

Analysis of National Reports

Implementation of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and the International Tracing Instrument in 2009–10

By Sarah Parker



An Occasional Paper of the Small Arms Survey

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

ASEAN	Association of South-east Asian Nations
ATF	US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
AUD	Australian dollar
BMS	Biennial Meeting of States
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DZD	Algerian dinar
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EFE	European Firearms Experts
EU	European Union
EUR	Euro
EUROPOL	European Police Office
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova
ILEA	International Law Enforcement Academy
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
ITI	International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons
IWETS	International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System (database)
JPY	Japanese yen
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MGE	Meeting of Governmental Experts
MoU	Memorandum of understanding
NAP	National action plan
NCA	National coordination agency
NGO	Non-governmental organization

NPC	National point of contact
OCO	Oceania Customs Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
PoA	Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
PoA-ISS	Programme of Action Implementation Support System
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons
RENAR	Registro Nacional de Armas
SARPCCO	Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization
SICA	Central American Integration System
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
US	United States
USD	United States dollar

About the author

Sarah Parker is a senior researcher with the Small Arms Survey. She has been engaged in small arms research since 2005 and has co-authored several publications on different aspects of Programme of Action implementation, including *International Assistance for Implementing the PoA to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects: Findings of a Global Survey* (UNIDIR, 2006) and *Implementing the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of the National Reports Submitted by States from 2002 to 2008* (UNIDIR, 2008). She served on the Australian delegation at the Third and Fourth Biennial Meeting of States and as a consultant to the chair of the Open-ended Working Group on an Arms Trade Treaty in 2009.

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Foreword

The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) will soon celebrate its tenth anniversary. More than 150 UN member states have issued over 580 national reports describing the progress they have made, the support they have given or received, and their unmet needs in implementing this critically important arms control agreement. This study by Small Arms Survey senior researcher Sarah Parker examines the reports submitted during the period 2009–10 on three themes covered during the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS4): border controls, international cooperation and assistance, and implementation of the International Tracing Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. It also examines broad trends in reporting since states submitted their first national reports in 2002, and provides important analysis and observations to help states improve on present practice.

This is the fifth publication on national reporting under the PoA that the Small Arms Survey has undertaken. The first three were undertaken with the UN Development Programme, the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research. They covered reports submitted between 2002 and 2008. The fourth study was an interim report for the period 2009–10 and included states' submissions through May 2010. This report builds on the fourth study and includes an additional 41 reports that the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) received between May and December 2010.

National reports on PoA implementation merit greater focus and attention, despite their existing shortcomings. The 34 countries that have failed to issue their first report should prioritize doing so. Twenty-eight states have reported just once. Only 107 of the UN's 192 member states have issued a report during the past two years. All states should strive to submit their next national

reports well in advance of the Second Review Conference scheduled for July 2012 to assist the conference chair, UNODA, other parts of the UN system, donors, and civil society to help promote and assess PoA implementation. Although national reports on PoA implementation do not provide a complete or, in many instances, even a satisfactory picture of implementation, they remain the most important and, in some instances, the only source of information on states' implementation efforts.

The preparation of this report is timely. As states prepare for the Meeting of Governmental Experts (MGE) scheduled for 9–13 May 2011, the first of its kind in the PoA process, and look towards the Review Conference scheduled for 2012, many are asking: What is the status of PoA implementation? And what is the future of the process? The Small Arms Survey is therefore pleased to offer this *Occasional Paper* as a contribution to the MGE and the PoA process generally.

Eric G. Berman
Managing Director, Small Arms Survey
May 2011

Introduction

UN member states convened in New York from 14 to 18 June 2010 for the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS₄) to consider the national, regional, and global implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA), as stipulated in General Assembly Resolution 63/72 (UNGA, 2008b, para. 6).¹

Following informal consultations with states, international and regional organizations, and representatives of civil society and academia in Geneva, Kigali, Lima, New York, and Sydney, the chair-designate of BMS₄, Ambassador Pablo Macedo, permanent representative of Mexico to the UN, identified the following themes for focused consideration during BMS₄:

(a) prevention and combat of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons across borders;² (b) international cooperation and assistance; and (c) strengthening of the follow-up mechanism of the Programme of Action.³

The fourth theme for consideration at BMS₄—implementation of the International Tracing Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (ITI)—is identified in operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly Resolution 64/50.

The Small Arms Survey prepared an interim report aimed at contributing to BMS₄ discussions by providing an analysis of national reports submitted by UN member states to the Secretary-General from January 2009 until May 2010. Accordingly, it focused on the themes identified for consideration at BMS₄. This final version of the report provides a comprehensive analysis of information provided by states on the themes selected for consideration at BMS₄, based on a review of all national reports submitted in 2009 and 2010, including those submitted after the publication of the interim report. It also provides an overview of the outcomes of BMS₄.

Organization

This report is divided into four parts. The first part provides a statistical overview of reporting by states from January 2002 to December 2010. It also reports on the findings of a survey conducted by the Small Arms Survey to verify the existence of and contact details for national points of contact (NPCs), as well as the status of national coordination agencies (NCAs) and national action plans (NAPs).

Part II provides an overview of states' implementation of the following BMS₄ themes: (a) border controls; and (b) international cooperation and assistance. Since national reports under review contain almost no specific information on the third theme identified by Ambassador Macedo—the strengthening of PoA follow-up mechanisms—consideration of this theme appears only in Part IV of the report.

Part III is dedicated to states' reporting on the ITI; only information provided by states that made specific reference to the Instrument is included and analysed. Part IV provides an overview of the outcomes of BMS₄.

Key observations and discussion points arising from the analysis of all national reports submitted in 2009 and 2010 are included at the end of each section. All cited texts are drawn from relevant 2010 national reports unless otherwise indicated.

Methodology

A total of 584 national reports have been submitted since the PoA was adopted in 2001.⁴ The analysis in Parts II and III of this report covers all reports submitted in 2009 and 2010⁵ and builds on three previous analyses of national reports published in 2004, 2006, and 2008.⁶ As part of the review of national reports, information regarding the BMS₄ themes was first identified; it was then classified according to the PoA or ITI commitment it reflected and inserted into tables to allow for comparisons across states. As official UN translations of all 2010 national reports were not yet available at the time of writing, the Small Arms Survey arranged for external consultants to provide the relevant analysis for non-English national reports.

The Small Arms Survey carried out a series of inquiries to determine the accuracy of NPC contact details provided by states and the responsiveness of NPCs. The findings of these inquiries are outlined in the section on NPCs and NCAs in Part I of this report. Other than this, no attempt was made to verify the information provided in national reports, or to assess whether activities reported by states fulfil their commitments under the PoA or the ITI.

I. Statistical overview of reporting trends

Introduction

The PoA does not require states to submit national reports.⁷ Nor does it specify the type of information they should include in their reports, or the frequency with which they should report (although there is a clear shift towards biennial reporting).⁸ Nevertheless, most states have participated at least once in the reporting process, and national reports continue to serve as an important—and sometimes the only—source of information on states' efforts to implement the PoA. In addition, most states have used, in whole or in part, the PoA reporting template that forms part of the Assistance Package developed under the auspices of the UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism.⁹

Global reporting trends, 2002–10

States have been invited to report on their implementation of the PoA and ITI through the General Assembly resolution on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects (the so-called omnibus resolution).¹⁰

From 2002 to 2010, 158 member states and the Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the UN reported at least once on their implementation of the PoA, while 34 member states have yet to submit their first report (4 states in Africa; 7 in the Americas; 13 in Asia; 8 in Oceania; and 2 in Europe).¹¹ Since BMS₃ in July 2008, Antigua and Barbuda, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Tunisia, and Turkmenistan have submitted reports for the first time. Annexe 1 provides a breakdown of reporting in each year. The number of national reports submitted in each year since 2002 is shown in Figure 1.¹²

Figure 1 **National reports, 2002–10, by year**





Figure 1 shows that reporting activity was most intense during BMS years (2003, 2005, 2008, and 2010), with more than 100 states reporting in each of these years (other than 2003, in which 99 states submitted national reports). There was a smaller spike in 2006, the year in which the UN Review Conference was held.¹³

The year 2009 experienced the lowest level of reporting ever, with only nine states submitting national reports. This may be a reflection of a gradual trend towards biennial as opposed to annual reporting, which was encouraged during BMS3 and reflected in the outcome document of that meeting.¹⁴ With 107 national reports submitted in 2010, the move towards biennial reporting appears to be firmly established.

Figure 2 **Number of reports submitted by states, 2002–10**



The number of reports submitted by member states varies, with 29 states having submitted only one report since the adoption of the PoA in 2001 and only one state, Australia, having submitted a national report every year.¹⁵ Figure 2 shows the number of states that have reported between zero and nine times.

Regional reporting trends, 2002–10

Table 1 (overleaf) breaks down reporting between 2002 and 2010 according to region. The regional categories used here are based on the geographical classification established by the UN Statistics Division. For each year, the rows show the number of states in each region that reported, as well as the percentage of reporting states in each region. For example, in 2010, 33 African states submitted national reports, representing 62 per cent of the total number of member states in the region.

Table 1 reveals that states in Europe have submitted the highest number of reports each year in absolute terms. Figure 3 illustrates that Europe is also consistently the region with the highest proportion of states reporting each year.

Figure 4 provides an overview of the number of reports submitted by states according to region.

Figure 3 **Overview of reporting by region, 2002–10 (%)**




Table 1 **National reports by region, 2002–10**

		Africa	Americas	Asia	Europe	Oceania
No. of states in region		53	35	47	43	14
2002	Reports	3	3	2	7	1
	Regional %	6	9	4	16	7
2003	Reports	22	18	21	35	3
	Regional %	42	51	45	81	21
2004	Reports	2	11	6	18	4
	Regional %	4	31	13	42	29
2005	Reports	28	16	21	34	4
	Regional %	53	46	45	79	29
2006	Reports	11	13	14	23	1
	Regional %	21	37	30	53	7
2007	Reports	4	6	4	20	2
	Regional %	8	17	9	47	14
2008	Reports	32	18	21	37	3
	Regional %	60	51	45	86	21
2009	Reports	2	0	1	5	1
	Regional %	4	0	2	12	7
2010	Reports	33	16	20	36	2
	Regional %	62	46	43	84	14

Figure 4 **Frequency of reporting by region, 2002–10**




Figure 5 **Overall reporting by region, 2002–10 (%)**




Figure 5 provides the overall figures for reporting by region, with the darker shade indicating the percentage of states that have reported and the lighter shade indicating the percentage of states that have never reported. For example, in the overall reporting period, 95 per cent of European member states have reported, whereas five per cent have not.

In terms of the frequency of reporting, Table 2 provides a breakdown of the number of states that reported once, twice, and so on, per region. For example, the table shows that 12 African states have reported three times, but no African state has reported every year. In Oceania, eight states (i.e. more than half the states in the region) have never reported, whereas one state (Australia) has reported every year.

Table 2 **Frequency of reporting by states, by region**

No. of reports	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total
Africa	4	15	8	12	5	6	2	1	0	0	53
Americas	7	6	3	6	3	5	2	2	1	0	35
Asia	13	5	7	6	9	5	2	0	0	0	47
Oceania	8	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	14
Europe	2	1	3	5	6	7	11	5	3	0	43
Total	34	29	23	29	23	23	18	8	4	1	192

The following points can be highlighted for each region.

Africa

As shown in Figure 4, reporting in Africa peaked in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2010 (with 22, 28, 32, and 33 reports submitted, respectively).

Since the adoption of the PoA in 2001, no state in Africa has reported every year. Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Malawi, and Tunisia reported for the first time in 2010. Togo has reported seven times, which is the highest number of reports submitted by any state in the region.

Americas

As revealed in Figure 4, reporting in the Americas peaked in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2010 (with 18, 16, 18, and 16 reports, respectively). In addition, a significant number of reports (13) were submitted in 2006, the Review Conference year. Only six states submitted national reports in 2010 prior to BMS₄, even though the chair-designate for the BMS, Ambassador Macedo of Mexico, is from the region. A further ten states, however, submitted national reports for 2010 after BMS₄. No national reports were submitted in 2009.

Since the adoption of the PoA in 2001, no state in the Americas has reported every year. Mexico has reported eight times, which is the highest number of reports submitted by any state in the region.

Asia

As Figure 4 shows, reporting in 2002 was low in several regions, with only two Asian states submitting reports. Reporting in Asia peaked in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2010 (with 21, 21, 21, and 20 reports, respectively). Reporting in the region was also high in 2006, the year of the Review Conference, with 14 reports having been submitted. As with almost every other region, 2009 saw the lowest level of reporting for Asia, with only one report submitted, by Indonesia.

Since the adoption of the PoA in 2001, no state in Asia has reported every year. China and Japan have reported six times, which is the highest number of reports submitted by any state in the region.

Europe

In Europe, as in other regions, reporting in 2002 was low, with only seven states submitting reports (see Figure 4). Since then, however, reporting in the region has been consistently strong, with 40–80 per cent of European states reporting each year, except in 2009, which saw the lowest level of reporting ever, with only five national reports having been submitted. As was the case in other regions, reporting in Europe peaked in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2010 (with 35, 34, 37, and 36 reports, respectively). Unlike other regions, however, Europe did not register any significant increase in 2006, when the Review Conference was held.

Despite the high level of reporting, no state in Europe has reported every year. Nevertheless, Belarus, Hungary, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) have reported eight times, which is the highest number of reports submitted by any state in the region. The only states in Europe that have never reported are San Marino and Montenegro, both in southern Europe.

Oceania

In Oceania, unlike other regions, there is no pattern of a peak in reporting during BMS years. The highest number of states to have submitted a report in any given year is four in 2004 and 2005 (almost 30 per cent of the states in the region).

Australia is the only state in the region (and the world) to have reported every year since 2001.¹⁶

National points of contact/national coordination agencies

Under paragraph II.5 of the PoA, states undertook to establish or designate ‘a national point of contact to act as liaison between States on matters relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action’. Under paragraph II.4, states also undertook to establish or designate

national coordination agencies or bodies and institutional infrastructure responsible for policy guidance, research and monitoring of efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

In addition, although the PoA does not expressly call on states to prepare NAPs on small arms, the development of NAPs allows states to pursue implementation of their commitments in an integrated, systematic fashion, and is in that sense consistent with the spirit of the PoA.

As at May 2010, 151 states and the Holy See had communicated their contact details of their NPCs on small arms to UNODA, which maintains a list of NPCs on its Programme of Action Implementation Support System (PoA-ISS) website.¹⁷ By the first BMS in 2003, 122 NPCs were already in place; there has not been a huge increase in their number since then. However, the list of NPCs on the PoA-ISS website does not reveal the accuracy of the contact details provided, nor the extent to which these NPCs are functional.

In an effort to answer these questions, the Small Arms Survey prepared a brief questionnaire on NPCs, NCAs, and NAPs, and between 8 March and 16 April 2010 attempted to contact all NPCs listed on the PoA-ISS website to (a) confirm whether their contact details are correct; and (b) request that the NPCs complete the questionnaire. Annexe 3 provides details of the questionnaire issued to NPCs.¹⁸

Methodology

Attempts were made to contact a total of 146 of the 151 NPCs listed on the PoA-ISS website. The remaining five NPCs (Bahrain, Chile, Egypt, Malaysia, and the Philippines) could not be contacted because no contact details were available, only the identity of the government ministry or department where the NPC is located. As a result, there was insufficient information with which to pursue enquiries.¹⁹ The following steps were taken to contact and identify NPCs:

- 1) The questionnaire was sent by email to 122 NPCs.²⁰ It was sent in whichever of the six UN languages was most relevant to the country in question.
- 2) Telephone calls were made to 110 NPCs.²¹
- 3) If no response to the first email was received and the telephone call did not produce satisfactory results, a follow-up email was sent between three and four weeks after the first email.

Outcome of attempts to verify NPC contact details

Email addresses. Of the 122 emails initially sent out, 47 (39 per cent) resulted in contact of some kind,²² although not all of the email addresses were correct. In some cases, the persons who responded to the email indicated that they were not the NPC and provided alternative contact details for it²³ or indicated they would forward the message to the correct person.²⁴ In some cases, the person contacted did not understand the nature of the request (and was certainly not the NPC)²⁵ or the response came from a person who was different from the one identified on the UNODA list.²⁶ In four cases, a successful email address was found through an alternative source.²⁷

Attempts to contact the other 75 states using email addresses listed on the PoA-ISS website failed. In 39 per cent of cases there was no response and in 22 per cent there was a failure to deliver, indicating the email address was faulty or incorrect.²⁸ Figure 6 provides an overview of the outcomes of attempts to contact NPCs via the email addresses contained in their national reports or the PoA-ISS website.


Telephone numbers. A total of 126 telephone calls were made in an effort to contact 110 NPCs (for many of which more than one phone number is listed).

In 37 cases (29 per cent) the telephone call was answered. In some cases, the individuals who answered the phone responded that it was the wrong number for the NPC,²⁹ forwarded the call to another number,³⁰ or suggested trying another number.³¹

The other 89 calls made to NPCs were unsuccessful for a variety of reasons. In 19 cases (15 per cent), further follow-up was required due to language limitations or time zone constraints (see next section). In the remaining 70 cases, there was no response, the number was invalid or incorrect, the number dialled was consistently busy, the telephone number turned out to be a facsimile number, the call was answered by an answering machine, or the number was blocked for some reason.

Figure 7 provides an overview of the outcomes of attempts to contact NPCs via the telephone number contained in their national reports or on the PoA-ISS website.

Figure 6 **Overview of attempts to contact NPCs by email**




Detailed responses to the email questionnaire

Only 45 NPCs responded to the questionnaire emailed to them.³² The findings with respect to these responses are set out below.

NPCs. Annexe 4 provides details of the responses provided regarding NPCs.³³ The responses overwhelmingly indicate that NPCs are hosted by or housed in the ministry of foreign affairs or its equivalent; in some instances, however, several departments and ministries are involved—as in the Demo-

Figure 7 **Overview of attempts to contact NPCs by telephone**



cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Gambia. Six states reported that the NPC is an office or a desk officer based in a particular department.³⁴

NCA. Twenty of the 45 NPCs that responded confirmed that there is an NCA or national commission on small arms in their countries.³⁵ An overview of responses received is provided in Annexe 5.³⁶ A further ten NPCs indicated that a formal NCA or national commission has not been established in their country, but that informal inter-ministerial consultations relating to small arms issues do take place on a regular basis.³⁷ Annexe 6 provides details of the agencies involved in the informal inter-ministerial consultations mentioned by respondents.³⁸

NAPs. The final question posed to NPCs as part of the survey was whether their countries have NAPs (i.e. a document setting out a country's strategy for small arms control and management). Only nine confirmed that their countries do have NAPs.³⁹ The Dutch NPC sent a copy of the relevant policy document, while France, Japan, and Switzerland sent web links to their NAPs, which were verified. Cyprus indicated its NAP was provided to UNODA during BMS3 and was available on the PoA-ISS website. However, at the time of writing, UNODA was not able to confirm the receipt of Cyprus's NAP. Iraq and Mali promised to send copies of their NAPs at a later date, but these have not yet been received. Burundi noted that its NAP was in the process of being verified and could not be sent; similarly, Panama reported that it was in the process of updating its NAP and was therefore unable to send a copy. During the eight-week research period, the Small Arms Survey was able to locate and view only four NAPs.

Nineteen NPCs responded that their countries do not have NAPs.⁴⁰ A further eight indicated they were in the process of developing NAPs,⁴¹ with Côte d'Ivoire and the Gambia commenting that they were waiting for the results of national surveys to inform their NAPs, and the DRC stating that it required funding in this regard. Sri Lanka also noted that the development of its NAP had been halted due to a lack of funds. Four NPCs pointed out in response to this question that their countries have laws and regulations governing the issue of small arms control,⁴² with Uruguay commenting that its regulations 'act as the national action plan'. The remaining nine NPCs did not respond to this question.

Observations and discussion points

One of the aims of the study conducted by the Small Arms Survey was to gather information on NPCs, NCAs, and NAPs and verify their existence exclusively through direct contact with NPCs. The objective was to provide insight into (a) how easy it is to contact or reach NPCs; and (b) how responsive or helpful NPCs are (and, indirectly, their awareness of their countries' implementation of PoA commitments, such as establishing an NCA).

Overall, the study found that, of the 151 NPCs the Small Arms Survey attempted to contact using information provided by national reports or the PoA-ISS website:

- The existence and identity of the NPC could be confirmed in 53 cases.
- Contact was made, but the existence or identity of the NPC could not be confirmed in 30 cases.
- In 69 cases, no successful contact was possible.
- Only 45 NPCs responded to the questionnaire emailed to them.

In other words, the Small Arms Survey was able to confirm the existence and identity of just over one-third of the NPCs listed. Given the important role NPCs play in PoA implementation, especially in terms of communicating states' needs and coordinating activities, this is a disappointing outcome.

The results of the Survey's enquiries into NPCs highlight one of the weaknesses in the PoA reporting system: in the absence of a mechanism to monitor and verify states' implementation efforts, information in national reports must be taken at face value. And yet even a small investigation such as this one, which merely scratches the surface of implementation by attempting to ascertain an objectively verifiable fact—such as whether country X has a functioning NPC—raises serious questions about implementation.

Given the poor response rate and the unreachability of many NPCs, the most important of these questions is whether NPCs are acting as a 'liaison' among states as envisaged under the PoA. Are states experiencing difficulty contacting other states? How are they liaising with one another, if NPCs cannot be contacted? Are states communicating with one another on PoA issues through means other than their NPCs? What role do other agencies play? ■

II. Thematic trends in Programme of Action reporting

Introduction

This section of the report analyses information provided by states with respect to the following two themes chosen for focused consideration during BMS₄: (a) border controls; and (b) international cooperation and assistance. Many reports provide little or no information specifically addressing the BMS₄ themes. Although they stem from the PoA itself, it is important to note that the focus themes for BMS₄ were announced by the chair-designate in March 2010—after the 31 January deadline set by UNODA for the submission of national reports.

Border controls

The central provision in the PoA that relates to border controls is paragraph II.27, which provides that states undertake:

To establish, where appropriate, subregional or regional mechanisms, in particular trans-border customs cooperation and networks for information-sharing among law enforcement, border and customs control agencies, with a view to preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons across borders.

States are also encouraged to enhance cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to identify groups and individuals engaged in the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (para. II.37), and

enhance cooperation, the exchange of experience and training among competent officials, including customs, police, intelligence and arms control officials, at the national, regional and global levels in order to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects (para. III.7).

The identification of borders and customs as a topic for consideration was timely. Some states identified ‘strengthening border controls’ as an important

PoA implementation issue during the discussion of ‘other issues’ (agenda item 9(d)) at BMS3.⁴³ The BMS3 outcome document also encourages states to enhance practical cooperation among border and customs control agencies to help combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons across borders.⁴⁴ Moreover, the national reports of many states list border and customs controls as a priority issue to be considered at a BMS.⁴⁵

The following overview of information provided in national reports on borders and customs is divided into two main sections: the first describes some of the challenges identified by states in this area, and the second details some of the measures and responses states have adopted to enhance customs and border controls at the national and transnational levels.

Challenges

The following are among the border-specific challenges identified by states in their national reports:

- porous borders (five states);⁴⁶
- open coastlines (two states);⁴⁷
- lack of capacity at border posts (four states);⁴⁸
- refugee influxes (two states);⁴⁹
- cattle rustling (one state);⁵⁰
- established smuggling routes (one state);⁵¹
- smuggling of dismantled firearms (one state);⁵²
- insecure border due to rebellion struggles (one state); and⁵³
- geopolitical position (one state).⁵⁴

Measures to enhance border and customs controls

This part of the report provides details of some of the measures and responses states have implemented to address problems associated with customs and borders. Information in national reports was included and categorized in this section if it related to measures addressing the physical movement of arms across borders or information sharing among law-enforcement agents on trans-border operations. Limited information on the transit of weapons was also included. However, the authorization processes for granting transit per-

mits, for example, and other information on export control systems more generally are not included.

National measures

National legislation and penalties. In describing the measures taken to deal with customs and border issues, some states cite or explain the legislation or regulations they have adopted; some states report that they are considering regulating and criminalizing arms smuggling.⁵⁵ Several states provide details of the penalties imposed for arms smuggling across their borders (see Table 3).

Enhanced border measures. States provide many examples of measures undertaken to enhance border protection, including increasing border security through the deployment of additional or specialized forces;⁵⁶ introducing physical security measures;⁵⁷ reducing the number of border crossings;⁵⁸ increasing patrols and investigation capabilities at sea;⁵⁹ training law-enforcement officers at entry points on possible smuggling methods and countermeasures; and monitoring compliance with procedures for identifying smuggled arms by border officials.⁶⁰ The Czech Republic also reports that its customs service has special investigating teams working closely with other governmental authorities, namely the police and intelligence services. Ghana indicates that it has obtained equipment to assist in border control for its immigration service. Pakistan reports that it has established one thousand border posts on its border with Afghanistan and has undertaken a programme to strengthen, train, and equip the Frontier Constabulary.

Monitoring. Several states provide details of some of the measures undertaken to monitor arms shipments on their territory, such as monitoring transport and transport agents;⁶¹ scrutinizing and authenticating transit permits and other documentation,⁶² including, in the case of Switzerland, ensuring that the original transit licence is returned to the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs when it expires, to prevent expired licences from being used in an illegal manner; and keeping records of arms entering and leaving the territory. For example, Algerian authorities put in place monitoring and surveillance stations along the country's borders to help customs agents fight smuggling and organized crime. Argentina reports that arms cannot be transported

Table 3 Examples of penalties for unauthorized small arms and light weapons transfers and smuggling

Country	Imprisonment/punishment	Fine
Algeria	2 years to life (depending on the category of small arm)	DZD 500,000–5,000,000 (USD 6,873–6,873,260) (depending on the category of small arm)
Australia	Up to 10 years	AUD 275,000 (USD 245,000)
Canada	1–10 years	Not specified
Croatia	6–5 years (1–8 years if committed by a group)	Not specified
Estonia	Up to 5 years	'a pecuniary punishment'
Georgia	5–8 years (7–10 years if committed repeatedly or by a group)	Not specified
Ghana	7–25 years	(No option of a fine)
Indonesia	20 years to life (or possibly the death penalty)	Not specified
Ireland	5 years	Up to EUR 10 million (USD 13 million)
Japan	Up to 7 years	JPY 30 million (USD 325,000)
Kazakhstan	Up to 5 years (2–8 years if committed repeatedly, by a person exploiting his official position or with the use of force against a customs inspector; increased to 7–15 years if committed by an organized criminal group)	Not specified
Latvia	Up to 10 years/community service	100 times the minimum monthly wage (with or without the confiscation of property)
Lithuania	Up to 10 years	Not specified
Sweden ^a	Up to 2 years	'a fine' (unspecified)
Syria	5–15 years	3–10 times the value of the seized weapons and ammunition

^a If the offence amounts to 'gross smuggling', the sentence imposed may be six months to six years. Notably, intent is not required and negligence is also punishable.

across its borders without prior authorization by the Registro Nacional de Armas (RENAR), to whom the end-user certificate (issued by the competent authority of the destination country and certified by the Argentinean consulate there) must be presented, as well as the export authorization (issued by the competent authority of the country of origin and certified by the Argentinean consulate there).

Bosnia and Herzegovina reports that it is in the process of implementing the US TRACKER system, which will ensure complete and centralized monitoring of data on weapons that are imported to, exported from, and transported through its territory. Germany reports that customs authorities carry out selective checks on flows of goods 'not motivated by any concrete suspicion'. Guyana states that all firearms imported into the country by land or sea must enter through a prescribed port or aerodrome and must be deposited at the police station nearest the point of entry into the country. Firearms cannot be withdrawn from the customs warehouse or police station where they are deposited on import until the relevant import documentation is produced, and unless and until such firearms are clearly marked. Kazakhstan notes that import and export permits must state the customs office through which the import or export will take place, and that all permits must be authenticated by the seal of the importer or exporter. New Zealand states that when goods transit through its territory, the owner of the ship or aircraft must provide customs with an electronic inward report of all goods on board. Oman reports that all entry and exit points are monitored using modern equipment and the latest methods, in an effort to prevent attempts at illicit trafficking. The Russian Federation states that, if arms are being transported by air, they are prohibited from flying over Russian territory without landing for customs control and registration.

Syria reports that public sector bodies wishing to transport weapons or ammunition must, sufficiently in advance of the date of the transport operation, advise the governate police command of the intended transport, including the starting point of the transport, the timing, the quantity of weapons and ammunition to be transported, the means of transport, the entity for whom the shipment is intended, and the route to be taken. In addition, approval for the transit of any weapons through Syrian territory will include information on the quantity and type of material being transited, the entity sending the shipment, the name of the sender, the entity for whom the shipment is intended, the name of the consignee, the shipper, the route, the time, and any other details of relevance to public security and safety. Zambia reports that any movement of military goods across or in transit out of a Zam-

bian customs area requires clearance from the Ministry of Home Affairs, and that, through its security agents, it has developed and strengthened methods of monitoring and detecting activities aimed at curbing illegal cross-border transportation, importation, exporting, stockpiling, and use of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and other materials.

Physical inspections. A number of states report that physical inspections of goods imported into or exported from their territories are or may be carried out⁶³ and that this may involve X-raying cargo,⁶⁴ taking samples for analysis,⁶⁵ inspecting cars with telescopic devices,⁶⁶ or using detection dogs.⁶⁷ Pakistan reports that it plans to install large vehicle-borne X-ray scanning systems at main border crossings and inter-provincial boundaries to help detect arms smuggling, and notes it has already installed a biometric border control system at one major crossing point and that three other regularly frequented routes are being automated.

Notification. Several countries report that they require prior notification before a shipment of arms may exit and, in some instances, enter their territory,⁶⁸ or that they are considering regulations that would require such notification.⁶⁹

The length of time stipulated for notifications varies. For example, the FYROM requires importers to notify the Ministry of the Interior 48 hours before a shipment's arrival at the border; Romania requires exporters to notify the export control authority 5 days before the export is to take place and importers to provide notice within a maximum of 10 days after the import took place. Examples of the details that states require as part of the notification include serial numbers, the means of transport, the route, and the exit location.

Escorting goods. Several states report that arms shipments are escorted through their territory to the end user or another border post if the arms are in transit.⁷⁰ For example, Algeria reports that the Algerian security forces escort small arms in transit. Andorra reports that, if a dealer on Andorran territory is selling to an overseas customer, the police will transport the arms to the border. The Philippines states that, once appropriate customs duties are paid for imports, police officers escort the small arms to the police storage site, where they remain until the appropriate licences to possess firearms are processed.

Considerations at the authorizing stage. Austria reports that, in the context of granting import, export, and transit licences, permission may be ‘subject to time limits and provisions concerning the means of transportation, safety measures, itinerary and border crossing’. Egypt reports that the transfer or retransfer of weapons requires a licence containing a detailed description of the weapons, their serial numbers, and the transport route and timing. Slovenia states that the Slovenian Customs Administration has developed a computerized risk assessment tool to determine which transactions are ‘higher risk’ and which are ‘lower risk’ and to allocate resources accordingly. In addition, a special system for rapid communication of alarms and warnings to the operational base was developed within the customs intranet (PIAC Infonet), which reduces response times. Trinidad and Tobago reports that its legislation provides that the transit of firearms or ammunition is permitted only if the cargo of a ship, vessel, or aircraft is ‘properly manifested to consignees’, and individuals seeking to export firearms must receive written permission from the commissioner of police and requisite clearance from the Customs and Excise Department (Trinidad and Tobago, 2010, para. 3.3, p. 8).

Transnational measures

Cooperation

Joint trans-border exercises among countries. Fourteen states have provided information on cross-border cooperation activities undertaken to combat arms smuggling. Some simply confirm that they cooperate with neighbours as part of their border management strategy.⁷¹ Others give examples of bilateral arrangements on cooperation between law-enforcement agents to fight cross-border crime⁷² or joint border patrols and operations.⁷³

Exchange and sharing of timely information (intelligence, judicial, financial). Many states provide details on information-sharing activities, including agreements and treaties on mutual administrative and technical assistance between customs administrations and law-enforcement agencies.⁷⁴ Argentina notes the adoption of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to exchange information on illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, explosives, munitions, and other related materials among the states parties of MERCOSUR.

SUR (Mercado Común del Sur) providing for inter-agency cooperation and information exchange between their law-enforcement authorities. Croatia reports that regional cooperation on customs issues is conducted in accordance with bilateral and multilateral agreements on assistance and cooperation among customs authorities in the region. The Czech Republic reports that its customs service attends the meetings of international organizations, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Proliferation Security Initiative, as well as the other international specialized meetings, to share experience and knowledge regarding the illicit trade in arms and ammunition. Georgia reports that there is a virtual centre established in the GUAM⁷⁵ National Law Enforcement Centre within the Ministry of Internal Affairs that facilitates the rapid exchange of information on illicit trafficking with other GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development member states. Guyana reports that it has signed the Nickerie Declaration of 2008 with Suriname, which specifically lists arms trafficking as one of the criminal activities against which the legal, judicial, and law-enforcement agencies of both countries will be given full policy support by their governments to enhance cooperation in combating cross-border crime. Malaysia gives a detailed description of the information exchange measures contemplated by the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, designed to strengthen regional commitment to combat transnational crime, such as arms smuggling. This plan calls for a compilation of national laws and regulations of ASEAN states pertaining to arms smuggling; typology studies to determine trends and modus operandi of arms smuggling in the region; and intelligence exchange and cooperation in border and customs control among ASEAN countries, as well as the European Police Office (EUROPOL), INTERPOL, and other organizations. Pakistan states that a tripartite commission was established by Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States in 2003, among other things, to promote cooperation in tracking illicit small arms. The United States reports providing investigative assistance on international trafficking cases involving US-source firearms.

Sharing of expertise and exchange of information and training on national experiences. Algeria reports that it engages in cross-border cooperation with

the countries from the Sahel to help security agents and customs services develop their administrative capacities, techniques, and operational procedures so they can deal with smuggling and the illicit trade in small arms. Australia reports that its officials are helping Papua New Guinea agencies strengthen customs, immigration, and aviation and maritime safety and security. Canada records having hosted a workshop organized by the Organization of American States (OAS) Department of Public Security, the US Department of State, and the Canada Border Services Agency on 'Practical Approaches to Combating the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials across Borders: Meeting of Law Enforcement Authorities and Customs Officials' in March 2009. France states that it has engaged in cooperation activities with regional organizations in Africa (the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community, and the Economic Community of Central African States) to increase their border control capacities. Ghana reports that its police service is an active participant on the West Africa Police Chiefs Committee, which meets annually to share knowledge on combating general and trans-border crime, including measures to curtail small arms proliferation in the sub-region. Indonesia reports that it informally gives information on illicit trade routes and techniques of acquisition through police-to-police cooperation and workshops on arms smuggling within ASEAN. Latvia reports:

having developed an effective strategic goods export controls system, created education system for customs officers as well as designed substantial data bases, Latvia has actively engaged in outreach activities to several Central and East European countries in recent years (Latvia, 2010, Part B, para. 3, p. 14).

Furthermore, Latvia writes that in December 2009 its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with the US Department of Energy and the Latvian Association of Logistics, organized a seminar for entrepreneurs and customs officers on practical and legal aspects of strategic goods circulation among local entities involved.

Training in and teaching of investigative techniques. France reports that it

participated in a study to improve cooperation among law-enforcement agencies in Europe and participates in targeted operations in the region to fight arms trafficking. Germany notes that, in the framework of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, it has provided specialized training to border police forces. Indonesia reports that, in cooperation with Australia, it established the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement in 2004, which is a training agency aimed at enhancing the capacity of law-enforcement officers in combating transnational organized crime, including terrorism. Japan reports that it has been providing training to customs officers for and giving other assistance to Cambodia, Kenya, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam as part of a bilateral capacity-building project for customs. Malaysia states that one of the objectives of the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime is to develop regional training programmes to enhance existing capabilities in investigation, intelligence, surveillance, detection, monitoring, and reporting through sharing experiences among law-enforcement officers and compiling lessons learned from national training programmes. Sweden reports that, as part of Project Crossfire, the customs and police services have arranged training concerning weapons legislation, weapons techniques, and handling, targeting customs officers involved in operational control activities such as physical checks and customs audits.

Role of international and regional organizations in facilitating cooperation.

States reported extensively on the activities undertaken by international and, especially, regional organizations in facilitating cooperation. These include:

- the Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation, which is aimed at combating international crime and enhancing cooperation among the law-enforcement agencies in the Baltic Sea region;⁷⁶
- the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime, which explores measures to promote cooperation with international agencies dealing with transnational crime;
- the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), including its Implementation Agency for Crime and Security;
- ECOWAS;

- the OAS;
- MERCOSUR;
- the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SAR-PCCO), which has conducted joint cross-border operations and training aimed at preventing, combating, and eradicating illicit small arms trafficking;
- the South-east European Cooperative Initiative, through which parties assist each other in the prevention, investigation, prosecution, and curbing of cross-border crime;
- the Commonwealth of Independent States' Agreement on Cooperation for the Suppression of Illicit Manufacturing and Circulation of Firearms, Munitions, Explosives, and Explosive Devices;⁷⁷
- the EU, which put a strategy in place in 2005 to fight against the accumulation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, including mechanisms to exchange information on trafficking networks and foster cooperation with other regional organizations;⁷⁸
- the European Commissioners Task Force, referred to as the European Firearms Experts (EFE), established to strengthen European cooperation to combat smuggling;⁷⁹ and
- the Oceania Customs Organization (OCO), which is engaged in assessing trafficking patterns in the Pacific region.

For the most part, states did not provide much detail on the workings of these organizations or their impact on arms smuggling in the region, but New Zealand did explain in detail that OCO members submit reports of seizures, methods of transportation, and methods of concealment to the New Zealand Customs Service, which produces and publishes the report on behalf of the OCO. An Internet-based information and reporting system (CENCOMM 2) is used by a number of OCO member countries. New Zealand reports that

collaboration with these regional bodies has resulted in a number of quality outputs including regional surveys, training opportunities, generic tool kits and model law development, as well as contribution to policy advice that have had mutual benefits (New Zealand, 2010, p. 15).

In addition, Armenia proposes the creation of a regional mechanism for dia-

logue and consultation among law-enforcement agencies of the Commonwealth of Independent States on matters related to small arms, which could include the following elements:

- the establishment of a regional register of small arms and light weapons;
- the harmonization of national export control laws and regulations; and
- the exchange of national lists of registered brokers.

Cooperation with INTERPOL. Thirty-eight states report on their cooperation with INTERPOL.⁸⁰

Assistance and capacity building

Equipment needed to combat the illicit trade across borders. Several states report on their need for assistance with border control.⁸¹ Some specify that they require equipment, such as vehicles and motorbikes⁸² or modern surveillance equipment;⁸³ Liberia reports on the need for ‘trained man power/operatives in modern method[s] of arms control’.

Other states report that they have provided assistance in the form of equipment. Australia, for example, reports that it is providing support to Tonga to build capacity in selected areas, such as investigation, intelligence, and compliance; and it has earmarked funds for a new X-ray machine for the Tongan customs service. Japan reports it has provided cars and communication equipment to police in Iraq to enhance the capacity of border police there. The United States reports that the Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Non-proliferation provides export and border control assistance to 55 countries under the Export Control and Related Border Security assistance programme, including the delivery of equipment and training to enhance the ability of border police and customs organizations in recipient countries to control the import, export, re-export, transit, and trans-shipment of items presenting proliferation risks (including small arms) and to prevent illicit trafficking in them.

Funding. Kenya reports that it received financial and technical support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for the Garissa Armed Violence Project and a programme to curb the proliferation of small arms to help

stabilize the security situation among pastoral communities. One of the outputs of the project is ‘systemic cross-border dialogue with countries bordering pastoral districts’. Nicaragua reports that it lacks the financial resources to strengthen border controls to prevent illicit arms trafficking. Tanzania states that it requires financial support for training programmes for border officials.

Technical expertise. Japan reports that it has been offering technical assistance in relation to investigations and prosecutions involving illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; it has sent experts to Asia, Africa, and Latin America to provide training in relevant investigation techniques. Kenya reports that it requires financial and technical assistance to set up ‘universally acceptable’ border posts for screening and control of movement in and out of the country, especially along the ‘porous’ borders with Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda (Kenya, 2010, para. 1.12.2, p. 18).

Sweden reports that in 2005 Swedish law-enforcement agencies initiated a long-term multidisciplinary intelligence project—Project Crossfire—targeting the smuggling of firearms into and among the countries of the Baltic Sea region. The project has reportedly identified the smuggling of firearms under cover of legal arms trade, problems with deactivated firearms that are reactivated by criminals, and a new trend involving the illegal manufacture or conversion of gas pistols and starting/signal pistols into fully functional firearms. Switzerland reports that its customs authority deploys up to two experts (one customs expert and one border guard expert) to the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire.

Observations and discussion points

While states assert that they have bilateral and regional arrangements in place to strengthen border controls, few provide operational details or specifics on the impact or outcome of these arrangements. It is clear that regional organizations play a crucial role in coordinating and facilitating border cooperation activities, which is not surprising, given the transnational nature of the issue and the PoA’s embrace of regional approaches.⁸⁴ More information on how these regional mechanisms operate could assist other states and regions in establishing similar networks.

International cooperation and assistance

Section III of the PoA contains the bulk of the provisions on international cooperation and assistance (see Annexe 2). In the review of national reports, information pertaining to international cooperation and assistance has been divided into assistance-related activities (including assistance required, assistance received, and assistance provided) and cooperation-related activities, and further subdivided into the themes reflected in Section II of the PoA. The aim of this part of the report is to provide an overview of the types of assistance and cooperation activity undertaken by states.

Assistance-related activities

Assistance required

Although it was acknowledged and indeed emphasized during BMS₃ that ‘national reports could be used as a tool for communicating assistance needs’,⁸⁵ few states specifically refer to assistance they required in their national reports in 2009 or 2010. Some identify the challenges they face with respect to PoA implementation, but they do not expressly request assistance to overcome those challenges. Based on requests for assistance or descriptions of challenges faced concerning PoA implementation in the national reports of 15 states, the following themes were identified in addition to general requests for financial and technical assistance:

- awareness raising;⁸⁶
- legislation and regulations;⁸⁷
- end-user certificates;⁸⁸
- law enforcement, including training and equipment;⁸⁹
- customs and borders;⁹⁰
- weapons storage and stockpile management;⁹¹
- weapons collection and destruction;⁹²
- weapons marking and tracing;⁹³
- record-keeping, principally establishing a computerized central register;⁹⁴
- information sharing;⁹⁵
- data collection and analysis;⁹⁶
- information technology programmes;⁹⁷
- NPCs and NCAs, and strengthening national institutions; and⁹⁸
- NAPs.⁹⁹

Assistance received

In their national reports, states report having received assistance in the following areas:

- awareness raising;¹⁰⁰
- legislation and regulations;¹⁰¹
- training and education;¹⁰²
- stockpile management;¹⁰³
- weapons collection;¹⁰⁴
- weapons destruction;¹⁰⁵
- disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration;¹⁰⁶
- national strategy development;¹⁰⁷
- NPCs and NCAs; and¹⁰⁸
- NAPs.¹⁰⁹

In addition, the DRC points out that it has received financial assistance indirectly (with funds managed by international or UN agencies) and that it would prefer to receive technical and financial assistance directly, without intermediary fund managers. Bolivia and Peru report receiving assistance from the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Peru reports it has received assistance with training in investigative techniques, the destruction of obsolete firearms, and awareness raising on various arms control instruments, including the ITI. Bolivia records it has received assistance for implementing international instruments, but does not provide details of the assistance received. Similarly, Guinea-Bissau notes that institutional support from Japan; the EU; and agencies such as UNODA, UNDP, and ECOWAS has had a 'significant impact' and has boosted the country's capabilities, but offers no details of the assistance received.

Assistance provided

In their national reports, states report that they provided assistance in the following areas:

- awareness raising;¹¹⁰
- legislation and regulations;¹¹¹

- training;¹¹²
- action-oriented research and seminars;¹¹³
- support to regional organizations;¹¹⁴
- stockpile management;¹¹⁵
- weapons collection;¹¹⁶
- weapons destruction;¹¹⁷
- marking and tracing;¹¹⁸
- disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration;¹¹⁹
- children, including efforts to prevent the use of child soldiers, the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers, and dealing with the effects of conflicts on children and youth;¹²⁰ and
- NPCs, NCAs, and NAPs.¹²¹

Cooperation-related activities

Cooperation-related activities reported by states include the following:

- customs and borders;¹²²
- engagement with INTERPOL;¹²³
- use of INTERPOL's International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System database (IWETS), now known as the INTERPOL Firearms Tracing System;¹²⁴
- participation in regional activities and organizations;¹²⁵
- exchange of information.¹²⁶ Activities listed include the submission of reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms or regional bodies, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation Europe and the EU Working Party on Arms Exports, as well as bilateral arrangements with neighbouring countries, including exchanges between police bureaus;
- cooperation with civil society,¹²⁷ including civil society representation on the national commission;¹²⁸
- enhancing mutual legal assistance, such as through multilateral or bilateral agreements;¹²⁹
- participation in seminars and workshops;¹³⁰ and
- cooperation among NPCs.¹³¹

In addition to reporting on the types of cooperation activity that are taking place, some states suggest additional cooperation activities to combat the illicit trade in small arms. For example, as noted above, Armenia suggests

that transparency and confidence-building measures be introduced, including a regional register of small arms; the harmonization of national export control laws and regulations; and the exchange of national lists of registered brokers within sub-regional or regional frameworks.

Observations and discussion points

At the time of writing, there is insufficient information in national reports to quantify the type and amount of assistance that was received or provided in 2009 or 2010. Indeed, such quantification was not the objective of this section of the report. Rather, a determination of the nature and quality of reporting on this area of the PoA was sought. The following are general observations based on the reports submitted in 2009 and 2010.

Scope. States often provided only selected examples of the assistance they provided or received. Few submitted a comprehensive overview of assistance provided or received, including details pertaining to the year in which an activity was implemented, the duration of the assistance, or the financial amount of the assistance provided or received. Conversely, states rarely limited their reports to activities carried out within the reporting period.

Mutually reinforcing reporting. The assistance reported by a donor or recipient state was not necessarily reported by the corresponding donor or recipient state.

Use of the reporting template. The majority of states that reported used the reporting template, or at least the headings of the reporting template. Although it helps states frame their responses, the previous version of the template—which many states are still using—does not encourage states to list the types of assistance they would like to receive or provide. The current version of the reporting template that is available on the PoA-ISS website, however, *does* encourage states to list the types of assistance they would like to receive. More importantly, the database on matching needs and resources (discussed below) makes it easier to identify the assistance desired and available in a more comprehensive manner.

Impact. Many states describe the activities they have engaged in or contributed to, but almost none give any assessment or information regarding the perceived impact the assistance had, or the findings or outputs of a particular project.

The observations and findings derived from national reports on this issue raise a number of questions regarding how states are communicating their cooperation and assistance needs and resources in practice:

- States have been encouraged to include assistance needs in their national reports, but to what extent are states that are in a position to provide assistance actually consulting the national reports of potential recipients to determine priority needs?
- Now that the PoA-ISS and the related database on matching needs and resources developed by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) are available on the PoA-ISS website,¹³² to what extent is it necessary or useful to continue to encourage states to request assistance through their national reports (especially given that it seems to have had limited success)?
- What are states' perceptions of how well the UN database on matching needs and resources is working? Are they aware of its availability and applicability to them?
- In practice, how do states that have received financial and technical support communicate their needs to donor states? How do donor states become aware of projects they wish to fund?¹³³ And what role do international, regional, and non-governmental organizations play in linking the two? ■

III. Reporting under the International Tracing Instrument

Introduction

Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 December 2005, the International Tracing Instrument commits states to undertake a number of measures to ensure the adequate marking and record-keeping of small arms and light weapons, and to strengthen cooperation in tracing illicit firearms.¹³⁴ With Resolution 61/66 of 6 December 2006, the General Assembly decided that the first meeting of states to consider ITI implementation would be held within the framework of BMS₃.¹³⁵ States have committed themselves to reporting on their implementation of the ITI every two years. Resolution 61/66 encouraged states to include such information in their national reports on PoA implementation.

In its *note verbale* in advance of BMS₄ inviting states to submit their national reports on the implementation of the PoA and ITI, UNODA encourages states to submit 'one integrated report' containing information on the implementation of both agreements and to refer to the guidelines on implementation.¹³⁶ This review finds that UNODA's encouragement went largely unheeded.

In preparing the analysis for this part of the report, the following methodology was used to determine whether a state qualifies as having reported under the ITI:


- (1) *Category 1*: If a state included a separate, distinct report on its implementation of the ITI (provisions of the ITI identified as such), it was classified as having reported under the ITI.
- (2) *Category 2*: If a state indicated in the title or body of its report that it constituted its national report on PoA and ITI implementation and the report included information on marking, record-keeping, and tracing (even though in most cases the PoA rather than the ITI was cited in this context), it was credited as having reported under the ITI.

- (3) *Category 3*: If a state included specific information pertaining to ITI implementation—albeit limited or minimal—or it mentioned the ITI somewhere in its report (such as by acknowledging that it participated in the negotiations) *and* the report included information on marking, record-keeping, and tracing (even though in some cases the PoA rather than the ITI was cited in this context), it was credited as having reported under the ITI.
- (4) *Category 4*: If a state made no mention of the ITI in its national report, then it was not credited as having reported under the ITI.

In other words, national reports were categorized in one of four ways, according to the level and nature of information they provided on ITI implementation, if any. If a national report fell into one of the first three categories, the state was considered to have reported under the ITI, and information contained in its national report is included in the analysis below. The statistical findings based on this categorization system are reflected in Figure 8.

As at 31 December 2010 only 33 states submitted a separate report on their implementation of the ITI (Category 1).¹³⁷ A further 12 states indicated that the report they submitted is their national report on PoA and ITI implementation (Category 2);¹³⁸ however, in most instances, they do not describe their marking, record-keeping, and tracing practices with reference to the ITI, but to the PoA. In some instances, these reports consist of mere assertions that the provisions

Figure 8 **Reporting under the International Tracing Instrument, 2010**



*MR&T: marking, record-keeping, and tracing

of the ITI are being implemented, without further elaboration.¹³⁹ An additional 21 states refer to ‘ITI implementation’, or at least mention the ITI somewhere in their national report, *and* also include information on marking, tracing, and record-keeping (although in some cases with reference to the PoA rather than the ITI) (Category 3).¹⁴⁰ The remaining 41 states that reported on the PoA in 2010 do not mention the ITI at all in their national reports, although they may provide information on their implementation of some or all of the PoA commitments on marking, record-keeping, and tracing (Category 4).¹⁴¹

The following analysis includes only information on the implementation of the ITI as part of national reports submitted in 2010 that fall under Categories 1–3, as long as they were posted on the PoA-ISS website by 31 December 2010. It is acknowledged that many states include details that are relevant to their implementation of the ITI in their reports on implementation of the marking and tracing commitments of the PoA. For example, many indicate that weapons must be marked at the time of manufacture with the name of the manufacturer, the country of manufacture, and the serial number, which are requirements of both the PoA (para. II.7) and the ITI (para. 8(a)). However, unless a state has indicated that the information was being provided as part of its report on ITI implementation or it made at least one reference to the ITI in its report and included in it information on marking, record-keeping, and tracing, it has not been credited with having reported on the ITI.

This methodology stems from the simple fact that the present report aims to analyse states’ implementation of their ITI commitments—including their awareness of those commitments and their obligation to report specifically on ITI implementation.

National points of contact

Under paragraph 25 of the ITI, states undertake to designate one or more NPCs to exchange information and liaise on all matters relating to its implementation.

In some national reports, states indicate that the NPC for matters relating to ITI implementation is the same as the NPC for PoA implementation.¹⁴² Other states list their NPCs on PoA implementation and on the ITI separately, even

though they identify the same person or entity for both.¹⁴³ Algeria provides contact details for the Central National-INTERPOL Office as its NPC. In the cases of Canada, Colombia, and the Czech Republic, there are two points of contact on ITI implementation, one of which is the same as the NPC for PoA implementation. Several states provide details of one or more NPCs for ITI implementation that were distinct from their NPCs on PoA implementation.¹⁴⁴ Italy provides contact details for an NPC for small arms and light weapons and a separate NPC for small arms and light weapons ‘traceability’, although it is not clear if this is intended to be the designated NPC for the ITI. The remaining states that provided separate reports on their ITI implementation do not offer details of their NPCs on ITI implementation (or do not indicate that the NPC for PoA implementation is also the NPC for ITI implementation).¹⁴⁵

Overwhelmingly, states report that NPCs on ITI implementation are based in ministries of foreign affairs (predominantly the arms control and export policy division or its equivalent), although some report that NPCs operate within the ministry of defence, the ministry of the interior, or the national police.

Marking

Marking at time of manufacture

Under paragraph 8(a) of the ITI, states have undertaken to mark small arms and light weapons at the time of manufacture with the name of the manufacturer, the country of manufacture, and the serial number; or, if they are already using such a system, with a unique user-friendly marking made up of simple geometric symbols in combination with a numeric and/or alphanumeric code permitting ready identification of the country of manufacture. They are also encouraged to mark additional information such as the year of manufacture, weapon type/model, and calibre.

Marking of small arms and light weapons

In 2010, 33 states provided information on the marking of small arms at the time of manufacture.¹⁴⁶ Twenty-three states report that marking at the time of manufacture must indicate the country of manufacture.¹⁴⁷ Italy reports that it

marks the name, city, and state of the importer on small arms destined for the US market. In addition, states indicate that the following information must be marked on the weapon at the time of manufacture: the year of manufacture (12 states),¹⁴⁸ the serial number (22 states),¹⁴⁹ and the manufacturer (26 states).¹⁵⁰ Other details are also required, most typically the type, model, and calibre of the weapon. Nine states specify the location of the marking in their reports.¹⁵¹

Most states indicate that their legislation requires particular markings as part of the manufacturing process. Of the states that reported that laws requiring particular markings were not in place, several indicated that such legislation is under consideration (e.g., New Zealand and Switzerland). Italy reports that amendments to its legislation on small arms to align it with EU regulations are under consideration; others note that markings are applied as a matter of course, despite the absence of a legal requirement.¹⁵² Conversely, Uruguay reports that, although there are no firearms producers in the country, specific legislation addresses the manufacture of small arms, including marking. Similarly, Antigua and Barbuda provides details of the markings required at manufacture, although it stipulates that it does not manufacture small arms. Ghana reports that there are no marking requirements under its law, but indicates that its legislation is under review. Eritrea reports that there are no manufacturers of small arms in its territory and that no national marking practice exists in the country at present.

Marking of ammunition

Although the ITI does not require—or even refer to—the marking of ammunition or ammunition packaging, several states report on their practices in this regard. Two states provide information on the marking of ammunition packaging at the time of manufacture.¹⁵³ States indicate that the following information must be marked on ammunition packaging¹⁵⁴ at the time of manufacture:

- the country of manufacture;¹⁵⁵
- the manufacturer;¹⁵⁶
- the batch number;¹⁵⁷
- the date of manufacture;¹⁵⁸
- the type;¹⁵⁹ and/or
- the quantity.¹⁶⁰

Lithuania, Norway, and the Philippines were the only states to report on the marking of ammunition at the time of manufacture. Lithuania notes that, by law, 'a manufacturer of arms and ammunition must mark ammunition with identifying marks of the manufacturer'. Norway reports that 'ammunition produced in Norway for export is marked with a lot number, in addition to the markings that the purchaser will require' and that 'all ammunition produced for and acquired by the armed forces is marked according to certain standards' (Norway, 2010, para. 9(b)(i), p. 12). The Philippines notes that manufacturers must ensure that all ammunition bears their trademarks for easy identification.

Marking at import

The ITI also requires, 'to the extent possible', marking at the time of import that permits the 'identification of the country of import and, where possible, the year of import' (para. 8(b)).

Fourteen states report having a marking requirement for imported weapons.¹⁶¹ In some instances, states require all imported arms to be marked with the importing country code¹⁶² and/or the year of import.¹⁶³ Other states only require imported arms to be marked if certain markings are missing, or the markings have been removed or altered. For example, India reports that, if a firearm does not bear the manufacturer's name, the importer is required to engrave appropriate identification marks identifying the importer. Others report that they prohibit the import of unmarked arms or arms that do not bear specific markings, such as the country of origin.¹⁶⁴ Argentina reports that, if a visual inspection of imported arms reveals they do not bear the manufacturer's mark and serial number, the competent authority (RENAR) will mark the weapons. Australia reports that all imported firearms manufactured after 1900 must bear a unique identifying mark (i.e. a serial number) (but does not specify whether it marks firearms that are not already marked or refuses the import). Botswana reports that 'all Weapons imported into the country are unambiguously marked and bear a minimum of the markings outlined in the International Tracing Instrument' (Botswana, 2010, para. 10.3, p. 14). Ghana reports that, although the armed forces, the police, and other security service organizations have some guidelines governing the marking of weapons that they import, this is not a

requirement under Ghanaian law. Germany reports that imported firearms must be marked with a unique sign of the producer or the importer. Sierra Leone states that ‘all firearms and munitions imported into the country are marked with the appropriate inscriptions’ (Sierra Leone, 2010, para. 9, p. 11).

In some reports, it is not clear whether the arms must be marked prior to their arrival in the reporting state or if such markings are applied at the time of import in the event that the imported arms do not have the required markings. For example, Portugal and Slovakia both report (in identical language) that their respective Ministries of Defence require that imported arms for military use be marked with the name of the manufacturer, the country of manufacture, and the serial number, and encourages additional markings, such as the year of manufacture, the weapon type/model, and the calibre.

The Russian Federation reports that this ITI provision is not applicable, since state forces use only domestically produced small arms, as opposed to imported weapons.

Marking of weapons transferred from state stockpiles to civilian use

In the context of arms transfers from government stockpiles to permanent civilian use, ITI paragraph 8(c) requires states to apply appropriate markings to any small arms and light weapons that are not already marked in a way that allows them to be traced. The markings must permit the identification of the country from whose stockpiles the arms transfer is made.

The United Kingdom is one of a handful of states to include information on this commitment, noting that all firearms that are surplus to police requirements are destroyed and that ‘the [Ministry of Defence] operates a total ban on small arms re-sale to private companies and individuals’. Weapons in state stockpiles can be sold only to other governments; when these sales occur, all serial numbers are kept and held indefinitely, and a clause is included in an onward sale contract ensuring that no resale would be possible without the express written permission of the British government.

Antigua and Barbuda reports that the government does not transfer arms to civilians or private companies. Argentina states that transfers from state stockpiles to civilian use are not expected to occur, since arms not being used by the

state are destroyed. Canada also reports that public agencies are not permitted to transfer surplus firearms to individuals or businesses and that such surpluses are destroyed. Switzerland reports that information regarding the transfer of small arms from the armed forces to private users is kept for 20 years.

Marking of state-held weapons

Paragraph 8(d) of the ITI calls on states to:

Take all necessary measures to ensure that all small arms and light weapons in the possession of government armed and security forces for their own use at the time of adoption of this instrument are duly marked.

Police

Thirteen states report that firearms held by their police forces are marked.¹⁶⁵ While some do not specify the nature of the markings, others indicate that they include manufacturer markings¹⁶⁶ and serial numbers.¹⁶⁷ Canada reports that when large quantities of firearms are purchased, they are also marked as belonging to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Germany reports that in addition to the name of the manufacturer and the serial number, firearms destined for the police must be marked with the type of ammunition they use or—if no ammunition is used—the type of projectiles, as well as a proof mark and a ‘property sign’ (e.g. ‘BMI’) indicating that the weapon is in use with the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Germany, 2010, s. 2.1.8.3, p. 30). In addition, arms held by state police forces are marked with a state-specific sign of ownership containing an abbreviation of the respective state and/or the name of the institution.

Lithuania reports that police firearms are marked with the calibre and, in most cases, the manufacturing state and year of manufacture; in addition, since 2005 they also bear a mark indicating that Lithuania is the importing state. The Netherlands also reports that all service pistols are also marked with a unique Dutch police acceptance mark. Sweden reports that police firearms are marked with the words ‘Tillhör polisen’ (police property).

Eritrea reports that small arms in the hands of law enforcement officers are ‘not properly and uniformly marked’¹⁶⁸ (since there is no national marking practice, and many of the arms in the hands of the government forces were seized from enemy hands during the war of independence and have different markings, because they were produced by various manufacturers).

However, Eritrea notes that existing markings on all government-held arms are registered for the purpose of tracing.

Armed forces

Twenty-one states report that firearms belonging to the armed forces are marked.¹⁶⁹ The nature of the specified markings include identification of the country that holds the arms,¹⁷⁰ type and model,¹⁷¹ manufacturer,¹⁷² serial number or identification number,¹⁷³ and the year of manufacture.¹⁷⁴ Canada reports that each small arm is identified as a Canadian forces weapon and the calibre is also marked. Germany reports that weapons held by its defence forces are also marked with calibre, serial number, proof mark, and possibly additional marks, such as maintenance information. Furthermore, in order to increase transparency, Germany has started marking small arms for the armed forces with the letters 'DE' as a central identification code. Ukraine points out that markings on small arms used by its armed forces comply with the requirements of intergovernmental normative documents that existed in the Soviet Union and which, although unique, lack the features that indicate a given weapon belongs to Ukraine.

Kenya notes that the Nairobi Protocol requires states to mark all small arms and light weapons in state possession with a unique marking. By the end of 2011 Kenya expects to have marked all state-owned weapons in accordance with this requirement and the provisions of the ITI.

As noted above, Eritrea reports that small arms in the hands of the armed forces are not properly and uniformly marked (since there is no national marking practice), but that existing markings on all government-held arms are registered for the purpose of tracing. The Republic of Congo notes that it does not have its own marking code for small arms and so traceability relies on the serial (factory) numbers on the weapons recorded by the armed forces. Uganda reports that it is in the process of rolling out a programme to ensure all small arms held by the police and armed forces are marked with the country and institution codes and serial numbers.

Measures by manufacturers

Paragraph 8(e) of the ITI requires states to '[e]ncourage manufacturers of small arms and light weapons to develop measures against the removal or alteration of markings'.

Eleven states provided information relevant to this issue.¹⁷⁵ Some acknowledge that no special measures against the removal or alterations of markings have been developed by manufacturers¹⁷⁶ or that no such measures are necessary, since firearms are not manufactured in their country.¹⁷⁷ Others indicate that existing regulations require firearms to be marked in such a manner that the removal of the marking would be technically complicated or impossible¹⁷⁸ or that draft legislation designed to regulate the removal or alteration of markings is under consideration,¹⁷⁹ and several provide details of the types of measure that have been developed. Algeria, for example, reports that the marking of manufactured firearms is done on the main piece and all other pieces to the extent that the modification and eradication of the marking is difficult without risking damage to the firearm. Japan reports that ‘a measure using laser technology against tampering of marks is adopted’ as a means of preventing the removal or alteration of markings. Liechtenstein notes that new legislation which entered into force in July 2009 requires manufacturers to mark firearms in such a way that the mark can be modified or removed only by mechanical methods. The Republic of Congo reiterates in the context of this commitment that it has no factories that manufacture small arms or military ammunition. Spain reports that its regulations provide that all markings should be punched or another procedure should be used to ensure the permanence of the markings. The United Kingdom gives a detailed description of manufacturers’ long-standing marking method that makes removal and alteration difficult.

Marking or destruction of illicit weapons

Paragraph 9 of the ITI urges states to ensure that all illicit small arms found on their territory are uniquely marked and recorded—or destroyed—as soon as possible, and that they are securely stored in the interim.

Few states report on this provision of the ITI, although several comment on the procedures surrounding the marking of small arms and light weapons designated for destruction (e.g., Latvia) and the destruction of surplus firearms (e.g., Lithuania and Oman). Algeria reports that all unmarked arms are considered illicit and become the property of the state. Antigua and Barbuda reports that weapons that are collected are marked and registered. Argentina states that illicit arms found on Argentinean territory are marked, registered, kept in

a safe place, and then destroyed as soon as possible. Australia reports that all firearms surrendered under the 1996 'buyback' of long arms and the 2003 'buyback' of handguns were destroyed, and firearms collected through other periodic amnesties are also destroyed. Belarus and the Russian Federation report that unmarked or improperly marked weapons are destroyed or properly marked. Botswana reports that all unmarked firearms found on its territory are destroyed. India reports that arms that do not bear specified identification marks may not be sold or transferred, and that any person found in possession of a weapon without identification marks would be presumed to have removed the marks unless proven otherwise. Lithuania declares that, once it is confirmed that surplus, confiscated, collected, or seized firearms (which presumably include illicit firearms 'found' on its territory (UNGA, 2005, para. 9)) are unsuitable for further use, they are destroyed. The Netherlands reports that if a weapon held by the armed forces is not marked, it will be considered illegal and destroyed. Nicaragua reports under this issue that its laws concerning the marking and identification of weapons have not been fully implemented due to a lack of financial, technological, and infrastructure resources. Pakistan reports that all unmarked or inadequately marked weapons that are confiscated or seized are either destroyed or marked in accordance with national marking requirements. Spain states that unmarked firearms are destroyed and registered. The United States reports that confiscated firearms retained for official use are marked if they are not already marked.

Record-keeping

In paragraph 11, the ITI commits states to ensuring that accurate and comprehensive records are established for all marked small arms and light weapons within their territory and maintained in accordance with paragraph 12, which states that 'in any case a State will ensure the maintenance of: (a) Manufacturing records for at least 30 years; and (b) All other records, including records of import and export, for at least 20 years'.

The ITI does not specify whether the records should be retained by the state itself or by individuals engaged in weapons manufacturing and trade.

Indeed, it indicates that the 'choice of methods for record-keeping is a national prerogative' (para. 11). Information provided by states on their record-keeping practices has been categorized according to whether, based on information provided by governments, the state or a private individual or company is responsible for maintaining records.

Records kept by the state

Records on manufactured firearms

Antigua and Barbuda reports that the state keeps records of manufacturing, although elsewhere in its national report it indicates that small arms are not manufactured on its territory. Canada reports that its legislation requires each firearm to be registered against the manufacturer's inventory at the time of production or the importer's inventory at the time of importation and at every subsequent transfer, allowing for a quick, electronic registration query to determine the last legal owner of a firearm at any given point in time. Finland states that it keeps a register for ten years of the manufacture of small arms and light weapons and ammunition falling under its jurisdiction and control. Ghana reports that record-keeping is not provided for in its law. India reports that all state-owned ordnance factories maintain detailed records of small arms manufactured by them. Mexico states that the secretary of national defence keeps a register of armaments that are manufactured nationally and that are legally imported. Neither India nor Mexico indicates for how long such records are maintained. Oman reports that information on markings applied to weapons is recorded in special registers in order to facilitate the monitoring of all weapons (although it also reports that no factories in the country manufacture weapons or ammunition). Switzerland reports that records pertaining to small arms held by the armed forces are kept for ten years after the destruction of the arms.

Records on small arms transfers

Argentina reports that records on exported arms and ammunition are kept in the national register maintained by RENAR. Australia reports that the relevant government agencies keep records of the details of all small arms exports and

imports, including details of end users. Botswana reports that it maintains records of all transfers, but no specific details are provided. Canada states that all records associated with the export of small arms and all import permits are stored indefinitely, and that all supporting documentation associated with an import that is not stored within the electronic system is retained for seven years. Finland also reports that documentation on export licences granted by the Ministry of Defence is kept permanently, and that it keeps a register for ten years on transfers of small arms and light weapons and ammunition falling under its jurisdiction and control. Pakistan reports that records on transfers must be kept permanently (but does not specify whether dealers or the state itself keeps such records). Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden report that the relevant ministry keeps records of transfers of military weapons and equipment, with Sweden noting that such records are 'in principle' kept indefinitely. Ukraine notes that all movements of small arms and light weapons held by the state are recorded. Several states also report that they keep records of transactions and transfers involving civilian small arms.¹⁸⁰

Records on holdings

Police. Fifteen states report that records are kept of police holdings;¹⁸¹ some elaborate on the nature of information recorded by the police, such as holdings, use, disposal, theft, and loss of weapons in their possession. Some also note that the police keep records of all permits granted to possess or trade firearms (e.g., Sweden). Eritrea reports that all law-enforcement agencies have their own uniform record-keeping system and periodically review their stockpiles and submit monthly reports to the National Staff of Ordinance of the Ministry of Defence. Guatemala also provides details of an ongoing project to improve arms control by government security forces; the project aims to ensure that members of the police force are assigned just one firearm throughout their careers. Sudan reports that it is in the process of establishing a system to mark and record police-held firearms.

Armed forces. Thirty-one states provide information on the maintenance of records with respect to the holdings of armed forces.¹⁸² Some simply assert that they have adequate record-keeping measures in place; others provide

details of their registration systems and the nature of the information they record, as well as procedures for monitoring the movement of arms and for reporting thefts and losses from state stockpiles. For example, Algeria states that the weapons of the armed forces are registered in a national (central) register for an unlimited time and that destroyed, lost, and stolen armed forces weapons are recorded there as well. Australia reports that weapons held by the armed forces are individually numbered and tracked, stored securely, registered, and subject to strict accounting procedures, including an annual census supervised by the Defence Materiel Organization and reviewed by the Defence Inspector General's Office to account for 100 per cent of weapons. Australia also reports that all operational weapons issued to units are checked on a fortnightly basis. Botswana reports that audit checks of state-owned armouries are conducted regularly. Germany's control system involves 100 per cent inventory checks with respect to guards and military police at the end of each shift, weekly checks with respect to combat units, and bi-weekly checks with respect to depots and stockpile facilities to ensure that documented records are updated and accurate. The Russian Federation reports that small arms used by its armed forces are subjected to special control, including control firing. The bullets and shells of such tests are kept within a governmental bank of bullets and shells, which enables law-enforcement organizations to investigate cases of illicit use of the arms and identify lost and stolen weapons and persons involved in the illicit use of the weapons. Ukraine notes that all movements of small arms and light weapons are recorded, and that an annual inventory of all firearms and ammunition held by the armed forces is taken during which 20 per cent of the small arms are checked piece-by-piece. The United States reports that the Department of Defense has a central register administered by the US Army Logistical Support Activity, which is responsible for giving serial numbers to and accounting for all Department of Defense small arms.

Eritrea reports that all armed forces agencies have their own uniform record-keeping system, and periodically review their stockpiles and submit monthly reports to the National Staff of Ordinance of the Ministry of Defence. Kenya notes that its Central Firearms Bureau, which currently maintains a register of all civilian-owned firearms, will be upgraded as part

of a new policy, so that eventually the bureau will also maintain an electronic database of all state-owned small arms. Uganda reports that it is developing a central firearms register that will record data on small arms stockpiles in state possession.

Civilians. Twenty-two states report that a competent authority retains records of civilian-held weapons¹⁸³ and/or civilian licensing information.¹⁸⁴ Algeria reports that it has established a national register of civilian-held firearms to supersede record-keeping by regional departments. Australia reports that all of its states and territories require the compulsory registration of firearms and licensing of firearms owners and that there is a National Firearms Licensing and Registration System. Botswana reports that the Central Arms Registry maintains manual records of all privately held firearms. Canada states that information on individual licences is recorded in the Canadian Firearms Information System and must be kept for a minimum of ten years after the last administrative action has been taken on the information in the record. It also notes that information relating to an individual's safety training cannot be destroyed until after the death of that individual. New Zealand reports that, while records of civilian-held pistols, restricted weapons, and military-style semi-automatics are maintained indefinitely, it does not maintain a register of all firearms (such as sporting firearms). However, as the vast majority of such firearms are imported into New Zealand, details of such weapons are, in practice, captured as part of the import process managed by the police. Several states also report that they keep records of transactions and transfers involving civilian small arms.¹⁸⁵ Trinidad and Tobago reports that it maintains a database of all legally owned firearms, including those purchased by private security firms and authorized civilians. Aside from a few states which report that records are kept 'indefinitely',¹⁸⁶ very few states indicate how long records are required to be kept. Lithuania, however, reports that information on its State Arms Register is kept until a particular firearm is destroyed, after which it is transferred to the archives, where it is kept for another 75 years.

Other records

Argentina reports that it has a centralized National Register of Seized Firearms and Controlled Materials under the competence of RENAR, which

retains records of all firearms seized within its jurisdiction. Nicaragua reports that it keeps a special register of firearms involved in crimes.

Records kept by individuals and companies

Manufacturers

Twenty states report that manufacturers are required to keep records of manufactured arms.¹⁸⁷ Some provide details of the information that must be recorded, such as serial numbers, date of manufacture, the manufacturer's markings, type and model, calibre, and transfers. Other states report on the manner in which manufacturers' records must be held. For example, Estonia notes that records must be kept

in a weapons ledger bound with string and sealed with the seal of the police prefecture ... weapons, essential components of firearms, laser sights and ammunition manufactured or acquired with the aim of being sold shall be specified on one side of a weapons ledger, and weapons, essential components of firearms, laser sights and ammunition sold shall be specified on the other side of the ledger (Estonia, 2010, s. 9, part iv, p. 22).

Japan also reports on the requirement that manufacturers of ammunition maintain records, noting that they should record their types and amounts, dates of trades, and the names and addresses of customers. The Philippines reports that firearms manufacturers must submit a monthly report to the police about the types, calibres, and quantities of finished products and sales made during the period, as well as an inventory of products and raw materials in stock.

Very few states reveal how long manufacturers' records must be kept. Algeria reports that manufacturers are obliged to keep the records for a period of 15 years before being archived for an indefinite period. Estonia reports that weapons ledgers must be preserved for five years from the date of the last entry. Finland states that they must be retained for at least ten years after the last entry. Germany reports that all production licence holders are obliged to keep records for at least ten years and that the supervising authorities regularly inspect such records. In addition, each arms manufacturer is obliged to keep an arms-manufacturing register (*Waffenherstellungsbuch*) and a register of the trade in arms (*Waffenhandelsbuch*), which contain information on the

production of arms, the recipients of the arms, the production numbers, and the production markings (e.g., registered trademarks or the name of the manufacturer). Italy reports that weapons factories must keep records for ten years. Japan reports that its law requiring manufacturers to keep records does not stipulate the duration that records should be kept; in practice, however, almost all manufacturers keep the records for more than ten years. Romania states that registers on manufacture are kept for ten years by armourers licensed to produce arms and ammunition, and are then taken over by the Romanian police for archiving. Although there is no indication of how long the police retain the records, elsewhere in the report Romania states that manufacturers are obliged to keep the records for a minimum of 30 years (in accordance with the ITI). Switzerland reports that manufacturers are required to keep records of the manufacture, acquisition, and transfer of small arms for ten years and to hand over the record books to cantonal authorities after this period of time. The United States reports that licensed manufacturers must maintain permanent records of all manufactured firearms.

While the United Kingdom does not report on this aspect of national regulation, it notes that, under the amended European Weapons Directive, by 31 December 2014 member states will be required to have a computerized data-filing system to record and maintain information pertaining to every firearm subject to the directive for at least 20 years. As part of this obligation, dealers will be required to maintain a register of all firearms received or disposed of by them; upon the cessation of business, such registers shall be delivered to the responsible governmental authority.

One state, Burkina Faso, expressly notes that manufacturers do *not* keep records, explaining that, although craft producers operating in its territory have been registered by the Ministry of Security, 'in as much as they themselves are mostly illiterate, they do not keep records and have no concept of the marking system' (Burkina Faso, 2010, s. 4, p. 2).

Dealers

Eleven states report that arms dealers or traders are required to keep records of their transactions or register such information with the competent authority.¹⁸⁸ Most states do not indicate how long such records must be kept. Algeria

reports that dealers are obliged to keep their registers for a period of 15 years before they are archived indefinitely. Ireland reports that dealers are required to keep records of firearms transfers for at least five years. The Netherlands reports that records must be kept during the period of validity of dealer licences (five years), and the licence will not be extended if this condition has not been fulfilled, but it is not clear whether the records must be kept beyond the duration of the licence and, if so, for how long. Oman reports that anyone who is licensed to trade in weapons must maintain two registers: one that serves as an inventory and the other to record sales to licensed purchasers. Romania reports that records are to be kept for a minimum of 20 years. The United States reports that all licensed dealers must maintain firearms transaction records of all sales and transfers (Form 4473) of firearms for not less than 20 years.

Records kept by companies going out of business

The ITI contains a specific provision under which states must require that records pertaining to small arms and light weapons held by companies that go out of business be forwarded to the state in accordance with its national legislation (para. 13). Botswana, France, Romania, and the United States are the only states that report on this commitment. Botswana notes that dealers and manufacturers who go out of business must provide all their records to the Central Arms Registry for permanent retention. Similarly, France reports that the records of manufacturers and dealers that go out of business must be delivered to the local police or gendarmerie. Romania notes that, if an armourer licensed to produce arms ceases its activities, its manufacturing records are taken over by the Romanian police within ten days of the cessation of such activities. The United States reports that, if dealers go out of business, they are required to submit their records to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for permanent retention.

Tracing

Cooperation in tracing

Few states provide details of their processes for responding to tracing requests or of the responsible agencies,¹⁸⁹ nor have many provided specific

examples of cooperation in tracing. Exceptions include Australia, Mexico, Romania, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States. Australia reports that the Australian Crime Commission signed an MoU on the sharing of information in relation to firearm trafficking issues with the US ATF in 2007 and that the commission is establishing a database of firearm transaction records to help determine the lawful nature of firearms found on Australian territory and to assist in the timely tracing of illicit firearms.

Mexico states that it cooperates with the ATF and that 58,371 tracing requests were processed between 2006 and 2009. Romania reports that in 2009 its export controls department participated in information exchange mechanisms established under the Schengen Agreement and provided data requested by one interested country from South America. Trinidad and Tobago reports that it has entered into bilateral arrangements with the ATF which ensure it has access to firearm tracing databases and training. The United States confirms this in its report, noting that it has signed eTrace¹⁹⁰ MoUs with 14 Caribbean countries and has provided eTrace to all seven members of the Central American Integration System (SICA).¹⁹¹ The United States also reports that the country's National Tracing Center traces firearms for US and foreign law-enforcement agencies that are of US origin and have been used in or suspected to have been used in criminal activities, and that the ATF also assists law-enforcement agencies in recovering obliterated or altered serial numbers. The United States reports that between 1994 and 2006 the ATF responded to over 200,000 requests from foreign law-enforcement agencies for assistance in tracing illegal firearms and that the ATF generally receives 300,000 requests per year, of which 50,000 are from foreign law-enforcement agencies.

Cooperation and assistance

Assistance with capacity building

According to paragraph 27 of the ITI:

States in a position to do so will, upon request, seriously consider rendering technical, financial and other assistance, both bilaterally and multilaterally, in building national capacity in the areas of marking, record-keeping and tracing, in order to support the effective implementation of this instrument by States.

Assistance provided. Argentina reports that it is able to provide technical, bilateral, and multilateral assistance to support national capacities in the areas

of marking, record-keeping, and tracing. France reports helping the EU to fund four workshops on the ITI in 2007 and 2008. Germany reports that it sponsored the Bonn International Center for Conversion to develop ready-to-teach courses on various aspects of small arms action for a variety of target groups in developing countries, including a training module on the marking and tracing of small arms and their ammunition. The Netherlands reports that it has provided financial support to the Nairobi-based Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) and other regional organizations and international NGOs. The country expresses its willingness to provide further support to states in their effort to implement the ITI, noting that, as priority regions in Dutch small arms policy, the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, the Balkans, and Afghanistan would be especially eligible for funding.

The United States reports that it provided funding to the OAS and RECSA to procure small arms marking equipment for their respective member states. It also reports providing small arms trafficking courses through the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) to countries in Africa and the Americas, as well as experts to ITI workshops held in South Korea and Togo.¹⁹² The United States reports that the ATF offers a basic firearms identification course for international law-enforcement professionals, and other courses that provide training on marking techniques and firearms identification. The United States works through the various ILEAs to provide expertise to representatives of foreign law-enforcement agencies to combat illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in small arms. In addition, the US assisted RECSA member states and several countries in Central and southern Africa from 2007 to 2009 with the purchase of marking machines and record-keeping computers. In addition to signing eTrace MoUs with Caribbean and Central American states (as discussed above), the United States reports that it provided a USD 1 million grant to the OAS to provide firearm-marking equipment to countries in the region that lack marking capabilities, and that at the ILEA in El Salvador, US experts conduct annual courses for Western Hemisphere states on firearms and explosives identification, serial number restoration, and firearms investigations.

Assistance received. Kenya reports receiving assistance as part of a training programme conducted by RECSA for its member states in the marking of

state-owned small arms and the establishment of electronic databases. It also notes that it received two marking machines in February 2009 and September 2009, enabling it to mark more than 16,800 small arms. Computers for data storage were also provided. Eritrea and Uganda report receiving two electronic marking machines from RECSA (although Eritrea states that it lacks the necessary technical and financial capacity to put the marking process into operation). The Republic of Congo reports receiving assistance in the form of an electronic marking machine from RECSA and training on its use.

Assistance required. The following states include specific requests for assistance with respect to ITI implementation:

- **Bangladesh** needs ‘appropriate modern technology’ (Bangladesh, 2010, p. 3), instruments, machinery, and equipment for arms checking, scanning, and recovery, as well as training for law-enforcement personnel. It also states that it would welcome cooperation from the UN with regard to training on tracing in order to establish an effective tracing mechanism.
- **Burkina Faso** states that it hoped BMS₄ would address assistance and training measures for implementing the ITI.
- **Eritrea** reports that it needs technical and financial assistance to upgrade its manual record-keeping systems into an electronic form.
- **Kenya** reports that it lacks adequate marking machines and trained personnel to mark both state-owned and civilian-licensed small arms and light weapons by the end of 2011 and needs funding to establish an electronic database.
- **Lesotho** reports that, in order to start marking state and civilian firearms in 2011 as planned, it needs technical and financial assistance to buy machines and train officers to use the marking machines safely and effectively. It is also seeking funds to computerize the Firearms Licensing Office, which is responsible for maintaining records on civilian-held firearms, currently through manual record-keeping. The Lesotho police force also needs to train experts in the actual tracing, ‘etching’, and destruction of firearms confiscated by the government, which is currently being done with the assistance of South Africa.
- **Mozambique** reports that it is receiving assistance from UNDP and Viva Rio to develop an integrated, digitized national firearms register (as regis-

tration is currently done manually). However, it notes that further donor support of USD 700,000 is required for full implementation at the national level, across 11 provinces. Mozambique provides a detailed breakdown of the nature and cost of the anticipated activities and states that a full proposal is available on request to donors interested in the project. The country also notes that it requires financial support to procure marking equipment.

International cooperation in technology development

No state reports under this section of the ITI.

International cooperation with other relevant organizations

In paragraph 29 of the ITI, states are requested to promote implementation by encouraging initiatives within the framework of the PoA to mobilize the resources and expertise of—and, where appropriate, cooperation with—relevant regional and international organizations. Finland is one of the few states to report under this section of the ITI, noting its participation in the 1969 Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition of Proof Marks on Small Arms.

Observations and discussion points

With just under one-third of all states that submitted national reports in 2010 providing a separate report on ITI implementation, and a further 10 per cent claiming that their national report was a report on PoA and ITI implementation (but in reality generally referring to PoA rather than ITI marking, record-keeping, and tracing commitments), reporting on ITI implementation in 2010 was disappointing, to say the least. As noted in the introduction to this part of the report, one of the aims of this analysis was to assess states' awareness of their ITI commitments and their obligation to report specifically on ITI implementation. The level of ITI reporting suggests that states are generally unaware of their obligation to report on ITI implementation, or, alternatively, chose not to report specifically on it.

It is possible that the low level of ITI reporting stems from the fact that many states used the reporting template that forms part of the Assistance Package as the basis of their 2010 national report.¹⁹³ This template does not

include specific references to the ITI, but rather refers to relevant paragraphs of the PoA in the section on marking, record-keeping, and tracing. If we assume that states which used the Assistance Package template were guided exclusively by it when drafting their national reports, perhaps they can be excused for the lack of information on ITI implementation.

Partly for this reason, the author interpreted 'ITI reporting' generously when designing the four classification categories for the purposes of the ITI reporting analysis. As noted in the methodology section of this part of the report, credit was given to states that at least mentioned the ITI somewhere in their report and provided information on marking, record-keeping, and tracing. Objectively, however, an acknowledgement by a state that it was part of the ITI negotiations without specific information on ITI implementation should not qualify as ITI reporting, yet it was recorded as such in this study

The online reporting tool recently prepared by UNODA is designed to ensure that states provide more detailed information on their implementation efforts for both the PoA and the ITI and to reduce the reporting burden by enabling states to update their information as and when necessary. This consolidation of the reporting commitments is intended to improve the quality of reports and facilitate a better understanding of the status of PoA and ITI implementation, including through enhanced comparability. One would expect that use of the revised reporting template will improve and increase ITI reporting in future national reports.

While reporting on the ITI may improve as states are guided by the revised template to include ITI-specific information, it also seems clear that additional awareness raising is necessary to ensure states know of their obligations with respect to the ITI, including their commitment to report on ITI implementation every two years. The ITI is unequivocal in this regard. Paragraph 36 clearly indicates that 'states will report *on a biennial basis* to the Secretary-General on their implementation of this Instrument' (UNGA, 2005, para. 36; emphasis added). Indeed, the commitment to report on the ITI is stronger than the commitment included in the PoA, which contemplates reporting on a 'voluntary basis' (UNGA, 2001, para. 33).

In this study, credit is given to states that acknowledge the existence of the ITI in their reports, but in reality very few states provide separate, clear, and

distinct information relating to their implementation of the ITI. Future analyses of ITI reporting may not be so forgiving of states' failure to provide specific information on their ITI implementation or so generous in their interpretation of what qualifies as 'ITI reporting'. ▀

IV. BMS4 and beyond¹⁹⁴

This report has offered a brief overview of the information provided in states' reports on the BMS₄ themes as at 31 December 2010. While the reports tend to constitute the most detailed source of information states make available on their implementation of the PoA and the ITI, the statements of national delegations at BMS₄ offer additional insights into national practices and priorities in each of the thematic areas.

BMS4 discussions

With respect to border controls, several states reiterated in their interventions that the selection of this theme for focused discussion was timely and appropriate. Most states that spoke on the issue emphasized the importance of regional and sub-regional cooperation (including information exchange, technical assistance, training, and capacity building), as well as coordination among relevant ministries at a national level. Many states gave examples of bilateral trans-border cooperation mechanisms they have established with neighbouring countries, as well as their engagement with INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization, while some discussed the nexus between small arms trafficking and drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime.

Other states focused their statements on the challenges they face in the context of border controls, namely long and porous borders and a lack of surveillance equipment, as well as on other assistance needs. Several states also specifically addressed the discussion points raised in the informal non-paper prepared by one of the Friends of the Chairman-designate to BMS₄.¹⁹⁵ For example, in response to the suggestion in the non-paper that international guidelines or a separate instrument be established within the framework of the PoA to address the issue of border controls, the United States said it did not see the need for a separate instrument to combat the illicit trade across borders, as the PoA already fulfils that role.

In their national statements on the theme of international cooperation and assistance, most states stressed the integral role of cooperation and assistance in the success of PoA implementation and the importance of regional approaches to the issue. Many welcomed and endorsed the ‘matching needs and resources’ checklist or mechanism developed by UNIDIR and made available on the PoA-ISS website, although one state noted that ‘the PoA ISS is not actively promoting the match-making of needs and resources and is not documenting the follow up on these proposals’ (Germany, 2010). Other states commented on the need for greater visibility with respect to available aid, noting that national reports provide an opportunity for states to identify their available resources and to outline their national programmes that could then be studied by other states. Other states cautioned that cooperation and assistance should not be subject to conditions or political motivations and must respond to the needs that are defined by the country requesting assistance. Finally, many states provided examples of assistance they received, require, or provided.

Most states that made national statements on the ITI during BMS₄ provided examples of their implementation efforts, giving details of their marking practices and tracing activities, including the mention by several states of the eTrace mechanism established by the United States. Notably, there appears to be a considerable discrepancy in states’ perceptions of the inherent value of the ITI. For example, the statement made on behalf of the EU declares the ITI to be ‘one of the most important practical achievements’ emerging from the PoA framework, noting that

despite the legally non-binding nature of the International Tracing Instrument, its provisions are precise and detailed, and call for a technical investment going beyond mere declarations of principle (EU, 2010).

By way of contrast, in its statement, CARICOM notes that the possible effectiveness of the ITI is ‘grossly retarded by the fact that it is not legally binding’ and emphasizes that efforts should be geared towards the development and adoption of a legally binding instrument on marking and tracing (CARICOM, 2010).

As noted above, national reports under review contain almost no specific information on the third theme discussed at BMS₄—‘Strengthening of the fol-

low-up mechanism of the Programme of Action, and preparations for the 2011 Experts Group meeting and the 2012 Review Conference’—and so this theme does not appear in the thematic analysis in Part II of this report. However, a large number of countries presented statements on the issue during the corresponding BMS₄ session, with many supporting the elements proposed by Ambassador Macedo in his non-paper on this theme (Macedo, 2010), including consideration of whether there has been measurable progress in implementing the PoA; developing mechanisms to evaluate such progress; streamlining and synthesizing reporting formats; preparing a progress report on PoA implementation; establishing a voluntary sponsorship fund to facilitate financial assistance to states who are otherwise unable to attend PoA meetings; and developing an implementation roadmap to 2012 and beyond.

Through their interventions, many states also endorsed the idea of a six-year PoA meeting cycle (i.e. holding a biennial meeting every two years and a Review Conference every six years); supported continuing the practice of selecting specific themes for biennial meetings; called for the early designation of chairs for PoA meetings; and suggested holding a preparatory committee meeting early in 2012 to support the 2012 Review Conference. Although, as explained below, this was not the case with all of the BMS₄ themes, the bulk of the discussion on follow-up was reflected in the meeting outcome document.

BMS₄ outcome document

The BMS₄ outcome document (UNGA, 2010a), agreed by consensus at the end of the meeting, distils various aspects of the discussions. While it does not delve into the details of national implementation, it does offer a general indication of common approaches in the thematic areas. In some cases, there was agreement on the specific parameters of future action, while other sections of the BMS₄ outcome are more general and noncommittal in nature.

The section of the outcome document devoted to border controls (UNGA, 2010a, s. I) enumerates the key elements of effective border control, including cooperation between states, cooperation and coordination among different border control agencies within a state, and capacity building. It also encour-

ages states to pay greater attention to small arms trafficking in their national border management strategies. Overall, however, the border controls text does little to advance national or multilateral action on borders, and states make no specific commitments in relation to border controls.

The section on international cooperation and assistance (s. II) is more detailed and specific in formulation than that on border controls. It recaps key recommendations from the BMS₃ outcome on this issue, in particular the improved identification and communication of needs, as well as the enhanced matching of needs and resources. It also highlights the critical importance of cooperation (not only assistance) to PoA implementation. Finally, building on text agreed at BMS₃, the section emphasizes the need to assess the *effectiveness* of cooperation and assistance, in essence ensuring that states measurably benefit from the assistance they receive.

The BMS₄ section on ITI implementation (UNGA, 2010b) is, like that on border controls, something of a non-event, offering relatively little added value in comparison with the ITI section that was agreed at BMS₃. Most importantly, the BMS₄ section encourages states to use the UNODA reporting template—redesigned in 2010 with both the PoA and ITI in mind—noting its utility in enhancing the comparability of reporting information and in evaluating ITI effectiveness. In line with evolving practice for PoA reporting, the 2010 outcome also encourages states ‘to submit their reports well in advance of biennial meetings and review conferences’ (UNGA, 2010b, para. 10d). What is most striking about the document is, however, what it leaves out—for example, a clear time frame for submitting point of contact information to the UN. Weak though current performance on PoA NPCs is (see ‘National points of contact’, above), it is clear that the ITI lags even further behind.

BMS₄ was the first PoA meeting to include a dedicated session on follow-up. As noted above, the results of that discussion are reflected in a fairly comprehensive manner in the outcome document (UNGA, 2010a, s. III). Agreed parameters for PoA follow-up include a six-year cycle for biennial meetings of states and review conferences; the early designation of a PoA meeting chair; the early development of meeting agendas; and acknowledgement of the need to clearly define and distinguish the mandates of different kinds of PoA meetings (BMSs, MGEs, and review conferences).

The reporting mechanism features prominently in the BMS₄ discussions and outcome document. In the latter, states recommend including in their national reports information on progress made in implementing measures agreed at preceding PoA meetings in order to enhance linkages between meetings. They also express support for a biennial PoA reporting schedule—timing reports so that they coincide with BMSs and review conferences. By easing the (annual) reporting burden, states seek to increase the number and quality of reports. The outcome also encourages the use of the new reporting template developed by UNODA, which should increase comparability among national reports and facilitate other aspects of reporting and implementation. Last but not least, the outcome puts some emphasis on the ‘analysis’ of national reporting, together with the ‘comprehensive assessment of progress in the implementation of the Programme of Action’ (UNGA, 2010a, paras. 36, 40).

The increased focus on the ‘analysis’ of reporting appears to signal the UN membership’s growing recognition of the limits of the current system, which stops at the publication and dissemination of national reports on PoA and ITI implementation and does not require follow-up. What is missing is an ‘analysis’ or ‘assessment’ of the contents of reports that is part and parcel of the UN small arms process (see McDonald, 2011). The BMS₄ text on follow-up includes a recommendation ‘that the 2012 Review Conference assess and, as necessary, strengthen the follow-up mechanism of the Programme of Action’ (UNGA, 2010a, para. 49). While it is promising, as at March 2011 it is unclear whether this recommendation will yield anything of substance.

Conclusion

This report has presented information—in particular, on the relative scarcity of functioning NPCs—that raises serious questions about the breadth and depth of PoA implementation. Other independent studies have highlighted important weaknesses in implementation on a broader scale (BtB with IANSA, 2006). The 2012 Review Conference provides an opportunity to resume—indeed, enhance—efforts to assess the state of overall implementation. Some

ten years after the adoption of the PoA, it has become clear that national reports, although an important basis for any such evaluation, rarely offer sufficient information. There is a need to go beyond the text of national reports to fill in missing details of implementation and, further, verify the information they contain—determining, for example, whether an NPC is functioning or not.

A further question relating to the PoA and ITI—extending beyond the facts of implementation—is whether such implementation is having the impact it was intended to have. Put another way, is the PoA fulfilling its declared mission ‘to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects’ (UNGA, 2001)? While this issue attracted some modest attention at BMS₄, it has mostly been eclipsed by efforts to improve our understanding of implementation. Over the medium and longer term, both questions are in fact crucial to determining the course of future action on small arms. The Small Arms Survey, in collaboration with partners in government, international organizations, and civil society, will be focusing on both questions during the coming years. ▀

Annexe 1: Frequency of reporting, 2002–10

Table A is based on information derived from submitted national reports that were made available on the PoA-ISS website between 2002 and 31 December 2010. The crosses indicate years in which a state submitted a national report.

Table A **Frequency of reporting, 2002–10**

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	TOTAL
Afghanistan										0
Albania		x	x							2
Algeria		x		x	x		x		x	5
Andorra					x		x		x	3
Angola					x		x		x	3
Antigua and Barbuda									x	1
Argentina		x	x	x	x	x	x		x	7
Armenia		x		x			x		x	4
Australia	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	9
Austria		x		x	x	x	x		x	6
Azerbaijan			x	x						2
Bahamas										0
Bahrain							x		x	2
Bangladesh	x	x							x	3
Barbados		x								1
Belarus	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	8
Belgium		x							x	2
Belize										0
Benin		x		x			x		x	4
Bhutan										0
Bolivia		x		x	x	x			x	5

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	TOTAL
Bosnia and Herzegovina			x	x	x	x	x		x	6
Botswana	x						x		x	3
Brazil		x		x			x			3
Brunei Darussalam										0
Bulgaria	x	x		x	x	x	x		x	7
Burkina Faso	x	x		x			x		x	5
Burundi		x	x	x		x	x		x	6
Cambodia			x				x			2
Cameroon		x								1
Canada		x	x	x	x		x		x	6
Cape Verde										0
Central African Republic		x								1
Chad		x								1
Chile				x	x		x			3
China		x	x	x		x	x		x	6
Colombia		x		x	x		x		x	5
Comoros										0
Congo, Republic of		x					x		x	3
Costa Rica	x	x		x						3
Côte d'Ivoire				x			x		x	3
Croatia		x	x	x	x	x	x		x	7
Cuba		x			x	x	x		x	5
Cyprus							x			1
Czech Republic		x	x	x	x	x	x		x	7

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	TOTAL
Democratic Republic of Congo		x							x	2
Denmark				x	x	x	x		x	5
Djibouti		x					x			2
Dominica										0
Dominican Republic							x			1
DPRK										0
Ecuador		x			x		x		x	4
Egypt		x		x	x		x		x	5
El Salvador		x	x	x						3
Equatorial Guinea		x								1
Eritrea									x	1
Estonia		x					x		x	3
Ethiopia	x						x			2
Fiji			x				x			2
Finland		x	x	x	x	x	x		x	7
France		x		x			x		x	4
Gabon				x						1
Gambia		x		x						2
Georgia				x	x		x		x	4
Germany		x	x	x		x	x	x	x	7
Ghana				x		x			x	3
Greece		x	x	x	x	x	x			6
Grenada			x							1
Guatemala			x	x	x		x		x	5
Guinea									x	1
Guinea-Bissau									x	1
Guyana									x	1
Haiti		x								1
Holy See				O ^a						0

^a O indicates that the state submitted a nil report.

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	TOTAL
Honduras		x	x							2
Hungary	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	8
Iceland							x			1
India		x		x		x	x		x	5
Indonesia		x		x				x	x	4
Iran, Islamic Republic of		x		x			x		x	4
Iraq							x		x	2
Ireland	x	x		x	x		x		x	6
Israel		x	x				x			3
Italy		x	x	x	x	x	x		x	7
Jamaica				x			x			2
Japan	x	x		x		x	x		x	6
Jordan		x		x					x	3
Kazakhstan				x	x		x		x	4
Kenya		x		x	x		x		x	5
Kiribati										0
Kuwait										0
Kyrgyzstan					x					1
Lao People's Democratic Republic										0
Latvia		x	x	x	x		x		x	6
Lebanon			x		x		x			3
Lesotho				x	x		x		x	4
Liberia				x			x		x	3
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya									x	1
Liechtenstein				x			x		x	3
Lithuania	x	x		x	x		x		x	6

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	TOTAL
Luxembourg		x		x					x	3
Madagascar							x			1
Malawi									x	1
Malaysia		x		x	x		x		x	5
Maldives										0
Mali		x		x			x		x	4
Malta			x	x	x	x	x		x	6
Marshall Islands				x						1
Mauritania				x						1
Mauritius				x			x			2
Mexico	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	8
Micronesia, Federated States of										0
Monaco		x	x							2
Mongolia										0
Montenegro										0
Morocco		x		x	x		x	x	x	6
Mozambique				x			x		x	3
Myanmar										0
Namibia				x	x		x		x	4
Nauru										0
Nepal										0
Netherlands		x		x			x		x	4
New Zealand		x	x	x		x	x		x	6
Nicaragua		x			x		x		x	4
Niger		x		x	x		x		x	5
Nigeria				x			x			2
Norway		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	7

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	TOTAL
Oman		x		x	x				x	4
Pakistan		x		x			x		x	4
Palau										0
Panama				x			x		x	3
Papua New Guinea				x						1
Paraguay		x		x	x	x	x			5
Peru		x	x	x	x		x		x	6
Philippines		x		x	x		x		x	5
Poland	x	x		x	x		x		x	6
Portugal		x	x			x	x	x	x	6
Qatar				x			x			2
Republic of Korea		x		x	x		x		x	5
Republic of Moldova		x		x	x	x	x		x	6
Romania		x		x			x		x	4
Russian Federation	x	x		x	x	x	x		x	7
Rwanda				x			x		x	3
Saint Kitts and Nevis										0
Saint Lucia										0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines										0
Samoa										0
San Marino										0
Sao Tomé and Príncipe		x								1
Saudi Arabia		x			x					2
Senegal		x		x		x	x		x	5
Serbia		x	x	x	x	x	x			6

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	TOTAL
Seychelles										0
Sierra Leone				x			x		x	3
Singapore										0
Slovak Republic		x		x			x		x	4
Slovenia		x		x			x		x	4
Solomon Islands		x	x							2
Somalia										0
South Africa		x		x			x			3
Spain		x		x	x	x	x		x	6
Sri Lanka		x		x	x		x			4
Sudan		x					x		x	3
Suriname										0
Swaziland							x			1
Sweden		x		x			x		x	4
Switzerland		x	x	x			x	x	x	6
Syrian Arab Republic		x		x	x	x			x	5
Tajikistan		x								1
Tanzania					x		x		x	3
Thailand		x		x			x			3
The FYRM		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	8
Timor-Leste										0
Togo			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	7
Tonga										0
Trinidad and Tobago		x	x				x		x	4
Tunisia									x	1
Turkey		x	x	x			x			4
Turkmenistan									x	1

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	TOTAL
Tuvalu										0
Uganda		x		x	x		x		x	5
Ukraine		x	x	x			x		x	5
United Arab Emirates				x	x					2
United Kingdom		x		x			x		x	4
United States of America	x	x	x	x		x	x		x	7
Uruguay				x			x		x	3
Uzbekistan										0
Vanuatu										0
Venezuela			x		x					2
Viet Nam					x					1
Yemen		x			x				x	3
Zambia				x					x	2
Zimbabwe				x			x			2
Total reports per year	16	99	41	103	62	36	111	9	107	584

Annexe 2: Summary of provisions on international cooperation and assistance under the Programme of Action

1. assisting and promoting conflict prevention (II.4);
2. developing and strengthening partnerships to share resources and information on the illicit trade (III.5);
3. building capacities in areas, including:
 - a. the development of appropriate legislation and regulations
 - b. law enforcement
 - c. marking and tracing
 - d. stockpile management and security
 - e. destruction
 - f. collection and exchange of information (III.6);
4. enhancing cooperation, the exchange of experience, and training among competent officials, including customs, police, intelligence, and arms control officials (III. 7);
5. developing specialist training on small arms stockpile management and security (III.8);
6. using and supporting INTERPOL's International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System database (III.9);
7. examining technologies that would improve the tracing and detection of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (III. 10);
8. cooperating in tracing illicit small arms and light weapons, in particular by strengthening mechanisms based on the exchange of relevant information (III.11);
9. exchanging information on national marking systems (III.12);
10. enhancing mutual legal assistance and other forms of cooperation in order to assist investigations and prosecutions (III.13);
11. assisting in the destruction or other responsible disposal of surplus

- stockpiles or unmarked or inadequately marked small arms and light weapons (III.14);
12. providing assistance to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons linked to drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, and terrorism (III.15);
 13. supporting appropriate programmes related to the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants (III.16);
 14. making greater efforts to address problems related to human and sustainable development (III.17); and
 15. developing and supporting action-oriented research aimed at facilitating greater awareness and better understanding of the nature and scope of the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects (III.18).

Online annexes

The following annexes are available at <<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP9-National-Implementation-annexes.pdf>>:

Annexe 3: Small Arms Survey questionnaire sent to NPCs

Annexe 4: Responses to the questionnaire regarding NPCs

Annexe 5: Responses to the questionnaire regarding NCAs

Annexe 6: Overview of ministries and departments involved in informal consultations in countries where no formal NCA has been established

Endnotes

- 1 The dates for BMS₄ were laid down in General Assembly Resolution 64/50 (UNGA, 2009, para. 6).
- 2 During BMS₄, this theme was adapted and amended to be ‘establishment, where appropriate, of subregional or regional mechanisms, with a view to preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons across borders, including trans-border customs cooperation and networks for information-sharing among law enforcement, border and customs control agencies’. For brevity, the term ‘border controls’ is used throughout this report to describe and refer to this theme.
- 3 Letter from the chair-designate to UN member states, New York, 11 May 2010.
- 4 UN member states have provided 584 national reports; the Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the UN also submitted a report (which consists of a *note verbale* stating that the Holy See has nothing to report on the issue).
- 5 With respect to national reporting for 2010, this report includes national reports submitted to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and posted on the dedicated website—the Programme of Action Implementation Support System (PoA-ISS)—by 31 December 2010. Unless otherwise indicated, citations are drawn from 2010 national reports; the exception is Indonesia (2009). See PoA-ISS (n.d.d) for all submitted national reports.
- 6 See Kytomaki and Yankey-Wayne (2004; 2006) and Cattaneo and Parker (2008).
- 7 The recommendation to provide reports is contained in paragraph II.33 of the PoA, in which states request the UN Secretary-General, through UNODA, ‘to collate and circulate data and information provided by States on a voluntary basis and including national reports, on implementation by those States of the Programme of Action’.
- 8 See UNGA (2010a, paras. 35, 38).
- 9 The UN Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, UNODA, and the Small Arms Survey jointly developed an Assistance Package to help member states prepare their national reports. The Assistance Package and reporting guidelines were first developed in 2003 and then revised in 2006; downloads are available at UNDP (n.d.).
- 10 This resolution has been presented for discussion at the General Assembly annually since 2001. See UNGA (2010c) for the most recent version.
- 11 The 34 member states are Afghanistan, Bahamas, Belize, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Kiribati, Kuwait, the Laos, Maldives, Micronesia, Mongolia, Montenegro (which became a UN member state on 28 June 2006), Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, North Korea, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Suriname, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, and Vanuatu. Antigua and Barbuda, Eritrea, Guinea,

Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, and Turkmenistan submitted their first reports after the publication of the interim version of this report in May 2010. The PoA-ISS website now indicates that Madagascar, which was not previously recorded as having submitted a report, submitted one in 2008.

- 12 This report includes only national reports submitted and posted on the PoA-ISS website by 31 December 2010.
- 13 The full title of the meeting is the United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.
- 14 See UNGA (2008a, para. 29(a)).
- 15 While Australia is recorded as having submitted a total of nine national reports, one for each year since the adoption of the PoA in 2001, its national report for 2006 was not submitted until September 2008, according to UNODA sources (author correspondence with UNODA, 26 April 2010). It is now available on the PoA-ISS website.
- 16 See previous endnote.
- 17 As of February 2011, the contact details of NPCs for 167 states, the Cook Islands, and the Holy See are available on the UNODA website, including the contact details for NPCs of states that have never submitted national reports. The list of NPCs and their contact details can be accessed at PoA-ISS (n.d.a).
- 18 The annexe is available online; see p. 86.
- 19 Following the regional meeting in Bali, additional information pertaining to the Philippines' and Malaysia's NPCs was posted on the PoA-ISS website. Additional information pertaining to the NPCs for Chile and Egypt has also been posted on the PoA-ISS website. This information was not available until after the enquiries were made for this report, however.
- 20 This included all 121 NPCs for which an email address was available in a national report or on the PoA-ISS website as at May 2010, plus Peru's NPC, whose email address was obtained during a telephone call to the number listed on the PoA-ISS website.
- 21 One or more telephone numbers were available via national reports or the PoA-ISS website for 133 of the NPCs. In 23 cases, however, it was not necessary to make telephone contact because a satisfactory response to the initial email was received. A total of 110 NPCs were thus approached via telephone.
- 22 By the time of preparing the interim version of this report in May 2010, the Small Arms Survey had received 46 responses to its email inquiry. Since the publication of the interim report in May 2010, only *one* additional email has been received—from Brazil—in response to the email enquiry sent by the Small Arms Survey. This has been incorporated into the adjusted figures.
- 23 For example, India.
- 24 For example, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Namibia, and South Korea.
- 25 For example, Senegal.
- 26 For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
- 27 The four cases were Fiji, Kazakhstan, Panama, and South Korea.
- 28 A total of 84 emails were sent to the remaining 75 states, for many of whom more than one

- email address was listed. In 53 cases there was no response and in the remaining 31 cases there was a failure to deliver, indicating the email address was faulty or incorrect.
- 29 For example, Belarus, Estonia, Guatemala, and Kazakhstan.
- 30 For example, Estonia.
- 31 For example, Belarus.
- 32 The 45 NPCs are Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Chile, China, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the DRC, Estonia, Finland, France, the Gambia, Germany, Hungary, India, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, the Netherlands, Panama, Peru, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay.
- 33 The annexe is available online; see p. 86.
- 34 For example, Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, India, the Netherlands, and Poland.
- 35 The 20 NPCs are Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, the Gambia, India, Iraq, Japan, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Panama, Peru, Romania, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, and Uruguay.
- 36 The annexe is available online; see p. 86.
- 37 The ten NPCs are Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- 38 The annexe is available online; see p. 86.
- 39 The nine NPCs are Burundi, Cyprus, France, Iraq, Japan, Mali, the Netherlands (which noted that the NAP is in the form of a 'policy document'), Panama, and Switzerland.
- 40 The 19 NPCs are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Poland, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- 41 The eight NPCs are Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, the Gambia, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Peru, and Sri Lanka.
- 42 The four NPCs are Brazil (which responded to the question by stating that Law No. 10826 of 22 December 2003, known as the 'Disarmament Statute', is the main arms control legislation), Chile, the Czech Republic, and Uruguay.
- 43 See UNGA (2008a, s. IV(IV), para. 28(e)).
- 44 See UNGA (2008a, s. IV(I), paras. 7(b), 7(e), 7(l)).
- 45 See the discussion under 'Future priorities' in Cattaneo and Parker (2008, p. 129).
- 46 The five states are Bangladesh, Kenya ('porous borders with unstable neighbouring states'), Liberia (which notes that inaccessible border areas are one of the constraints it faces in the context of strengthening border control and security), Niger, and Peru.
- 47 The two states are Bangladesh and Indonesia (Indonesia, 2009).
- 48 The four states are Botswana, Lesotho, Liberia, and Niger.
- 49 The two states are Kenya and Niger. Kenya states that 'the mode of trafficking [small arms and light weapons] is linked to increased incursions by refugees and displaced persons; trade and transfers by merchandise transporters, herders, gun dealers, bandits and local traders'; Niger refers to refugees from Chad.

- 50 Kenya reports that large areas (two-thirds) of its territory are inhabited by armed nomadic pastoral communities that engage in cattle rustling and live across common borders with Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda, and that instability arises from the cross-border manifestation of pastoral conflicts. Joint consultations and disarmament programmes have been conducted with Uganda and Ethiopia to restore peace and order among the nomadic pastoral communities that straddle the common border. However, Kenya notes that—with respect to the joint operations with Uganda to combat the cross-border raids—the processes continue to face setbacks due to lack of funds to sustain the processes, collaboration among the partners and effective development interventions’.
- 51 Slovenia reports that illicit weapons are smuggled along established smuggling routes leading from Turkey via the Western Balkan countries to the EU in lorries, ships, and cars. Most weapons are reportedly smuggled in lorries or regular buses that run daily between the Western Balkans and the EU; they are mostly shipped as unaccompanied packages that are left on the bus by smugglers and collected by recipients at the final destination.
- 52 Botswana reports that it faces a problem with combating the smuggling of dismantled firearms, components, and ammunition closely linked to the trafficking of other illicit goods.
- 53 Guinea-Bissau.
- 54 Zambia reports that its geopolitical position makes border policing difficult.
- 55 These states include China, Jordan, Moldova, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Tunisia.
- 56 These states include Bangladesh, Benin, France, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru, and Slovenia. Peru reports that in 2008 and 2009 it launched a special operation ‘Frontera’, which led to the capture and disarticulation of a network of arms traffickers supplying the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). Slovenia reports that it has established mobile anti-smuggling units at border posts; these are trained and equipped (with endoscopes, contraband detectors, laser distance metres, and various testers) to examine and search transport vehicles.
- 57 India, for example, reports on the erection of a fence with ground sensors and floodlights on the Line of Control along the international border in Jammu and Kashmir.
- 58 Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, reports that it is considering a resolution that will reduce the number of border crossings for the future transport of weapons and military equipment so that the movement of such items can be conducted only over designated border crossings.
- 59 The states include Jordan, Malaysia, and Yemen.
- 60 Egypt.
- 61 The states include Austria, Bangladesh, Egypt, the FYROM, the Russian Federation, and Syria.
- 62 The states include Argentina, China, the FYROM, Guyana, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Switzerland.
- 63 These states include Bahrain, Benin, China, Egypt, New Zealand, the Philippines, Slovenia, and Switzerland. Bahrain reports that the coastguard inspects small vessels that enter its territorial waters to prevent smuggling.

- 64 For example, Egypt, the FYROM, Morocco, and New Zealand.
- 65 For example, Slovenia.
- 66 For example, Egypt.
- 67 For example, Egypt.
- 68 These states include the FYROM, the Netherlands, and Romania.
- 69 For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is considering a resolution that would require 48 hours' notice before a shipment of weapons, military equipment, or other dangerous goods would be permitted to cross the border.
- 70 These states include Algeria, Andorra, the FYROM, Kenya, and Syria.
- 71 For example, Benin, Bolivia, the FYROM, Guinea, Malaysia, and Tanzania.
- 72 Examples were provided by Algeria (which reports that Algerian customs concluded 15 bilateral agreements and two multilateral agreements), Benin (which reports that mixed border patrols are organized with Nigerian authorities), Canada (which launched a joint initiative with the United States in 2006 to deter the illicit cross-border movement of firearms by making travellers more aware of the laws in both countries), Denmark, Estonia, Hungary (which has entered into agreements with Serbia and Romania, although these have not yet entered into force, and begun similar discussions with Poland), Indonesia (which has conducted joint investigations and interrogations in cooperation with authorities from neighbouring countries), the Philippines (which is in negotiations with Indonesia and talks with Malaysia), the Republic of Congo (which reports that it is implementing a tripartite agreement concluded with the DRC and Angola to stem trans-border crime), Sweden, and the United States (which reports that the Department of Justice participates in biannual Senior Law Enforcement Plenary meetings with counterparts in Mexico and the annual US–Canada Cross-border Crime Forum to address cross-border firearms trafficking and other bilateral issues).
- 73 Examples were provided by the DRC, Germany, Indonesia, Liberia (with Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Sierra Leone), Malawi (with Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia), Mozambique, and Niger. Indonesia reports that, through joint investigations and interrogations with its neighbours, it has gathered information that some groups smuggled various types of arms to be used in conflict areas such as Aceh and the border with Papua New Guinea (Indonesia, 2009).
- 74 These states include Argentina, Croatia, Georgia, Germany, Guyana, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkmenistan, and the United States.
- 75 The GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development is a regional organization established in 2001, consisting of the following four states: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Objectives of the organization include cooperation, ensuring stable development, enhancing regional and international security, and accelerating European integration.
- 76 Reported by Moldova. Created in 2000, this initiative covers police and customs from the 13 southern European countries.
- 77 The Russian Federation reports that this agreement was signed in November 2008.
- 78 Reported by France.

- 79 Denmark reports that this body has established a common information system on weapons, and the EFE is working on a European weapons dictionary to ensure the use of standardized terminology in the exchange of information.
- 80 The 38 states are Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire (which reports that it is the headquarters for INTERPOL for West and Central Africa), Croatia, Denmark, the DRC, Eritrea (although it reports that no specific action has been taken due to the non-existence of such incidents in the country), Estonia, France, the FYROM, Germany, Ghana, Indonesia (as well as ASEANPOL—Police Association of South-east Asian Nations), Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the Russian Federation, Togo, Turkmenistan, the United States, and Zambia. Slovenia notes: 'All major cases of seized weapons or thefts of weapons in Slovenia are reported to Interpol SG in Lyon. Unfortunately, we have no practical experience with the operation of the system and its applicability.'
- 81 For example, Bangladesh and Nicaragua.
- 82 These countries include Kenya and Liberia.
- 83 As mentioned by Benin (which reports needing mobile scanners and metal detectors), Niger, and Tanzania (which reports needing 'scanners and bullet proof [*sic*] and metal detectors').
- 84 See UNGA (2001, para. II.27).
- 85 See UNGA (2008a, s. IV(I), para. 3).
- 86 Mentioned by Angola, Bangladesh, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, and Tanzania.
- 87 Mentioned by Botswana, Burkina Faso, Iraq, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Panama, and the Republic of Congo (which mentions it would like to see a harmonization of legal and regulatory instruments related to small arms in the sub-region).
- 88 Egypt reports it requires assistance to develop a mechanism to validate end-user certificates.
- 89 Mentioned by Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Kenya, Iraq, Mozambique (although it notes it is receiving assistance from UNDP in this regard), Niger, Panama, and Yemen. Armenia comments that it would be useful to have a regional mechanism to facilitate dialogue and consultation among regional law-enforcement agencies on small arms and light weapons matters.
- 90 Mentioned by Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Colombia, Guyana (reports needing international assistance to help in checking the outflow of guns from North America), Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nicaragua, Niger, Tanzania, and Yemen.
- 91 Mentioned by Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Colombia, the DRC, Lesotho, Liberia, Mozambique, Niger, Panama, and Sudan.
- 92 Mentioned by Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Iraq, Malawi, Niger, and Tanzania.
- 93 Mentioned by Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, the DRC, Egypt, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sudan, and Tanzania (requests additional marking machines).
- 94 Mentioned by Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Egypt, Lesotho, Moldova,

- Mozambique (although it reports it is already receiving some assistance from Viva Rio in this regard), Niger, and Tanzania.
- 95 Mentioned by Bangladesh and Burkina Faso (which indicates it needs support from regional and international partners to exchange information and train experts).
- 96 Mentioned by Sudan.
- 97 Mentioned by Guyana.
- 98 Mentioned by Angola (which notes it has experienced difficulties implementing the PoA in part due to a need to strengthen and consolidate national institutions), Iraq, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, and Togo.
- 99 Mentioned by Eritrea, Lesotho, and Tanzania.
- 100 Mentioned by Benin, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua (which notes it has received assistance through various regional and international seminars on such issues as transfer controls and marking and tracing), and Uganda.
- 101 Malawi reports that it has established a Special Commission to review the Firearms Act of 1967 and that the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa is supporting the process. Mali reports that it received assistance in regulating craft production of small arms from ECOWAS/the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme.
- 102 Mentioned by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eritrea, Ghana (which has received training on marking and tracing, stockpile management, and cybercrime), Latvia, Liberia, Moldova, Mozambique (which receives training on weapons destruction techniques for law enforcement officials), Peru, Sudan, and Tanzania (which reports receiving training on brokering, marking, record-keeping and tracing, end-user certification, information gathering, cross-border operations, firearm offences, investigations and prosecutions, border management, and intelligence gathering).
- 103 Mentioned by Belarus, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Moldova, and Mozambique.
- 104 Mentioned by Mali and Mozambique.
- 105 Mentioned by Bosnia and Herzegovina, the DRC, Liberia, Moldova, Mozambique, and Peru.
- 106 Mentioned by the Republic of Congo.
- 107 Mentioned by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kenya, and Mozambique.
- 108 Mentioned by Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eritrea, Liberia, and Mali.
- 109 Mentioned by Eritrea, Mozambique, and Sudan.
- 110 Mentioned by Germany, Japan, Senegal, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the United States.
- 111 Mentioned by Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States (which reports funding a seminar organized by the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons to strengthen brokering controls and also notes that US regional legal advisors work with foreign prosecutors, legislators, and judges to improve criminal legislation, codes, and regulations).
- 112 Mentioned by Belarus, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Germany, Ghana (which reports that it trained officers from Liberia on, among other things, the detection and seizure of small arms), Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
- 113 Mentioned by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,

- Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- 114 Mentioned by Belgium, Canada, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
- 115 Mentioned by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- 116 Mentioned by Australia, Belgium, France, Japan, and Lithuania.
- 117 Mentioned by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Croatia (which notes it is ‘supporting’ the UNDP ‘Destruction for Development’ programme), Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States (which reports it has helped destroy over 1.4 million small arms, more than 80,000 tonnes of associated ammunition of various calibres, and nearly 32,000 man-portable air defence systems since 2001).
- 118 Mentioned by Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and the United States.
- 119 Mentioned by Australia, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania (disbandment of illegal armed groups in Afghanistan), New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- 120 Mentioned by Australia, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- 121 Mentioned by Belgium, Botswana, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
- 122 Mentioned by Australia, Benin, Canada, Germany, Japan, Mozambique, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Sweden. For more details, see ‘Measures to enhance border and customs controls’, above.
- 123 See endnote 80.
- 124 Mentioned by Belgium, Canada, Croatia (which states it does not have data about the systematic use of IWETS, but its employees have access to INTERPOL databases and ‘probably’ use the system), Denmark, the DRC, Japan, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, Togo, and the United States (which also reports providing technical assistance in expanding the use of IWETS). Estonia reports that it has access to IWETS, but has not used it yet; Sweden and Switzerland confirm that they do not use IWETS. France states it has not yet put IWETS in place, but that it is contributing to the EUROPOL Information System database. Lithuania also suggests IWETS could be upgraded into a database containing information on missing firearms. Zambia reports that it has not used this database yet, but that efforts are being made to use it in the near future. INTERPOL offers three tools to help countries obtain firearms intelligence: the INTERPOL Firearms Trace Request, the INTERPOL Firearms Reference Table, and the INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network. For more information, see <<http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/FactSheets/PST04.pdf>>.
- 125 Mentioned by Argentina, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Canada, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Finland, the FYROM, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea,

- Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Libya, Lithuania, Mali, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway (which participates in the Schengen Information System and uses it to trace small arms and light weapons), Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Congo, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, the United States, and Zambia.
- 126 Mentioned by Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Eritrea, the FYROM, Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Sweden, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- 127 Mentioned by Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, the FYROM, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Iraq, Ireland, Kazakhstan (which reports that it has accredited two private NGOs—Soyuz Atameken and the Kazakh Association of Security Organizations—with which meetings are held to discuss national legislation regulating the circulation of civilian and service weapons), the Netherlands, the Philippines, Romania, Sweden (which has a Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons), Tanzania, Uganda, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Zambia. Indonesia reports that no NGOs are working on the issue of the illicit trade in small arms in Indonesia.
- 128 Côte d'Ivoire reports that five of the 17 members of its National Commission are from civil society; the FYROM reports that the non-governmental sector was invited to be represented on the National Commission to revise the Law on Weapons. The DRC and Niger also report that civil society is represented on their NCAs. Eritrea reports that civil society participates in its National Focal Point.
- 129 Mentioned by Croatia, Eritrea, Estonia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Syria, the United States, and Zambia. Malaysia notes that it initiated and led the negotiations on the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters among ASEAN member countries in 2004, and that it has also concluded bilateral treaties on mutual assistance in criminal matters with Australia, Hong Kong, and the United States and bilateral extradition treaties with Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Thailand, and the United States.
- 130 Mentioned by Algeria, Benin, China, Croatia, the DRC, France, Ghana, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Peru, the Republic of Congo, Romania, Spain, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, the United States, and Zambia.
- 131 Mozambique reports: 'Mozambique is one of the 4 [Southern African Development Community] Member Countries where the National Focal Point Coordinators were tasked with the responsibility to develop the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) for NFPs for Regional Cooperation. This work was performed with the coordination of SARPCCO Secretariat and technical assistance of Safer Africa.'
- 132 See PoA-ISS (n.d.b).
- 133 New Zealand, for instance, makes the point that it 'is willing and able to offer further advice and assistance to address the small arms challenge. We are careful, however, to ensure that we only offer assistance when requested to do so by the states concerned.'
- 134 See UNGA (2005).
- 135 See UNGA (2006).

- 136 *Note verbale* from UNODA to member states dated 11 December 2009.
- 137 The 33 states are Algeria, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Eritrea, Finland, Guatemala, India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Lithuania, Mexico, Mozambique, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, the Republic of Congo, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay.
- 138 The 12 states are Antigua and Barbuda, Belarus, China, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Morocco, Niger, and Poland.
- 139 For example, Liberia reports that it ‘subscribes to conditions of marking and tracing of weapons in line with the ITI and the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons and their Related Materials. However, since the country is under arms embargo, the UN peace keeping force performs the task’.
- 140 The 21 states are Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Croatia, Cuba, Estonia, France, Ireland, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, and the United States. The national report submitted by Cuba, which mentions the ITI, does not include information on the country’s implementation of the marking, record-keeping, and tracing commitments under the ITI or PoA per se, but it does annex Cuba’s relevant legislation, which includes provisions requiring the marking of all firearms, hence the country’s inclusion in Category 3.
- 141 The 41 states are Andorra, Angola, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, the DRC, Egypt, the FYROM, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Libya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Moldova, Namibia, Panama, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Turkmenistan, Yemen, and Zambia.
- 142 For example, Antigua and Barbuda, Belarus, China, Germany, Latvia, and Tunisia.
- 143 For example, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Switzerland.
- 144 For example, Eritrea, Mozambique, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, and Spain.
- 145 In the analysis of national reports prepared for BMS³, it was noted that, as of 13 December 2007, 27 states had provided UNODA with the contact details of their NPCs, and a list of ITI NPCs was available on the PoA-ISS website (Cattaneo and Parker, 2008, p. 113). Unfortunately, the list has been temporarily removed from the PoA-ISS website for updating; at the time of writing it was thus not clear how many states had NPCs on ITI implementation.
- 146 The 33 states are Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, China, Croatia, Ecuador, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, India, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mexico, Mozambique, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay.
- 147 The 23 states are Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, China, Croatia, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, India, Italy, Lithuania, Mexico, Mozambique, Oman (‘place of manufacture’), Pakistan, Romania, Spain, the United Kingdom (the serial number must indicate the country of origin), and the United States.

- 148 The 12 states are Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, China, India, Mozambique, Portugal (with specific reference to firearms for civilian use), Romania, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom (the serial number must indicate the year of manufacture).
- 149 The 22 states are Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, India, Italy, Liechtenstein (individual numerical or alphabetical marking), Mexico, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal (with specific reference to firearms for civilian use), Slovakia, Spain ('numeration of manufacture'), Sweden ('unique number'), the United Kingdom (all military and civilian firearms are marked with a unique serial number), and the United States.
- 150 The 26 states are Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, China ('factory code'), Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, India, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mexico, Mozambique, Oman, the Philippines (which notes that all manufacturers must ensure all firearms bear their trademark), Portugal (with specific reference to firearms for civilian use), Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom (the serial number engraved on military firearms must include a letter to designate the manufacturer; in addition, civilian firearms must carry the 'name and origin of the maker'), and the United States.
- 151 The nine states are Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Germany, Lithuania, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Bulgaria notes that one of the two manufacturing companies operating in the country stamps the whole marking on the receiver and marks other parts, including the bolt carrier, with the serial number; the other manufacturer puts the whole marking on 'the lower [*sic*], the bolt and the barrel'. China states that '[m]arkings on [small arms and light weapons] should [be] positioned on the main components of the weapon so as to be clearly visible and not easily worn away'. Germany provides a diagram indicating the location and design of markings. Lithuania states that the barrel of the firearm should be marked with the official abbreviation of the Republic of Lithuania. The Russian Federation reports that the last three numbers of the markings on military firearms also appear on the trigger, shutter, 'and other parts of the weapon'. Switzerland provides diagrams illustrating where markings are to be placed. The United Kingdom notes that, with respect to military firearms, the serial number is engraved into the metal of the body, trigger mechanism housing, or receiver of the weapon.
- 152 For example, Japan and Sweden.
- 153 The two states are Finland and Japan.
- 154 With respect to Japan, the national report indicates that certain markings are required on the packaging of 'explosives'; it is not clear whether this requirement extends to the packaging of ammunition.
- 155 For example, Finland and Japan (which requires manufacturers to indicate the 'place' of manufacture).
- 156 For example, Finland.
- 157 For example, Finland.
- 158 For example, Japan.

- 159 For example, Japan.
- 160 For example, Japan.
- 161 The 14 states are Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Botswana, China, Germany, Guatemala, India, Lithuania, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, the United States, and Uruguay.
- 162 For example, Antigua and Barbuda, China, Guatemala, Lithuania (for certain categories of arms), the United States (city and state of the importer), and Uruguay.
- 163 For example, Antigua and Barbuda, China, and Uruguay.
- 164 For example, Guatemala, India (regarding small arms for the armed forces), and Spain (which reports that imported arms that are not marked may be refused and returned to the customs department of the country of origin).
- 165 The 13 states are Algeria, Bangladesh, Canada, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Uganda (which reports that the marking of police arms is ongoing), and Uruguay.
- 166 For example, Canada, Germany, Lithuania, and the Netherlands.
- 167 For example, Canada, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Uganda.
- 168 Eritrea (2010, p. 1 of the separate report on the ITI).
- 169 The 21 states are Algeria, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Germany, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Uruguay.
- 170 Mentioned by Canada, Guatemala, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Norway.
- 171 Mentioned by Canada, Germany, Lithuania, and the Netherlands.
- 172 Mentioned by Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, and Ukraine.
- 173 Mentioned by Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine.
- 174 Mentioned by Canada, Germany, the Russian Federation, Sweden (some types of small arms only, for example, assault rifles), and Ukraine.
- 175 The 11 states are Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Finland, Guatemala, Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, the Russian Federation, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
- 176 For example, Antigua and Barbuda (in response to the question in the reporting template as to whether it encourages manufacturers of small arms to develop measures against the removal or alteration of markings, Antigua and Barbuda responds 'no'; however, elsewhere in its national report it indicates that it does not manufacture small arms) and Finland.
- 177 For example, Bahrain, Guatemala, and Lithuania.
- 178 For example, Estonia.
- 179 For example, New Zealand and Sweden.
- 180 These states are China, Colombia, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, and Slovakia.
- 181 The 15 states are Algeria, Australia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Estonia, Germany, Guatemala, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Sierra Leone, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
- 182 The 31 states are Algeria, Australia, Bahrain, Bolivia, Botswana, Canada, Croatia, Ecuador,

- Estonia (for ten years), France, Germany, India, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Mozambique (manual record-keeping system), the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, and the United States.
- 183 The 22 states are Algeria, Bangladesh, Botswana, Canada, China, Colombia, Estonia (for ten years), France, India, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho (records are kept manually), Lithuania, Mozambique (records are kept manually), New Zealand, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Sudan, Sweden, and Trinidad and Tobago. Pakistan reports that keeping records on ‘manufacturing, sales, import, export, transfers and possession is binding’ (Pakistan, 2010, para. 5(f), p. 3), but does not specify who keeps such records.
- 184 Mentioned by Canada.
- 185 The states are China, Colombia, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, and Slovakia.
- 186 For example, Canada (registration information is kept indefinitely), Lesotho, and the United Kingdom.
- 187 The 20 states are Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda (which reports that manufacturers are required to keep a record of their activities, although elsewhere in its national report it indicates that small arms are not manufactured on its territory), Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Morocco, the Philippines, Romania, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
- 188 The 11 states are Algeria, Argentina, China, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Japan (whose legislation refers to record-keeping by manufacturers of ammunition), the Netherlands, Romania, and the United States. Germany reports that *all* licence holders are required to keep records for ten years, which presumably includes dealers.
- 189 Canada and Germany are among the states that did provide details.
- 190 eTrace (Electronic Tracing System) is an Internet-based trace request submission system developed by the ATF. Participating law-enforcement agencies can submit firearm trace requests to the ATF National Tracing Center electronically, monitor the progress of traces, search a database of all firearm traces submitted by the individual agency, and perform analytical functions. Access to the website is limited to registered members.
- 191 The seven members of SICA are Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.
- 192 The various ILEAs were established and are administered by the United States.
- 193 For more information on the Assistance Package reporting template, see endnote 9.
- 194 Section co-authors: Glenn McDonald and Sarah Parker.
- 195 The informal non-paper on border controls was prepared by Federico Perazza and is available at <<http://www.poa-iss.org/bms4/Documents/DraftNonPapers/ONU01848%20BMS4.pdf>>.

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