs) to support the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) as foreseen in the HCFA and for a small force to protect the observers. The PSC authorized 132 observers, of which roughly half—60—would come from the AU.[28] The protection element was to number up to 300 men and women. While the parties agreed that the MilObs may be 'lightly armed' (AU, 2004), the AMIS I force commander (FC)[29] reportedly did not permit any AU MilObs to carry weapons (Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015). The first AU MilObs arrived in the mission area on 9 June and the FC deployed ten days later, making the CFC 'fully operational' (AU, 2005, p. 13, para. 10). The two armed AU infantry companies arrived throughout the month of August. By 10 October the strength of AMIS included 66 AU MilObs and 310 AU infantry troops (AU, 2005, pp. 29–31, paras. 16(b), 19).

In October 2004 the PSC agreed to what amounted to a new mission: AMIS II. The PSC decided 'AMIS shall . . . protect civilians whom it encounters under

imminent threat in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability' (AU, 2005, p. 45, para. 6). The mission's protection force would jump from just over 300 armed men and women to more than 1,700. The number of MilObs would also similarly grow and the AU authorized an 815-strong civilian police (CivPol) component (AU, 2005, p. 40, paras. 64–65). Ten weeks later, on 9 January 2005, the number of AU MilObs stood at 285, the protection force at 790, and CivPol at 7 (AU, 2005, pp. 5–7, para. 5). The AU expected to have 400 CivPol deployed by that month's end, but more than 3 months later this component's strength stood at 245 (AU, 2005, p. 71, para. 38). The military component advanced more capably—at least in terms of numbers. By 20 April 2005, 1,647 troops and 376 AU MilObs had joined the mission (AU, 2005, pp. 71, 91, para. 38 and Annexe A).

The AU recognized that despite some examples of progress in achieving its mandate, its peacekeeping force could not be successful with its existing means. For example, Human Rights Watch (HRW) credited AMIS reports on the government's ceasefire violations with having led to Khartoum's decision to stop using its Antonov bombers in Darfur (HRW, 2006, p. 19: see also AU, 2005, p. 70, para. 35). The AU acknowledged, however, that 'compliance with the [HCFA was] insufficient and the general level of insecurity in Darfur remain[ed] unacceptable' (AU, 2005, p. 68, para. 26). Accordingly, in April 2005 the PSC decided to further enlarge the mission, which became known as AMIS II-E (with E standing for 'Enhanced'). It authorized up to 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 CivPol (AU, 2005, p. 95, para. 9). Eight months later HRW issued a critical and comprehensive review of the AU's peacekeeping efforts in Darfur and concluded that

> *Mission personnel lacked training, operational capacity and political initiative to achieve the mandate through proactive mission operations within the mission's rules of engagement* (HRW, 2006, p. 4).

Both the AU and UN recognized that even the significantly enhanced AMIS II-E was unprepared for the task at hand, which eventually led to a joint AU–UN peacekeeping operation. In October 2005 the AU chairperson envisioned the AU mission needing more than 12,000 troops.[30] The AU, together with the UN—which had become increasingly involved in supporting AU peacekeeping efforts in Darfur—subsequently determined that the situation required a substantially larger force. During the first half of 2006 the AU and UN explored having the

latter take over peacekeeping duties from the former in Darfur. And in August 2006 the UN Security Council supported the creation of a new UN mission in Darfur with 'the consent of the Government' (UNSC, 2006b, para. 1), which was not forthcoming (see UNSC, 2007a, paras. 3–7).[31] The Security Council did, however, agree to transfer some UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) personnel and assets to Darfur to assist the AU force as an interim measure. Over the next four months the AU and UN worked out important modalities for how to move forward. For example, they agreed that the civilian head of the mission would be a joint appointment of the two organizations, the military head of the mission would be an African (appointed by the AU chairperson in consultation with the UN Secretary-General), the UN would assume responsibility for the eventual mission's 'backstopping and command and control structures', and the mission's size would be a joint decision (UNSC, 2007a, paras. 10–11). They also developed support packages to facilitate AMIS, which were concluded in May 2007.[32] A compromise was eventually reached whereby the AU and UN would field a joint force known as UNAMID, which the UN Security Council formally authorized in July 2007, and which became fully operational on 1 January 2008.[33]

UNAMID, although larger and better resourced than AMIS, encountered similar operational challenges and shortcomings. The mission's strength was set at 19,555 military personnel (mostly of formed units) and 6,432 police personnel (mostly of individual officers, with 19 formed units) (UNSC, 2007b, para. 2). On 31 December 2008, one year into its operations, 12,374 military personnel had been deployed to UNAMID, representing a little more then 60 per cent of its authorized strength at the time (UNAMID, 2008). The proliferation of armed groups in its midst (as noted above) and the sustained lack of cooperation from Khartoum (as noted below) made an already difficult job even more so. Throughout 2013 and 2014 the mission came under repeated attack—not only from armed groups, but from unarmed civil society organizations who accused UNAMID of deliberately withholding information on human rights abuses and not doing enough to stop them from occurring (e.g. see Lynch, 2014). In August 2014 the Security Council reduced the mission's military and police personnel by almost 20 and 50 per cent, respectively, from its initial authorized strength.[34] At the beginning of 2015 the peace process in Darfur continued to drag on and the AU and UN were discussing with Khartoum how to close the mission in an orderly way.[35]

Addressing the conflicts between North and South (five missions)

- Joint Military Commission (JMC)
- Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT)
- Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT)
- UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)
- UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)

Prior to the CPA, the international community worked with Khartoum and the SPLM on a series of interim confidence- and security-building measures that resulted in three separate peacekeeping operations. The first of these, the JMC, was established in January 2002 (six months prior to the signing of the first protocols that led to the January 2005 CPA), and benefitted from substantial financial and political support from the United States.[36] The JMC would oversee a ceasefire and a series of conflict-mitigation and transparency measures in the Nuba Mountains, an area spanning some 80,000 sq. km in West Kordofan and South Kordofan—about the size of Austria or the United Arab Emirates. They further agreed that a JMC, which would include international monitors along with representatives of both warring parties, would help them implement the agreement (see Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement, 2002). The mission, which included about 40 international staff and 34 Sudanese officers from the 2 parties,[37] reached its expected strength in 9 months (Ibscher and Szili, n.d., p. 52).[38] About half of these international staff served as monitors and were deployed in five sectors (Souverijn-Eisenberg, 2005, p. 4). Working together with their Sudanese counterparts, they conducted more than 4,000 patrols (Ibscher and Szili, n.d., p. 76). The JMC is generally viewed as having served a useful function and having done a credible job in a challenging environment (e.g. see Souverijn-Eisenberg, 2005).

The Sudanese parties followed up their agreement on the Nuba Mountains within six weeks with a broader commitment to protect non-combatants throughout the country. The CPMT, as the mission would eventually be called, was formally established at the end of March 2002 (although the agreement makes reference to a 'Verification Mission'; see Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement, 2002). The CPMT became fully operational in October 2002 (USDOS, 2003). It operated from two bases: in Khartoum (covering the northern sector) and in

Rumbek (covering the southern sector). The civilian monitors were empowered to investigate abuses allegedly committed by either the SPLA or SAF in any part of the country. By August 2004 the CPMT had conducted 50 investigations into alleged detentions, forced conscription, killings, and theft (Kevane, 2004). Sudan watcher Eric Reeves, while condemning what he deemed to be a slow deployment, subsequently gave the mission high marks—albeit briefly. He described the CPMT as having 'performed in extraordinary fashion, flying virtually daily, producing many highly detailed analyses, and impressive summary reports' in the first months of 2003. He was critical, however, of subsequent staffing and procedural changes the CPMT implemented following Khartoum's decision in March 2003 to deny flight requests, which lasted a month, but which had repercussions for a much longer period (Reeves, 2003).

In February 2003 the agreement that established the CPMT was amended to include a provision for a Verification Monitoring Team. The Addendum created the VMT and tasked it to oversee that the two parties' military forces maintained their positions, as had previously been agreed on 15 October 2002, and which had come into force two days later (see Addendum, 2003). While this agreement got the stalled peace negotiations back on track, the CPMT did not have a mandate to investigate troop deployments or possible movements. Despite a provision to permit the VMT to draw on aviation assets and personnel from the existing CPMT (Addendum, 2003, para. 3), the VMT mission experienced considerable problems in deploying and becoming operational as envisioned. Six months after being established the team had just 15 members (IRIN, 2003).[39]

The UN Security Council authorized UNMIS in March 2005 to help implement the CPA. The operation was headquartered in Khartoum, but most of its initially foreseen 10,715 uniformed personnel (UNSC, 2005a, para. 1) would be deployed in the ten Southern states. The mission also deployed Blue Helmets in three Northern states—Blue Nile, Kassala, and South Kordofan[40]—to oversee the return of SPLA combatants to south of the 1956 border and prepare for the CPA-stipulated elections and referendum. Initial deployment was slow—in early September the number of Blue Helmets stood at just over 20 per cent of authorized strength (see UNSC, 2005c, Annexe). A year into the mission the

situation improved substantially on paper, with more than 75 per cent of the military and police personnel having deployed, but many specialized units were lacking (UNSC, 2006a, paras. 30–32, 45). In August 2006 the Security Council almost doubled the mission's authorized strength, including 17,300 military and 3,300 police (UNSC, 2006b, para. 3), and provided it with a mandate to support the Darfur Peace Agreement and AMIS until a new UN operation could be established to take over from the latter. As noted above, Khartoum did not consent to this scenario and the mission did not expand, despite the greatly raised ceiling. At its height, in January 2011, the mission's uniformed personnel reached more than 98 per cent of its initial authorized strength (UN DPKO, n.d.). The referendum on whether the ten Southern states in Sudan should remain part of Sudan or gain independence was successfully held in January 2011. The people voted overwhelmingly for independence. The Republic of South Sudan became an independent country six months later on 9 July and the 193rd UN member state four days later. The day the country became independent, UNMISS took over from UNMIS.

The UN succeeded in overseeing elections and the referendum, but failed to resolve the contentious issue of Abyei. On 27 June 2011 the Security Council authorized UNISFA to help implement an agreement reached between Khartoum and the SPLA a week earlier (UNSC, 2011b, para. 2).[41] (In recognition of additional agreements reached between the two governments in June and July, the Security Council expanded the mission's mandate in December (UNSC, 2011c, para. 1), but not the number of Blue Helmets.) UNISFA, which initially was to consist of up to 4,250 Blue Helmets (UN, 2011b, para. 1), was augmented to 5,326 three years later (see UNSC, 2013a, para. 2) in response to a deteriorating security situation between the area's two principal protagonists. Despite the presence of the peacekeeping force—which deployed relatively quickly[42]—the long-standing tensions between the Missiriya and Ngok Dinka have remained pronounced. The killing of the Ngok Dinka paramount chief, Kuol Deng Kuol, in May 2013 did not help matters. (A UN peacekeeper, part of the UNISFA convoy accompanying the chief, also lost his life in the attack (*Sudan Tribune*, 2013).) Three years into the mission many of the foreseen provisions and structures have not been acted on or created, including the police force.

Addressing the conflicts in South Sudan (two missions)

- UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)
- Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM)

UNMISS succeeded UNMIS in July 2011. The UN Security Council provided UNMISS with a mandate

> *to consolidate peace and security, and help establish conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbours* (UNSC, 2011d, para. 3).

Towards this end the Security Council initially authorized the mission to consist of 7,000 military personnel and 900 civilian police (UNSC, 2011d, para. 1). Because it drew heavily on a larger force that was already deployed, it differed from the other missions described in this paper in that initially there was no delay between its authorized and deployed strength. Within a little over two months from the mission's start the military deployment was in excess of 75 per cent of authorized strength (UNSC, 2011e, para. 31). Deployment of the UN Police component proceeded much more slowly, however. Subsequently the mission did experience a more significant and prolonged gap between authorized and deployed strength after the Security Council greatly expanded the size of the force in an effort to respond to the surge of violence in December 2013 due to the country's escalating political crisis. In December 2013 the Security Council augmented the number of Blue Helmets to serve in the mission by 75 per cent (UNSC, 2013b, para. 4). Within six months UNMISS had augmented its force by more than 1,000 troops and effectively stood at two-thirds of its mandated strength. Within a year authorized strength stood at a little more than 80 per cent of mandated strength (UNSC, 2015a).

IGAD acted with alacrity to authorize a peace operation to support the 23 January 2014 Cessation of Hostilities (COH) Agreement between the Government of South Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM-In Opposition. IGAD heads of state and government met before the end of that month to formally authorize the MVM as set forth in the COH Agreement (IGAD, 2014b). The agreement called on the two parties to cease hostilities and hostile propaganda, to protect civilians,

and to support access for humanitarian assistance. The parties further agreed to an IGAD-led MVM to monitor the parties' implementation of the agreement (see IGAD, 2014a). The operation comprises a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) based in Juba with Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs). The JTC was established in early March and the first MVTs were established later that month and in early April (Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015). IGAD authorized a Protection and Deterrence Force (PDF) to provide security for the MVTs (IGAD, 2014c, para. 9), because the latter are unarmed (Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015). IGAD envisioned the proposed strength of the PDF element in the MVM to be around 2,500 armed men and women (Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015). Instead, the UN authorized the use of military units serving in UNMISS, which are co-located with the MVTs, to cater to the latter's security needs (UNSC, 2014a, para. 3). IGAD has not set a maximum strength for its mission, but spoke of plans for up to 20 fixed sites (IGAD, 2014d, para. 15). Numbers are determined according to need and budgetary constraints. By the end of August 2014 about 70 personnel served in the mission in Juba and at 6 fixed sites based in 3 states (Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile) (Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015) and had carried out a dozen-plus investigations (IGAD, 2015). Four months later, at the end of 2014, the MVM was operating at similar strength along similar lines (Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015). IGAD, which at first 'regret[ted] the continued and flagrant violations' (IGAD, 2014d, para. 9) and then 'deplor[ed] . . . and . . . condemn[ed]' (IGAD, 2014e, para. 4) them, has been largely limited to cajoling the protagonists to rededicate themselves to adhere to their commitments and seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis (e.g. see IGAD, 2014f).

Peacekeepers

Police- and troop-contributing countries

The AU and UN primarily rely on their member states to contribute uniformed personnel for their peacekeeping missions. The AU has 54 member states; the UN has 193. With few exceptions their members have met their requirements—at least far as numbers are concerned (albeit with frequent lengthy delays). Non-member states have sometimes served in missions, but never in large

Table 1 **Peace operations in Sudan and South Sudan as of December 2014**

Mission	Mandating authority*	Principal mission area	Dates	Authorized strength**	Armed?	Notes
JMC	(Outside of any regional organization)	Nuba Mountains (South and West Kordofan states)	2002–05	About 40 international staff	No	The mission included some 20 international monitors. In addition to the international staff, each of the two Sudanese parties to the agreement provided 17 representatives.
CPMT	(Outside of any regional organization)	Southern Sudan	2002–05	About 30	No	CPMT, with country-wide mandate, operated from two bases: Khartoum and Rumbek. Most investigations took place in Southern Sudan.
VMT	IGAD	Eastern Equatoria, Northern Bahr al Ghazal, Unity, Upper Nile	2003–05	About 50 MilObs	No	VMT monitors did at times conduct investigations outside their four bases.
AMIS I	AU	Darfur	2004	380 military personnel	Yes	The two AU infantry companies were armed. The AU MilObs were to be unarmed
AMIS II	AU	Darfur	2004–05	3,156 military and police personnel	Yes	Authorized strength included MilObs from non-AU members. Military and police experts from EU and NATO members supplemented AU personnel.
UNMIS	UN	Ten Southern states of Sudan (what is today South Sudan)	2005–11	20,600 military and police personnel	Yes	UNMIS had its HQ in Khartoum and troops in several Northern states. The mission's maximum strength for uniformed personnel, for practical purposes, was 10,715.
AMIS II-E	AU	Darfur	2005–07	7,731 military and police personnel	Yes	Benefitted from EU and NATO personnel (as in AMIS II), and UN support packages of personnel and equipment.
UNAMID	AU and UN	Darfur	2007–present	25,987 military and police personnel	Yes	The mission's strength was reduced in July 2012 and August 2014 to reflect an overall cut of some 25 per cent.
UNISFA	UN	Abyei region	2011–present	5,376 military and police personnel	Yes	In May 2013 the mission's strength was increased by some 25 per cent.
UNMISS	UN	South Sudan	2011–present	13,823 military and police personnel	Yes	In December 2013 the mission's strength was increased by 75 per cent.
MVM	IGAD	South Sudan (Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile)	2014–present	About 70 personnel (mostly ex-military)	No	No maximum strength was authorized; the PDF did not materialize.

* The UN Security Council will at times acknowledge and authorize a mission undertaken by a regional organization or ad hoc coalition of the willing. This column refers to the regional organization that took the initiative to deploy the mission (if applicable).
** For AU and UN missions listed here the 'authorized strength' refers only to maximum numbers of military and police personnel.

Source: Berman (2014)

numbers.[43] The AU and UN have at times called on private companies to supplement the tasks their member states undertake. The US company Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), for example, has provided substantial logistical support to both AU and UN missions.[44]

Not all members furnish military or police, however. In December 2014, 122 UN member states provided Blue Helmets to one or more of the organization's 16 peacekeeping operations. Eighty-one of these 122 states contributed uniformed personnel to 1 or more of the 3 active missions (UN DPKO, 2015). Overall, 108 UN member states have contributed uniformed personnel to those three missions, UNMIS, and the various AMIS missions (see Annexe A). According to the UN, 50 of its member states have not provided military personnel to any of its peace operations (IPI, 2013, p. 2).

The vast majority of uniformed personnel in AU and UN peacekeeping operations serve in formed units. In December 2014 troops assigned to formed units[45] comprised more than four-fifths of this number. MilObs (as well as liaison officers and advisers)[46] represented less than 2 per cent. Police made up the difference (about 12 per cent), with formed police units (FPUs) specializing in crowd control representing almost three-quarters of this strength.[47] Outside of UNAMID, in December 2014 six AU member states were providing some 22,000 Green Helmets to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).[48]

Relatively few of the countries that furnish uniformed personnel contribute formed units. Most countries can provide—and have provided—MilObs. A state can make available as little as one single MilOb to a mission. A MilOb holds the equivalent rank of at least captain in the military, which usually corresponds to at least six years of armed forces experience. Many countries also contribute civilian police, but comparatively few furnish infantry battalions. In December 2014, for example, 98 countries provided MilObs (or other military experts not deployed as part of a formed unit), 75 contributed UN Police (UNPOL, which the UN formerly referred to as civilian police or CivPol), and 35 furnished infantry battalions to the 16 ongoing UN peacekeeping operations. The number of countries providing specialized formed units (e.g. engineers, logistics, or medical) is fewer still.

Accordingly, the number of Blue Helmets is not distributed equally among TCCs and PCCs. In December 2014 ten countries alone provided more than half of all Blue Helmets (see Figure 2). The top three (Bangladesh, India, and

Figure 2 **Top ten contributors of military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, December 2014**



Source: UN DPKO (2014a)

Pakistan) contributed close to 25 per cent, while the top five (the top three plus Ethiopia and Rwanda) provided more than 35 per cent. Twenty-three countries each provided fewer than 10 Blue Helmets to the 16 UN peacekeeping operations, while Blue Helmets from those 23 and 27 others accounted for just over 1 per cent of the total.[49] Military planners for peacekeeping operations have a relatively limited number of countries that are both willing and able to provide the personnel that the UN Security Council or AU PSC have authorized.

The situation facing military planners in the three ongoing UN and AU missions in Sudan and South Sudan is similar if not more pronounced. One country—Ethiopia—provided fully one-quarter of all Blue Helmets in these three operations (see Figure 3). Rwanda and India together accounted for another

Figure 3 **Top ten contributors of military and police personnel to UNAMID, UNMISS, and UNISFA, December 2014**



Source: UN DPKO (2014b)

20 per cent of the total. The next seven top TCC/PCCs represented almost 30 per cent, meaning that ten UN member states contributed three of every four military or police personnel serving in the three mission areas. One-third of the remaining 67 UN member states that provided military or police to UNMISS, UNAMID, or UNISFA in December 2014 made available fewer than ten uniformed personnel in total to these three missions (UN DPKO, 2014a).[50] (See Annexe A for a list of countries that have provided uniformed personnel to AU and UN missions in Sudan and South Sudan.)

Peacekeepers' small arms, light weapons systems, and ammunition

Formed units of military and police deploy with weapons and ammunition in peace operations. MilObs traditionally are unarmed,[51] as are most UN Police.[52] Police serving in AU and UN missions in Sudan and South Sudan were all unarmed apart from FPUs (Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015). Formed units of military will deploy with their personal firearms, which means assault rifles in most instances. Assault rifles typically used in peacekeeping missions include the M16, G3, FAL, INSAS, and AK variants and copies. Officers may also deploy with side arms—usually a self-loading pistol.

Besides rifles and side arms, formed military units will also deploy with crew-served weapons. Crew-served systems in peacekeeping operations often include sniper rifles or designated marksman rifles, machine guns, mortars, and recoilless weapons and rocket launchers (see Figure 4). Machine guns include light (most often chambered for the same ammunition as a military unit's service rifles, such as 5.56 × 45 mm, 7.62 × 39 mm, or 5.45 × 39 mm calibres), medium or general-purpose (most commonly in 7.62 × 51 mm or 7.62 × 54R calibres), and heavy (generally chambered for 12.7 × 99 mm or 12.7 × 108 mm ammunition). Mortars typically consist of light (generally firing 60 mm or smaller projectiles), medium (most commonly 81 or 82 mm), and heavy (generally 100 or 120 mm). Mission planners usually require a certain minimum level of equipment and preparedness. TCCs may bring additional materiel in excess of these requirements for doctrinal or force protection reasons—but often at their own expense.[53]

Some TCCs also obtain—sometimes only temporarily—weapons (and ammunition) after they have deployed outside of national resupply or supplemental

Figure 4 **Typically equipped patrol of military personnel in UNMIS, UNAMID, UNISFA, or UNMISS**

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donor support. Materiel processed during disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) activities (a component of many peacekeeping operations, which Blue Helmets are frequently tasked to support in one way or another) is usually well documented[54] and secured. Some of it may be destroyed (and some may recirculate unintentionally).[55] TCCs do not use such weapons and munitions for their members' use. However, peacekeepers on occasion do secure materiel from armed groups within the mission area through patrols, cordon and search operations, and military engagements—all outside of DDR or voluntary arms recovery schemes. Sometimes this recovery can be substantial—such as what has occurred in AMISOM.[56] TCCs do not retain these weapons on all occasions (see Box 2). In the absence of the foreseen Abyei Police Service, for example, UNISFA has confiscated weapons and handed them over to 'relevant authorities' (e.g. see UNSC, 2013b, para. 6).[57] Yet interviews with senior peacekeeping officials—speaking about missions generally and not UNISFA specifically—suggest that headquarters' oversight of materiel

Box 2 **Materiel recovered from armed groups by TCCs and PCCs in Sudan and South Sudan outside of DDR: the case of Graida**

On 3 June 2005 SLA forces attacked a village under the control of JEM. The village, Graida (not far from Nyala), was located in an area the SLA considered to be part of the territory it controlled. The SLA viewed JEM's claim to it and the deployment of combatants on its soil as a provocation. (It allegedly was also unhappy with some of its combatants defecting to JEM—along with some communications and vehicular assets.) The SLA attacked the village over a three-day period (beginning with a mortar barrage), inflicting significant casualties (at least 14 dead and as many injured) on civilians and perhaps on JEM as well. On 5 June many JEM combatants sought refuge in nearby AMIS sites. AMIS personnel seized their firearms, registered the weapons and their serial numbers, and issued 'receipts' for them to the JEM fighters. AMIS collected about 50 firearms. AMIS kept the weapons secure and eventually returned them against submission of the receipts.

Sources: IRIN (2005); Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset (2015); *Sudan Tribune* (2005a)

recovered in this way is limited, with one former force commander describing the situation as a 'grey area'.[58]

FPUs are also well armed. An FPU with a UN peacekeeping operation is expected to comprise 140 men and women. Each police officer in an FPU is to

Figure 5 **Example of typical UNAMID TCC commercial vehicle**

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be equipped with a rifle or a side arm, while each unit is to deploy with 12 machine guns and two sniper rifles. In addition, FPUs are to be equipped with substantial crowd-control and anti-riot gear, including soft kinetic projectile systems, and tear gas launchers and canisters (UN DPKO, 2012).

Formed military units and FPUs will also deploy with vehicles equipped with weaponry. The numbers and types will vary and depend on numerous criteria. These factors include the mission's mandate, the doctrine and discipline of a particular TCC or PCC, and often the generosity of donor support. For the purposes of this paper it is important to note that many 'soft-skinned' vehicles such as pick-up trucks are fitted with machine guns (see Figure 5). Armoured vehicles typically possess significantly greater firepower.

Ammunition requirements for peacekeepers vary greatly. This is true among missions, within a mission among contingents, and within a contingent, depending on the threat perception or the task. For example, peacekeepers on a short-range patrol in a non-hostile environment may have just their personal weapons with two magazines of ammunition, whereas those on a long-range patrol across terrain in which they have recently come under attack may have six or more magazines per rifle and bring along crew-served weapons with additional munitions. A magazine for a Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifle usually holds 30 rounds of 7.62 × 39 mm ammunition. One for an M16 or INSAS rifle holds 30 rounds of 5.56 × 45 mm ammunition. One for a G3 or FAL typically holds 20 rounds of 7.62 × 51mm ammunition. (Larger magazines or drums of 40-plus rounds of ammunition exist for most standard-issue rifles, but are seldom used in peacekeeping operations.)

Ammunition requirements for a machine gun will be much greater than for a rifle because of the way in which the weapon is deployed and used. Machine guns are typically fed from a belt (consisting of either disintegrating or non-disintegrating links) or, less frequently, from a removeable box or drum magazine. Ammunition capacity varies greatly according to the model and calibre of the weapon in question, but is most commonly between 100 and 300 cartridges when using a belt, and between 30 and 100 cartridges for box and drum magazines.

Containers used to support vehicle-borne machine guns are usually considerably larger than those intended for use by foot soldiers. These larger containers (sometimes called tins or cans) will commonly hold belts of ammunition

with 200–1,000 cartridges, although quantities vary according to model, calibre, mission, doctrine, and other factors. Peacekeepers will normally load a pick-up truck like a Toyota Hilux (which is ubiquitous in many peacekeeping operations) fitted with a machine gun with four to six large containers of ammunition. If the threat is elevated they may place ten or more tins on a vehicle.

This said, care must be taken to distinguish between 'requirements' and realities when it comes to what TCCs and PCCs actually take with them into the field. Some countries will send troops or police to a mission area equipped with far less than what guidelines call for. (And regulations can change; for example, when a contingent serving in an AU mission gets rehatted and finds itself part of a UN mission. This has created real concerns that can take a long time to adequately address.)[59] Some materiel that contingents bring may not work. Some countries may bring arms and ammunition—and weapon systems such as armoured vehicles—in excess of what was asked for. They may lobby the UN for special dispensation to augment the types and amount of their contingent-owned equipment (COE) so that the UN covers the depreciation value for the materiel or insures it against loss or damage. Or they may decide to invest in bringing materiel to the mission outside of what will be covered by the UN.

A distinction must also be made between 'requirements' and realities when it comes to what troops and police carry with them when undertaking their work. For example, in the mission area one TCC may require each soldier on patrol to routinely carry four magazines of ammunition, whereas another may call for only two. These requirements can change due to the perceived length of the patrol or the threat it faces. Moreover, different TCCs may have different perceptions of the same situation. Each government has its own military and police doctrines with different tactics, techniques, and procedures for addressing challenges in a combat or peacekeeping setting.

Arms flows to non-state actors

Non-state armed groups acquire arms and ammunition in many ways. Lack of transparency makes their acquisition patterns difficult to document. Embargoes enacted to counter such activity—the UN has had one in place intended to restrict arms flows to armed groups in Darfur since March 2005 (see UNSC,

2005b)[60]—make governments more reluctant to divulge information about their supplies to armed groups. This section does not address arms flows to states or government-authorized production of small arms and ammunition (both of which are dealt with in other HSBA titles).[61] Rather, it looks at how armed groups acquire arms and ammunition, first globally, and then with a focus on the situation in Sudan and South Sudan. It then explores the phenomenon of diversion as a means of acquisition and concludes with a short discussion on challenges to conducting research on such matters.

Global picture

Armed groups, just like other unauthorized end users of small arms in conflict settings, acquire their weapons and ammunition in four principal ways: through seizures, donations, financial transactions, and local production (see Table 2). While all groups will rely on a mixture of armament sources, the exact ratios vary according to the types of armed groups, the conflict, and the local context (Perrin, 2012; Green and Marsh, 2013).

Seizure is a common way for armed groups to acquire weapons. In many countries in conflict, government arsenals are the principal source of armament for opposing armed groups due to relatively low costs of acquisition and high returns (Jackson, 2010; Perrin, 2012). Other sources of seized weapons for armed groups include state-supported paramilitary groups, rival armed groups, and external forces like those deployed as part of peace operations (Berman and Racovita, 2013). Seizures occur through different methods, from small-scale thefts to mass looting of stockpiles or battlefield capture. These methods imply different 'costs' for the armed groups, from risks to the lives or liberty of its members to material expenses (such as bullets and fuel needed to conduct the operation). Small-scale thefts often carry low costs, although assailants are still at risk of being captured and prosecuted. The mass looting of stockpiles as a result of a overwhelming attack on a base or storage site is generally exceptional, and is usually the result of planned attacks. Although risky and costly, these type of seizures provide high returns. Battlefield capture carries some of the largest potential risks (death and injury) and provides potentially significant amounts of armaments.

In this paper *donations* refer to small arms and ammunition that are supplied by governments to armed groups or other end users, often through retransfer. Such transfers are often—but not always—covert. Mergers or alliances with other armed groups and recruitment can also bolster the number of arms possessed by a group.

Financial transactions involving weaponry and ammunition can be a principal source of arms for some armed groups. Groups with significant funding streams or active state sponsorship can reportedly purchase large amounts of equipment and can even procure more sophisticated weapons systems (Perrin, 2012, p. 109). In addition, corrupt practices involving individuals or governments are another mode of weapons acquisition whereby equipment is purchased or otherwise acquired on a large scale (involving corrupt procurement practices, such as preferential contracting or bribery) or small scale (a few weapons at a time) from government stockpiles (Transparency International, 2013). In peace operations, cases of corruption and arms trafficking involving peacekeepers have been documented in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone (Ghilain, 2011, p. 9), to give just a couple of examples.

Local production refers to the proliferation of small arms and ammunition through craft production, conversion, and refurbishing, as well as industrial production from seized factories. Craft production and the conversion of firearms by armed groups themselves are often marginal compared to the other types of proliferation, due to the costs and time involved (Pezard, 2005, p. 145). In a few documented cases weapons and ammunition have been converted or reloaded, or cannibalized to provide replacement parts for existing weapons. However, given the scarcity of data on local production, it is difficult to determine the magnitude of this practice. Some armed groups have the capacity to produce their own weapons (particularly improvised explosive devices) and have the ability to undertake at least minor repairs (Perrin, 2012, p. 108).

Sudan and South Sudan

Diversion in Sudan and South Sudan primarily occurs through seizures, including battlefield capture, theft, and mass looting, but also through financial transactions. As such, diversion is a sub-set of practices that fall under the generic label of arms transfers to unauthorized users, such as armed groups, although

Table 2 **Arms flows to armed groups**

Type of activity	Sources	Methods
Seizure	• State actors (e.g. national or foreign state security forces) • Other (rival) armed groups (e.g. pro-government militias) • Private sector actors (e.g. PSCs,* MNCs,** gun shops) • International actors (e.g. peace-keeping forces, multilateral intervention forces, or foreign troops in the country as a result of a bilateral agreement)	• Small-scale theft • Battlefield capture • Mass looting
Donation	• State actors (national or foreign) • Other (allied) armed groups • Individuals (e.g. politicians, civilians)	• Government transfers (both covert and official) • Mergers with armed groups • Political alliances • Recruitment of new members with personal weapons
Financial transaction	• State actors (national or foreign) • Other armed groups • Businesses (e.g. retail gun stores) • Dealers/brokers • Blacksmiths • Other civilians	• Purchase • Barter • Rental
Local production	• Armed group	• Craft production • Industrial production (e.g. seized factories) • Conversion • Refurbishment (of old/decommissioned weapons)

* Private security companies

** Multinational corporations

it has certain key characteristics. First, diversion involves the transformation of the status of a weapon from authorized to unauthorized (which disqualifies, for instance, black market purchases by armed groups as amounting to diversion). Secondly, the intentionality of the original owner is a determining factor, because diversion will happen contrary to the intention of the owner. For this reason, donations that occur through firearms transfers are counted as retransfers, which may breach certain rules or laws, but do not necessarily count as diversion.

Diverted weapons begin their life cycle in the possession of authorized producers, carriers, or end users, only to be put to unauthorized use by being taken, seized, sold, donated, or otherwise retransferred. Where military materiel originates in stable countries and is destined for actors in fragile or conflict-ridden countries, materials are more likely to be diverted from end users and carriers. Producers, particularly those in conflict areas, can also be targets of attacks or battlefield capture, or corrupt practices, but more stringent regulations placed on the manufacture of weapons and ammunition decrease the proliferation risks (Small Arms Survey, 2014).

Military materiel can be seized from two primary sources: stockpiles or during transfers. Stockpiles, be they those of the manufacturer, temporary stockpile facilities of carriers, or those of end users, can be vulnerable to theft or mass looting if they lack adequate security measures. Storage facilities for small arms and ammunition range from large military depots (army, navy, etc.) to barracks and smaller depots (held by police, military, or paramilitaries), unit-level stocks, and personal stocks (held at home by personnel) (Small Arms Survey, 2008, p. 48). Proper physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) practices that include, among others, accurate recording and storage can reduce the likelihood of diversion. During peace operations diversion generally affects peacekeepers (the end users) and the material stored at base camps (mid-level to unit-level storage facilities) or carried during missions. Weapons and ammunition can also be diverted from temporary stocks in transit or from destination countries.

Transfers of military materiel can be diverted at several points in the transfer chain. Diversions can occur while the cargos are loaded by the manufacturer, at the point of embarkation, while they are in transit, at the point of delivery, or post-delivery (Ghilain, 2011; Schroeder, Close, and Stevenson, 2008, p. 115). In fact, most diversions involve the exploitation of multiple weak links in the transfer chain, particularly in cases of a planned retransfer to an unauthorized user. This is also true for diversion that occurs during peace operations, from factories, TCCs, or private contractors who transport military equipment to base camps or in resupply efforts.

Non-state armed groups in Sudan and South Sudan acquire small arms, ammunition, and parts from a variety of sources, but the state is often either

the ultimate primary source or intermediary. For example, the GoS (i.e. Khartoum) acts as both supplier and an intermediary for the groups it supports by supplying new domestically made ammunition or retransferring imported shipments to its Southern proxy forces (Leff and LeBrun, 2014). Data suggests that SAF and allied militias in Darfur acquire newly made small arms and light weapons ammunition less than 12 months after manufacture (HSBA, 2012, p. 1).

SAF and government stockpiles have increasingly become an alternative to foreign supplies for armed groups, which have dwindled in recent years (Small Arms Survey, 2014, p. 238; Leff and LeBrun, 2014, p. 106). The HSBA estimates that in South Kordofan SPLA-N captured hundreds of thousands of ammunition rounds in 2012, as well as a dozen vehicles and tanks from SAF (Leff and LeBrun, 2014, p. 106). Similarly, in 2012–13 Yau Yau militia captured large amounts of small arms and associated ammunition from the SPLA in Jonglei (Leff and LeBrun, 2014, p. 107).

As their capabilities increased and diversified, armed groups also became more opportunistic and targeted not only government stockpiles, but also those of AU and UN peace operations, as well as resupply efforts to support these operations and peacekeepers on patrol or escort duty (Lewis, 2009, p. 52). Diversion through seizure also presents a tactical or strategic advantage, by weakening and demoralizing the adversary (Jackson, 2010, p. 139). In Sudan and South Sudan peacekeepers are confronted by armed groups that are well armed. Shortfalls in the operational capabilities of peacekeeping contingents and patrols severely limit the force's 'mobility, effectiveness and ability to deter attacks' (UNSC, 2014c, pp. 8–9).

Research challenges

The diversion of weapons in general, and that originating from peace operations in particular, is difficult to quantify in the absence of reliable data on stocks, documented seizures, or captures. Employing an incident-recording and -monitoring template, the current Working Paper documents more than 100 incidents involving the diversion of weapons from peace operations in Sudan and South Sudan.

There is a chronic lack of systematic and comprehensive data on diversion due to the sensitivity of the subject, opacity regarding stocks or procedures,

and lack of awareness of the magnitude of the phenomenon. Even though the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty and the advances in regional PSSM initiatives have recently brought diversion into the limelight, little is known about its scale and scope within peace operations. Scarce knowledge is compounded by a culture of non-disclosure. In many cases diversions are not officially reported in full. The media are often the only source of information on a given incident, but reporting is not always consistent in its coverage. Thus, while some large-scale incidents, such as the overrunning of base-camps (like the Haskanita incident in 2007 or the overrunning of the Akobo base in 2013) make the newspapers, others are seldom made public.

Diversion encompasses more than the misappropriation of small arms and light weapons, and includes ammunition, parts, and vehicles fitted with weapons. Whether it involves operational, reserve, training, or surplus ammunition, diversion 'poses a risk to any legally held quantity of arms and ammunition' (Bevan, 2008, p. 145). International transfers of ammunition are less transparent than the trade in small arms, making it particularly difficult to track (Herron et al., 2010). Furthermore, there is a pervasive lack of information on the diversion of vehicles fitted with weapons, which makes the estimation of diversion difficult. The diversion of small arms and associated components (ammunition, parts) exploits the same regulatory and enforcement deficiencies (Bourne and Berkol, 2004, p. 120).

In assembling the working dataset on diversion in Sudan and South Sudan, this research draws on a variety of sources, ranging from official UN reports and documents to selected archival data, investigative journalism, and UN press releases, in an effort to get as full an account as possible. The paper also relies on a series of interviews with peacekeepers; TCCs; and AU, UN, and EU officials to shed more light on the particular circumstances of diversion. Data on incidents of diversion collected for this study was cleaned, verified, and triangulated wherever possible in order to ensure the accuracy of the reported information. This is not a comprehensive survey of diversion or of arms flows in Sudan and South Sudan, but an effort to capture and understand an underreported phenomenon.

Multiplicity of sources does not equal availability of data. Information on incidents of diversion is often scarce, patchy, or even contradictory. For instance,

the number of weapons and amount of ammunition lost through diversion is seldom reported in full by peacekeepers. Descriptions are often indicative rather than precise, stipulating, for example, that a container of ammunition was stolen, without specifying the type, mark, or quantity. In other cases information is lacking altogether, and the media will report a patrol being ambushed and vehicles captured without specifying if the vehicles were fitted with weapons or whether any weapons were seized. Small-scale incidents involving patrols are particularly difficult to quantify, because patrols vary by size and personnel type, which in turn affects the type of weapons they carry.

The problem of collecting data on diversion is further compounded by the lack of clear and comprehensive terminology. Labels for and definitions of diversion abound. For some UN agencies the movement of small arms and related ammunition from licit to illicit holders is described more succinctly as 'leakage', 'evaporation', or 'trickling', which are labels that avoid the attribution of responsibility. In other cases diversion is described through the method of capture of the material, such as 'seizure', 'capture', or 'forced abandonment'. This terminology underlines an institutional preoccupation with the method rather than the scale of diversion, showcasing the political sensitivities often attached to the word.

Part II: Scale and scope of small arms diversion

Challenges to peace operations

Peacekeeping operations face numerous difficulties before, during, and after deployment. Protagonists in the conflict—not all of whom may be party to a peace agreement—will have competing agendas. TCCs and PCCs will also have competing agendas and various abilities. Mandates can be vague or restrictive, while the force composition may be insufficient compared to the needs on the ground.

This section looks at three levels of challenges that increase the risk of the diversion of weapons in peace operations: strategic, operational, and tactical.[62] The strategic level includes all aspects dealing with the design and preparation of the mission before it is fielded or from outside the mission area (e.g. the mission's authorization, its goals, and the general parameters for the planning and establishment of the mission and its future operations). The operational level pertains to mandate implementation and resource allocation in the field, comprising guidance on operating space, equipment deployed, quantities supplied, and timeliness. Challenges at this level comprise decisions taken at headquarters (HQ) level in the mission (e.g. the creation of sectors and the deployment of formed units). And, finally, the tactical level refers to the regional, sectoral, and local responsibilities of missions, including battle engagements, patrol difficulties, responses to tactical moves by armed groups, and small-scale logistical concerns, such as resupply routes and stock coordination at base level. Tactical-level challenges include decisions taken within a mission outside of HQ or issues (e.g. implementing rules of engagement (ROE), and the maintenance of combat skills and engagement in the field).

Strategic-level challenges

Particularly in the early years, peace operations in Sudan were plagued by a variety of strategic challenges. These ranged from authorization and role (as inscribed in the mandate negotiated with the GoS) to planning logistics, force

generation, and financial aspects. As an intrinsic part of the design and execution of peace operations, the mandate shapes not only the success of the mission, but also the security of peacekeepers and their materials or equipment. Together with the tasks and ROE, mandates define the activities and objectives of missions, creating thus the framework of operations. If these are too restrictive in scope or in the powers granted to peacekeepers, mandates can severely impede the success of a mission before it is even configured or deployed.

Restrictive mandates inhibited missions' operational and protective capabilities. Despite the experience that the AU gained from its first peace operation (in Burundi; e.g. see Boshoff, 2003) AMIS I represented a very steep learning curve for the organization.[63] AMIS was deployed in July 2004, with an initial mandate to monitor the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement brokered by the AU on 8 April 2004, to assist with confidence building on the ground, to protect civilians, and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) (AU, 2004, Art. 4). However, its civilian protection component was framed restrictively, referring only to a mandate to

> *protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS* (AU, 2004; Luqman and Omede, 2012, p. 64).

This, coupled with the absence of a mandate to disarm militias (the mandate only referred to the provision of aid to the GoS in this area), further reduced the mission's protective capabilities. Even though the presence of peacekeepers deterred sporadic attacks against civilians, it was insufficient to tackle the widespread violence (Murithi, 2009).

Drawing on the difficult experiences of the AMIS I, II, and II-E missions, the hybrid UNAMID mission enjoyed a broader mandate, although the mission remained affected by instability, particularly in its early years. Set up under UN Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007, the mission benefitted from a 'Chapter VII mandate to take "necessary action" to support the implementation of the DPA', including, among others, the disarming of the 'janjaweed' (Birikorang, 2009, p. 10). According to Resolution 1769, UNAMID was also authorized to 'take the necessary action' to 'protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment,

and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers' (Luqman and Omede, 2012, p. 65). These broader and more robust provisions were not enough to ward off attacks on peacekeepers and banditry (Murithi, 2009).

The UN-led missions in Sudan and South Sudan benefitted from very ambitious, if somewhat vague, mandates that proved to be insufficient to ensure mission success. The UNMIS and UNMISS mandates included the monitoring of the peace agreement, 'peace consolidation', civilian protection, and the coordination of humanitarian assistance (Saferworld, 2011; Fenton and Loughna, 2013). The larger freedom of action awarded under the UNMIS and UNMISS mandates did not lead to increased civilian security, reportedly due to operational constraints, such as the absence of equipment and manpower necessary to enforce these mandates (Saferworld, 2011). Following the independence of South Sudan the UNMISS mission featured not only a 'robust mandate', sanctioning the use of any necessary force to protect civilians, but also strong state-building prerogatives (Hutton, 2014, p. 13). However, some analysts have pointed to a gap between the mandate and its translation or execution by contingents or TCCs fearful of placing their peacekeepers in harm's way, particularly by operating in insecure areas or by clashing with government forces (Hutton, 2014).

Even where mandates are far-reaching, host governments can severely impede the deployment and operations of peace missions on their territories. In the case of Sudan, with the subsequent move to AMIS II and II-E, the mission's mandate was also expanded, although these extended powers were often hampered by the continuous obstructionism of the Sudanese authorities. The GoS reportedly argued that AMIS forces needed to protect its own peacekeepers and facilities rather than civilians under GoS protection, and in practice limited the movements and jurisdiction of AMIS personnel, despite having agreed on their military presence on its territory (Gelot, 2014, pp. 115, 118). Analysts argued that the hindrances of the local government were the main cause for AMIS's failure to fulfil its tasks (HRW, 2006; Murithi, 2009). Through its membership of the AU PSC from 2004 to 2006 the GoS also reportedly slowed down AMIS's activities and deployment (Jibril, 2010, p. 14). Also, although the mandate for civilian protection was improved, it was still guided by the 'principles

of "consent", "impartiality" and "minimal force"', which restricted decisive action in the field (Birikorang, 2009, p. 6). Moreover, the AU lacked official guidelines for civilian protection, which were only introduced in March 2010 (Williams, 2013, p. 7). Even UNAMID was faced with continued obstructionism from the GoS, which intensified after the issuing of the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of President Omar al Bashir in July 2008 (Murithi, 2009).

The politicization of the mission represented an additional barrier to the ability of peace operations to fulfil their mandate, which is closely linked to host government obstructionism. AMIS came to be perceived by some militias to not be independent, but rather as favouring the government and the SLA-MM faction (Luqman and Omede, 2012). This view led to an increased number of attacks on or harassment of peacekeepers, which further impeded their ability to fulfil their mandate or even at times to secure the safety of their own troops (Luqman and Omede, 2012) and equipment. In August 2014, for instance, an UNMISS helicopter was shot down in Unity state (Reeves, 2014). Credible reports indicate that the attack was motivated by a belief that the UN mission was transferring weapons and ammunition to loyal SPLA troops. While such an assertion was unfounded and the ownership of the equipment in question was not claimed to be COE or materiel that UNMISS had captured, the incident underlines the negative impact of such perceptions on force protection. Moreover, perceptions of partiality on the part of UNMIS—and UNMISS in particular—further obstructed the ability of these missions to fulfil their tasks and objectives. Their dual mandate to protect civilians, while also supporting the peace process and state building, offered no clear instructions as to how to react to challenges posed by the GoS or the Government of South Sudan (i.e. the SPLA-led government in Juba that the CPA created) (Fenton and Loughna, 2013).

Besides the mandates, a mission's ROE are also key in shaping the fulfilment of its strategic objectives. While AMIS I did not have explicit ROE, the two subsequent missions had them laid down, beginning in 2005, also reflecting an expanded mandate in relation to civilian protection (HRW, 2006, p. 26). Starting with AMIS II, the ROE set clear boundaries on the use of force in relation to attacks on peacekeepers, abduction, and the possible diversion of military or other equipment. Thus, according to Rule 1.14 of the AU ROE for AMIS, the use of deadly force was only authorized in self-defence (including to resist

the abduction or detention of other AU personnel); while to protect AU installations and equipment non-deadly force was 'authorized' (HRW, 2006). However, HRW (2006) noted that the rules of engagement were too ambiguous and insufficient in allowing for the 'proactive protection of civilians at sector and company level'.

In addition, early missions lacked the institutional capacity and strategic management to ensure effective deployment. The AU lacked experience in launching and managing a large-scale operation of the scale of AMIS. The rapid succession of AMIS I, AMIS II, and AMIS II-E put an additional strain on already scarce resources, in terms of both force generation and planning capacity or coordination.

Operational-level challenges

Once authorized, peace operations always confront operational challenges that can affect their ability to function in hostile environments and ensure the security of their own troops and equipment. At times these challenges are external and context-dependent (such as territory- or infrastructure-related issues), while in other instances they depend more on logistical and operational issues that are intrinsic to the mission (e.g. armament supply and condition). The number and strength of armed groups on the ground, the history of the conflict, and the capabilities of the peace operations deployed affect the number and type of incidents of diversion that occur. Although not a causal factor, these intervening variables act as factors in the diversion of small arms and ammunition.

Peacekeepers operating in Sudan and South Sudan have to cover a vast and harsh terrain, which poses problems to operational planning. With 1,886,068 km² of territory, Sudan is the third-largest country in Africa, while Darfur, with 493,180 km², is roughly the size of Spain. Coupled with a rugged terrain and poor road network, the sheer vastness of the territory causes operational problems for peace operations on the ground in AU-led missions (Agwai, 2010), but also in UN-led and hybrid missions (UNSC, 2014d).

The length and conditions of roads prevented or delayed the deployment of equipment or the establishment of functioning resupply routes. For instance, the 1,400-mile-long supply route between Port Sudan and Darfur hampered the movement of COE (UNSC, 2008a, para 11). Agwai (2010) notes that poor infrastructure increased the need for and emphasized the lack of specialist assets,

such as attack helicopters and fixed-wing surveillance planes. In 2008 efforts to integrate AMIS battalions into UNAMID were progressing slowly, due to reported difficulties in finalizing procurement and transporting equipment in Darfur (UNSC, 2008b, para. 20). Moreover, deteriorating airport infrastructure and runway conditions limited the number of flights to transport heavy equipment (Gujral, 2011). For UNMISS the difficult terrain and lack of investment in the infrastructure of South Sudan also made the transportation of heavy engineering equipment (such as bulldozers and cranes) necessary for the building of sites and bases quite difficult (Boutellis and Smith, 2014, p. 6).

Furthermore, the two countries' harsh climate takes a toll on the personnel and impedes operations. The rainy season rendered the already poor road infrastructure in Sudan practically unusable for establishing UNAMID routes (Agwai, 2010, p. 5). The excessive heat posed additional obstacles, because peacekeepers must sometimes conduct patrols in full body armour in temperatures that go above 45 degrees Celsius (Abdulrahman, 2013).

The characteristics of peacekeeping missions, such as their size and achieved deployment, can also affect both their operational success and the number of diversion incidents they register. UNAMID, as the mission with the largest deployment (over 17,000 troops on the ground), the longest duration (seven years and running), and the highest number of peacekeeping fatalities (200 in July 2014) (UN DPKO, 2014a), also registers the highest number of documented incidents of diversion. The increased scrutiny and monitoring of UNAMID—and, more recently, UNMISS—also translate into higher transparency as to its losses. The periodic reporting drives these figures up compared to other, more opaque missions. Much less is known, for instance, about the reporting practices of AMIS, which operated between 2004 and 2007.

Besides the delays in the deployment of infantry troops or police units, peacekeeping missions also suffered from a lack of personnel able to provide adequate logistical support. In 2007, for instance, no African units in AMIS (except for the South Africans) deployed with combat support teams, even though these had been planned for on paper (Besenyo, 2007, p. 778). Similarly, a 2010 report by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) on UNAMID found that at 12 of the 33 team sites, communications and information technology staff were performing camp management services, and reported an overall lack of

logistics and mission support personnel (OIOS, 2010, p. 13). The OIOS team also flagged that in the absence of logistical teams to construct proper warehousing facilities, equipment and materials were at times stored improperly, posing a 'high' operational risk (OIOS, 2010, Annexe, p. iii). When reviewing operational challenges that plagued UNAMID, Agwai (2010, p. 5) states that enablers (engineers, transports, and logistics personnel) were not able to be deployed ahead of battalions as planned. AMIS was particularly dependent on outside contractors for meeting its logistical needs, such as providing accommodation and support infrastructure for its troops, which negatively impacted deployment rates.

The increase in violence on the ground and the intensification of intercommunal conflicts also translated into a higher number of attacks on peacekeepers, and occasionally into diversion as a result of battlefield capture. In mid-July 2008 all UNAMID policing activities were suspended for over two weeks due to the worsening security situation in the country and the increased frequency and lethality of attacks on UNAMID (UNSC, 2008b, para. 22). Furthermore, due to the insecure environment at the end of 2008, some local contractors reportedly refused to transport UNAMID assets (UNSC, 2008a, para. 11). The UN Secretary-General's report reviewing the UNAMID mission in 2014 concluded that

> *in 2013, [the mission] suffered 19 attacks, resulting in 16 dead and 27 injured [peacekeepers] and a significant loss of vehicles, weapons and ammunition* (UNSC, 2014c, para. 1).

The rise in violence in South Sudan at the end of 2013 further pinpointed other operational limitations of the force:

> *The UNMISS military was largely based in former garrison towns, and some of these deployments tended to remain close to base rather than regularly visiting communities, especially the more remote ones* (Fenton and Loughna, 2013).

The troops' own perception of their safety and capabilities also shapes their response and action plans. Attacks with high casualty rates take a toll on troop morale. A 2008 *Economist* article argued that the rehatting of AU troops to UNAMID forces was hampered by demoralized soldiers having weathered the

troubles of previous missions and who suffered a series of fatalities prior to the change (*Economist*, 2008). The article also underlines that even where adequate equipment is present, demoralized troops will have a harder time engaging on the battlefield (*Economist*, 2008).

Besides contextual factors, such as the size of the country, difficult terrain, and the periodic spikes in violence, peace operations in Sudan and South Sudan are also affected by endogenous factors, such as the amount and conditions of their armament. According to UN regulations, COE is the responsibility of the TCC. However, given the skewed contribution of TCCs to the peace operations in Sudan, the burden is often shouldered by countries that lack the military capabilities to equip their troops to UN standards. According to Gelot (2014, p. 29), 'a regional actor that cannot bear the costs itself has to rely on bilateral pledges to support, which may not be reliable', further deepening the problems of mission arming and deployment. A shortage of aviation and vehicular assets, as well as financial and administrative constraints, hampered AMIS operations. According to then-AU force commander, Lt Gen. Agwai, after the Haskanita attack in 2007 African TCCs could only provide troops able to support themselves for six months, and added that 'there's no African country that can have the equipment we need for example in air assets', not even Nigeria (which had a good record) (*Sudan Tribune*, 2007).

The poor serviceability of armament and weapons systems poses further operational challenges. An analysis of Nigerian COE concluded that in 2012, 'out of over 45 APCs [armoured personnel carriers] for four battalions of 800 troops, less than seven were serviceable' and military and police contingents could not 'meet up to 20 per cent of the contingent-owned equipment required by the UN' (El-Rufai, 2012). El-Rufai (2012) argues that this lack in equipment and funds impacted negatively on the ability of patrols to resist attacks, such as the one in February 2010 when a Nigerian patrol was stopped and disarmed, and its APCs seized 'without any resistance'. The 2014 UNAMID review has found that the serviceability rates for major equipment, such as APCs, was below 90 per cent for 20 out of 27 military units deployed as of 2013, and for 5 units these rates reach below 44 per cent (UNSC, 2014c, para. 32). In other cases heavy armament was reportedly lacking or in poor condition. Similarly, of the 17 FPUs, five were found to fall

well below operational requirements: one armoured personnel carrier unit has a serviceability rate of 50 per cent, another has a rate of 20 per cent and three have a rate of 0 per cent (UNSC, 2014c, para. 32).

This situation is by no means unique to UNAMID. Low serviceability rates also plagued the AU-led missions in Darfur (which further suffered from severe armament shortages), which impaired their ability to protect their assets effectively.

Besides lack of armaments, peacekeepers operating in Sudan faced administrative and financial challenges that affected both operations and troop morale. In March 2007 the AMIS base in Abeche reportedly lacked lines of communication (hampered by no Internet connectivity) and was forced to rely on access provided by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or local French forces. It also had only eight operational vehicles, with few spare parts, and had to overcome other operational obstacles, such as broken generators, inadequate medical support, and a chronic lack of funds. Delays in payments of AU allowances to peacekeepers in AMIS missions negatively affected morale. On one occasion the troops had not received their mission subsistence allowance for six months (Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015).

Tactical-level challenges

At a tactical level, peace operations can face challenges in the everyday management of operations on the ground. In Sudan and South Sudan peacekeepers are often confronted by armed groups that are well if not superiorly armed. Shortfalls in the operational capabilities of peacekeeping contingents and patrols operating in Sudan and South Sudan severely limit the force's 'mobility, effectiveness and ability to deter attacks' (UNSC, 2014c, pp. 8–9). AMIS peacekeepers have long been considered to have been both outnumbered and outgunned by rebel groups with access to more firepower and advanced weaponry, due to the operational challenges that plagued the mission (Luqman and Omede, 2012; Mansaray, 2009). 'Janjaweed' forces, for example, possessed weapons that included the truck-mounted NSV 12.7 × 108 mm heavy machine gun and the 122 mm Sakr-30 multiple rocket launcher (Feldman, 2008, p. 269). Also, as UNAMID force commander Lt Gen. Nyamvumba stated in a January 2013 interview, a majority of casualties incurred by peacekeepers in Sudan were the result of ambushes, which are particularly difficult to react to (Abdulrahman, 2013).

To conduct patrolling missions effectively, peacekeepers require advanced knowledge of local dynamics. Lt Gen. Nyamvumba declared that before entering areas that experienced tribal conflicts, peacekeepers must know about the ethnic composition of the area, the tribal leadership, and the incompatibilities with other ethnic groups in the vicinity (Abdulrahman, 2013). This information can allow for better tactical responses in the field and also for measures to be taken to prevent diversion (by adjusting the size or weaponry of patrols).

Political tensions with the host government erect barriers to the timely deployment or import of logistical supplies, including weaponry, which severely impedes the ability of peacekeepers to perform their daily duties. In AMIS 105 APCs donated by the Canadian government in June 2005 were only allowed entry into Darfur after four Nigerian peacekeepers moving in a soft-shell vehicle were killed by the SLA on 8 October 2005 (two missing peacekeepers were also later found dead); these APCs reached the peacekeepers in December (Gelot, 2014, pp. 120–21). A 2014 Secretary-General's report reviewing the challenges faced by UNAMID concluded that delays in customs clearances for COE further 'constrained the force by hindering the deployment of units and creating gaps in the force configuration' (UNSC, 2014c, para. 29). The report adds that as of mid-2014, 'clearances had been pending for an infantry reserve unit and a military utility helicopter unit since July and November 2013, respectively' (UNSC, 2014c, para. 29). Also, in the case of South Sudan, tensions between UNMISS and the government led to heavy delays and even the halt of the circulation of materials destined for peacekeepers, which originated in Port Sudan, further complicating the situation (Boutellis and Smith, 2014, p. 9).

The shortage of or insufficient equipment has been tied to attacks resulting in large losses of life, as well as the overrunning of two team sites, one during AMIS II-E in 2007 and another in UNMISS in 2013. In the case of the attack on the AMIS II-E Haskanita base camp in 2007, peacekeepers reportedly ran out of ammunition after a sustained attack from over 1,000 SLA rebels armed with rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers and APCs (*Washington Post*, 2007). Lt Gen. Agwai, the AU force commander, declared that: 'we [peacekeepers] are outgunned, we are outnumbered and we can be overrun very quickly' (*Sudan Tribune*, 2007). AMIS was plagued by multiple operational weaknesses, from lack of personnel and weapons to a shortage of transport vehicles (Amnesty International, 2007; ISS, 2007). Similar lack of air support and air assets was

also cited as the reason for the inability of UNAMID to repel an attack on 8 July 2008, which resulted in the deaths of seven peacekeepers (UNSC, 2008b, para. 38). In the midst of violence raging in South Sudan in December 2013 the Akobo base was overrun by over 2,000 Nuer youths who were targeting the Dinka who had taken refuge on the base, overwhelming the 45 peacekeepers (Goldberg, 2013). The failure of the UN to secure its own bases in Akobo and Bor in the latest crisis served to further draw attention to UNMISS's lack of operational capacity to fulfil its mandate, in terms of both personnel and armament (Hutton, 2014).

Lack of military materiel can also prevent, not just impede, ground operations. Observers have questioned the absence of UNMISS peacekeepers from the streets of Juba in the first days of the ethnic conflict. An UNMISS source declared that '[peacekeepers] would have been "outgunned and outnumbered" if they had tried to intervene in the fighting between rival groups' (Goldberg, 2013). This example showcases the difficult balancing act that peacekeepers must perform between fulfilling their mandate and the responsibility to protect clause, and avoiding casualties that would only dissuade TCCs from committing more troops on the ground. Furthermore, scarce resources affect day-to-day operations. A 2014 UN Secretary-General's report on UNMISS stated that much of the mission's engineering capability is provided by five military engineering companies, whose capacities have been greatly overstretched (UNSC, 2014b, para. 64).

Diversion incidents

Attacks on peacekeepers

Despite a prohibition under international humanitarian law, the personnel of peace operations often come under attack;[64] this was certainly the case for those who served in AU and UN missions in Sudan and South Sudan. As of April 2015 more than 700 UN Blue Helmets had lost their lives in the 60-plus UN peacekeeping operations authorized since 1948 (UN DPKO, 2015c) due to malicious acts,[65] of whom more than 80 served in UNMIS, UNAMID, UNISFA, or UNMISS (UN DPKO, 2015d).[66] More than 25 Green Helmets lost their lives due to hostile actions in AMIS I, AMIS II, or AMIS II-E (Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015).

The Survey has documented more than 100 attacks on Blue and Green Helmets in 5 of the 7 AU and UN missions in Sudan and South Sudan from 2005 to 2014. The two IGAD missions (the VMT and MVM), the JMC, and the CPMT were unarmed and therefore lost no arms or ammunition. (According to the JMC's force commander, the mission was allowed to deploy with arms or ammunition, but he chose not to do so.)[67] A distilled account of these incidents appears in Annexe B. This listing should be seen as indicative of the challenges peacekeepers

Box 3 **The Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset: making sense of disparate and incomplete data**

The dataset does not aim to be exhaustive or comprehensive of diversion in peace operations. When the data is contradictory (two or more sources have different accounts of the same incident) the sources with the highest reliability and more complete information are prioritized. This dataset is not intended to give a systematic account of attacks on peacekeepers and draw conclusions on the incidence of diversion. Rather, it aims to better understand the cases and circumstances in which diversion occurs, and the scale and scope of lives and materiel lost.

Type of source	Availability	Sources
UN and AU reports, press releases, and updates	Open source	UN Security Council documents, UN DPKO documents, OIOS reports, AU documents, UN Panel of Experts embargo reports, UN and AU press releases, UNHCR and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs documents
Media reports	Open source	Local, regional, and international press (e.g. BBC, AFP, Reuters, *Sudan Tribune*)
Academic sources	Open source	Books and academic articles by scholars and experts in the field of peacekeeping
Blogs and Internet sources	Open source	Expert blogs written by analysts or former peacekeepers/military with first-hand experience; papers from military academies or organizations working on peacekeeping or Sudan/South Sudan
Key informant interviews	Not openly available	Key informant interviews (more than 100 conducted since 2008, with most taking place between 2013 and 2015, including in Accra, Addis Ababa, Berlin, Cape Town, Geneva, Jos, Juba, Kigali, Nairobi, New York, and Washington, DC)

face and is not comprehensive. The record of events is based on the Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset (see Box 3), which is an aggregation of data on attacks on Blue and Green Helmets resulting in possible or documented material losses. It draws on a variety of open-source data (such as official reports of the UN, AU, and affiliated bodies; media reports; and academic research), as well as original data generated from key informant interviews.

Not all attacks result in the loss of materiel, and when equipment has been taken it has not always involved arms and ammunition. Non-lethal materiel includes communications equipment, vehicles, fuel, and uniforms. This paper focuses on the loss of arms and ammunition, but mentions other material, although not methodically.

The loss of weapons or ammunition does not automatically translate into an incident of diversion. In some cases weapons are lost in circumstances that make them unusable or unlikely to recirculate. For example, on 27 June 2012 peacekeepers from the Rwandan contingent of UNAMID drowned in unclear circumstances, resulting in the loss of 1 medium machine gun, 1 sub-machine gun, and 2 chains with 500 rounds of machine gun ammunition. Similarly, on 26 August 2012 three Tanzanian peacekeepers on route to Misterei, 50 km from al Geneina, drowned when their APC became stranded in a swollen river. According to key informant data, the materiel they were carrying—a small number of AK-type assault rifles and accompanying small-calibre ammunition—was not recovered. In this case, since the loss of weapons does not clearly result in unauthorized possession or use by another actor (according to the definition used in this paper), it does not qualify as an instance of diversion.

Small-scale diversions are recorded in the Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, but they are not used in the current analysis. By 'small-scale' we mean an incident in which nine or fewer arms or less than 500 rounds of ammunition are lost. Almost 40 such instances of diversion of weapons, ammunition, and vehicles have been documented in the current dataset. Although the amount of material lost in single cases is not sizable, this is probably not negligible, given the frequency of attacks. From 29 October 2008 to 3 January 2009, for example, UNAMID encountered a series of such incidents (see Box 4). Opportunistic vehicle thefts occurred frequently in the vicinity of bases or refugee camps where peace mission forces are stationed. For instance, on 14 April 2007 an AMIS vehicle was seized at the entrance of the AU compound in Nyala (UNSC, 2007c, para. 5).

Box 4 **Ten weeks in UNAMID: the significance of small-scale attacks on peacekeepers**

Four incidents over a ten-week period underscore the challenging environment that peacekeepers face and the materiel they frequently lose. On 29 October 2008 nine South African peacekeepers guarding a water point near Kutum were attacked. One peacekeeper was killed and another injured, while one light machine gun and 200 rounds of ammunition were taken. On 9 November a Nigerian patrol was ambushed between its camp and Al Geneina and one vehicle was seized. On 27 December one peacekeeper was killed while on patrol with others near Al Fasher. One AK-type assault rifle and an unspecified vehicle were seized on this occasion. A few days later, on 3 January 2009, a vehicle carrying six members of the Nigerian contingent was carjacked. Three assault rifles and 180 rounds of ammunition were taken in the incident.

Source: Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset (2015)

This analysis focuses on large-scale—or 'notable'—losses resulting from attacks on peacekeepers or their materiel. A notable incident for the purposes of this paper includes the seizure or loss of either ten or more weapons or 500 or more rounds of ammunition. The Survey further distinguishes among three types—or categories—of notable incidents according to the number of weapons and amount of ammunition captured during an individual event: Category I (10–49 weapons or 500–2,499 rounds of ammunition); Category II (50–99 weapons or 2,500–4,999 rounds of ammunition); and Category III (100+ weapons or 5,000+ rounds of ammunition). Only one of the two conditions has to be met to qualify for a particular category. When criteria are met that cover both weapon and ammunition thresholds, the classification corresponds to the higher of the two categories. Thus, an incident involving 25 weapons and 3,000 rounds of ammunition would constitute a Category II (or Cat. II) event.

This paper records 22 notable incidents of diversion (see Map 3). The geographical concentration of notable diversion events varies, with a majority of documented incidents located in North and South Darfur, and to a lesser extent in West Darfur. A handful of incidents involving UNMISS took place in South Sudan.

Not all incidents are fully documented. Some assumptions are made when accounts do not provide details and official sources could or would not provide the requested information. In each instance numbers based on assumptions are


Map 3 Notable incidents of diverted arms and ammunition from AU and UN missions in Sudan and South Sudan, 2005–14
EGYPT
Red Sea
NORTHERN
RED SEA
CHAD
SUDAN
NILE
NORTH DARFUR
KHARTOUM
KASSALA
Khartoum
NORTH KORDOFAN
GEZIRA
GEDAREF
WEST DARFUR
WHITE NILE
SENNAR
ETHIOPIA
CENTRAL DARFUR
Al Odaiya
BLUE NILE
EAST DARFUR
SOUTH DARFUR
WEST KORDOFAN
SOUTH KORDOFAN
20.04.08 UNAMID
Abyei
UPPER NILE
NORTHERN BAHR AL GHAZAL
UNITY
19.12.13 UNMISS
SOUTH SUDAN
WESTERN BAHR AL GHAZAL
WARRAP
JONGLEI
Akobo
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Rumbek
05.03.14 UNMISS
LAKES
Gumuruk
09.04.13 UNMISS
WESTERN EQUATORIA
Juba
EASTERN EQUATORIA
CENTRAL EQUATORIA
DRC
KENYA
Source: SAS Diversion Dataset based on assessments carried out through June 2015. Category types and place names are sometimes based on assumptions or represent approximations. See Annexe B for further details.
0 km 200


Category I
10-49 weapons or
500-2,499 rounds of ammo
Category II
50-99 weapons or
2,500-4,999 rounds of ammo
Category III
100+ weapons or
5000+ rounds of ammo
International boundary
State boundary
Abyei
National capital
The higher category is selected even if only one criterion is met.
CHAD
SUDAN
NORTH DARFUR
WEST DARFUR
CENTRAL DARFUR
SOUTH DARFUR
EAST DARFUR
CAR
SOUTH SUDAN
Tine
Um Baru
Abdel Shakur
Sindy
Kulbus
Korma
Lwabit
Um Hakhibah
Menawashe
Nama
Kawara
Khor Abeche
Shearia
Saleah
Haskanita
Al Sharif
El Daein
Angabou
09.10.05 AMIS II-E
16.10.14 UNAMID
29.11.05 AMIS II-E
09.01.10 UNAMID
05.03.10 UNAMID
29.02.12 UNAMID
21.01.12 UNAMID
16.02.10 UNAMID
12.08.13 UNAMID
01.04.07 AMIS II-E
06.07.06 AMIS II-E
08.02.14 UNAMID
19.08.06 AMIS II-E
08.07.08 UNAMID
08.10.05 AMIS II-E
13.07.13 UNAMID
29.09.07 AMIS II-E
25.08.05 AMIS II-E
0 km 100

Box 5 **The decision to err on the side of caution: five possible additional 'notable incidents'**

- **6 January 2006 (Girgira, West Darfur):** A Senegalese contingent of 30 peacekeepers was ambushed in Girgira, 20 km from Kulbus, while returning from an escort mission. The deadly attack resulted in one soldier being killed and ten others wounded. The UNMIS press release and media coverage make no reference to military materiel being seized. However, they do mention that this was the second ambush of an AU peacekeeping force after the attack on 29 November 2005, in which four Senegalese soldiers were injured, an event that after further investigation was revealed as a Category II diversion incident. Given the violence of the exchange, questions remain as to whether the assailants managed to also seize weapons, ammunition, or vehicles from the convoy.
- **10 April 2007 (Kube, North Darfur):** A Rwandan contingent was ambushed while patrolling near the Kube water point. One peacekeeper died and two were injured during the assault, and one vehicle was also reportedly captured. Although there is no information about the weapons or other equipment involved, the seizure of one vehicle raises the question whether any other materiel was also captured and if the vehicle itself was fitted with any weapons or stored any ammunition on board.
- **19 February 2012 (Shegeg Tova, North Darfur):** A UNAMID patrol of 50 Senegalese troops, three police advisers, and two language assistants was blockaded for nearly two days by over 100 JEM forces. Although released after the first day, the troops refused to leave without the police advisers and interpreters, and on the second day, after extensive negotiations and the arrival of reinforcements, all 55 were allowed to leave. What remains unclear from the accounts, however, was whether the troops were also disarmed during their detention and, if so, what happened to the materiel after the blockade was lifted.
- **2 October 2012 (Al Geneina, West Darfur):** Thirty Nigerian infantry travelled to Al Geneina by road to deliver an APC. The Survey understands that the APC was delivered successfully and without incident. On the way back the peacekeepers came under attack. It is not clear how many vehicles and troops were engaged. What is known is that UNAMID suffered 12 casualties—four of whom died. A team of Nigerians arrived within 30 minutes to help the injured. It is not clear if the attackers seized any materiel.
- **14 December 2014 (Gharabshi, South Darfur):** According to the *Sudan Tribune* an unidentified armed group ambushed two UNAMID military vehicles in Nateega county, not far from Gharabshi. The peacekeepers were reportedly stripped of their belongings, including their weapons, while two vehicles were carjacked. The newspaper provided few details (mentioning neither the number of peacekeepers involved nor their nationality), but intriguingly wrote that the incident was 'similar to the ambush' UNAMID suffered on 5 March 2010 at Kawara village near Jebel Marra, which the Survey knows was a Category III notable incident.

Source: Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset (2015)

clearly differentiated from those that are based on reports. In each instance assumptions seek to minimize the scale of the loss—within reason—and to err on the side of caution.[68] Indeed, the Survey has chosen not to make assumptions about several events that might well constitute notable incidents, but are not among the 22 listed below (see Box 5 for just five such examples).

To give a comprehensive picture of diversion, the empirical analysis of notable incidents is organized in three sub-sections, according to the missions' authorizing bodies.

Notable incidents in AU-led missions

The AU mission AMIS II-E experienced a series of notable diversion incidents of various magnitudes during its operations in Darfur (see Table 3). The Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset documents eight notable incidents, five of which are located in North Darfur, ranging from Category I to Category III diversions.

2005 saw a series of attacks on peacekeepers that resulted in the diversion of military materiel. The first event took place on 25 August 2005 near Angabou, East Darfur, when a patrol was attacked by armed assailants. One assault rifle was reportedly seized, and we estimate that 500 rounds of ammunition were also taken. On 8 October 2005, on the road from Menawashe to Khor Abeche, which is notorious for banditry, a patrol returning to base encountered two vehicles whose drivers had been killed by around 20 bandits armed with AK-type rifless. An exchange of fire ensued that led to the deaths of six peacekeepers (four on the spot and two missing, later found dead) and the wounding of four others. The assailants seized six AK-type rifles and one general-purpose machine gun (GPMG) from the peacekeepers, and the rifles of the two missing peacekeepers, who were later found dead 600 m from the site of the attack. The amount of ammunition also seized remains unclear, although we estimate it to be between 250 and 600 rounds. Also in 2005 there was an attack on peacekeepers in Kulbus, West Darfur, on 29 November 2005, when an AMIS patrol was ambushed by unidentified men as it was returning from an investigative patrol. Five peacekeepers were injured in the attack and the assailants escaped into nearby Chad with 9 M16 rifles, 1 self-loading pistol, and 1 M60 machine gun, as well as an AMIS vehicle (*Sudan Tribune*, 2005b).

AMIS also experienced a more significant incident in Tine, North Darfur, on 9 October 2005. According to a key informant interview, a patrol of 18 Senegalese troops reportedly left Tine (in Sector 5) that morning for Nana. Along the way they were abducted by JEM or NMRD soldiers, and the team leader and his interpreter were separated from the group. Later that day 20 Senegalese troops went to rescue them, but they were also detained. All 38 Senegalese troops were disarmed and six vehicles were also seized. The peacekeepers were released the following day without their weapons, which were not subsequently recovered, although three of the six vehicles were later recovered. Although no official figures on the losses registered have been made available, based on deployment patterns and interview data, we estimated that 1 self-loading pistol, 38 assault rifles, 10 machine guns, 5 anti-tank weapons, and 7,000+ rounds of ammunition were seized (Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015).

In another incident, on 6 July 2006, which can be classified as a Category III incident, an AMIS convoy escorting two fuel tankers to Anabegi was hijacked and disarmed by 45 SLA armed militias. The patrol was made up of 37 troops, 2 PAE drivers, 1 interpreter, 2 PAE fuel tankers, and 4 vehicles. The attackers captured 38 rifles and took the 2 fuel tankers, as well as 4 AMIS vehicles. We estimate that in addition the assailants also seized 1 self-loading pistol, 9 machine guns, some anti-tank weapons, and over 6,000 rounds of ammunition (ReliefWeb, 2006; UNSC, 2006c, Annexe III).

In 2007 AMIS peacekeepers withstood numerous attacks, some of which resulted in large-scale diversions, while others did not involve any equipment losses. On 1 April 2007 an AMIS unit was ambushed by unidentified armed men while guarding a water point in Um Baru, 220 km from Al Fasher in North Darfur (UNMIS, 2007, p. 1). Five Senegalese peacekeepers were killed and materiel seized. The assailants captured a Toyota Land Cruiser mounted with a machine gun, an M203 grenade launcher, and an M16 assault rifle, as well as assorted ammunition that we estimate to be more than 500 rounds. AMIS II-E was plagued by numerous operational and tactical challenges that inhibited its ability to counter or prevent diversion effectively. A culmination was the overrunning of the Haskanita base in 2007, when peacekeepers were overwhelmed in terms of both numbers and firepower (see Box 6).

Table 3 **Notable diversion incidents in AMIS II-E, 2005–07**

Date	Location	Materiel lost (*italics = estimates*)*	Type
25 August 2005	Angabou, East Darfur	1 assault rifle, *500+ rounds of ammunition*	Cat. I
8 October 2005	Menawashe, South Darfur	8 assault rifles, 1 machine gun, *500+ rounds of ammunition*	*Cat. I*
9 October 2005	Tine, North Darfur	*1 self-loading pistol*, 38 assault rifles, *10 machine guns, 5 anti-tank weapons, 7,000+ rounds of ammunition*, 6 vehicles	*Cat. III*
29 November 2005	Kulbus, West Darfur	1 self-loading pistol, 9 assault rifles, 1 machine gun, *2,500+ rounds of ammunition*, 1 vehicle	*Cat. II*
6 July 2006	*Abdel Shakur*, North Darfur	*1 self-loading pistol*, 38 assault rifles, *9 machine guns, anti-tank weapons, 6,000+ rounds of ammunition*, 4 vehicles, 2 fuel tankers	*Cat. III*
19 August 2006	Lwabit, North Darfur	7 assault rifles, *500+ rounds of ammunition*	*Cat. I*
1 April 2007	Um Baru, North Darfur	1 assault rifle, 1 machine gun, 1 grenade launcher, *500+ rounds of ammunition*	Cat. I
29 September 2007	Haskanita, North Darfur**	*3 self-loading pistols, 50+ assault rifles, 24 machine guns, 18 mortars, 24 anti-tank weapons, 100,000+ rounds of ammunition*, 6 APCs, 11 vehicles	*Cat. III*

* Estimates are based on the circumstances of the attacks, key informant interviews, and accompanying assumptions where specific data has not been obtained. Where the estimate is responsible for changing the category of the event, this is also marked with italics.

** Some sources located Haskanita in South Darfur in 2007.

Source: Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset (2015)

Box 6 **Haskanita attack, 29 September 2007**

The attack on the Haskanita base camp was significant because of the magnitude of the casualties (12 peacekeepers were killed and eight injured), the amount of military equipment diverted, the attack's strategic significance (the first overrunning of an AMIS base camp), and the extensiveness of looting and destruction that ensued. Some witness testimonies claimed that the attack on Haskanita was retaliatory, due to the inability or unwillingness of AMIS to intervene decisively to restore the peace between the SLA/JEM and the GoS, particularly after the 29 September bombing of a neighbouring village killed a number of civilians. A subsequent AU investigation suggested that the actual purpose for the attack was the replenishing of logistic stocks, which had been depleted in earlier clashes with GoS forces.

The incident was a particularly deadly one for AMIS. On 29 September 2007 Military Group Site Haskanita, which hosted 157 peacekeepers, was attacked and overrun by anywhere between 300 and 1,000 JEM and SLA forces aboard vehicles carrying JEM insignia who were armed with 106 mm recoilless guns, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft guns (14.5 mm), and rifles. Of the Nigerian peacekeepers on site, armed with AK-type rifles, 12 were killed and several others injured in the gun fight that ensued. The superior firepower of the attackers, the element of surprise, and the timing of the attack (during the rites of breaking the Ramadan fast) gave them a tactical advantage.

The narrative of the attack paints a picture of the tactical and operational difficulties encountered by peacekeepers once the base had been breached. Thus, according to eyewitness accounts, on entering the gates the JEM and SLA forces destroyed the radio room with a 106 mm gun and seized the other hand-held radios. This tactical move, together with the lack of communications equipment on site (the site possessed only one serviceable Thuraya phone, in the possession of the MilOb operations officer) severely impeded the ability of peacekeepers to coordinate their defence or ask for reinforcement from El Daein, 93 km away. A number of peacekeepers returned fire, while others sought shelter outside the base, with or without their firearms.

The looting and vandalizing of the Haskanita base camp were notable, as was the amount of military equipment diverted on this occasion. After overcoming the last resistance on site, the attackers seized cash, fuel, 16 trucks, food, and unspecified amounts of small arms and ammunition. Although the exact number of weapons and amount of ammunition taken remain unconfirmed, the presence of a looted 20 ft. container on site suggests that the losses in military equipment were great. Since the base was hosting 157 peacekeepers and 30 or so MilObs and other staff at the time, weapons captured by the attackers probably included a majority of the rifles (Kalashnikov-pattern) and handguns (mostly 9 mm self-loading pistols), as well as crew-served machine guns on site, as well as mortars and anti-tank weapons. According to eyewitnesses, some peacekeepers reportedly fled the camp with their weapons and some even buried them to avoid having to hand them over to the rebels. Yet a large number of peacekeepers were disarmed and all other weapons and ammunition in the base's armoury were looted. This makes Haskanita a likely Category III diversion incident, because more than 100 weapons and an estimated 100,000 rounds of ammunition were seized (assuming 500 rounds of ammunition per soldier, 200 rounds of ammunition per machine gun, and around 10,000 rounds for vehicle-mounted machine guns). Additionally, one APC was completely destroyed after it was set on fire and others were made unserviceable. After the JEM and SLA forces withdrew, local villagers continued the looting of the base, taking beds, mattresses, chairs, and equipment, essentially making the site unusable for future missions.

Source: ICC (2014); Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset (2015); AU (2007, paras. 7, 10, 11)

Besides military materiel, some attacks particularly targeted fuel. Thus, on 19 August 2006 an AMIS protection force escorting a convoy of 27 fuel tankers that belonged to the Matthews Petroleum company was ambushed. The attack resulted in the deaths of two Rwandan peacekeepers and the injuring of three others. On that occasion the attackers seized seven weapons (probably assault rifles), an estimated 500+ rounds of ammunition, and communications equipment from the peacekeepers. They commandeered 18 fuel tankers, abducting their drivers in the process.

Notable incidents in UNAMID

UNAMID has experienced the largest number of 'notable' incidents of diversion on record. Unlike AMIS, where the largest diversion involved the looting of mission stockpiles, the large-scale events in UNAMID involve patrols and resupply convoys (see Table 4). In addition, UNAMID also registered numerous small-scale incidents of diversion during patrols, as well as carjackings. In 2013 the mission reportedly conducted around 150 patrols a day (UNAMID, 2013), which is a high circulation of armed peacekeepers in insecure territory. Some of these patrols were stopped, attacked, and at times relieved of their weapons and ammunition. Although most of the time patrol seizures tend to be small, with a handful of personal weapons and spare magazines being surrendered, occasionally large patrols will lose larger-calibre weapons, anti-tank weapons, and dozens of firearms.

Attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers are not always committed by rebels for the purpose of diverting weapons. In certain circumstances attacks are strategic, meant as deterrent, or as a justification for denying peacekeepers' access to insecure zones at a later date. Sources inside UNAMID argued that

> *on 7 January 2008, one week after the deployment of the mission, the Sudanese Armed Forces fired at the first UNAMID resupply convoy near Tine in Northern Darfur, injuring a civilian driver* (Elbasri, 2014).

Although eyewitnesses reported that the assailants were in fact GoS troops, UNAMID did not officially identify them as such (Elbasri, 2014; Reeves, 2008).

Some attacks on patrols are premeditated, showing signs of careful planning and organization. This was the conclusion reached by a UNAMID panel about

an attack on one of the mission's patrols on 8 July 2008 near Um Hakhibah in North Darfur. The convoy, composed of 13 vehicles (including APCs) and carrying 51 Rwandan peacekeepers, had reportedly left Shangil Tobaya for Gusa Jamat and was expected to make the return trip the same day. On the way back, at about 12 km from Gusa Jamat, the convoy was attacked by around 300 assailants in 40 vehicles. The attackers were well armed, carrying 'heavy machine guns, twin-barrel antiaircraft guns, recoilless rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars' (UNSC, 2008c). At the end of a 2-hour battle 7 UNAMID peacekeepers had been killed and 22 wounded. The attackers also seized 7 of the UNAMID vehicles (1 Land Cruiser, 3 Buffalo armoured fighting vehicles, and 3 pick-ups, with 2 of the latter fitted with heavy machine guns) and associated equipment before leaving the scene. The Survey estimates that the assailants also captured at least 10 assault rifles, 1–2 machine guns, and over 500 rounds of ammunition.

In one of the deadliest incidents involving UNAMID peacekeepers, a convoy of 63 Tanzanian peacekeepers on a routine patrol was attacked by an unknown group on 13 July 2013 near Khor Abeche, South Darfur. The attack resulted in seven deaths and 17 injuries. Although the patrol was extracted by reinforcements from the Khor Abeche and Menawashe team sites, the attackers seized sizable quantities of small arms and light weapons carried by the peacekeepers (UN News Centre, 2013a). More specifically, they seized 24 AK-type assault rifles, 4 machine guns, 1 anti-tank weapon, 500+ rounds of ammunition, and more than 150 40 mm rocket grenades. Subsequently, the Tanzanian military, who were supplying 875 peacekeepers at the time to UNAMID, asked permission for its peacekeepers to be allowed to use heavy weapons (APCs, artillery, and helicopters) to better defend themselves and fulfil their mission parameters (Sabahi Online, 2013).

The mission registered two documented larger-scale (Category III) diversion incidents from 2008 to 2012, according to our working dataset. The first involved the Raiba Trans resupply convoy (see Box 7), while the other involved a large patrol—a UNAMID patrol of 63 mostly Nigerian peacekeepers that was ambushed on 5 March 2010 at Kawara near Jebel Marra in South Darfur. The peacekeepers were released after 24 hours, although without their equipment,

Table 4 **Notable diversion incidents in UNAMID, 2008–14**

Date	Location	Materiel lost (*italics = estimates*)*	Type
20 April 2008	Al Odaiya, West Kordofan	600,000+ rounds of ammunition	Cat. III
8 July 2008	Um Hakhibah, North Darfur	*10+ assault rifles,* *1–2 machine guns,* *500+ rounds of ammunition,* 7 vehicles	*Cat. I*
9 January 2010	Nama, Central Darfur	*500+ rounds of ammunition*	*Cat. I*
16 February 2010	Al Sharif, South Darfur	*7 assault rifles,* *500+ rounds of ammunition,* 2 vehicles	*Cat. I*
5 March 2010	Kawara, South Darfur	55 assault rifles, 8 machine guns, 4 RPGs, 14,000+ rounds of ammunition, 13 rockets, 6 vehicles	Cat. III
21 January 2012	n/a** (near Saleah), East Darfur	23 assault rifles, 2 machine guns, 2,500+ rounds of ammunition	Cat. II
29 February 2012	Shearia, East Darfur	8 assault rifles, 1 machine gun, *1,000+* rounds of ammunition	*Cat. I*
13 July 2013	Khor Abeche, South Darfur	24 assault rifles, 4 machine guns, 1 rocket launcher, 500+ rounds of ammunition, 150+ RPG-series projectiles, 1 vehicle	Cat. I
12 August 2013	El Daein, East Darfur	7 assault rifles, 500+ rounds of ammunition, 1 APC, 2 out of 6 vehicles taken	Cat. I
8 February 2014	Sindy, North Darfur	37 assault rifles, 4 machine guns, *3,500+ rounds of ammunition*, 3 vehicles	*Cat. II*
16 October 2014	Korma, North Darfur	*7 assault rifles,* *500+ rounds of ammunition,* 1 vehicle	*Cat. I*

* Estimates are based on the circumstances of the attacks, key informant interviews, and accompanying assumptions where specific data has not been obtained. Where the estimate is responsible for changing the category of the event, this is also marked with italics.

** Non-applicable: refers to unknown location and unknown or disputed facts.

Source: Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset (2015)

firearms, and vehicles (*Sudan Tribune*, 2010). On this occasion UNAMID lost 55 AK-type rifles, 8 GPMGs, 4 RPG launchers, 13 RPG rockets, over 14,000 rounds of ammunition, and 6 vehicles (Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015). Armed gunmen claiming to be with the SLA-AW faction carried out the attack (UNAMID, 2014, p. 11).

The weapons that are most commonly seized are small arms, including Kalashnikov-pattern rifles and related ammunition, although rockets have also been reportedly captured, as well as larger machine guns. On 29 February 2012 unidentified armed men attacked a Nigerian UNAMID contingent comprising 31 solders of Nigerian Battalion 31, 9 UNPOL officers, and 1 MilOb, killing 1 peacekeeper and injuring 3. They also captured 1 gun truck with a mounted GPMG, 8 assault rifles (Kalashnikov-pattern), and over 1,000 rounds of ammunition, as well as other equipment (uniforms, communications devices, and money).

Small-scale incidents of diversion that are below Category I thresholds (i.e. losses below ten weapons or 500 rounds of ammunition) have also been

Box 7 **Raiba Trans incident, 20 April 2008**

The largest incident of diversion in our working database occurred on 20 April 2008. A shipment of 5.8 x 42 mm and 9 mm ammunition (some reports also mention 12.7 mm ammunition) by the Raiba Trans Sudan private company was attacked on its way from El Obeid to Nyala. Twelve-and-a-half tons of ammunition of Chinese COE destined for UNAMID peacekeepers were reportedly stolen: 400+ cases, containing 5.8 x 42 mm rifle cartridges, 26 mm signal flares, and 9 mm pistol cartridges. In total, over 600,000 rounds of ammunition were seized on this one occasion. Key informant interview data suggests that the necessary security elements and verification procedures had not been put in place in this case, which played a large part in increasing the risk of diversion. Also, unlike other attacks whose intended purpose was the diversion of military equipment and replenishing of stocks by armed groups, in the Raiba Trans case the hijackers did not know about the content of the containers until they had stopped and searched the convoy, at which point they discovered the ammunition.

The scale of the Raiba Trans incident is significant not only in absolute terms, but also due to its value in supporting the operations of a medium-sized rebel group. Thus, the 600,000 rounds of ammunition captured during this ground transfer could be enough to cover the minimum use of over 800 soldiers (if we apply the UN formula for calculating ammunition requirements of 720 rounds per person for a rifle/carbine for 12 months of service).

Sources: Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset (2015); UN (2002, p. 17)

recorded. Thus, on 20 August 2012 two Jordanian FPU personnel were abducted. The abductors seized an M16 series assault rifle and 120 rounds of 5.56 × 45 mm ammunition. Also, on 2 September 2012 a Nigerian patrol was attacked and lost four AK-type rifles and 210 rounds of 7.62 × 39 mm ammunition.

Not all notable incidents of diversion gain attention or visibility in the press. For instance, the disarming of a UNAMID military patrol in February 2014 was virtually unreported in the media, although it was included in the Secretary-General's report. This lack of reporting obscures the circumstances of the attack. The Secretary-General's report states that unidentified assailants disarmed a UNAMID military logistics patrol on 8 February 2014 at Sindy in North Darfur. Thirty-seven small arms, four light machine guns, unspecified quantities of ammunition and assorted battle gear, and three vehicles were diverted as a result (UNSC, 2014e, para. 24). Similarly, on 21 January 2012 a Nigerian contingent was ambushed while on patrol in East Darfur on the road from El Daein to Nyala near Saleah (*Sudan Tribune*, 2012). One peacekeeper was killed and another injured during the battle. A SAF spokesperson declared that the attackers captured '37 guns, two Dushka machine-gun and four vehicles' (*Sudan Tribune*, 2012). Key informant data showed that 23 Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles, 2 GPMGs, 40 AK-type magazines, around 1,200 7.62 mm rounds, and more than 1,400 7.62 × 51 mm rounds were seized during the attack (Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015).

Elsewhere, media sources represent some of the only publicly available accounts of diversion. Such is the example of the seizure of UNAMID vehicles in El Daein, East Darfur. On 12 August 2013 a UNAMID convoy consisting of six double-cab vehicles and one APC was attacked by a mob at a local market. The mob reportedly seized the peacekeepers' weapons, the APC, and two double-cab vehicles. A UNAMID spokesperson later confirmed the attack, but made no mention of the registered losses and confirmed the statement that peacekeepers had been injured in the attack (Radio Dabanga, 2013).

In some cases media reports may document an attack on peacekeepers where supplies were seized, without mentioning whether weapons were also taken. This was the case in an incident on 7 January 2008, when a UNAMID convoy consisting of 8 civilian fuel tankers, 2 trucks with UN markings, 1 truck

with an AMIS marking, and 10 white AMIS APCs of the UNAMID military protection forces was attacked between Um Baru and Tine in North Darfur. The Sudanese civilian driver was seriously injured, a fuel truck was destroyed, and an APC was damaged. The road convoy was on a resupply mission to UNAMID team sites in the area between Um Baru, Tine, and Kulbus. The assailants reportedly seized some of the vehicles and supplies. There is no mention of whether the peacekeepers were also disarmed or if the supplies included ammunition. Similarly, on 6 October 2008 unidentified gunmen ambushed 70 UNAMID personnel near Menawashe, South Darfur, including a protection force of 53 peacekeepers, 2 MilObs, and 13 police officers. One Nigerian peacekeeper died. No additional information was made available on the circumstances of the attack or the weapons carried by the peacekeepers.

Further attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers took place at the beginning of 2010. On 9 January a UNAMID patrol to Nama village in the Jebel Marra area was surrounded by SLA-AW forces, who reportedly confiscated their equipment. The exact types of equipment, as well as numbers, remain unknown. On 16 February a UNAMID police convoy was ambushed near al Sharif IDP camp in South Darfur. Seven Pakistani peacekeepers were reportedly injured in the fight and vehicles, cash, and mobile phones were seized. There is no information regarding the possible seizure of weapons or ammunition, but the Survey estimates that seven assault rifles and over 500 rounds of ammunition were also captured on this occasion.

Notable incidents in UN-led missions

UN-led missions in Sudan and South Sudan have also lost weapons and ammunition, although perhaps not on the same scale as the peace operations operating solely in Darfur discussed above. The UN has reported relatively few attacks as having occurred on its peacekeepers in UNMIS, UNISFA, and UNMISS. This could be due in part to less media attention and the absence of embargo panel investigations. None of the reports on Blue Helmets in UNMIS or UNISFA resulted in a notable incident of diversion (see Table 5). UNMISS, however, came under attack with greater frequency and intensity in 2013 and 2014, resulting in the loss of sizable quantities of small arms and ammunition

Table 5 **Notable diversion incidents in UNMISS, 2013–14**

Date	Location	Materiel lost (*italics = estimates*)*	Type
9 April 2013	Gumuruk, Jonglei state	7 assault rifles, *500+ rounds of ammunition*, 3 vehicles	*Cat. I*
19 December 2013	Akobo, Jonglei state	*40+ assault rifles*, *10+ machine guns*, 22,000+ rounds of ammunition	Cat. III
5 March 2014	Rumbek, Lakes state	19 assault rifles, 17 rocket launchers, 19 machine guns, 6,000+ rounds of ammunition	Cat. III

* Estimates are based on the circumstances of the attacks, key informant interviews, and accompanying assumptions where specific data has not been obtained. Where the estimate is responsible for changing the category of the event, this is also marked with italics.

Source: Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset (2015)

on at least two occasions. The overrunning and ransacking of the Akobo base in December 2013 qualifies as a particularly significant incident (see Box 8).

In April 2013 a deadly attack on an UNMISS convoy also resulted in the diversion of weapons and ammunition. On 9 April 32 Indian peacekeepers escorting a civilian convoy were ambushed by around 200 attackers near Gumuruk in Jonglei. In the fight nine peacekeepers lost their lives together with seven civilians, and many more were injured (UN News Centre, 2013b). According to key informant data, 7 INSAS assault rifles and more than 500 rounds of 5.56 × 45 mm ammunition were seized, while 3 vehicles were vandalized beyond recovery (Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015).

Just as not all attacks on peacekeepers result in equipment losses, not all losses are permanent. In some cases the missions are able to recover the weapons, ammunition, or vehicles captured. The most prominent case in UNMISS was the incident on 5 March 2014 in Rumbek, Lakes state. South Sudanese forces stopped a convoy of 11 commercial trucks, three of which were transporting mislabelled firearms and military equipment for the Ghanaian contingent in Unity state. According to a Conflict Armament Research investigation, the shipment contained

Box 8 **Akobo attack, 19 December 2013**

According to the UN, on the afternoon of 19 December 2013 around 2,000 people stormed the UNMISS base in Akobo, Jonglei. The attackers were described as armed Nuer youths. An Indian infantry platoon was stationed at the base, along with a small number of UNPOL. (Reports mention anywhere from 36 to 43 Indian military personnel at the site, plus 6 UNPOL, and 2 UN international civilian staff.) Thirty-six members of the Dinka tribe were also at the base, having sought refuge there following the outbreak of the political crisis earlier in the week. The Nuer youths targeted the Dinka at the base, killing most of them. Two Indian peacekeepers also died in the attack.

The UN reported that UNMISS peacekeepers, together with the SPLA, re-established control of the site some two hours after the attack. (The International Crisis Group quotes local government officials as describing UNMISS as having 'returned to Akobo only to "collect the bodies" and "lock the gate"', but a former UN official explained that UN safety and security protocols required the mission to evacuate its personnel and aviation assets from the site as priorities.) As a result of the attack UNMISS lost more than 20,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. Given the circumstances surrounding the hasty departure, the Survey assumes that the attackers also seized 40+ assault rifles and 10+ machine guns.

Sources: ICG (2014, pp. 25–27); Purohit (2013); UNICK (2013); Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset (2015)

> *19 Colt M16A2 assault rifles; 17 RPG-7-pattern launchers; 19 MG3 general-purpose machine guns; and 4 boxes and one bag of loose 5.56 × 45 mm ammunition, totalling around 6,800 rounds* (Conflict Armament Research, 2014, p. 5).

After a protracted political standoff these weapons were subsequently returned to UNMISS. A former UN official familiar with the event noted that the incident represented a violation of the Status of Forces Agreement and that the SPLA should be described as having 'held' the weapons, adding that this type of incident had occurred elsewhere in UNMISS and in other UN peace operations—including in Sudan (Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015).

Part III: Observations and areas for further research and engagement

Observations

As noted from the outset of this paper, placing the focus on the loss of arms and ammunition from peace operations is meant to shed light on one under-researched facet of diversion and provide policy-relevant information and analysis. The overarching goal is to make peace operations more effective and help to protect the men and women who are tasked with protecting others. This study is not intended to sensationalize the problem. (Indeed, assumptions made in the text about losses incurred during attacks on peacekeepers—when full information is not available—are made explicit and estimates have been calculated conservatively.) Neither is it intended to suggest that the challenge is large and more important than addressing other ways in which armed groups obtain materiel. While the total 'pie' of illicit weapons and ammunition held by armed groups is not possible to estimate with any precision, this research suggests that, indeed, those obtained from peacekeepers, generally speaking, represent a relatively small 'slice'. The study does, however, underline that losses of materiel are neither infrequent nor negligible, and that record keeping, reporting, and oversight can be improved.

Losses of materiel neither infrequent nor negligible

Since 2004, when peacekeeping forces first deployed in Sudan with arms and ammunition, there have been at least 22 notable diversion incidents. This number represents roughly an average of one every six months. The paper defines 'notable' as those events in which peacekeepers lose ten or more firearms or 500 or more rounds of ammunition. It has created three categories: Category I (10–49 firearms or 500–2,499 rounds of ammunition); Category II (50–99 firearms or 2,500–4,999 rounds of ammunition); and Category III (100 or more firearms or 5,000 or more rounds of ammunition).

Almost half of the 22 recorded notable incidents are classified as Category II or III incidents. One of these incidents alone resulted in the loss of more than half a million rounds of ammunition. As good luck would have it, the majority of the rounds seized in the April 2008 incident—5.8 × 42 mm—are for Chinese-manufactured firearms that are not in wide circulation with non-state armed actors. The loss of 7.62 × 39 mm ammunition used in Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles, which are ubiquitous among Sudanese armed groups, would have been far more problematic. Four other incidents probably involved losses of 10,000 cartridges or more—one of which almost certainly was in 'six figures'. Firearms seized include hundreds of pistols, assault rifles, RPG launchers, mortars, and machine guns.

Very little of this lethal equipment has been recovered. The SPLA's seizure—and subsequent return—of materiel (more than 50 firearms and 6,000 rounds of ammunition) from UNMISS in March 2014 is a notable exception. A former UN official has noted the existence of additional examples of lethal materiel having been detained and released in this way in UNMIS, UNMISS, and UNAMID, but did not disclose the amounts of materiel involved. (None of these events is recorded in the Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset.)

Recorded losses in study significantly underestimate true scale and scope

Clearly, the number of notable incidents and the amount of lost materiel recorded in this study are a significant underestimate of the true scale and scope of diversion from peace operations in Sudan and South Sudan. The way in which information is sometimes reported can be as problematic as the propensity not to report. Imperfect record keeping and a predilection not to share information or make details public result in many notable incidents going uncounted (see below).

Moreover, small-scale non-'notable' incidents, which this report did not cover, add up. The study did, however, highlight a ten-week period during which 4 attacks on UNAMID forces resulted in the loss of at least 4 assault rifles, 1 light machine gun, and 380 rounds of ammunition—as well as 2 vehicles and, more importantly, the lives of 2 peacekeepers. AU and UN peacekeepers routinely undertake dozens, if not hundreds, of patrols every day, resulting in many thousands per year. (For example, in the two-month period December 2008–

January 2009, with UNAMID's military and police deployed at less than 60 per cent of full strength, the mission undertook more than 8,000 patrols—more than five every hour, on average (UNSC, 2009, paras. 2, 3, 22).)[69] Almost all of these patrols occur without incident. But if only one-tenth of 1 per cent result in an altercation with an armed group, and if one in ten of these result in a loss of COE, this would mean that this report has not accounted for hundreds of incidents that have included losses of various magnitudes. Even if each of these incidents were not 'notable', together they would represent a significant and meaningful loss of materiel, including arms and ammunition. Thus, a better understanding of the circumstances of attacks on patrols would be useful.

Imperfect reporting and record keeping

A tendency toward rhetoric and imprecision obscures the utility of reporting. 'Ambush' is often used as a catch-all term, to the extent that it has lost any precision. For instance, as uncovered in the course of this research, the term has been used to describe an instance in which peacekeepers are accosted and asked to give up their weapons by a small and lightly armed foe; elsewhere, it describes a large attacking force of heavily armed men on horseback and with vehicles armed with machine guns—sometimes enjoying the advantage of higher ground. Furthermore, the word 'vehicles' can be used to minimize or understate the significance or existence of the materiel lost. Many non-armoured commercial vehicles serve as troop escorts or 'technicals' and are armed with medium or heavy machine guns.

Imperfect reporting and record keeping constitute another contributing factor. There is a noticeable and understandable reluctance to share bad news. Communication is sometimes made more difficult when peacekeepers are tasked with filing reports in a language that is not their mother tongue, which can reduce useful expansiveness and nuance. As noted in the report, a shortage of computers and telecommunications equipment in AMIS did not help keep the AU informed of incidents of diversion.

Oversight of recovered weapons a 'grey area'

Record keeping and oversight of weapons recovered by peacekeepers are also considered problematic. The recording of materiel recovered during formal and

mandated DDR exercises is usually fairly rigorous (even if not particularly efficacious in terms of weapons tracing). Yet there are comparatively few demands placed on record keeping or oversight of weaponry and ammunition recovered outside of DDR—such as through cordon and search operations, engagements with hostile forces, or uncovering caches. Some of this materiel is returned to the armed group from which it was taken; some is redistributed to local authorities; some may be destroyed; some may be stored for safe keeping. It is all very ad hoc. (This laissez-faire approach is apparently not limited to missions covered in this study.) In this respect, the UN Security Council's recent reaffirmation of UNISFA's mandate to destroy the arms and ammunition it confiscates is an important development.

Political sensitivities influence (non-)reporting

Political sensitivities and calculations largely explain the reticence of those in the know to divulge losses incurred in the mission area. The number of countries willing to contribute troops or police to UN or AU peace operations is limited. In December 2014 more than 70 UN member states did not provide Blue Helmets, despite demand far outstripping supply. And those countries contributing troops or police often find themselves unable to provide infantry at battalion strength (or greater) or specialized units. This goes a long way to explaining why UN and AU officials are extremely reluctant to discuss incidents of diversion. They fear what might happen if a large troop-contributing country (TCC) or police-contributing country (PCC) took umbrage at being named and decided to withdraw from a mission. Who would take their place? The question is understandable, but the concern may be exaggerated (see the following section).

Areas for further research and engagement

Many more than the ten policy-relevant issues discussed below are worthy of attention. This list is meant to be indicative and not exhaustive. The number of police and troops deployed in UN and AU peacekeeping operations is at an all-time high. Seven other active African regional organizations also authorized peace operations over the past 20 years—most recently the Lake Chad Basin

Commission (LCBC)[70]— and they can learn from UN and AU experiences and practices. Given the billions of dollars invested in fielding these operations, the expense of identifying better practice—and learning from it—would seem to be modest, worthwhile, and timely.

Relative prevalence of types of diversion

The study has documented that arms and ammunition have been seized during patrols (both short and long) and (re-)supply efforts, and at fixed sites. The existing lack of information surrounding diversion incidents makes it impossible to know which type of activity or sites are most attractive targets or represent the largest losses. A more complete examination of this issue with a greater willingness to contribute data would be useful.

Units and TCCs at particular risk of loss of materiel

This paper has not focused on the type of unit that was attacked. Was it 'organic' or 'composite' (i.e. did the unit train and serve together (organic) or was it assembled from different parts of that country's armed forces just for a particular mission (composite))? Does one type of formed unit seem predisposed not to follow rules of engagement (ROE) and standard operating procedures and lose contingent-owned equipment (COE) more readily than another? Do certain countries account for a disproportionate percentage of losses? If so, can this be explained by these countries' willingness to participate in missions or in sectors and missions with higher levels of insecurity?

Blue hatting Green Helmets

Similarly, are troops that are 'blue hatted' from African-led or ad hoc coalitions of the willing more predisposed toward losing equipment or underperforming than those selected fresh to participate in a new mission? Rehatting happens frequently. Should this policy be re-examined?

Scale, scope, and effects of non-lethal materiel lost

As noted in the study, the loss of non-lethal equipment such as vehicles, communications gear, and uniforms can have significant deleterious effects on a

peacekeeping mission's ability to conduct its affairs. This includes force protection issues, as well as the protection of civilians and the delivery of humanitarian aid. Research on the extent of such losses, their effects, and ways to reduce this occurrence is worth undertaking.

Promising checks and balances to counter proliferation

In 60+ years of undertaking peacekeeping operations the UN has assembled numerous checks and balances to keep track of COE brought to the mission area—as well as of losses of COE in the course of operations. Which ones work well? Which not so well? What measures might be created and implemented that could address existing concerns? How do other organizations, such as the AU, account for and control arms and ammunition in theatre? What do TCCs and PCCs do that are best practice and worth emulating independently of oversight mechanisms imposed on them?

Additional case studies

Several interlocutors contacted in the course of this study offered the view that losses incurred during operations in Darfur are not so surprising, given the failure of the various peace agreements, the proliferation of armed groups, and the impediments that the host government put in the way of the various missions' ability to operate effectively. In attempting to establish the scale and scope of losses incurred during peace operations, it would be useful to know more about such instances in other missions. Additional case studies would therefore be warranted.

Development of a global database

For similar reasons, there would be merit in collating open-source information systematically in a global database on diversion incidents. The database might include information on perpetrators, whether the materiel lost was subsequently recovered (where, by whom, in what setting, in what condition), and the type of contingent, as noted above. A global database should include a methodology to permit the estimation of losses incurred when specific data is not known.

Stockpile management and storage security

Contingent-owned arms and ammunition brought to a mission often arrive in poor condition and, when stored improperly, can deteriorate over time—sometimes not a long time when exposed to heat or moisture. And materiel recovered during a mission may also be stored far below best practice. Addressing dangerous practices is currently done in an ad hoc way. A review of current procedures and activities would be timely.

Sensitizing, training, and debriefing peacekeepers

The risks and dangers of proliferation and stockpile management concerns should be part of pre-deployment training for police and military serving in peace operations. These men and women would benefit from an appreciation of global and regional (where applicable) arms control measures and best practices (such as how to record and keep safely and securely weapons recovered during the mission). Follow-on training after deployment would be advisable. After-action reviews should include questions about arms and ammunition recovered and lost. Such information could be used to develop the above-mentioned global database.

Desensitizing—and engaging—AU, UN, and government officials

Many policy-makers and programmers do not wish to discuss the issue of diversion in the belief that losses of life or materiel are too sensitive. They fear that broaching these subjects could result in countries choosing to withdraw their troops and police from a mission or deter them from contributing in the first place. Others see losses as inevitable, or view improved performance as unlikely or unnecessary. Both views frustrate efforts to generate better policies and programmes to address shortcomings and improve on present practice. These views are not set in stone, however. A fuller appreciation for the numerous factors that come into play for governments to contribute Blue or Green Helmets—and of the nature of the challenge—could encourage decision makers, donors, and TCCs to meet established or improved guidelines and adhere to best practice. Countries become TCCs and PCCs for myriad reasons, including moral, corporatist, financial, and political considerations and agendas (e.g. see

Bellamy and Williams, 2013).[71] A series of briefings and discussions at AU and UN HQ, as well as in select government capitals of important contributors of police, troops, and funds, would help address the loss of materiel from peace operations and move the issue higher up on the international agenda. Moreover, facilitating dialogue among various stakeholders—such as workshops run by former planners and commanders of peace operations—can help policy-makers develop and implement better practices.

Endnotes

1 Those serving in AU missions are frequently called 'Green Helmets'. Because the UN administers and pays for the joint AU–UN mission in Darfur, people serving in this operation are counted among UN Blue Helmets.

2 'Peacekeeping' is often associated with missions undertaken by the UN, even though the UN Charter contains no such term or explicit provision for such enterprises. In recent years pundits and practitioners have come up with numerous terms to unpack the various types of deployments in an effort to distinguish among missions of various robustness, composition, and rules of engagement. In this paper the Survey uses 'peace operations' to encompass all forms of multilateral engagements that include the deployment of uniformed police or military personnel, whether armed or not, barring military engagements that seek to overthrow governments. These missions include, but are not limited to, 'peacekeeping operations', 'peace support operations', 'peace enforcement operations', and 'stabilization operations'. When referring only to UN missions, the term 'peacekeeping' is also sometimes used.

3 The UN reports that as of 31 December 2014, 250 of its troops, police, and military observers have died in UNMIS, UNAMID, UNISFA, and UNMISS, and more than 70 civilian personnel as well (UN DPKO, 2015a).

4 The HSBA project has five focus areas: (i) arms holdings (state and non-state actors); (ii) arms flows (across state borders and within the state); (iii) armed groups (e.g. areas of operation, and command and control systems); (iv) demand for arms (including perceptions of security and security actors); and (v) the effects of arms use and availability (both direct and indirect).

5 For example, in the first two years of UNAMID the mission lost an average of one vehicle a week (carjackings of other UN agency and NGO vehicles were even more frequent) (de Waal, 2009).

6 As of May 2015 the Survey had published 23 HSBA *Issue Briefs* and 36 HSBA Working Papers. All are available in English and Arabic, and those focusing on the Central African Republic and Chad are also available in French. Since July 2010 the HSBA has also published 'Facts and Figures' reports containing information and analysis on various themes, which appear on the HSBA website: <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org>.

7 Thus, there is no section on the conflict in Eastern Sudan (in the states of Gedaref, Kassala, and Red Sea, principally) that pitted the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions against government forces (e.g. see Young, 2007a; 2007b). The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement of October 2006 was concluded without a corresponding peace operation to support its implementation. The implementation of the agreement has been poor, and has not led to human development or security gains in the region (Small Arms Survey, 2015).

8 Khartoum subsumed the state of West Kordofan into North and South Kordofan in 2005, changed the border between North and West Darfur in 2008, created Central Darfur and East Darfur from parts of South Darfur and West Darfur in 2012, and split South Kordofan into two states, re-establishing West Kordofan in 2013. In 2005 the 'Government of South Sudan', created by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as an interim administrative body, renamed Bahr al Jabal state Central Equatoria.

9 Flint and de Waal (2005, p. 99) report that at least 75 SAF personnel died in the attack and 32 soldiers were taken prisoner. The rebels lost nine men.

10 According to Powers (2004), the Arabic term '*jaan*' means 'evil' in English, and '*jawad*' and '*janjaweed*' mean 'evil horsemen'. For a more nuanced and fuller examination of the term and its origins, see Flint (2009, pp. 11, 52). The groups armed by Khartoum to support SAF in responding to the rebels are mostly made up of Mahamid, Mahariya, and Zabalat ethnic groups (e.g. see Flint, 2009, pp. 17–18).

11 Minawi, representing SLA-MM, chose to sign the DPA, and assumed a government position as chair of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority and as senior assistant to the president, although in 2010 he withdrew from the DPA and resigned his position in the government, returning to rebellion. Abdul Wahid and his SLA-AW never signed the agreement.

12 The First Sudanese Civil War lasted from 1955 (preceding official statehood, which took effect in January 1956) to 1972. The Second Sudanese Civil War lasted from 1983 to 2005.

13 Garang, the leader of both the SPLM and the SPLA during the Second Sudanese Civil War through to the conclusion of the CPA, died in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005. He was the first vice president of Sudan at the time. Garang's vision was of a federal Sudan within which the South would have more autonomy, rather than of full independence. With his death and Salva Kiir's ascendancy, Southern independence became the SPLM's goal.

14 The vote for statehood was almost unanimous: fewer than 2 per cent of those casting ballots did not select this option. South Sudan became the 193rd UN member state within a week of celebrating its independence.

15 Abyei, as declared under the CPA, is a special administrative region, whose members were granted citizenship in both Northern Bahr al Ghazal and West Kordofan during the interim period until the border could be demarcated and a referendum held. The territory, as determined by a 2009 ruling, is about 10,000 sq. km (or around 4,000 sq. miles)—about 20 per cent smaller than the US state of Connecticut (the third smallest US state) or the country Montenegro.

16 A judge who was part of the panel hearing the case dissented, noting that the ruling made the Missiriya 'second-class citizens on their own land and creates conditions which may deny them access to water' (*Economist*, 2009).

17 For a short and insightful assessment of the challenges AUHIP and the international community face, see a thoughtful interview with Douglas Johnson, a former ABC member, in IRIN (2006).

18 Anyanya (a term for a poison made in Southern Sudan (Rone, 2003, p. 20) and sometimes written Anya-Nya) was the name of a group of largely Nuer fighters who fought the government in the First Sudanese Civil War. The resumption of conflict and the resurrection of the Anyanya were not sufficiently large or widespread to qualify as a return to civil war. These characteristics did, however, apply to the larger and more geographically and diverse SPLA that engaged the government in hostile actions starting in 1983.

19 The Sudan Peace Agreement was concluded between the government in Khartoum and the United Democratic Salvation Front comprising five members: the SSIM, SSIG, EDF, 'SPLM/A' (quotations added), and Union of Sudan African Parties. The signatories to the accord included these five entities plus the Bor Group (represented by Arok Thon Arok Kongor, the group's chair). Kerubino Kwanyin Bol signed for the SPLM/A, but did not represent Garang at the time. He served with the SPLA from 1983 to 1987, when Garang had him jailed for conspiring to overthrow him. Bol did rejoin the SPLA, but only in January 1998, some eight months

after the Sudan Peace Agreement was concluded. He left the SPLA later that year and died the following year (see Rone, 2003, pp. 15, 129).

20 Khartoum provided support, including arms, to numerous tribal militias that had risen up in part to protect themselves against the SPLA. These included the Bari, Didinga, Fertit, Latuka, Murle, Mundari, Toposa—and some Dinka as well (see Young, 2006, p. 13).

21 Machar, for example, left the SSDF in 2000 and formed the Sudan People's Liberation Front before rejoining the SPLM/A.

22 The full name of the Juba Declaration is: Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People's Liberation Army and the South Sudan Defence Forces.

23 Ismail Konye (a Murle), for example, became an adviser to President Kiir on peace and reconciliation (see Vuni, 2007). Konye was commander of the Pibor Defence Force.

24 According to the UN, in the year since the start of the crisis 1.5 million South Sudanese were internally displaced in the country as of December 2014 and almost 500,000 people had sought refuge in neighbouring countries (USAID, 2015).

25 The International Crisis Group has estimated that at least 50,000 people have died, a figure some analysts believe to be conservative. According to humanitarian actors active in Sudan, children have been forcibly recruited to fight in their thousands and entire towns have been pillaged and burned (Smith, 2014).

26 The transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID occurred on 31 December 2007, with UNAMID beginning its operations on 1 January 2008.

27 An earlier ceasefire, concluded in September 2003, which was only partially successful, did not result in any peacekeeping operation.

28 The other 72 would come from the Sudanese Parties to the Agreement (36), the Chadian mediation team (18), and the international community (as represented by the European Union and United States: 18) (AU, 2005, p. 13, para. 8).

29 The AU initially referred to Brig. Gen. Festus Okonkwo as the chair of the CFC and the chief MilOb. But he became FC with the arrival of AU infantry troops. All subsequent military heads of the mission were known as FCs.

30 The chairperson framed this as 'Phase 3', the other two being meeting the deployment goals set by the PSC in April 2005 (referred to as AMIS II in this study) and then meeting the PSC's short-term objectives established in October 2005 (referred to as AMIS II-E). Had the AU again enhanced its mission, some have referred to this planned-for mission as 'AMIS III'.

31 No single reason or actor explains the Security Council's deference to Khartoum. The resolution's choice of words—and ultimate irrelevance—was part of a long-established pattern of Security Council members not demanding too much from Sudan and relying on the AU, despite that organization's proven shortcomings. Bodies within the UN System were similarly weak-kneed when it came to standing up to Khartoum (Weschler, 2010). For additional background see Bah (2010, pp. 10–11) and Weber (2010, pp. 15–16).

32 This support consisted of a 'light support package' and a 'heavy support package', which included equipment and personnel that focused on four areas of assistance: (i) logistical and material; (ii) military staff; (iii) advice to CivPol; and (iv) expertise in mine action, humanitarian liaison, public information, and support to peace processes (see UNSC, 2007a, paras. 40–51).

33 Several commentators see China as having been particularly influential in the Security Council's (in-)actions concerning the question of a UN peacekeeping operation taking over from the

AU in Darfur. One UN watcher described the establishment of UNAMID as a 'compromise . . . brokered with the assistance of China, which feared that ongoing violence in Darfur would tarnish its standing on the world stage on the eve of Beijing's 2008 Summer Olympics' (Lynch, 2014).

34 In August 2014 the Security Council reduced the number of military personnel to 15,845 (a reduction of 19 per cent from its initial plans for up to 19,555); and the number of police to 3,403 (a cut of 47 per cent from the planned 6,432) (see UNSC, 2014a, para. 8). This decision followed from an earlier one (in July 2012) to 'reconfigure' (i.e. 'reduce') the mission's Blue Helmets over 12–18 months to no more than 16,200 military personnel and 4,690 police (see UNSC, 2012, para. 2).

35 On 17 March 2015 a joint working group (comprising 16 Sudanese government officials and 21 officials from the AU, the UN, and UNAMID) convened to start preparations for a common strategy for UNAMID to cease operations (UNAMID, 2015).

36 Numerous countries long supported a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Nevertheless, US political and financial support played an important role in moving things forward. In September 2001 US president George W. Bush appointed former US senator John ('Jack') Danforth as his special envoy for peace in Sudan. The Missouri Republican, who had served three terms in the US Senate, later served briefly as US ambassador to the UN. Seventeen months after his appointment as special envoy the Machakos Protocol had been signed and three peace operations had been established, with substantial US financial assistance. The US provided USD 25.5 million of the JMC's 44.7 million total budget. The Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom together contributed just under a third of the total cost. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland provided the remaining approximately 10 per cent (see Ibscher and Szili, n.d., pp. 76, 90, 91).

37 These figures do not include about 150 additional personnel, mostly Sudanese, responsible for meals, lodging, healthcare, and logistical support to the mission (see Souverijn-Eisenberg, 2005, p. 4).

38 These 40 international staff came from 10 countries: 7 of the 9 donor countries (all but for Belgium and Germany) and 3 countries that did not provide funds for the mission (France, Italy, and South Africa) (see Ibscher and Szili, n.d., pp. 76, 90–94).

39 In October 2003 the mission's chief of staff acknowledged that 'to all intents and purposes' the mission only started its work in September. Disagreements between the parties on the mission's mandate and composition largely led to the delays and the small size of the initial mission (see IRIN, 2003).

40 UNMIS also had a logistical base in North Kordofan and a liaison office in North Darfur (as well as in the Ethiopian capital, which is where the AU headquarters is based).

41 For the text of the Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, see UNSC (2011a).

42 Despite some Khartoum-imposed logistical hurdles and administrative constraints (UNSC, 2011b, para. 19), an advance force headquarters was functional before the end of July and more than 400 Blue Helmets had already joined the mission (UNSC, 2011b, para. 15). A month later the mission's strength had trebled (UN DPKO, 2011a) and by the year's end the force's strength was nearly 90 per cent of its authorized strength (UN DPKO, 2011b).

43 Switzerland provided small numbers of MilObs to UN peacekeeping operations starting in 1990 (Swiss Armed Forces, n.d.), 12 years before formally becoming a member of the world body. (Bern was at that time a member of most UN agencies and bodies, however.) The AU incorporated nationals from EU countries and the United States to serve on the CFC in small numbers as part of AMIS.

44 PAE has also supported missions undertaken by the Economic Community of West African States.

45 Headquarters staff officers also comprise a 'formed unit' even if a country contributes a single military official to this body.

46 In an effort to better describe the composition of its missions, UN DPKO coined the term 'UNMEM' to include personnel that previously had been included as part of 'troops' (the other category being MilObs). UN Military Experts on Mission (UNMEMs) include MilObs plus military advisers and military liaison officers. All UNMEMs distinguish themselves from troops in that they are unarmed. The great majority of UNMEMs are MilObs. This paper uses the more common 'MilObs' and not the more recently coined 'UNMEMs'.

47 In December 2014 there were 104,062 Blue Helmets from 122 UN member states serving in 16 UN peacekeeping operations: 89,846 troops, 1,774 military experts, and 12,442 police (UN DPKO, 2014b).

48 The six AU member states contributing troops and police to AMISOM are Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. For an assessment of the mission, with information on the changing force strength and composition, see Burton and Williams (2014).

49 In December 2014, 23 countries provided 10 or fewer Blue Helmets and accounted for 82 military and police. The bottom 50 of the 122 TCCs and PCCs contributed in total 1,149 uniformed personnel (UN DPKO, n.d.).

50 In December 2014 22 UN member states provided between one and nine uniformed personnel to UNAMID, UNISFA, and UNMISS: Albania, Argentina, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea, Iran, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Moldova, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam (UN DPKO, 2014a).

51 One UN TCC requires its citizens servings as MilObs in UN peacekeeping operations to deploy to the mission area with firearms (written correspondence with UN official, 6 March 2015).

52 UN Police serving in UN peacekeeping operations that are 'Executive Missions', meaning that the UN mission assumes primary responsibility for promoting law and order (as was the case with its missions in Timor-Leste and Kosovo), possessed firearms in the mission area. PCCs may request that their police outside of FPUs deploy with side arms. However, the UN and the Status of Forces Agreements concluded between the UN and a host nation to establish the rights and privileges of military and police forces and their limits very rarely grant such requests (key informant interview, Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset, 2015).

53 The UN does not pay for equipment that a TCC or PCC may bring to a mission area outside of the Statement of Unit Requirement.

54 Sometimes weapons received are improperly recorded (see Bevan, 2009, pp. 122–26).

55 Sometimes weapons that peacekeepers (or other actors in the UN System) recover in (or outside of) peace operations are subsequently retaken by armed groups (e.g. see Berman with Lombard, 2008, pp. 107–33).

56 AMISOM TCCs have equipped militias in their sectors and battalions of the Somali National Army with materiel recovered from al-Shabaab (author interviews, Mogadishu, February 2013).

57 According to reports of the UN Secretary-General on Abyei, UNISFA routinely confiscates firearms and associated ammunition from individuals or small unauthorized armed groups in the Abyei area. For example, between 10 October and 9 November 2014 UN peacekeepers took into custody three firearms and ammunition (see UNSC, 2014b, para. 5). In February 2015 the Security Council affirmed that UNISFA may undertake weapons confiscation and destruction in the Abyei area as authorized under Resolution 1990 (2011) (UNSC, 2015b, para. 12). Previously, the destruction of weapons confiscated in the course of UNISFA's work was implicit (e.g. see UNSC, 2011f, paras. 2 (a) and 3). This paves the way for the mission to destroy rather than redistribute the weapons.

58 Author interview, location withheld, March 2014.

59 Many of the formed units serving in AMIS II-E that joined UNAMID remained far below UN requirements in terms of materiel. Two years and two months into UNAMID's operations, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon informed the Security Council that four (ex-AMIS) countries' contingents 'have a shortfall of requsite major equipment ranging between 61 and 100 per cent and are not self-sustained in the majority of the required categories' (UNSC, 2010, para. 8).

60 For background on the UN arms embargo against Sudan and international adherence to this control measure see, for example, Lewis (2009) (which also includes a description and assessment of the arms embargo enacted by the EU).

61 For information on local production in Sudan and state-to-state transfers to Khartoum see, for example, HSBA (2014); Leff and LeBrun (2014, pp. 22–24).

62 For more information on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in peace operations, see UN DPKO and DFS (2008).

63 Besides the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the AU Secretariat would have benefitted from the experiences gained from numerous peace operations undertaken in the framework of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the AU's predecessor. The OAU undertook a half-dozen operations in the 1990s alone, but these tended to be small and short-lived (see Berman and Sams, 2000, pp. 45–74). AMIB, with 3,000+ troops, was in many ways more ambitious, but the UN took over from the AU a little more than a year into the operation. Moreover, AMIB involved deploying troops from three countries into a mission area about half of one per cent the size of Darfur, with a comparatively good road network and other infrastructure.

64 Under Article 8(2)(b)(iii) and (e)(iii) of the ICC Statute, attacks on peacekeepers—and their assets—are considered war crimes (ICRC, n.d.).

65 According to the UN, malicious acts had accounted for more than one in four of the fatalities military and police serving in UN peacekeeping operations had suffered. (Other causes include illnesses and accidents.) All told, more then 3,300 Blue Helmets and other staff members have died in peace operations (UN DPKO, 2015c).

66 UN DPKO (2015d) records more than 330 UN personnel as having died in UNMIS, UNAMID, UNISFA, and UNMISS as of 30 April 2015. This number represents almost one-tenth of the total fatalities suffered in UN peacekeeping operations since 1948.

67 Written correspondence with Jan-Erik Wilhelmsen, 15 January 2014.

68 In one case, for instance, the circumstances of the event raise questions over the handling and securing of military equipment. On 20 September 2011 an Egyptian military unit left its team site at Kauda without UN authorization. The platoon, originally part of UNMIS, had stayed

on as part of that mission's liquidation phase. (Many units that were part of UNMIS did not join UNMISS.) The UN had to responsibly and methodically withdraw and account for personnel, COE, and UN assets, often in difficult circumstances. Questions persist over the proper securing of the site and if any equipment may have been left behind, given the ad hoc nature of the withdrawal.

69 According to the UN, the mission undertook 8,694 patrols in December 2008 and January 2009, with the military component conducting 3,552 of them (1,325 confidence-building patrols, 1,748 village patrols, and 479 escort patrols) and the police component responsible for 4,142 patrols (3,806 inside IDP camps and 1,336 outside IDP camps); see UNSC (2009, para. 22). This is an average of just over 140 patrols a day.

70 Besides the LCBC, the six others are the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, Community of Sahel-Shara States, Economic Community of Central African States, Economic Community of West African States, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and Southern African Development Community. (An eighth organization, the Non-Agression and Defence Pact, also fielded a peace operation, but it no longer exists.) For background on several of these missions, as well as those undertaken by ad hoc coalitions of the willing, see Berman and Sams (2000). In March 2014 the LCBC authorized a military task force to address the threat from Boko Haram (Kindzeka, 2014). In January 2015 the AU PSC authorized an LCBC mission towards this end. In the following month four LCBC members plus Benin pledged more than 8,000 military, police, and civilian personnel to this force, for which the budget and funding were still being discussed (see AU, 2015).

71 See also the Providing for Peacekeeping Project of the International Peace Institute, the Elliott School at George Washington University, and the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Queensland. In May 2015 the project's website (<http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org>) provided profiles on 53 UN member states' contributions of troops or police to peace operations (and noted plans to include additional country overviews).

Annexes

Annexe A: TCCs and PCCs to peace operations in Sudan and South Sudan, through December 2014

TCC/PCC		AU missions						AU–UN mission		UN missions					
		AMIS I		AMIS II		AMIS II-E		UNAMID		UNMIS		UNISFA		UNMISS	
African states	1. Algeria	□		□		□									
	2. Benin			□		□			◊	□		■		■	
	3. Botswana			□	◊	□	◊		◊	□	◊				
	4. Burkina Faso			□	◊	□	◊	■	♦	□		■		□	
	5. Burundi			□		□		■	♦			■			
	6. Cameroon			□	◊	□	◊	□	♦						
	7. Chad			□		□									
	8. Congo (Republic of)	□		□		□									
	9. Côte d'Ivoire								◊						
	10. Djibouti								♦						
	11. Egypt	□		□	◊	□	◊	■	♦	□	◊	□		■	
	12. Ethiopia							■	♦		◊	■	♦	■	♦
	13. Gabon	□		□		□		□		□					
	14. Gambia			□	◊	□	◊	■	♦	□	◊				♦
	15. Ghana	□		□	◊	□	◊	■	♦	□	◊	■	♦	■	♦
	16. Guinea									□		■		■	
	17. Kenya	□		□	◊	□		■	◊	□	◊			■	♦
	18. Lesotho			□		□	◊	■							
	19. Libya			□		□		□							
	20. Madagascar			□	◊	□	◊		♦						
	21. Malawi			□		□		□	♦	□		■			
	22. Mali			□	◊	□	◊	■	◊	□	◊	■		■	
	23. Mauritania			□	◊	□	◊		◊						
	24. Mauritius						◊								
	25. Mozambique	□		□		□				□		□			
	26. Namibia	□		□		□		■	♦	□	◊	■	♦	■	♦

TCC/PCC		AU missions								AU–UN mission		UN missions					
		AMIS I		AMIS II		AMIS II-E				UNAMID		UNMIS		UNISFA		UNMISS	
African states	27. Niger				◊		◊				◊	□					
	28. Nigeria	□		□	◊	□	◊			■	♦	□	◊	■	♦	■	♦
	29. Rwanda	□		□	◊	□	◊			■	♦	□	◊	■	♦	■	♦
	30. Senegal	□		□	◊	□	◊			■	♦	□				■	♦
	31. Sierra Leone									■	♦	□		□		□	♦
	32. South Africa	□		□	◊	□	◊			■	◊	□					♦
	33. Sudan	□		□		□											
	34. Tanzania									■	♦	□	◊	■	♦	■	
	35. Togo			□		□	◊			■	♦					■	
	36. Tunisia										♦						
	37. Uganda			□	◊	□	◊			□	◊	□	◊			■	♦
	38. Zambia			□	◊	□	◊			■	♦	□	◊	■		■	♦
	39. Zimbabwe									■	♦	□	◊	♦			♦
Non-African states	1. Albania																♦
	2. Argentina												◊				♦
	3. Australia									□		□	◊			■	◊
	4. Austria			?	?	?	?					□					
	5. Bangladesh									■	♦	□	◊			■	♦
	6. Belarus															□	
	7. Belgium			?	?	?	?					□					
	8. Bolivia									■		□		□		□	
	9. Bosnia & Herzegovina												◊				♦
	10. Brazil											□	◊	■		■	♦
	11. Cambodia									■		□		■		■	
	12. Canada			□	◊	□	◊			□	◊	□	◊			■	◊
	13. China									■		□	◊			■	♦
	14. Croatia											□					
	15. Cyprus			?	?	□	?										
	16. Denmark			?	?	□	?				◊	□				■	
	17. Ecuador									■		□		■		□	
	18. El Salvador										◊	□	◊	■		■	◊
	19. Fiji										♦	□	◊			■	♦
	20. Finland			?	?	?	?				◊	□	◊				◊

TCC/PCC		AU missions						AU–UN mission		UN missions					
		AMIS I		AMIS II		AMIS II-E		UNAMID		UNMIS		UNISFA		UNMISS	
Non-African states	21. France	□		□	?	□	?	□	◊	□					
	22. Germany			?	?	?	?	■	♦	□	◊			■	♦
	23. Greece									□					
	24. Guatemala							□		□		■		■	
	25. Hungary			□	?	□	?								
	26. India									□	◊	■		■	♦
	27. Indonesia							■	♦	□	◊	■		■	♦
	28. Iran							■		□					
	29. Ireland			?	?	?	?								
	30. Italy			?	?	□	?	□		□				□	
	31. Jamaica								♦		◊				◊
	32. Japan									□				■	
	33. Jordan							■	♦	□	◊			■	
	34. Kazakhstan								◊						
	35. Kyrgyzstan							■	♦	□	◊	■		■	♦
	36. Malaysia							■	◊	□	◊	■		□	◊
	37. Moldova									□				■	
	38. Mongolia							■		□		■		■	
	39. Nepal							■	♦	□	◊	■		■	♦
	40. Netherlands			□		□	◊	□		□	◊			■	♦
	41. New Zealand									□	◊			■	
	42. Norway								◊	□	◊			■	♦
	43. Pakistan							■	♦	□	◊			□	
	44. Palau							■	◊						
	45. Papua New Guinea													■	
	46. Paraguay									□		□		■	
	47. Peru							■		□		■		■	
	48. Philippines								◊	□	◊			□	◊
	49. Poland									□				■	
	50. Portugal			?	?	?	?								
	51. Romania									□				■	♦
	52. Russian Federation									□	◊	■		■	♦
	53. Samoa								♦		◊				♦

TCC/PCC		AU missions						AU–UN mission		UN missions					
		AMIS I		AMIS II		AMIS II-E		UNAMID		UNMIS		UNISFA		UNMISS	
Non-African states	54. South Korea							■		□				■	
	55. Spain				?	□	?								
	56. Sri Lanka									□	◊	□		■	♦
	57. Sweden			?	?	□	?	□	◊	□	◊			■	♦
	58. Switzerland									□				■	♦
	59. Tajikistan								◊						
	60. Thailand							■		□					◊
	61. Timor-Leste													□	
	62. Turkey							□	♦	□	◊				♦
	63. Ukraine									□	◊	■		■	♦
	64. United Kingdom			?	?	□	?	□	◊	□	◊			■	♦
	65. United States	?		□	?	□	?				◊			■	♦
	66. Uruguay									□	◊	□			
	67. Vanuatu								◊		◊				
	68. Vietnam													■	
	69. Yemen							■	♦	□	◊	■		■	

Key: □ = former TCC; ◊ = former PCC; ■ = active TCC; ♦ = active PCC; **?** = country provided military and/or police to one or more AU missions

Source: Berman (2015b)

Annexe B: Partial list of attacks on Blue and Green Helmets in Sudan and South Sudan, and seizure of materiel

This annexe features data on incidents documented in the Small Arms Survey Diversion Dataset (see Box 3). It is structured chronologically, and features information on events, context, and materiel lost (or not) during attacks on AU and UN military and police personnel. Events include the date, the mission, and the location. Context includes a description of the incident and the casualties suffered by the mission's Blue and Green Helmets. The dataset includes five types of incidents: (i) attacks on convoys; (ii) attacks on fixed sites; (iii) attacks on patrols; (iv) carjackings; and (v) robberies. A third sub-section under 'Context' labelled 'Notes' provides additional background such as the number of peacekeepers attacked, the size of the attacking force, and other casualties suffered. 'Material lost' includes information on small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. A separate sub-section labelled 'Notes' mentions other materiel lost and equipment recovered. Incidents of diversion deemed to be 'notable' are flagged and a distinction is made among their levels of magnitude and between those that are verified or not. *Italics* are used when the information provided represents an approximate location or is based on an assumption.

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate	
• 25 August 2005 • AMIS II-E • *Angabou*, East Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC unknown) **Casualties incurred by peacekeepers (PKs):** • 1 PK injured	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 1 assault rifle **Ammunition:** • *500+ cartridges*	**Cat. I** ■
• 29 August 2005 • AMIS II-E • *Ishma*, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (TCC unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** 18 assailants	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 15 September 2005 • AMIS II-E • *Shangil Tobaya*, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • Unknown	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 19 September 2005 • AMIS II-E • Khormley, North Sudan	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 2 PKs injured (Rwandan)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 8 October 2005 • AMIS II-E • *Menawashe*, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of about 40 Nigerian infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 5 PKs killed (all from Nigeria), 4 PKs injured **Notes:** 2 civilian contractors also killed	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 8 assault rifles, 1 machine gun **Ammunition:** • *500+ cartridges* **Notes:** 3 rifles and 1 machine gun recovered from the attacking force	***Cat. I*** □
• 9 October 2005 • AMIS II-E • Tine, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of around 18 Senegalese infantry + 13 MilObs and 5 CivPol); followed by abduction of 20-person rescue force (from same battalion) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Small arms/light weapons:** • *1 self-loading pistol,* 38 assault rifles, *10 machine guns, 5 anti-tank weapons* **Ammunition:** • *7,000+ cartridges* **Notes:** 6 vehicles stolen, 3 recovered	***Cat. III*** ■
• 15 November 2005 • AMIS II-E • Gereida, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on fixed site (AU camp) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** 120 assailants	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 29 November 2005 • AMIS II-E • Kulbus, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of Senegalese infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 5 PKs injured (from same contingent) **Notes:** 20–30 assailants	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 1 self-loading pistol, 9 assault rifles, 1 machine gun **Ammunition:** • *2,500+ cartridges* **Notes**: 1 vehicle stolen	***Cat. II*** □

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate	
• 6 January 2006 • AMIS II-E • Girgira, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 30 Senegalese infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent), 10 PKs injured	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 10 March 2006 • AMIS II-E • Masteri, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on fixed site (AU camp) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** No arms or ammunition taken	
• 26 May 2006 • AMIS II-E • Masteri, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (Nigerian protection force) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent), 1 PK injured **Notes:** 6–12 assailants	**Notes:** No arms or ammunition taken	
• 27 May 2006 • AMIS II-E • Masteri, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on fixed site (AMIS camp) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 5 PKs injured **Notes:** 50–60 assailants	**Notes:** No arms or ammunition taken	
• 6 July 2006 • AMIS II-E • *Abdel Shakur*, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (of 37 PKs; TCC unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** 45 assailants	**Small arms/light weapons:** • *1 self-loading pistol,* 38 assault rifles, *9 machine guns, anti-tank weapons* **Ammunition:** • *6,000+ cartridges* **Notes:** 4 vehicles stolen (including 2 fuel tankers)	***Cat. III*** ■
• 17 August 2006 • UNMIS • Phom al Zeraf, Upper Nile	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of Joint Monitoring Team comprising 3 MilObs, 2 national observers (NatObs), 1 interpreter, and 6 soldiers; TCCs unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 2 PKs wounded (from same contingent) **Notes:** 1 Sudanese NatOb also wounded	**Notes:** Probably no weapons seized	
• 19 August 2006 • AMIS II-E • Lwabit, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (of Rwandan infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 2 PKs killed (from same contingent), 3 PKs injured	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 7 assault rifles **Ammunition:** • *500+ cartridges* **Notes:** 1 APC destroyed, 2 vehicles damaged, 18 (of 27) fuel tankers seized	Cat. I

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate	
• 10 December 2006 • AMIS II-E • Al Fasher, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Abduction (1 Nigerian PK officer, possibly 2) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 26 January 2007 • UNMIS • *Opari*, Central Equatoria	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (demining force protection of Indian PKs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (Indian), 2 PKs injured	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 1 February 2007 • AMIS II-E • Kutum, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of UNPOL; TCC unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (Niger)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 5 March 2007 • AMIS II-E • Greida, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 4 Nigerian MilObs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 2 PKs killed, 1PK injured (all from Nigeria)	**Small arms/light weapons:** • None (patrol unarmed) **Ammunition:** • None (patrol unarmed) **Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	
• 1 April 2007 • AMIS II-E • Um Baru, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of Senegalese infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 5 PKs killed (from same contingent) **Notes:** 3 assailants killed in attack and their weapons recovered	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 1 assault rifle, 1 machine gun, 1 grenade launcher **Ammunition:** • *500+ cartridges* **Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	***Cat. I*** ■
• 10 April 2007 • AMIS II-E • Kube, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 3 Rwandan soldiers) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent), 2 PKs injured	**Other materiel:** • 1 vehicle **Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 14 April 2007 • AMIS II-E • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on fixed site (AU compound) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (Ghanaian) **Notes:** Carjacking	**Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	
• 25 May 2007 • UNMIS • Al Fasher, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Robbery (residence of Egyptian PK) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate	
• 29 September 2007 • AMIS II-E • Haskanita, North Darfur (sometimes reported as South Darfur)	**Description of incident:** • Attack on fixed site (military base housing infantry company from Nigeria and MilObs from several TCCs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 10 PKs killed (7 from Nigeria, 1 each from Botswana, Mali, and Senegal), 12 PKs injured (2 injured PKs subsequently died) **Notes:** 300–1,000 assailants	**Small arms/light weapons:** • *3 self-loading pistols, 50+ assault rifles, 24 machine guns, 18 mortars, 24 anti-tank weapons* **Ammunition:** • *100,000+ cartridges* **Notes:** 17 vehicles stolen; many PKs left site with their personal firearms. Calculations assume looted container(s) stored 500 cartridges per soldier in infantry company plus 2,000 cartridges per machine gun, plus 10,000 cartridges for vehicle-mounted machine guns	***Cat. III*** ■
• 7 January 2008 • UNAMID • *Tine*, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (of 87 infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** Fuel truck and APC destroyed, 1 Sudanese driver injured	**Notes:** 1 APC damaged, 1 fuel truck destroyed	■
• 9 April 2008 • UNAMID • Zam Zam, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (1 police adviser; PCC unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK injured **Notes:** 4 assailants	**Notes:** 2 vehicles stolen, 1 recovered	
• 20 April 2008 • UNAMID • Al Odaiya, West Kordofan	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (resupply for Chinese engineers) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** Raiba Trans convoy	**Ammunition:** • 600,000+ cartridges **Notes:** Majority of ammunition (12 tons total) reportedly 5.8 mm, contradicting reports about 9 mm and 12.7 mm in lesser quantities	Cat. III ■
• 21 May 2008 • UNAMID • *Al Geneina*, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 4 Nigerian infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** 50–60 assailants	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 3 assault rifles **Ammunition:** • 180 cartridges	
• 28 May 2008 • UNAMID • *Al Fasher*, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Carjacking (1 Ugandan police adviser) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent) **Notes:** Victim found shot dead in his vehicle	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate	
• 30 June 2008 • UNAMID • Zam Zam, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 21 UN police advisers, 12 troops, and 5 translators; TCCs unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 8 July 2008 • UNAMID • Um Hakhibah, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (51 Rwandan infantry, 10 UNPOL, 2 MilObs, and 2 language assistants) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 7 PKs killed (from Rwanda, Uganda, and Ghana), 22 PKs injured **Notes:** 300 assailants	**Small arms/light weapons:** • *10+ assault rifles, 1–2 machine guns* **Ammunition:** • *500+ cartridges* **Notes:** 7 vehicles stolen, several vehicles damaged or destroyed	Cat. I ■
• 16 July 2008 • UNAMID • Foro Baranga, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of Nigerian infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (of same contingent)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 18 July 2008 • UNAMID • *Al Geneina*, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (4 PKs; TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** Around 1,000 assailants	**Small arms/light weapons:** • *1–4 assault rifles* **Ammunition:** • *90–300+ cartridges*	
• 21 July 2008 • UNAMID • Al Fasher, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (1 UN security officer; TCC unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 12 August 2008 • UNAMID • Dorti, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Robbery (UNPOL; TCCs unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
8 September 2008 UNAMID Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Carjacking (TCC unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	
• 11 September 2008 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Carjacking (civilian driver) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate
• 13 September 2008 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Carjacking (2 UNAMID engineering staff) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen
• 6 October 2008 • UNAMID • *Nyala*, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 70 PKs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (Nigerian)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel
• 29 October 2008 • UNAMID • Kutum, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 9 South African PKs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent), 1 PK injured	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 1 machine gun **Ammunition:** • 200 cartridges
• 9 November 2008 • UNAMID • *Supercamp*, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of Nigerian infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK injured (from same contingent)	**Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen
• 27 December 2008 • UNAMID • Al Fasher, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 3 PKs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (Senegalese) **Notes:** Carjacking	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 1 assault rifle **Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen, recovered by GoS police
• 3 January 2009 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 6 Nigerian infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** Carjacking, 10 assailants	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 3 assault rifles **Ammunition:** • 180 cartridges **Notes:** 1 stolen vehicle recovered
• 9 March 2009 • UNAMID • Al Geneina, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 4 PKs injured (from same contingent)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel
• 17 March 2009 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 6 Nigerian infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent) **Notes:** 8 assailants	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate	
• 7 May 2009 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** Carjacking (1 Nigerian officer) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** 1 PK killed (from same contingent)	**Notes:** 1 stolen vehicle recovered	
• 30 May 2009 • UNAMID • Al Fasher, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** Carjacking (residence of 1 PK) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** None **Notes:** 3 assailants	**Notes:** 1 stolen vehicle recovered	
• 6 August 2009 • UNAMID • Aljeel, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** None	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 6 August 2009 • UNAMID • Unknown	**Description of incident:** • Robbery (residence of 1PK; TCC unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** 2 assailants	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 10 August 2009 • UNAMID • El Daein, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 10 August 2009 • UNAMID • Mournei, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 26 August 2009 • UNAMID • Fata Borno, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	
• 29 August 2009 • UNAMID • Kabkabiya, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK injured	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 28 September 2009 • UNAMID • Al Geneina, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (of 13 troops, 4 military police, 5 staff, and 2 non-UNAMID personnel; TCCs include Nigeria and Kenya) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (Nigerian), 2 PKs injured **Notes:** 6–8 assailants	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 1 assault rifle **Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate	
• 12 October 2009 • UNAMID • Kutum, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK injured (from same contingent)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 17 October 2009 • UNAMID • Zalingei, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of Nigerian UNPOL FPU) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 3 PKs injured (from same contingent)	**Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	
• 4 December 2009 • UNAMID • Saraf Umra, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (of 20 Rwandan PKs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 3 PKs killed (Rwandan), 2 PKs injured	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 5 December 2009 • UNAMID • Shangil Tobaya, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of Rwandan infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 2 PKs killed, 1 PK injured (from same contingent)	**Notes:** 1 stolen vehicle recovered	
• 9 January 2010 • UNAMID • Nama, Central Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Small arms/light weapons:** • Unknown weaponry **Ammunition:** • *500+ cartridges*	***Cat. I*** □
• 10 January 2010 • UNAMID • *Shawa airstrip*, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (TCC unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 1 assault rifle	
• 16 February 2010 • UNAMID • Al Sharif, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (of 18 Pakistani UNPOL) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 7 PKs injured (from same contingent)	**Small arms/light weapons:** • *7 assault rifles* **Ammunition:** • *500+ cartridges* **Notes:** 2 vehicles stolen	***Cat. I*** □
• 5 March 2010 • UNAMID • Kawara, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of mixed contingent: 56 Nigerian PKs; 4 police advisers from Rwanda, Cameroon, Uganda, and Benin; 2 Nigerian and Tanzanian MilObs; 1 Sudanese language assistant) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK injured	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 55 assault rifles, 8 machine guns, 4 anti-tank weapons • 14,000+ cartridges **Ammunition:** • 13 rocket grenades **Notes:** 6 vehicles stolen, 3 APCs released	Cat. III ■

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate	
• 11 April 2010 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (4 South African UNPOL) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** Abduction, PKs unarmed; all PKs released 16 days later	**Notes:** 2 vehicles stolen	
• 7 May 2010 • UNAMID • *Katila*, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (of 20 Egyptian infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 2 PKs killed (all Egyptians), 3 PKs injured **Notes:** 20 assailants	**Notes:** No arms or ammunition taken	
• 22 May 2010 • UNAMID • Al Geneina, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 3 June 2010 • UNAMID • Dorti, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 10 unarmed police officers; TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** 2 vehicles stolen	
• 20 June 2010 • UNAMID • Al Geneina, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 21 June 2010 • UNAMID • Nertiti, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on fixed site (Rwandan team site) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 3 PKs killed (Rwandan), 1 PK injured **Notes:** 20+ assailants	**Small arms/light weapons:** • Unknown number of weapons **Ammunition:** • Unknown amount of ammunition **Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	
• 15 July 2010 • UNAMID • Kulbus, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 26 July 2010 • UNAMID • Unknown, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 1 Russian helicopter pilot) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** Abduction; pilot forced to make landing in undesignated area; released 3 days later	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate
• 29 July 2010 • UNAMID • *Foro Baranga*, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 7 PKs injured (from same contingent)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel
• 30 July 2010 • UNAMID • Al Fasher, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK injured	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel
• 14 August 2010 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (2 Jordanian police advisers) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** Abduction, 3 assailants; personnel released 3 days later	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel
• 26 August 2010 • UNAMID • Unknown	**Description of incident:** • Robbery (South African contingent) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 1 assault rifle
• 5 November 2010 • UNAMID • *Kutum*, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK injured (from same contingent)	**Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen
• 15 December 2010 • UNAMID • *Fata Borno*, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (of UNPOL; TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** 3 assailants	**Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen
• 22 March 2011 • UNAMID • Masteri, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 2 PKs injured	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel
• 27 March 2011 • UNAMID • Zam Zam, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of Indonesian FPU) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** Carjacking	**Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen
• 5 April 2011 • UNAMID • *Kutum*, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCCs include Sierra Leone) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (Sierra Leonean), 2 PKs injured	**Small arms/light weapons:** • *3 assault rifles* **Ammunition:** • *200+ cartridges* **Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate
• 10 May 2011 • UNMIS • Goli, Abyei region	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of Zambian PKs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 4 PKs injured (from same contingent)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel
• 19 May 2011 • UNMIS • Dokura, Abyei region	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (of 200 troops, including SAF Joint Integrated Unit; TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** No arms or ammunition taken
• 1 June 2011 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** Carjacking, 15 assailants	**Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen
• 5 June 2011 • UNMIS • Kadugli, South Kordofan	**Description of incident:** • Attack on fixed site (of Egyptian contingent) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Small arms/light weapons:** • Unknown number of weapons **Ammunition:** • Unknown amount of ammunition
• 11 June 2011 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (3 PKs; TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** 1 PK injured (from same contingent) **Notes:** Carjacking, 3 assailants	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 1 assault rifle **Ammunition:** • 30 cartridges **Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen
• 5 August 2011 • UNAMID • Duma, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 5 Sierra Leonean PKs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent), 1 PK injured	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 1 assault rifle **Ammunition:** • 30 cartridges
• 10 October 2011 • UNAMID • Zam Zam, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 12 multinational PKs, including unarmed UNPOL) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 3 PKs killed (2 Rwandans, 1 Senegalese), 6 PKs injured	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel
• 6 November 2011 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of Sierra Leonean contingent) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent), 2 PKs injured	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate	
• 21 January 2012 • UNAMID • *Saleah*, East Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of Nigerian contingent) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent), 3 PKs injured	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 23 assault rifles, 2 machine guns **Ammunition:** • 2,500+ cartridges **Notes:** 4 vehicles stolen	Cat. II ■
• 16 February 2012 • UNAMID • Kutum, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Carjacking (1 PK; TCC unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK injured	**Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	
• 19 February 2012 • UNAMID • Shegeg Tova, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Detention of patrol (of 55 persons, including 50 PKs, majority from Senegal, 3 police advisers, and 2 interpreters) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	□
29 February 2012 UNAMID Shearia, East Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of Nigerian contingent, including 31 soldiers, 9 UNPOL, 1 MilOb) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent), 3 PKs injured	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 8 assault rifles, 1 machine gun **Ammunition:** • *1,000+ cartridges* **Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	***Cat. I*** ■
• 20 April 2012 • UNAMID • Mournei, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of FPU; TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from Togo), 3 PKs injured	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 9 August 2012 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Robbery (residence of 8 PKs; TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** 15 assailants	**Notes:** No arms or ammunition taken; stolen materiel includes uniforms, UNAMID IDs, communications equipment, etc.	
• 12 August 2012 • UNAMID • Otash, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on fixed site (of Bangladeshi FPUs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed, 1 PK injured (from same contingent)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 20 August 2012 • UNAMID • Kabkabiya, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (2 Jordanian UNPOL) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** Abduction; personnel released 136 days later	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 1 assault rifle **Ammunition:** • 120 cartridges	

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate	
• 26 August 2012 • UNAMID • *Misterei*, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Accident on patrol (Tanzanian PKs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 3 PKs killed (from same contingent) **Notes:** PKs drowned when their APC became stranded in a swollen river	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 2 assault rifles **Ammunition:** • 300+ cartridges	
• 2 September 2012 • UNAMID • Unknown	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (Nigerian contingent) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • Unknown	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 4 assault rifles **Ammunition:** • 210 cartridges	
• 11 September 2012 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Robbery (residence of 1 Cameroonian and 1 Nigerian UNPOL) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK injured (Nigerian) **Notes:** 4 assailants	**Notes:** No arms or ammunition taken; stolen materiel includes UNAMID IDs, communications equipment, personal belongings, etc.	
• 2 October 2012 • UNAMID • Al Geneina, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 30 Nigerian infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 4 PKs killed, 8 PKs injured (from same contingent)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 17 October 2012 • UNAMID • Hashaba North, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of around 120 South African infantry: 110 military from RSA BATT 10, 2 MilObs, 2 police, 18 members of mission HQ, 2 members of UN Department for Safety and Security, 4 language assistants) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (South African), 3 PKs injured	**Notes:** No arms or ammunition taken	
• 12 November 2012 • UNAMID • Guba, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (multinational verification mission; TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (South African), 4 PKs injured	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 26 November 2012 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Robbery (residence of 2 Sierra Leonean PKs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** 6 assailants	**Notes:** No arms or ammunition taken; stolen materiel includes uniforms, cash, communications equipment, etc.	

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate	
• 5 March 2013 • UNAMID • Al Fasher, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Carjacking (1 Burkinabé UNPOL) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** 2 assailants	**Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	
• 20 March 2013 • UNAMID • Ed al Fursan, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on fixed site (Egyptian infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** 13 assailants	**Notes:** No arms or ammunition taken; assailants stole a night-vision device	
• 3 April 2013 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Robbery (residence of 1 Jordanian UNPOL) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** 7 assailants	**Notes:** No arms or ammunition taken; stolen materiel includes uniforms, cash, communications equipment, etc.	
• 9 April 2013 • UNMISS • *Gumuruk*, Jonglei	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (32 Indian infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 5 PKs killed (from same contingent), 9 PKs injured **Notes:** Around 200 assailants; 7 civilian staff also killed	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 7 assault rifles **Ammunition:** • *500+ cartridges* **Notes:** 3 vehicles vandalized beyond recovery	*Cat. I* ■
• 19 April 2013 • UNAMID • *Muhajeria*, East Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on fixed site (Nigerian infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent), 2 PKs injured	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 4 May 2013 • UNISFA • Abyei, Abyei region	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (armed escort for Dinka VIP; TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent), 3 PKs injured **Notes:** Around 200 armed assailants	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 14 June 2013 • UNISFA • Kadugli, South Kordofan	**Description of incident:** • Attack on fixed site (UNISFA and Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism interim HQ) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (Ethiopian), 2 PKs injured	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate	
• 13 July 2013 • UNAMID • *Khor Abeche*, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (of joint force of 63 PKs, majority Tanzanian) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 7 PKs killed (Tanzanian), 17 PKs injured	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 24 assault rifles, 4 machine guns, 1 anti-tank weapon **Ammunition:** • 500+ cartridges, 150+ rocket grenades **Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	Cat. I ■
• 3 August 2013 • UNAMID • *Nyala*, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (helicopter with 1 Sudanese and 2 Ukrainian crew members) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** MI8 forced to make emergency landing; crew detained and later released	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 12 August 2013 • UNAMID • El Daein, East Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 7 AK-pattern assault rifles **Ammunition:** • 500+ cartridges (in 25 magazines) **Notes:** 1 APC and 2 out of 6 double-cab vehicles stolen; APC repossessed by Sudanese police	**Cat. I □**
• 11 October 2013 • UNAMID • Al Fasher, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of MilObs; TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (Zambian)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 13 October 2013 • UNAMID • *Al Geneina*, West Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (of Senegalese PKs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 3 PKs killed (from same contingent), 1 PK injured	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 24 November 2013 • UNAMID • Kabkabiya, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (of Rwandan PKs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed (from same contingent)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 19 December 2013 • UNMISS • Akobo, Jonglei	**Description of incident:** • Attack on fixed site (base of 43 Indian PKs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 2 PKs killed (from same contingent), 1 PK injured **Notes:** Around 2,000 assailants	**Small arms/light weapons:** • *40+ assault rifles, 10+ machine guns* **Ammunition:** • 22,000 cartridges	Cat. III ■

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate	
• 29 December 2013 • UNAMID • *Greida*, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (of multinational contingent) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 2 PKs killed (Jordanian and Senegalese)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 8 February 2014 • UNAMID • Sindy, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (military logistics; TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 37 assault rifles, 4 machine guns **Ammunition:** • *3,500+ cartridges* **Notes:** 3 vehicles stolen	***Cat. II*** ■
• 5 March 2014 • UNMISS • Rumbek, Lakes state	**Description of incident:** • Detention of convoy (carrying materiel for Ghanaian infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 19 assault rifles, 17 RPG launchers, 19 machine guns **Ammunition:** • 6,000+ cartridges **Notes:** On 1 April 2014 the SPLA returned the seized materiel and other contents	Cat. III ■
• 9 March 2014 • UNAMID • Nyala, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of 1 Nigerian PK) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** Abduction; PK released 54 days later	**Small arms/light weapons:** • *1 assault rifle* **Ammunition:** • *90 cartridges* **Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	
• 17 April 2014 • UNMISS • Bor, Jonglei	**Description of incident:** • Attack on fixed site (UNMIS base) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 2 injured (both Indian PKs) **Notes:** 30–40 assailants	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 24 April 2014 • UNMISS • Tonga, Upper Nile	**Description of incident:** • Attack on convoy (barge with 56 PKs) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 2 PKs injured	**Notes:** No military materiel lost	
• 24 May 2014 • UNAMID • Kabkabiya, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of Rwandan contingent) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 1 PK killed, 3 PKs wounded (all from same contingent) **Notes:** 60 assailants	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	

Event • Date • Mission • Location (*italics = nearby/approx. site*)	Context	Materiel lost ■ = notable incident, verified □ = notable incident, unverified Italics = assumption/estimate	
• 16 October 2014 • UNAMID • Korma, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of Ethiopian infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 3 PKs killed (from same contingent)	**Small arms/light weapons:** • *7 assault rifles* **Ammunition:** • *500+ cartridges* **Notes:** 1 vehicle stolen	*Cat. I* ■
• 29 October 2014 • UNAMID • Kutum, North Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on patrol (of South African infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 3 PKs injured (from same contingent)	**Notes:** Possible loss of materiel	
• 12 December 2014 • UNAMID • Wadi Korno, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on a patrol (of Tanzanian infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 3 PKs injured **Notes:** 20 assailants	**Small arms/light weapons:** • 1 weapon **Notes:** 2 vehicles stolen	
• 12 December 2014 • UNAMID • Labado, East Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on a patrol (of Pakistani infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • n/a	**Notes:** Nothing taken	
• 14 December 2014 • UNAMID • Gharabshi, South Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on a patrol (TCC(s) unknown) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • None **Notes:** 10 assailants	**Small arms/light weapons:** • Unknown number of weapons **Notes:** 2 vehicles stolen	
• 19 December 2014 • UNAMID • Um Zeifa, East Darfur	**Description of incident:** • Attack on a patrol (Pakistani infantry) **Casualties incurred by PKs:** • 3 PKs injured (all Pakistani)	**Notes:** Assailants attempt to steal 2 vehicles, but are repelled under fire	

Annexe C: Additional reference maps (showing border changes)



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Acknowledgements

This study could not have been undertaken without the generous support of the Government of Norway, which has funded the HSBA project in Sudan and South Sudan for many years and specifically saw merit in this initiative. The Governments of Denmark and the United States also support the HSBA.

Other governments not currently funding the HSBA enhanced the profile of the issue and aided our research. Germany and the United Kingdom provided additional financial assistance that allowed us to hold briefings or participate in seminars. These events were held in Addis Ababa, Berlin, New York, and Washington, DC. Canada sponsored two briefings at its Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, and Belgium chaired a side event at UN Headquarters in New York within the framework of the Programme of Action on small arms, at which we shared our preliminary findings.

The opportunity to hold briefings and attend meetings with relevant stakeholders generated useful feedback and enabled us to better frame our research agenda. Accordingly, we are indebted to Obed Boamah Akwa, Wolfgang Bindseil, Mike Bittrick, Cedric de Coning, Mikael Eriksson, Miriam Fugfugosh, Eddy Gatana, Thomas Goebel, Elissa Golberg, Hugh Griffiths, Mohamed Hatem Elatawy, Robert Kabage, Richard Le Bars, Frank Meeussen, Elsa Muelhi-Rondeau, Vincent Nyakarundi, Mohammed-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, and Ashraf Swelam.

Apart from funding, data on incidents, and agenda setting, we also benefitted from people's time and general expertise. For example, the UN explained it could not provide greater details on losses incurred apart from what was already in the realm of public information. Nevertheless, many UN officials—as well as knowledgeable officials from the AU and governments, and experts in academia and the media—were happy to explain processes and constraints, clarify when no diversion took place, review parts of the manuscript, or make useful introductions. Without such interventions the work would have been less rigorous. Accordingly, we wish to acknowledge useful contributions from Michael Amuzu, Henry Anyidoho, Seth Appiah-Mensah, Norm Atkins, Marcel Bahlmann, Anthony

Banbury, Serge Bavaud, James Bevan, Larry Bottinick, Doug Brooks, Peter Due, Aicha Elbasri, Mohamed ElMolla, Anthonie Erasmus, Scott Fischer, Ibrahim Gambari, Michael Gaouette, Jean-Philippe Ganascia, Linnea Gelot, Alison Giffen, Richard Gowan, Marc Gustafson, Tigist Hailu, Dylan Hendrickson, Mohamed Hojeij, Jonas Horner, Herbert Howe, Lisa Ibscher, Naoki Ishikawa, Greg Joachim, David Lochhead, Hilde Johnson, Eugene Karuhanga, Jeremy King, Daniela Kroslak, Jonah Leff, Annette Leijenaar, Katrina Lennon, William Lietzau, Walter Lotze, Colum Lynch, Godwin Mahunu, Meg Manthey, Stuart McGhie, Edmond Mulet, Elizabeth Mutamba, Alexandra Novosselof, Patrick Nyamvumba, Festus Okonkwo, Helen Olafsdottir, Einas Osman Abadalla Mohamed, Hester Paneras, Kenneth Payumo, Michael Pugh, Richard Rands, Eric Reeves, Andre Roux, Halvor Saetre, Tarek Sharif, Bruce Smart, James S. Smith, Karim Smither, Jason Steeves, Meredith Street, Thierry Tardy, Frederic Tissot-Daguette, Nicolas von Ruben, Ghassim Wane, Jan-Erik Wilhelmsen, Paul Williams, and Matthew Willis.

Collating the data was time consuming and demanding. Julia Diamond, Nicolas Erwes, Hannah Hilligoss, Miraziz Khidoyatov, Michael Picard, Michael Stinnett, Margaret Wagner, and Mackenzie Wislar, all of whom were students interned at the Survey, provided able and appreciated research assistance.

Last but not least, we wish to acknowledge the excellent support we received from our colleagues at the Survey, as well as the HSBA and publication teams.

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The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate impartial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and other stakeholders. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

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The Human Security Baseline Assessment

The Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan is a multi-year research project administered by the Small Arms Survey, an independent research project of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. The HSBA has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, the United Nations Development Programme, and non-governmental partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely empirical research, the project supports violence reduction initiatives, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes, incentive schemes for civilian arms collections, and security sector reform and arms control interventions across Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy-relevant guidance on redressing insecurity.

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