

Briefing Paper

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ARMS CONTROL 2.0

Operationalizing SDG Target 16.4

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Front cover photo

The Sustainable Development Goals are projected onto the UN Headquarters building, New York, 2015.
Source: Cia Pak/UN Photo



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Overview

Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will rest upon, and in turn potentially strengthen, complementary international processes, including that on conventional arms control. This Briefing Paper describes how the implementation of international arms control instruments supports the aim of reducing illicit arms flows in line with SDG Target 16.4. In so doing, the paper distinguishes measures designed to reduce diversion risks from those aimed at curbing illicit arms manufacture and the misuse of transferred arms.

The Briefing Paper also focuses on the challenge of measuring progress made in achieving Target 16.4 and related SDGs, noting that the success of both the SDG and conventional arms control processes will largely depend on the extent to which states take advantage of the synergies among SDG indicators, including at the national and regional levels, and reporting under the international arms control instruments. While important potential synergies in reporting and data collection exist, they will remain stillborn unless translated into concrete action.

Key findings

- Implementation of the international arms control instruments will underpin achievement of the significant reduction in illicit arms flows mandated by SDG Target 16.4. Measures designed to curb arms diversion, illicit manufacture, and the misuse of transferred arms are all relevant to this objective.
- Although seizure data, which serves as the foundation of SDG Indicator 16.4.2 and the primary source of information on illicit arms in countries around the world, cannot fully describe the illicit trade, it can still offer a useful window on illicit arms flows, as long as it is sufficiently detailed.
- Reporting under the international arms control instruments can support the gathering of data for Indicator 16.4.2 and, more broadly, measure progress made in reducing illicit arms flows, whether indirectly, through the provision of information on the implementation of arms control measures, or directly through assessments of the impacts of these efforts.
- National-level SDG indicators that are based on the arms control instruments can help overcome the limitations of Indicator 16.4.2, which is restricted to the generation of better—albeit incomplete—information on illicit arms flows.

Introduction

The early years of the 21st century have seen the step-by-step development of global norms for the control of conventional arms, with a particular focus on small arms. The international arms control instruments, which include the UN Small Arms Programme of Action (PoA), the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), the UN Firearms Protocol, and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), have, however, existed in relative isolation from a separate strand of work that has captured international attention over the past few decades, namely sustainable development (UNGA, 2001a; 2001b; 2005; 2013).

This Briefing Paper will not only explain how the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UNGA, 2015) connect conventional arms control to sustainable development; it will argue that they strengthen the justification for arms control—providing it with a set of specific objectives, along with the means to measure progress towards their fulfilment. The paper begins with a brief overview of the events that brought the security and development strands of multilateral action together. The following sections unpack the concepts of implementation and reporting synergies, focusing on the measurement challenge given its importance to the success or failure of these increasingly joined processes.

Security and development: a short history

Concern over the implications of illicit arms for sustainable development accompanied the emergence onto the international agenda of the small arms issue in the latter half of the 1990s, when the UN Development Programme (UNDP), in particular, focused on the linkage in a series of development projects aimed at preventing and reducing armed violence.¹ The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000–15, however, restricted themselves to core development aims, such as poverty reduction and improved education and health care, ignoring violence, insecurity, and arms control.

In order to fill this gap, in June 2006, 42 states, led by the Swiss government and UNDP, adopted the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (Geneva Declaration, 2006). Signatories of the Declaration, which numbered 113 by the time the process ended in late 2015,² agreed to enhance the integration of initiatives to reduce armed violence and prevent conflict in national and multilateral development policies and frameworks.

“The international arms control instruments provide the normative framework needed to underpin the achievement of Target 16.4.”

Under the Declaration’s measurability pillar, the Geneva Declaration Secretariat published three editions of the *Global Burden of Armed Violence*, a report that reviewed the scope and impacts of armed violence throughout the world (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2008; 2011; 2015).

The global peace and development process, largely centred on the Geneva Declaration, also fostered a UN General Assembly resolution and a UN Secretary-General report that stressed the linkages between sustainable development and armed violence prevention and reduction (UNGA, 2008; 2009). The preparatory process for the SDGs, which replaced the MDGs in 2015, also revealed a growing recognition of the need to move beyond the traditional development goals of the MDGs to address a broader range of factors driving underdevelopment, including violence, insecurity, and illicit arms.³

In the event, Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development promotes ‘peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development’, in part

by committing states to ‘significantly reduce illicit [. . .] arms flows’ by 2030 in line with Target 16.4 (UNGA, 2015). This Briefing Paper examines the role of international arms control processes in achieving the aims of Target 16.4.

Implementation synergies

Operationalizing Target 16.4 within the framework of arms control processes means identifying and taking advantage of implementation synergies. Regarding the UN small arms process, the outcome of the Sixth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS6) makes the point:

States underlined the importance of the full and effective implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument for attaining Goal 16 and target 16.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals (UNGA, 2016a, para. 26).

The same is true of the ATT and the UN Firearms Protocol. Together with a wide array of other arms control instruments and processes, including at the regional and sub-regional levels, these agreements dovetail with Target 16.4 in their aim to reduce illicit arms flows. Their effective implementation is thus the single most important factor in the achievement of the illicit arms component of Target 16.4.

These instruments act to curb illicit arms flows in several different ways. In the first instance, arms control aims to prevent the diversion of legal weapons¹⁵ to the illicit sphere (unauthorized users or uses). Since vast numbers of illicit arms begin their lives in the legal domain, meaning that they are legally manufactured, preventing diversion is fundamental to the fight against illicit weapons. The PoA acts to prevent diversion by strengthening control over small arms at key stages of their life cycles—including international transfer, and storage by national armed and security forces—to ensure that they remain in the hands of legitimate users (UNGA, 2001b, s. II).

The Firearms Protocol and the ATT also deploy a series of measures designed to curb arms diversion, at the time of both international transfer and, in the case of the Protocol, manufacture.¹⁶ Another form of diversion is the illicit conversion of replica or blank-firing (non-functioning) firearms into functional weapons, or the illicit reactivation of deactivated arms. The Firearms Protocol, adopted in May 2001, acknowledges these problems by defining a ‘firearm’ to include a weapon that ‘may be readily converted’ to function as a firearm and requiring that deactivated firearms ‘be rendered permanently inoperable’ (UNGA, 2001a, arts. 3a, 9). The UN small arms process has also begun to address illicit conversions and reactivations (UNGA, 2016a, paras. 31, 37, 72).

Not all illicit arms are diverted arms, however. Weapons that are manufactured without government authorization begin their lives as illicit arms. Many of these typically ‘craft-produced’ weapons are intended for ordinary citizens who seek a more affordable alternative to industrially produced firearms. Individual criminals, criminal groups, or other non-state armed groups also procure and use these arms. The PoA requires states ‘to prevent [the] illegal manufacture’ of small arms (UNGA, 2001b, para. II.2). The Firearms Protocol addresses the problem with greater specificity, defining and criminalizing the illicit manufacture of firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition, and providing for the confiscation, seizure, and disposal of illicitly

Box 1 Illicit arms: the broader picture

As underlined in the 2030 Agenda, the SDGs and their targets ‘are integrated and indivisible’ (UNGA, 2015, para. 55). By committing states to reduce illicit arms flows, Target 16.4 not only supports Goal 16’s overarching aims of ‘peace, justice and strong institutions’ (UNGA, 2016a, para. 25),⁴ it also bolsters several other Goal 16 targets. They include the separate, but related crime-fighting objectives of Target 16.4,⁵ as well as Target 16.1, under which states have committed to ‘[s]ignificantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere’ (UNGA, 2015).⁶ Other related Goal 16 targets seek to end violence against children (16.2), reduce corruption (16.5), promote transparency (16.6 and 16.10),⁷ and build the capacity of national institutions ‘to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime’ (16.a).

Beyond the scope of Goal 16, the target of significantly reducing illicit arms flows supports the achievement of goals such as:

- poverty reduction (Goal 1) and economic growth (Goal 8);⁸
- health (Goal 3);⁹
- education (Goal 4);¹⁰
- gender equality (Goal 5);¹¹
- access to water and sanitation (Goal 6);¹²
- safe cities and communities (Goal 11);¹³ and
- the protection of terrestrial ecosystems (Goal 15).¹⁴



A British soldier from Signals Squadron, 19 Mechanized Brigade, guards arrested crew members of an Iraqi ship, a confiscated rifle, and small bags allegedly containing drugs in the port of Basra, 2003. Source: Maxim Marmur/AFP Photo

manufactured items (UNGA, 2001a, arts. 2, 3d, 5a, 6).

Another important component of the illicit arms market involves weapons that, while legally produced and held, are transferred within or outside a country despite a significant risk that they will be misused. Examples include transfers from a government to a ‘pro-government non-state armed group’ within a country¹⁷ or to a foreign security force with a poor human rights record.

Under the PoA, UN member states undertake ‘[t]o assess applications for export authorizations according to strict national regulations and procedures that [...] are consistent with the existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law’ (UNGA, 2001b, para. II.11). The ATT is more specific, detailing the circumstances under which states parties are prohibited from transferring conventional arms abroad, as well as the factors they must consider before approving any arms export application (UNGA, 2013, arts. 6–7). To the extent that the ATT (and PoA) fulfil the aim of promoting ‘responsible action’ by their adherents (art. 1), they promote the aims of Target 16.4.

As acknowledged in all of the international instruments discussed here, effective arms control—and the significant reduction in illicit arms flows mandated

by Target 16.4—depends on international cooperation and assistance. In its section on international assistance, the BMS6 outcome acknowledges the important ‘synergies between projects designed to support implementation of the [PoA and ITI] and projects related to the [SDGs]’ (UNGA, 2016a, para. 99).¹⁸ International cooperation and assistance involve more than assistance, however. Cooperation among states, and between states, multi-lateral organizations, and other stakeholders—across all of the areas covered by the arms control instruments—is also essential to effective arms control and to the achievement of Target 16.4.

In short, the normative framework needed to underpin the achievement of Target 16.4 exists. But how do we know it works?

Measuring reductions in illicit arms flows

There is limited information on the types, quantities, and value of illicit arms circulating around the world, including information that would allow for the establishment of a baseline against which reductions (or increases) could be measured. In fact, given the concealed nature of the illicit trade, most of the strategies that could

be employed to track implementation of Target 16.4 would not involve direct measurement of the trade, but would instead measure it indirectly—for example, by assessing compliance with international arms control commitments—or aim to generate better data on illicit arms by strengthening data-gathering practices and capacities. The global indicator for Target 16.4, Indicator 16.4.2, takes the latter approach.

The global indicator

Adopted by the UN General Assembly in July 2017,¹⁹ Indicator 16.4.2 serves to measure the:

[p]roportion of seized, found or surrendered arms whose illicit origin or context has been traced or established by a competent authority in line with international instruments.

In essence, by increasing the number of ‘seized, found or surrendered arms’ whose illicit nature is determined, whether through weapons tracing or some other form of investigation, Indicator 16.4.2 aims to generate better information on illicit arms flows. It thus builds on international efforts dating back to the turn

“ Weapons manufactured without government authorization are another component of the illicit arms market.”



A demonstrator uses a makeshift weapon at a rally during a strike called to protest against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro's government in Caracas, 2017. Source: Ueslei Marcelino/Reuters



of the century—such as the UN Firearms Protocol, the PoA, and the ITI—that have focused on the development of common rules and the building of national capacity for weapons marking, record-keeping, and tracing.

Indicator 16.4.2 looks to weapons seizures (weapons ‘seized, found or surrendered’) for information on illicit arms flows. Seizure information cannot fully describe the illicit trade, since seizures can be driven, for example, by changes in law enforcement practices and policies, as much as by underlying changes in illicit markets.²⁰ Nevertheless, it can offer a useful window on illicit arms flows, as long as it is sufficiently detailed.

Information on the circumstances of a seizure is especially important as not all seized weapons are illicitly trafficked. Arms can be seized in connection with other, non-trafficking criminal offences; they can also be seized because of administrative violations, such as the lack of a licence or registration for an otherwise lawful, arms-related transaction (UNODC, 2015, p. 5). Equally important is information on the type and model of seized arms, which can be used to iden-

tify new types of equipment in illicit markets and the sources and transfer routes of specific models. To the same end, data on parts, accessories, and ammunition seizures should be distinguished from that on weapons seizures.

In 2016–17, the Small Arms Survey found that seizure data served as the most important source of information on illicit arms in four countries that faced varying arms-related challenges in different regions. To some extent, these states—or their international partners²¹—are using seizure data to measure illicit arms flows, but their current efforts fall well short of what is needed to track implementation of Target 16.4 since, by and large, the data is not sufficiently detailed or comprehensive for this purpose.²²

Reporting synergies

SDG follow-up and review processes are to ‘build on existing platforms and processes’ (UNGA, 2015, para. 74(f)). Reporting under the global arms control instruments, especially the Firearms Protocol²³ and the ITI,²⁴ can in fact be

harnessed to the aims of Indicator 16.4.2. States parties to the Firearms Protocol have undertaken to confiscate and seize²⁵ illicit firearms (UNGA, 2001a, art. 6). Meanwhile, governments have committed to mark, record, and cooperate in tracing firearms/small arms under the Protocol, the PoA, and the ITI—with the latter covering these issues in greatest detail.

While current reporting practices, whether within the Firearms Protocol or PoA/ITI frameworks, do not as a rule provide the kind of information Indicator 16.4.2 seeks,²⁶ work is now underway to remedy this, including by the two ‘custodian agencies’ for Indicator 16.4.2: the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

In line with a mandate received under the transnational organized crime process, which includes the Firearms Protocol, and drawing on the language of Indicator 16.4.2, UNODC is developing an annual questionnaire for the collection of information on weapons, ammunition, and parts and components that are seized, found, or surrendered (COP, 2016, paras. 28–29). In order to identify arms trafficking trends, the questionnaire will seek information



Illegal firearms are burnt as part of a campaign by the Kenyan government to reduce illicit small arms and light weapons, Nairobi, 2010. Source: Tony Karumba/AFP

on the circumstances of seizure/retrieval and the types of seized/retrieved weapons—information, which, as noted above, is essential to effective arms monitoring. At the same time, UNODC is developing a technical assistance project aimed at building national capacity to collect information for the questionnaire.²⁷

Within the framework of the UN small arms process, UN member states have undertaken to ‘take advantage of national reports under the [PoA and ITI] so as to support data collection for relevant indicators relating to [the SDGs]’ (UNGA, 2016a, paras. 53, 76).²⁸ The UN template for PoA and ITI national reports was revised in 2017, in part to support data collection for relevant SDG indicators, including Indicator 16.4.2 (UNODA, n.d.). Further, through its three regional centres for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean, UNODA is convening a series of workshops in 2017–18 for purposes of building national capacity to collect such data. As with the UNODC assistance project, this initiative will also help participating states to develop complementary national-level indicators for Target 16.4.²⁹

Looking past Indicator 16.4.2, national reporting could provide an indirect indication of progress made in achieving Target 16.4 by sharing information on the implementation of arms control measures designed to curb diversion, illicit manufacture, and the misuse of transferred arms. But the real challenge is to measure the achievement of Target 16.4 more directly: not through an inventory of arms control efforts, but through an assessment of the impacts of these efforts. More specifically, such an assessment would seek to answer questions such as:

- Has strengthened stockpile security led to a reduction in the rate of weapons diversion from national stockpiles?
- Are efforts to bolster end-user certification in advance of any arms export translating into fewer diversions of shipments to undeclared recipients?
- Are new laws on small arms manufacture and accompanying enforcement measures reducing the number of weapons produced outside of state control?
- Has the more rigorous application of ATT criteria for arms export authorizations led to a decrease in the misuse of transferred weapons?

In short, tracking reductions in illicit arms flows in line with Target 16.4 requires more than a review of efforts undertaken to implement international arms control instruments—and more than the collection

“ Practical work is underway to enhance synergies between the SDGs process and the international arms control instruments.”

and analysis of seizure data, useful though this may be. It requires a thorough assessment of the impacts of implementation.

National-level indicators

As noted above, practical work is underway to enhance synergies between the SDGs process and the international arms control instruments, especially in the area of reporting. More can be done to ensure that reporting under the instruments helps track progress made in implementing Target 16.4, both within the framework of Indicator 16.4.2 and independently of it. Yet, given current shortfalls in national reporting practices,³⁰ it is probably unrealistic to expect such reporting to provide all of the needed information. Moreover, as explained, Indicator 16.4.2 has a relatively modest aim: to generate better—not necessarily complete—data on illicit arms flows.

National-level indicators, developed by UN member states, can help fill the gap.³¹ In the context of the UN small arms process, they would normally be ‘based on’ the PoA and ITI (UNGA, 2016a, para. 27).³² States can draw similar inspiration from the UN Firearms Protocol and the ATT. Logically, states would track—and report on—not only their implementation of measures designed to curb diversion, illicit manufacture, and the misuse of transferred arms, but also the impacts of such implementation.

Relevant measures would include those contained in the four conventional arms control instruments—the PoA, ITI, UN Firearms Protocol, and ATT—and span the weapon life cycle, from manufacture through to international transfer, temporary storage, and final disposal.³³

Relevant impacts would include:

- reductions in the numbers of weapons diverted from the legal to the illicit spheres;
- reductions in the numbers of illicitly manufactured weapons; and
- a decrease in the misuse of arms transferred abroad.

National-level indicators that help to assess the implementation of international arms control instruments—and the impacts of such implementation—can be complemented by indicators that provide additional information on illicit arms. Along with disaggregated seizure data, court documents,³⁴ illicit market prices, survey data,³⁵ and information on the use of firearms in homicide or other crimes³⁶ can cast light on:

- reductions (or increases) in illicit arms flows;
- changes in source countries, transfer routes, and modes of transport and concealment;
- shifting patterns of supply and demand for specific weapon types and models, their parts, accessories, and ammunition; and
- changes in access to or the presence of illicit arms.

Increased transparency by states on arms issues, as encouraged or mandated by all of the international instruments discussed in this paper,³⁷ is equally important to the measurement of progress made in implementing Target 16.4. Improved transparency on international arms transfers, coupled with data on arms control legislation, stockpile management, and surplus disposal—to cite only a few examples—generates new information and can spur improved arms control practices and outcomes. To the extent the information is made public, the network effects enjoyed by large communities can come into play—allowing other governments, international organizations, and civil society partners to analyse, refine, and complement information provided by individual states and to identify implementation challenges and solutions.³⁸

National circumstances obviously vary widely; what one country can measure may be beyond the reach of another.³⁹ But within the broad menu sketched out above, combined with basic—and extended, impact-oriented—reporting under the international arms control

instruments, the road to a significant reduction in illicit arms flows can be mapped out and followed.

Conclusion

In fact, the road to a significant reduction in illicit arms flows has been under construction for some time. The adoption of the UN Firearms Protocol and the PoA in 2001, followed by the ITI in 2005 and the ATT in 2013, has established the basic normative framework for the control of conventional arms at the global level, with a focus on small arms. Yet, as the word indicates, these *instruments* are a means to an end, not an end in and of themselves.

SDG Target 16.4 articulates the globally agreed objective in the area of arms control, namely the achievement of a significant reduction in illicit arms flows by 2030. More broadly, this target contributes to the promotion of peace, justice, and effective institutions, as set out in Goal 16, and to the realization of a range of other SDGs, from core development goals, such as poverty reduction and improved health and education, to gender equality and environmental protection (see Box 1).

Target 16.4 is made operational through the international arms control instruments. To implement the instruments is to implement the target. This, at least, is the theory. In practice, the absence of formal implementation monitoring for the control instruments discussed in this paper means that our position on the road towards illicit arms reduction is uncertain. This is why the 2030 Agenda places such emphasis on the need to measure progress made towards the achievement of the SDGs, specifically through its system of global indicators, such as 16.4.2, along with complementary national- and regional-level indicators.

Here, too, there are important synergies with existing arms control processes. As described above, work is now underway to use reporting under the arms control instruments—and new types of data collection based on them—to support the gathering of information for Indicator 16.4.2 and related SDG indicators. Reporting under the international instruments can also be used to communicate progress made in implementing Target 16.4. Implementation and the measurement of implementation are in reality two sides of the same coin. If ‘what gets measured gets done’, one must conclude that effective arms control will depend on measuring the achievement of the SDGs. ●

List of abbreviations

ATT

Arms Trade Treaty

BMS

Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

Geneva Declaration

Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development

ITI

International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons

MDG

Millennium Development Goal

PoA

Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

SDG

Sustainable Development Goal

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNODA

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

UNODC

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Notes

- 1 See Dorn (2000).
- 2 See Geneva Declaration (n.d.) and Switzerland and UNDP (2015).
- 3 See, for example, High-Level Panel (2013, pp. 9, 52–53, 61).
- 4 Regarding national institutions, see UNGA (2015, Targets 16.6, 16.a) and De Martino (2012).
- 5 The full text of Target 16.4 reads: ‘By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime’ (UNGA, 2015).
- 6 Approximately 50 per cent of homicides around the world were committed with firearms between 2010 and 2015, with the highest proportion of firearm killings recorded in regions with the highest levels of lethal violence, in particular Latin America and the Caribbean (Widmer and Pavesi, 2016).
- 7 Regarding transparency and the international small arms trade, see Holtom and Pavesi (2017).
- 8 According to the World Bank: ‘On average, a country that experienced major violence over the period from 1981 to 2005 has a poverty rate 21 percentage points higher than a country that saw no violence’ (World Bank, 2011, p. 5). The same report calculates the average cost of a civil war at more than 30 years of GDP growth for a medium-size developing country (pp. 5–6).
- 9 For details on the direct and indirect costs of non-lethal firearm violence, including medical costs, see Alvazzi del Frate (2012, p. 94).

- 10 Of note is that ‘[c]hildren in conflict-affected countries account for just 22% of primary school-age children, but one-half of all children who were denied an education in 2011’ (UIS and UNICEF, 2015, p. 45).
- 11 Under Target 5.2, states have undertaken to ‘[e]liminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres’ (UNGA, 2015). Regarding the lethal form such violence can take, see Racovita (2015). The promotion of ‘women’s full and effective participation [...] in political, economic and public life’, reflected in Target 5.5, has found traction in the UN small arms process, most recently in the Sixth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS6) outcome (UNGA, 2016a, para. 59).
- 12 See De Martino (2012, p. 3).
- 13 See Jütersonke, Krause, and Muggah (2007) and Jütersonke and Dönges (2015).
- 14 Target 15.c focuses on wildlife poaching, which is often facilitated with firearms (UNGA, 2015). On this subject, see Carlson, Wright, and Dönges (2015).
- 15 Unless stated otherwise, this Briefing Paper uses the terms ‘weapons’ and ‘arms’ to mean conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons, their parts, accessories, and ammunition, while it uses ‘small arms’ to refer to small arms and light weapons, their parts, accessories, and ammunition.
- 16 See, for example, UNGA (2001a, arts. 10–11; 2013, art. 11).
- 17 See Hazen (2010).
- 18 See also UNGA (2016a, para. 101).
- 19 The initial formulation of Indicator 16.4.2, agreed by the UN Statistical Commission in March 2016, is analysed in McDonald and De Martino (2016). That version was revised in late 2016 and approved by the UN Statistical Commission in March 2017, before being adopted by the UN General Assembly in July 2017 (UNGA, 2017; UN Statistical Commission, 2017).
- 20 See Nowak (2016, p. 2) and Martyniuk (2017, p. 5).
- 21 In Somalia, the mechanism that reports to the UN Security Council on compliance with the arms embargo on the country conveys information on arms seizures and diversion. See Carlson (2016, p. 2).
- 22 See Carlson (2016, pp. 2–3), Nowak (2016, p. 2), Martyniuk (2017, p. 5), and de Tésières (2017, p. 7).
- 23 Reporting and data collection for the Firearms Protocol is grounded in its parent convention and in resolutions adopted by the convention’s Conference of the Parties. See UNGA (2000, art. 32) and COP (2016, paras. 6–9, 13, 23, 28–29).
- 24 Under the ITI, UN member states have committed to report every two years on their implementation of the instrument (UNGA, 2005, para. 36). PoA reporting, which is voluntary, includes a recommendation to share information on ‘(a) small arms and light weapons confiscated or destroyed within their jurisdiction; and (b) other relevant information such as illicit trade routes’ (UNGA, 2001b, paras. II.23, II.33).
- 25 The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defines ‘seizure’ as temporary in nature, in contrast to ‘confiscation’,

- which is permanent (UNGA, 2000, arts. 2(f), 2(g)).
- 26 See McDonald and De Martino (2016).
- 27 Author correspondence with UNODC, 29 August 2017.
- 28 See also UNGA (2016a, paras. 40–41).
- 29 Author correspondence with UNODA, 28–29 August 2017.
- 30 See McDonald and De Martino (2016).
- 31 See paragraph 75 of the 2030 Agenda, which also calls for the development of regional-level indicators (UNGA, 2015).
- 32 Specific follow-up to this provision of the BMS6 outcome includes UN General Assembly Resolution 71/64, in which the General Assembly ‘encourages the Group of Interested States to contribute to the development’ of such indicators (UNGA, 2016b, para. 6).
- 33 For examples of relevant measures, see De Martino and Atwood (2015).
- 34 See Schroeder (2016).
- 35 Regarding the use of illicit market prices, as well as survey data covering, for example, households and law enforcement officials, see De Martino and Atwood (2015, p. 3). On the use of price information in specific countries, see Carlson (2016, p. 3), Nowak (2016, pp. 2–3), and de Tésières (2017, p. 9).
- 36 See Martyniuk (2017, pp. 5–6), Nowak (2016, p. 3), and de Tésières (2017, p. 9). Note that the relationship between fire-arm-related deaths and the availability of illicit arms is seldom clear-cut due to the potential presence of other causal factors. On this point, see, for example, Nowak (2016, p. 3).
- 37 For references to transparency in the UN Firearms Protocol, see COP (2016, paras. 6, 9, 23) and UNGA (2000, art. 32); in the PoA, see UNGA (2001b, paras. II.31, II.33); in the ITI, see UNGA (2005, paras. 31–32, 36); and in the ATT, see UNGA (2013, arts. 1, 13).
- 38 See Carlson (2016, p. 2), Nowak (2016, p. 2), and de Tésières (2017, pp. 8–9).
- 39 See Carlson (2016), Nowak (2016), Martyniuk (2017), and de Tésières (2017).

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The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to generate impartial, evidence-based, and policy-relevant knowledge on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. It is the principal international source of expertise, information, and analysis on small arms and armed violence issues, and acts as a resource for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and civil society. It is located in Geneva, Switzerland, at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.

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