'Post-conflict' Iraq: gunmen take aim at coalition soldiers in the center of Basra, southern Iraq, in May 2004, one year after President George W. Bush declared major combat operations over.
(© Nabil Al-Jurani/AP Photo)

Managing 'post-conflict' zones
DDR AND WEAPONS REDUCTION

10

INTRODUCTION

> Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country.
>
> —US President George W. Bush, 2 May 2003

The end of war does not necessarily signal a return to security. The introduction of a ceasefire, a peace agreement, or even discrete interventions that seek to disarm warring parties do not guarantee tangible improvements in the safety of either civilians or former combatants. In fact, in 2004, many so-called post-conflict environments presented more direct and indirect threats to civilians than the armed conflicts that preceded them. This raises an important question: what constitutes 'post-conflict'? Does it necessarily begin with a signed peace accord? When does it end? The expression has become so ubiquitous that its very meaning is rarely questioned.

This chapter contends that the post-conflict designation unhelpfully disguises the risks facing many societies emerging from war, as events over the past year in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and the countries of the Great Lakes Region painfully illustrate. A weary pessimism has now replaced the hubris that once accompanied the signing of a peace deal and the 'transition' to post-conflict reconstruction. Yet there is reason for cautious optimism: the introduction of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and weapons reduction programmes as part of overall recovery strategies appears to be an important factor in winning the peace.

The post-conflict environment—whether ushered in by a significant reduction in direct mortality, the signing of a peace agreement, the deployment of a peacekeeping force, an arbitrary period of time, or the holding of national elections—is unstable. Too sudden or too slow an influx of relief and reconstruction assistance can trigger a fresh outbreak of armed conflict. Given that tensions may still be simmering and the dividends of 'peace' not equally shared, it is little surprise that almost half of all countries emerging from conflict show a tendency to suffer a relapse within five years of signing a peace agreement (Millennium Project, 2004; Collier et al., 2001). Thus, preventing armed violence from flaring up during the transition is critical to avoiding its escalation into full-fledged war.

Encouragingly, the current preoccupation of donors and multilateral agencies with the promotion of recovery and reconstruction in post-conflict contexts, including support for DDR and weapons reduction, underlines their growing commitment to securing peace. Recurring criticisms of conventional 'post-conflict recovery' packages remain valid: inadequate treatment of the political or structural causes of conflict, insufficient consideration of 'reintegration', delayed disbursement of funds, and the attachment of unrealistic conditions. Nonetheless, there is growing acceptance of the importance of making efforts to decrease the number of small arms and light weapons an integral component of recovery strategies. Since 2000, for example, the UN and the World Bank have launched at least 14 DDR initiatives in

post-conflict countries—eight of which were continuing at the end of 2004. Similarly, at least 22 weapons reduction projects were established in post-conflict countries during the same period—and more than 16 were operational in 2004.

Below are the key findings of this chapter:

- In some countries considered 'post-conflict', levels of firearm-related violence are often higher than they were before, or even during, the armed conflict.
- Countries emerging from armed conflict can produce contagion effects with potentially destabilizing ramifications for neighbouring states.
- Multilateral agencies and donors increasingly view DDR and weapons reduction as pivotal pillars of post-conflict recovery.
- There is mounting recognition within the UN of the need to adopt regional and integrated approaches to DDR and weapons reduction.
- Current approaches to DDR and weapons reduction still suffer because of limited political will, confusion over objectives, a disproportionate focus on disarmament selection biases, inadequate financing, and coordination gaps.
- Alarmingly, DDR and weapons reduction continue to substitute for political solutions, the reform of the governance and judicial sectors, and sustainable development.
- Reducing the demand for firearms is a fundamental factor regularly overlooked in the rush to secure peace.

This chapter begins by reviewing the variety of threats confronting civilians in a post-conflict environment. It then turns to a number of concrete interventions designed by international and national actors to alleviate these risks, including DDR and weapons reduction initiatives. Although the 'success' of these endeavours in reducing armed violence in post-conflict contexts is still open to debate, the international donor community continues to pin considerable hope on them.[1] Building on previous work of the Small Arms Survey, the chapter goes on to provide a critical review of DDR and weapons reduction programmes.

SMALL ARMS-RELATED THREATS IN THE POST-CONFLICT PERIOD

It is difficult to gauge definitively the number of direct deaths due to armed conflict, although many have tried (CONFLICT DEATHS).[2] At a minimum, typologies usually distinguish between combatants *fatally injured* in political violence (excluding genocide and massacres) and *excess* civilian deaths. There is also widespread consensus that the proportion of those fatally injured in war is ordinarily less than that of those who have died from secondary or indirect causes. Moreover, public health specialists and epidemiologists are growing increasingly cognisant of the gruesome effects of war that linger in the 'post-conflict' period. While fatal injuries often decline sharply immediately after an armed conflict ends, the fall is less dramatic than previously believed. As the cases of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Iraq show, fatal injuries and excess deaths can remain surprisingly high in the wake of an armed conflict (IRC, 2004; Roberts, 2002; Roberts et al., 2004a; 2004b). A diverse literature exists on the costs of armed conflict.

Direct war-related deaths (and disabilities) range from intentional fatal injuries sustained during pitched battles to 'excess' deaths due to displacement and 'natural' mortality and morbidity associated with and return and resettlement.

While combatants (male and female) are the most obvious casualties, armed conflicts are also a cause of excess mortality and morbidity within the civilian population, largely through the spread of infectious disease, the destruction of assets, the dismantling of livelihoods, and the diversion of scarce resources away from basic services (Muggah and Batchelor, 2002). Legal and humanitarian specialists have repeatedly observed that, in 21st-century armed conflicts, civilians are deliberately targeted, often in direct violation of international humanitarian law (Muggah with Griffiths, 2002; ICRC, 1999).

Analysts have also pointed to the link between internal conflict and regional destabilization. There is basic agreement that most conflicts being waged today are 'internal' or 'intra-state' and involve automatic rifles and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-personnel landmines, and mortars (Duffield, 2001; Kaldor, 1999). The threats posed predominantly by men and boys who wield these guns contribute to underdevelopment and have potentially destabilizing ramifications for the surrounding region.[3]

Rethinking post-conflict orthodoxies

A common perception among donors and policy-makers is that when armed conflicts end, safety and security are likely to return. It seems intuitive that death and injury rates, and especially 'collateral damage', will decrease after the shelling stops. Also assumed is that, when normalcy resumes, development and investment will begin anew. The international aid system has, in many ways, adopted wholesale elements of this interpretation.[4] The World Bank, for example, was established with the express purpose of reconstructing war-torn countries, as well as with a view to promoting development elsewhere.[5] Even though this neat interpretation is coming under increasing scrutiny, alternative explanations do not rest comfortably with aid bureaucracies.

It is true that direct deaths often rapidly increase before the signing of a peace agreement, and decline equally dramatically after it is finalized. Yet, as noted above, it is also generally the case that both direct deaths and excess mortality and morbidity remain comparatively high, sometimes at levels higher than before the war (Guha-Sapir and van Panhuis, 2002b; Ghobarah et al., 2004; Pederson, 2002). In reflecting on the 1990–91 Gulf War, Daponte (1993) notes that 'far more persons died from post-war health effects than from direct war effects'.[6] Where wars are exceptionally long and pernicious, these post-conflict excess deaths can rise even further. In Guatemala (see Box 10.1), it is estimated that the number of violent fatalities in the aftermath of the peace agreement have only partially decreased compared to those registered during the 37-year war (Pearce, 1999).[7]

So, are the 'armed conflict' and 'post-conflict' labels of any use if mortality and morbidity rates before and after wars are often indistinguishable? Would it make more sense to describe such countries as 'conflict-affected' (Millennium Project, 2004)? The answer is not as straightforward as one might like to imagine. Certainly, there are normative consequences associated with either label—for instance, international humanitarian law applies during an armed conflict, but not during the post-conflict phase (Small Arms Survey, 2002; Muggah with Griffiths, 2002). Moreover, there are political, economic, legal, and administrative implications associated with whether a country is at, or is emerging from, war. The transition from humanitarian relief to longer-term reconstruction—bridging the controversial 'relief–development gap'—and the assignation of priorities require a coherent determination of whether a country is in the midst of armed conflict.[8] Yet the combination of violent realities and the otherwise non-violent discourse employed by international aid agencies can generate distortions in the identification of both problems and solutions (Macrae, 1999). In the absence of agreement on the objective distinctions between conflict and post-conflict scenarios, analysts have pointed to peace agreements as a conventional indicator of the 'shift' (see Map 10.1).

> After conflicts come to an end, 'direct deaths' and 'excess' mortality and morbidity remain comparatively high— sometimes higher than before the war.

Box 10.1   Firearm-related incidents in Guatemala, 1995–2002

A Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit guerrilla receives her demobilization papers in May 1997 in the Salcol disarmament camp. Despite these efforts, firearm-related incidents increased after the 1996 peace agreement.

© Reuters

Guatemala endured one of the longest civil wars in Latin American history. It lasted for 37 years, ending with a peace agreement in December 1996. The direct costs were catastrophic: an estimated 140,000–200,000 people were shot and killed, or as many as 5,400 per year (UNDP, 2003). According to reports of the Pan American Health Organization, homicide was the single most common cause of death of men in Guatemala in the early 1980s; most of these homicides related to armed conflict as opposed to crime or accidents (PAHO, 1986). The end of the conflict has not, however, marked a return to stability or peace. In fact, firearm-related deaths have increased since December 1996. Evidence suggests, furthermore, that the wider population has actually experienced a rise in real and perceived insecurity (Moser and Winton, 2002).

**Figure 10.1   Number of violent and firearms-related deaths**

PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED

— Number of violent deaths
— Number of firearms-related deaths

Figure 10.2   Firearm death rate and homicide rate

PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED

— Percentage of violent deaths involving firearms
— Homicides per 100,000 members of the population

Source: Godnick (2005)

Other transition benchmarks include temporal thresholds and concrete activities on the ground, such as ceasefires, the holding of negotiations, and various weapons reduction, demobilization, and reintegration initiatives.[9]

Map 10.1   Selected conflict and 'post-conflict' zones, 1994–2004*

Conflicts ongoing in 2004
Post-conflict 1999-2004
Post-conflict 1994-1998

Sources: IISS (2004); SIPRI (2004); University of Uppsala (2004)

War ends, violence grows?

In what ways do post-conflict conditions differ from the armed conflict circumstances that preceded them? While fatality trends may remain comparable from a *quantitative* standpoint, the dynamics of armed violence can alter *qualitatively* in the post-conflict period. Rather than clashes between combatants, targeted attacks on civilians, and forced displacement leading to excess deaths, the post-conflict environment can witness years of surging rates of violent crime and inter-personal violence.[10] Moreover, the types of armaments used in violence can change, from heavy and light weapons to pistols and revolvers.

As the cases of Kosovo and Nicaragua illustrate, 'substitution effects' are sometimes also registered during the post-conflict period. In part because of the heavy (and enforced) penalties being handed down for possession and use of weapons, acts of violence are increasingly being perpetrated with bladed instruments (see Box 10.2). Additionally, armed violence can move geographically from primarily rural areas to urban centres, as was the case in Guatemala (Moser, 2004).

Research has shown that armed conflicts substantially increase the exposure of civilians, particularly children, youth, and the displaced, to risks that raise the likelihood of mortality and morbidity, including fatal firearm and ordinance injuries (WHO, 2001; Ghobarah et al., 2003; Garfield and Neugut, 1991).[13] Similarly, the civilian population is also disproportionately affected after a war comes to an end. The cases of Afghanistan and Cambodia, which effectively entered post-conflict phases in 2001 and 1991, respectively, are instructive. A survey conducted in Afghanistan

271

Box 10.2   Kosovo: post-war public health effects

Kosovo emerged from conflict in late 1999. It is estimated that, between 1997 and 1999, a combination of shelling and small arms fire claimed the lives of 10,000–13,000 civilians (Khakee and Florquin, 2003). Despite a range of DDR and weapons reduction initiatives in the post-conflict period, it remains a comparatively well-armed society. Flare-ups between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in Mitrovica in March 2004 indicate that tensions are continuing to fester.

Figure 10.3   Intentional injury profile, Pristina University Hospital, 1999–2002*

*Note: Data for 1999 reflects injuries tracked in June–December only.
Source: Khakee and Florquin (2003)

Overall levels of armed violence fell precipitously following the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) beginning in March 1999. Small Arms Survey research finds, however, that certain types of intentional violence seem to have increased over the following years (Khakee and Florquin, 2003). A review of in-patients at Pristina University Hospital (PUH) suggests that, while firearms-related injuries have stabilized, there has been a rise in knife-related injuries, pointing to what is commonly referred to as the 'substitution effect'.[11] This is hardly surprising, since the introduction and enforcement of penalties by NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) has indirectly pushed up the relative price of possessing and using firearms.

This data should be treated with caution. Reported firearm injuries at PUH are lower than the total number of firearm-related injuries sustained in Kosovo. While the catchment area of PUH spans the whole of Kosovo, other clinics also reportedly treat acute wounds, including those caused by firearms. Furthermore, ethnic Serbs frequently receive treatment in Mitrovica, indicating a selection bias.[12] There is also evidence that not all firearm-related injuries are treated by public hospitals, particularly those incurred through criminal activities. Moreover, few statistics are available on injuries due to celebratory fire, which occurs regularly (during festivals, weddings, and events to mark the New Year).

(between March 2001 and June 2002) notes that, of the 1,636 individuals treated for injuries due to landmines, grenades, bombs, mortar shells, and cluster munitions from December 2001 onwards, more than *80 per cent* were civilians (Bilukha et al., 2003).[14] A review of injuries in Cambodia conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) between January 1991 and February 1995 found that weapon injury rates were seasonal and rose in the post-conflict period.[15] Importantly, the ICRC observed that intentional firearm injuries affecting civilians made up by far the largest category of non-combat injuries: almost *60 per cent* of those injured were civilians.

Another reason for excessively high mortality rates in the post-conflict period is that armed violence leads to a reduction in the human and financial resources available for renewed investment in public infrastructure including healthcare systems. Depending on the length and severity of the armed conflict, the public and professional health workforce can be severely depleted.[16] In addition to sharp declines in recurrent expenditures on the quality of and access to public services during a conflict, the restoration of infrastructure (and public confidence) can take years, even decades. Due to the deliberate targeting of public utilities and monitoring and surveillance systems *during* armed

Box 10.3   Disarming the camps: Militarization of refugees and the internally displaced

Armed violence generates vast numbers of refugees and IDPs. In 2004, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were 9.9 million refugees, while the Global IDP Project calculated that there were close to 25 million IDPs.[17] Refugees and IDPs are often unable to return to their home country or original place of residence in the immediate post-conflict period. Many thousands of people may sometimes languish for years in camps and settlements. UNHCR reports that at least 6.2 million refugees in 38 camps are caught up in a 'protracted refugee situation' (UNHCR, 2004). In these circumstances, camps can become 'militarized', and, in turn, constitute a threat to regional and internal stability.

The Small Arms Survey carried out field research in such protracted situations in Africa between July 2004 and January 2005. Based on studies of refugee camps and settlements in Guinea, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, where UNHCR works to protect refugees and to provide them with critical humanitarian assistance, the research revealed a number of common patterns. First, the political economy of violence in the region conditions the scale and intensity of militarization. Militarization does not take place in a vacuum; it is deeply embedded in historical developments. Second, classic cross-border militarization appears to have declined in recent years, because of reduced refugee flows, and because of the successful interventions and situation-specific refugee security strategies applied by hosting states and UNHCR.

Worryingly, however, 'internal militarization' seems to have risen, as refugees and IDPs have become increasingly caught up or directly implicated in civil conflicts (Muggah, 2005a). They may be armed, are often recruited into a militia, and will seek to defend their livelihoods. In some countries, it seems that humanitarian agency

Thousands of Sudanese IDPs populate this makeshift camp in Sudan's West Darfur province, captured from a helicopter in September 2004. The threat of 'militarization' in such camps increases with time.

© Ben Curtis/AP Photo

efforts to address refugee insecurity and refugee and IDP militarization—as well as the donor support for these efforts—are only compensating for the failure of asylum and country-of-origin states to meet their responsibilities. Ensuring the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum and protecting civilian populations are, and must remain, primary responsibilities of the state. The 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,* the 1967 *Protocol*, and the 1969 Organization of African Unity *Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa* sanction international protection. While there are no comparable instruments for protecting IDPs, various guiding principles have been elaborated.

Clearly, ensuring the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum is a major concern of the international community, especially of UNHCR. In the late 1990s, UNHCR published a conceptual framework document known as the 'ladder of options', outlining levels of refugee insecurity and proposing a range of possible responses to address a given situation effectively. The ladder included an array of 'soft' and 'medium' (practical) options, such as screening borders, community policing, and the deployment of international observers, and 'hard' options, including military intervention when authorized by the UN Security Council. Because the latter has been slow to act on the issue, UNHCR has worked with a number of other actors, such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), to tackle a problem that is ostensibly outside of their remit.[18] Together with host governments (and with the assistance of the international community), UNHCR has also advised on issues such as the repatriation of foreign ex-combatants or 'armed elements' through DDR processes. This is a fairly new area of activity for the agency, however, and achievements and problems need to be evaluated.

conflicts, effective resource planning for public health is regularly undermined in the post-conflict period (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003; Levy and Sidel, 1997).

Furthermore, armed violence, particularly violence committed by former soldiers and militia members, can reach epidemic proportions in the shadow of a ceasefire. The *perception* of spiralling intentional violence is also liable to grow, as post-conflict Guatemala amply demonstrates (Moser, 2004; Mcllwaine and Moser, 2001). There is also considerable evidence that the assault rifles and light weapons used during the war can resurface and be employed in an uncommon kind of criminality, especially in urban areas. In many cases, former combatants and criminals wielding military-style armaments literally outgun police officers and civilians. Often, these weapons were originally looted from the country's own arsenal.

It is common for organized urban criminality to rise following a conflict. Available data from across the Balkans and Central America indicates that armed criminality and social violence often escalate despite peace agreements (Grillot et al., 2004; Godnick et al., 2003; Braveman et al., 1997); in some cases, these rise above pre-war levels (Guha-Sapir and van Panuis, 2002b). In Uganda and Sierra Leone, the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants appears to have had varying effects in terms of reducing crime. A study tracing demobilized Ugandan soldiers in the 1990s, for example, found that, prior to their disbandment, soldiers without land were responsible for significantly raising district-level crime rates. Statistically, they were 100 times more likely to commit a crime than the average citizen. By contrast, district-level crime rates did not go up after the return of those who had been properly demobilized (Collier, 1994). In the case of Sierra Leone, however, it appears that DDR has had little effect in reducing the stigmatization of returning combatants or promoting non-violence or the dismantling of factions (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004).

In many cases, these lingering effects of conflict spill across borders, into neighbouring and ostensibly 'peaceful' countries (Millennium Project, 2004; World Bank, 2003a; 2003b). Former soldiers regularly cross international frontiers, contributing to the militarization of refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) camps, often with the tacit support of host governments, as in the Great Lakes Region and West Africa (see Box 10.3). Criminal gangs and militia groups often coalesce into syndicates, in many instances forging cross-border partnerships and subsisting on, among other things, the trade in drugs, contraband, and military-style weapons.

Many of the indirect consequences of violence during the post-conflict period are hidden and thus difficult to discern. The chronic psychological and psychosocial traumas present among displaced populations have been investigated (Barbara, 1997; Sabin et al., 2003). Studies of combatants and civilians indicate that a considerable proportion is exposed to a high incidence of extreme violence involving firearms and other types of armaments, and that a significant number suffer from long-term mental disability (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004; Butler, 1997; CDC, 1988).[19] Participatory research conducted in post-conflict contexts, including Cambodia, Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), the Solomon Islands, and Sri Lanka, also highlights surprisingly common patterns of insecurity, such as sexual violence,[20] and impacts on physical and social mobility, familial cohesiveness, and access to sustainable livelihoods among soldiers and civilians alike.[21]

Demand for weapons in the post-conflict period

The end of armed conflict does not necessarily signal a reduction in demand for weapons. In fact, where penalties are neither implemented nor enforced, the propensity for civilians and former combatants to acquire weapons can increase. Moreover, there is a sense that, partly because of the continued presence of automatic rifles, grenades, and handguns, arming in self-defence becomes normalized.

In some post-conflict environments, the presence of leftover weapons can increase the chance of a fatal outcome. In El Salvador, for example, between June 2001 and May 2002, some 3,704 persons entered the state public health system with firearm injuries, while 7,592 entered with injuries caused by sharp objects, such as knives and machetes. Whereas pistols and revolvers were responsible for many of the injuries sustained, assault weapons and grenades also figured prominently (Godnick et al., 2003). The availability of small arms and light weapons in situations where the costs of ownership are low and the motivations for acquisition are stable or rising can lead to an escalation in armed violence.

Societies often remain heavily armed, despite the political resolution of a conflict, for numerous reasons. At the macro level, states are frequently over-committed in terms of defence expenditure; concomitantly, they have to maintain large armies. National defence spending in developing countries can rise dramatically during an internal armed conflict—to an average of five per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), as compared to 2.8 per cent during peacetime (World Bank, 2003b). Conversely, it also regularly takes years for defence expenditure to contract to pre-war levels, with implications for infrastructure and healthcare spending, as well as for income-earning potential (Brauer and Dunne, 2004).[22] Moreover, the surfeit of weaponry, some of it looted or poorly managed, often results in it being recycled into the hands of civilians. The real 'price' of weapons may decline—a necessary, but insufficient, factor behind an increase in demand.

Small arms demand, however, can also arise out of perceived horizontal disparities in the post-conflict period. Countries emerging from conflict regularly register sizeable external debts, which can have serious consequences for the collection and allocation of domestic revenues. While various international agencies have established a host of macroeconomic stabilization instruments to ease the transition, socio-economic fault lines often quickly emerge.[23] As economies tend to expand after a period of severe contraction, sharp socio-economic inequalities are not uncommon.[24] The per capita earning power of the middle class and the poor are not uniform during this time (Millennium Project, 2004; Sambanis, 2003). Consequently, widespread disenfranchisement and resentment can fuel inter-personal violence. Thus, individual and collective 'preferences' for weapons can grow in the delicate period after a war ends.

At the micro level, collective and individual demand for weapons can remain high, partly as a result of the continued desire for self-protection, predatory and rent-seeking behaviour, and long-standing or recent socially determined norms on weapons possession (GUN CULTURE). New empirical research on armed groups in the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, and South Africa indicates that demand for firearms—as with most commodities—is ultimately conditioned by high 'preferences', low real and relative 'prices', and the ability to mobilize sufficient monetary or non-monetary 'resources' for procurement.[25]

The 'preference' for weapons can grow in the delicate period following the end of war.

SECURING THE PEACE: DDR AND WEAPONS REDUCTION

Awareness of the risk factors accompanying transition processes is growing. For example, recent evidence warns that there is a positive correlation between the length and intensity of an armed conflict and the relative likelihood of renewed armed violence.[26] Other dangers associated with the latter stages of transition—inadequate and uneven assistance, disproportionate and ineffective targeting, poor growth, and insufficient attention to peace-building,[27] including disarmament—are becoming more established.[28]

Nonetheless, something of a post-conflict orthodoxy has emerged. Diamond captures this view, arguing that efforts to rebuild a shattered, war-torn country should comprise at least four components:

> [p]olitical reconstruction of a legitimate and capable state; economic reconstruction, includ-
> ing the rebuilding of the country's physical infrastructure and the creation of rules and insti-
> tutions that enable a market economy; social reconstruction, including the renewal … of a
> civil society and political culture that foster voluntary cooperation and the limitation of state
> power; and the provision of general security, to establish a safe and orderly environment
> (Diamond, 2004, p.2).

In post-conflict environments in which the state has crumbled or collapsed, security is the foundation on which all else depends. Without minimum security, people cannot trade, organize, rebuild communities, or participate meaningfully in politics or economic development.

Multilateral donors now regularly advance a number of formulaic security- and development-oriented interventions to secure the peace. The World Bank, for example, has elaborated a series of 'best practices' to assist affected countries, donors, and multilateral agencies in navigating volatile post-conflict settings (World Bank, 2003b; 2003d). It advocates the deployment of international peacekeepers and the introduction of stabilization measures in the earliest stages of the post-conflict period. Subsequent to this comes the gradual phasing in of financial aid over the next five years, particularly when absorptive capacity is 'optimum' for growth. And finally, within a decade, democratic institutions are established. All of these activities are generally subsumed under the mantle of reconstruction and development; alternatively, they are described as a 'security first strategy'. Included in this bundle of initiatives are DDR and weapons reduction, two strands that—while sharing certain attributes and often overlapping—are in fact distinct.

Very generally, DDR is a process introduced after a conflict that primarily focuses on ensuring the reintegration of combatants (from standing armies, police forces, or insurgent factions) into civilian life.[29] While a single doctrine has yet to be produced for DDR, a considerable literature has emerged in recent years, much of it descriptive, theoretical, or distilling so-called best practice and lessons learnt.[30] By contrast, weapons reduction is a generic term encapsulating a diverse cluster of programmes that seek to reduce the number of armaments principally in civilian hands. Essentially filling the lacunae left by DDR, weapons reduction initiatives often fall outside peace deals and tend to adopt a more disparate approach than does DDR. They emphasize everything from legislation and regional border agreements to practical activities designed to remove weapons and reduce incentives for possession. A third process, security sector reform (SSR), transforms institutions of the security sector—including the police, the military, and the judiciary[31]—and compels them to accept greater democratic (civilian) control and increased transparency and accountability (Ball, 2001; 2002; Smith, 2002). A key objective of SSR is to convert defence and police personnel into providers of legitimate security and to install accountable, professional, appropriately sized, and affordable security sectors. Ensuring that the linkages between DDR, weapons reduction, and SSR are robust and well defined is a continuing challenge.[32]

Multilateral and bilateral development agencies are changing their attitudes towards the security sector.

A developmental approach to DDR and weapons reduction?

Due in part to the chilling realities they confront in post-conflict contexts, multilateral and bilateral development agencies are changing their attitudes towards the security sector. The development community appears to have shed many of its prejudices with respect to the security sector and is slowly grappling with issues such as military reform and practical disarmament. Moreover, it is now widely accepted that persistent personal or human insecurity of the kind often encountered in countries emerging from war can obstruct human development and achievement of the Millennium Development

Goals.[33] Indeed, persistent insecurity caused by small arms, and the itinerant former combatants who use them, can jeopardize sustainable investment, good governance, and, ultimately, socio-economic recovery in the post-conflict environment (UNF, 2004; Millennium Project, 2004; Muggah and Batchelor, 2002). Related to this is the theory that misguided, rapid, or uneven development can itself fuel insecurity and armed violence.[34] In response, the development community now recognizes that it has to face up to the challenges connected with building sustainable human security.

Nevertheless, the operational responses of many agencies and donors remain narrowly conceived. Post-conflict recovery is seldom situated in the context of a country's political economy or existing civil-military relations,[35] and donors instead continue to favour technical and apolitical interventions with short time horizons. Consequently, DDR and weapons reduction are two kinds of intervention regularly advanced to redress insecurity.

A short history of DDR

DDR is a comparatively recent instrument adopted by the development community in the context of post-conflict reconstruction. The term DDR is used here, although acronyms such as DDRR, DDRRR, and DRP have been regularly employed over the past few years (Ginifer et al., 2004; Muggah, 2004a).[36] The optimism of the early 1990s spurred on a renewed international commitment to UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions and reconstruction efforts. Since 1948, the UN has sponsored 59 peacekeeping missions, most of them launched after the end of the cold war. Many of these early peacekeeping missions, from Cambodia to Namibia, were initial test cases for DDR. The conventional approach emphasized disarmament after a ceasefire or peace agreement, as in El Salvador, Mozambique, and Nicaragua, followed by limited reintegration. While no doctrine or minimum standards emerged to guide DDR, it became an important element of peace processes, usually introduced early in the post-conflict period and geared toward neutralizing potential spoilers in the absence of clearly defined peace accords.[37]

In 1998, a UN Secretary-General report declared that one of the priorities of post-conflict peace-building was the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants and others and their reintegration into productive society (UN, 1998). Various UN Security Council presidential statements issued in 1999 highlighted the importance of successful DDR and underscored that 'disarmament, demobilization and reintegration cannot be seen in isolation, but rather, as a continuous process which is rooted in and feeds into a broader search for peace, stability and development' (UNSC, 1999a). A year later, the Secretary-General submitted a detailed report to the Security Council on the role of UN peacekeeping missions in DDR (UNSC, 2000a).

Within a few years, DDR came to occupy a central position in military–civilian transition operations, pursued by donors of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the UN, the World Bank, affected governments, and myriad agencies and NGOs. In the UN General Assembly and Security Council, the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) and DPKO strongly advocated for disarmament to be made an integral part of peace settlements (Faltas and Chiaro, 2001). Standardized templates for DDR were introduced and best practice articulated by UN divisions, such as DPKO, and predominantly Western think tanks (Kingma, 2000; Berdal, 1996).[38] In rare instances, various types of weapons reduction initiatives were piloted before the implementation of full-scale national disarmament programmes and DDR projects. In others, linkages with development and peace-building were gradually established (Small Arms Survey, 2003, pp. 293–95).

Considering the tremendous amount of energy invested in advocating for DDR and weapons reduction, surprisingly little evidence is available to help determine the effectiveness of such programmes, whether in terms of meeting

DDR and weapons reduction are two kinds of intervention regularly advanced to redress insecurity.

Box 10.4 DDR in Sierra Leone: successful reintegration?

Between 1998 and 2002, Sierra Leone's National Commission on DDR registered some 76,000 combatants and collected and destroyed around 42,330 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition. The programme was supported by a Multi-Donor Trust Fund, valued at USD 31.5 million, as well as by Emergency Recovery Credits and a Post-Conflict Fund grant (Bradley et al., 2002). The intervention is widely heralded as a model initiative in promoting 'reintegration' (CERI, 2004; Mazurana and Carlson, 2004; Bradley et al., 2002).

A man pours fuel over guns before burning them at Lungi, Sierra Leone, in January 2002.

© Alistair Thomson/Reuters

A 2004 study uses survey data to assess the effectiveness of the DDR process in Sierra Leone (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004). It identifies some important successes, but also raises questions about its longer-term effectiveness. Conducted in 2003, the study includes a large-scale survey of 200 non-combatants and 1,000 ex-combatants from all Sierra Leonean factions and regions. Its purpose was:

· to evaluate the motivations of those who participated in political violence;
· to collect systematic information on organizational structures and the economic behaviour of the warring parties; and
· to gather representative data on combatants' experiences of the demobilization process and the extent to which they were successfully reintegrated into their communities.

In particular, the authors note that the DDR process was implemented in an even-handed way. The research indicates that there was no evidence that any of the various factions were treated preferentially in the design or implementation phases. In a society rife with factional differences, where perceptions of mistreatment could have undermined the peace process, this neutrality is extremely important.

The report points out that non-participants in the DDR process (representing just over ten per cent of the sample) did not fare any worse with regard to reintegration than did participants. Indeed, they were just as likely to be accepted by family members and neighbours; to return to their home communities; to reject factions as major political actors in the post-war period; and to embrace non-violent means of affecting political change. Further, there is some evidence that non-participants resolved problems concerning community acceptance faster than did participants.

The authors stress, however, that the findings must be treated with caution. On the one hand, those who did not participate in DDR may differ in fundamental ways from those who opted to participate. For example, the DDR programme may have taken on the hardest reintegration cases—notably, fighters from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). On the other hand, it is possible that those who did not take part in the process formally may have derived some of its benefits. Consequently, the effects of DDR would not be reflected so strongly in observed differences between those who did and those who did not participate.

The fact that, on average, those who did participate did not reintegrate more easily than those who did not, could indicate that DDR programmes do not currently play a sufficiently important role in redressing community stigmatization. Rather, success in post-war reintegration has largely been the result of the war coming to an end. The RUF was decisively defeated, the country had grown weary of fighting, and there was broad acceptance of the peace terms.

Ultimately, a randomized controlled evaluation is the only way to appraise systematically the effectiveness of DDR programmes. If implemented in a way that avoids creating inequities, it could generate very precise estimates of the impact of DDR in general, and specific interventions in particular, on the prospects for post-war reintegration.

Source: Humphreys and Weinstein (2004)

their own discrete objectives or contributing to security more generally (see Box 10.4). For example, a 2004 survey of more than a dozen DDR and weapons reduction initiatives observes that none of the interventions could 'claim [to have had] a statistically significant impact on security … [despite] many observed changes in individual and community perceptions of security' (CICS, 2004). The World Bank also remarks in the case of DDR that 'no statistical analyses of the effects of military integration on the likelihood of war recurrence are available, [although] in several cases military integration [is] associated with a lowered rate of war recurrence' (World Bank, 2003b, p. 149).

Nevertheless, DDR was incorporated into mainstream development thinking soon after the World Bank began to concentrate on the security sector. The World Bank had in fact immersed itself in DDR debates comparatively early on and has been involved in the demobilization and reintegration components of DDR since the late 1980s. Subsequently, it has provided demobilization and reintegration project (DRP) assistance to more than 16 countries (27 projects) for designing and financing interventions. It has frequently done so in close partnership with those UN agencies that typically handle disarmament, weapons destruction, and SSR (Colletta et al., 1996). Indeed, the World Bank was one of the first institutions to develop an analytical capacity in this sector. Furthermore, it 'has broadened its response from a focus on providing financial capital and rebuilding physical infrastructure, to a comprehensive approach also including initiatives to support the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants ... an especially vulnerable group in the post-conflict setting' (World Bank, 2003b).[39]

Yet while it has made a considerable investment in the demobilization and reintegration of both vulnerable groups and combatants, the World Bank has never explicitly addressed the disarmament component of DDR. The main reason for this relates to its mandate. The World Bank's *Operational Manual* states: 'In view of its mandate, the Bank does not engage in peacemaking or peacekeeping, which are the functions of the United Nations and certain regional organizations. It also does not provide direct support for disarming combatants' (World Bank, 2001d). Some insiders assert that this is more a matter of the World Bank not wishing to become involved in issues that could threaten its reputation than a constraint imposed by its mandate.

The World Bank immersed itself in DDR debates comparatively early on.

Weapons reduction: a potted history

Weapons reduction, which has a lengthier history than DDR, is not confined to either conflict or post-conflict situations. Although weapons reduction is today included in development, peace-building, policing, and other sectors, it has its roots in the US crime prevention initiatives of the 1950s. At the time, practical approaches to reducing weapons availability generally entailed buying them back, despite awareness that this was only a short-term solution and encouraged illegal firearms markets. By the 1970s and 1980s, weapons reduction efforts had broadened their focus (beyond arms per se) to encompass the individual agents who possessed them and the permissive regulatory structures that facilitated acquisition. Police and criminology specialists increasingly adopted holistic approaches to weapons reduction, concentrating simultaneously on raising the cost of obtaining firearms via penalties, and providing cash incentives to encourage their relinquishment.

Weapons reduction is, in many ways, a surprising new addition to the development sector's arsenal. Throughout the 1990s, the negative correlation between armed violence and underdevelopment became ever more difficult to ignore (Humphreys, 2002; Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2001). As pervasive weapons use increasingly compromised development interventions, reducing availability was no longer a matter of choice, but of grim necessity. More recently, as some policy circles have sought to establish ties between underdevelopment and terrorism, weapons reduction has become part of a general drive to reduce poverty in the post-conflict period.[40]

As with DDR, weapons reduction lacks a doctrine or clear conceptual basis. In fact, it involves various activities, ranging from the tightening of the regulatory framework for civilian arms possession to public awareness campaigns that concentrate on 'gun cultures'. This approach is fast becoming a core element of post-conflict recovery strategies (Ginifer et al., 2004).

Weapons reduction initiatives are increasingly being linked with DDR. They are frequently introduced as follow-on activities, as in Kosovo, the Republic of Congo, or Sierra Leone (Ginifer et al., 2004). Discrete initiatives in the weapons reduction portfolio, such as 'Flames of Peace' in Mali, Serbia, and Sierra Leone, have also been tagged on to formal DDR. In addition, weapons reduction is now introduced to address gaps in ongoing DDR programmes, particularly in relation to weapons storage and disposal, pubic awareness campaigns, community mobilization, and demand reduction. By engaging civil society groups and stigmatizing weapons ownership, as with the 'Strengthening Mechanisms for Small Arms Control' project of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in El Salvador (2001–03), weapon reduction activities have also opened up the possibility of achieving long-term, sustainable reversals in community criminality and violence.[41]

Weapons reduction can be divided into at least two distinct categories: reduction by command (phase one); and voluntary reduction (phase two).[42] Weapons reduction by command often forms part of a general disarmament strategy during and immediately following peace negotiations—although it can also take place outside of formal agreements. These so-called phase one initiatives are generally administered by peacekeepers and militaries and are organized, centralized, supervised, public, involuntary, and collective (Faltas et al., 2001). Examples are the continuing disarmament efforts of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) or the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Also included in this category are cross-regional initiatives, such as the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation, which has collected thousands of weapons in the region.

Voluntary reduction activities, meanwhile, are often introduced later in the transition process, and are designed to address civilian arms possession. These so-called phase two interventions advance a combination of collective and individual incentives, are decentralized, and are often preceded by various penalties to deter illegal ownership. Examples include 'weapons for development', 'community arms collection for development', 'weapons lotteries', voluntary amnesties, and 'weapon-free zones'. Multilateral and bilateral donors, including UNDP and other development agencies, increasingly favour phase two initiatives (see Annexe 1).

Engineering consent: focusing on incentives

The development community has injected new and dynamic thinking into DDR and weapons reduction interventions. As a result, they are now typically wide-ranging in terms of their parameters and approach.[43] Specifically, development actors have broadened the traditional focus on cash incentives to include a host of other 'carrots' to tempt individuals into relinquishing weapons and to re-engineer the preferences of armed agents. For example, while buy-backs are voluntary and concentrate on influencing an individual's choices, Weapons in Exchange for Development (WED) programmes, while also voluntary, centre on modifying community preferences (Figure 10.4). A concerted attempt to shape perceptions of weapons ownership—through stigmatization and public awareness campaigns—is central to new weapons reduction efforts. By contrast, traditional random stop-and-search interventions are involuntary and primarily target individuals. Community searches, while sometimes coercive, focus on building confidence among residents and are often conducted in tandem with community policing.

Figure 10.4   Weapons reduction incentives

Source: Wilkinson (2004)

Moreover, development actors have underscored that effective and sustainable weapons reduction should nurture local ownership. Over the past five years, UNDP, as well as British and German development cooperation agencies, the European Union (EU), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and others, have launched weapons reduction projects in more than 45 countries. Yet the extent to which these have successfully contributed to promoting human security, let alone development, remains something of an empirical question.

A number of shifts are taking place in contemporary approaches to DDR and weapons reduction. Although they are still regularly pursued at the national level, there appears to be growing emphasis on regional approaches to DDR and weapons reduction—explicit recognition of the transnational dimensions of arms proliferation and foreign ex-combatants. Good examples are the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program in the Great Lakes Region (2002–06) and Operation Rachel involving Mozambique and South Africa (1995–2003) (see Annexe 10.1). In the case of Latin America, there is also growing awareness of the importance of institutionalizing activities through national legislatures in order to ensure their sustainability.

There also appears to be some limited reorientation of focus on the demand for weapons. Recent initiatives in post-conflict Haiti (2004–05) and the Solomon Islands (2003–04), for example, are concentrating as much on collecting weapons as on re-engineering community attitudes toward firearms—through the introduction of 'gun-free spaces' and reconciliation activities (see Box 10.5). Public awareness campaigns and strong messaging have helped to spawn social penalties for arms acquisition and ownership, and can simultaneously raise the price of, and reduce the preference for, firearms. While debates persist over the advantages of individual versus collective incentives for surrendering weapons, acknowledgement of the demand aspects of weapons possession is growing (Muggah and Brauer, 2004; Muggah, 2004d). Greater attention to demand reduction is likely to become an increasingly important feature of DDR and weapons reduction interventions in coming years.

While new and energetic approaches to demand reduction are being introduced in DDR and weapons reduction initiatives, many are still top-down, and are not accountable to the very communities they seek to support. Many agencies continue to adopt *blueprint* methodologies for DDR, devoting insufficient attention to customary norms and practices. As the following section makes clear, a major debate is continuing on the goals and appropriate ways of measuring

Recent initiatives in Haiti and the Solomon Islands are concentrating on re-engineering community attitudes towards firearms.

Box 10.5 *Konflik i nostap nao ia**: arms reduction in the Solomon Islands

The Solomon Islands is emerging from a brutal episode of violence, colloquially referred to as the 'tensions'. From 1998 to 2003, between 150 and 200 people were fatally injured and between 430 and 460 people were non-fatally injured—a sizeable number considering that the country's population is only 409,000.[44] At the height of the tensions, more than 35,000 Solomon Islanders were displaced throughout the two main islands, Guadalcanal and Malaita. All of this turmoil was caused by an estimated 3,500–5,000 illegal high-powered, manufactured weapons (Nelson and Muggah, 2004).

**Figure 10.5   Frequency of arms and laceration injuries, National Referral Hospital, 1994–2004**

Notes: High-velocity weapons include M-16 and police-issue SL88 assault rifles, and pistols; low-velocity weapons include shotguns, .22 rifles, and home-made armaments.

Source: Nelson and Muggah (2004)

The country entered a post-conflict period following the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement on 15 October 2000. Despite the accord and the deployment of an international peace monitoring team, fighting continued between the two principal factions, the Isatabu Freedom Movement and the Malaita Eagle Front.

A number of other initiatives were conducted between 2001 and 2003, including the demobilization of more than 2,500 special constables (police reservists) believed to be responsible for much of the armed violence. The National Peace Council also introduced a weapons reduction initiative, the 'weapons-free village' scheme, leading to the return of 67 firearms of varying quality (Muggah, 2003).

Under the Pacific Island Forum's Biketawa Declaration and authorized by International Assistance Bill 200, a 2,250-strong Regional Assistance Mission for Solomon Islands (RAMSI) force was dispatched to the country's capital, Honiara, in July 2003. Operation Helpem Fren was given an 18-month mandate, and was primarily a policing endeavour. From the beginning, it sought to establish security through robust deterrence-based approaches in Honiara in order to enable government, businesses, and communities to operate free of armed intimidation. By the end of 2003, security had been extended to outlying islands.

A memorial dedicated to the prospect of a gun-free Solomon Islands.

© Robert Muggah

Box 10.5 *Konflik i nostap nao ia**: arms reduction in the Solomon Islands (continued)

A weapons reduction initiative formed a core pillar of the campaign in the early stages. In fact, the disarmament of out-standing militia groups was widely regarded as the clearest challenge facing RAMSI.[45] After the first RAMSI-administered amnesty in August 2003, some 3,700 weapons were gathered together and many of the items were destroyed. Between 2000 and the end of 2004, the interventions had collected more than 5,800 manufactured and home-made weapons.

The success of the demobilization and weapons reduction efforts can be measured by both the number of weapons collected, and the considerable reduction in armed violence from 2003. There has only been one reported firearm-related murder since the launch of RAMSI in 2003. Although the preference for weapons still exists—for self-defence, and for hunting and pest con-trol—the cost of acquiring them has sky-rocketed. Not only are the penalties for possession extremely high and well enforced, but the collection of most known armaments has also pushed the real monetary price of weapons up to a level beyond the reach of most Solomon Islanders.

*Note: Loosely translated from Solomon Creole: 'Conflict is not tolerated now.'
Source: Nelson and Muggah (2004)

the success of DDR and weapons reduction. Indeed, the majority of evaluations to date have concentrated on the number and quality of weapons collected or destroyed and the types of incentives introduced. In addition, most offer anecdotal evidence on whether communities have benefited from a weapons-free environment or the lives of 'bene-ficiaries' and their communities have improved.[46] Few evaluations provide evidence on whether security and safety have changed meaningfully in response to the intervention. The reasons for this lack of information are varied, although they can be partly attributed to a lack of upfront funding for monitoring and analysis.

A critical look at DDR and weapons reduction

In the rush to promote DDR and weapons reduction as integral elements of post-conflict recovery, their many shortcom-ings tend to be glossed over. These limitations are interconnected and often poorly understood. At the outset, it should be recalled that, with regard to DDR, less-developed countries in particular confront a host of difficulties not faced by demobilizing armies in OECD nations and parts of Asia (Colletta et al., 1996).[47] DDR and weapons reduction are espe-cially complex in environments where there is no tradition of transparency and civilian oversight of the military, and where fundamental institutions, such as the police and judiciary, have broken down. Other major weaknesses relate to the dis-proportionate focus on disarmament, at the expense of longer-term activities such as reintegration, and the ambiguous criteria invoked for measuring 'success' or 'failure'. Related to this are the ambiguous 'objectives' often ascribed to DDR and weapons reduction. Moreover, strategies to manage expectations, to ensure effective institutional collaboration, to raise adequate funds, and to create appropriate incentives are often formulated with insufficient advance preparation.

Disarmament bias

Despite the development sector's growing involvement in promoting DDR and weapons reduction, the number of weapons collected continues to serve as a benchmark of the success of an intervention rather than the extent to which it has improved security, much less redressed gender imbalances or advanced poverty reduction.[48] Many donors and governments continue to prioritize the gathering of hardware. This 'disarmament bias' persists, even though there is mounting evidence that absolute numbers of arms collected do not necessarily contribute to improved security, or even to the building of confidence. In addition, even when considerable numbers of arms have been collected, DDR

and weapons reduction efforts continue to neglect their safe storage or destruction—a crucial activity in unstable environments where police and military structures are notoriously prone to 'recycling' arms back into the community.

Measuring success

Another major criticism of DDR and weapons reduction pertains to the meaning of 'success' itself. Success is often defined differently because the objectives (and motives) of numerous actors are widely divergent and even contradictory during the post-conflict period. Due in large part to acute political pressure to initiate DDR or weapons reduction rapidly, there is seldom adequate reflection on their short-, medium-, and long-term objectives. For example, many military and government strategists concede that DDR serves a pragmatic and temporary function: collecting weapons and disarming and deterring potential spoilers. They might also agree that DDR should serve a symbolic purpose, such as building confidence between erstwhile combatants and their communities. Development agencies and donors may also, confusingly, see DDR and weapons reduction as either tied to, or substituting for, viable long-term development programmes, and former combatants as a creative and dynamic source of productive labour. Furthermore, in situations where hard choices regularly need to be made, DDR can also seek to lead or replace a genuine political process in the post-conflict period. In resource-scarce environments, where DDR or weapons reduction are the only initiatives on offer, this can result in the setting of dangerous precedents (Muggah, 2004a).

DDR and weapons reduction frequently substitute for 'political' solutions.

Where the precise aims of DDR or weapons reduction efforts are not completely clear, donors and implementers can adopt objectives that far exceed what can realistically be achieved. In Sudan, for example, it is expected that DDR will compensate for decades of underdevelopment. The cases of the Central African Republic, Liberia, the Republic of Congo, and others testify to the limitations of DDR, where goals and benchmarks of success measurements were poorly articulated from the outset (CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC). While some donors, development agencies, and policy-makers may see advantages in keeping their aims as flexible as possible, it is of little surprise that primary stakeholders, combatants, and civilians often treat DDR and weapons reduction initiatives with suspicion, and even contempt.

To complicate matters, ambiguous labelling frequently frustrates DDR and weapons reduction initiatives. There are no clear or generally accepted definitions of what constitutes effective 'disarmament', 'demobilization', or 'reintegration', and there is no consensus on when these processes end or how their effectiveness can be gauged. The conceptual and practical difficulties associated with distinguishing between 'combatants' and 'civilians' are also well known—and are predominant in post-conflict countries such as Afghanistan, Haiti, and Iraq, as well as in the Great Lakes Region of Africa (CERI, 2004; Jensen and Stepputat, 2001; Muggah, 2004a).[49] Sometimes the demobilized include ex-soldiers from a national army and the former rebel fighters with whom they have been at war, as in Angola and Sierra Leone. In other instances, the demobilized are soldiers from two warring national militaries, as with Eritrea and Ethiopia. In Afghanistan and the Republic of Congo, it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between legitimate combatants and civilians. In many cases, the distinction between formal combatants and part-time warriors is glossed over or quietly ignored (CERI, 2004).

Management of expectations

Development actors often overlook a key challenge: the effective management of expectations. If DDR or weapons reduction are undertaken without an effective communications or public awareness strategy, the consequences can be disastrous. DDR pursued in the Philippines and West Africa reveals how the mismanagement of expectations and inadequate preparation for disarmament generated counterproductive, even lethal, outcomes (see Box 10.6). As in

Box 10.6   UN peacekeeping operations: *plus ça change*

More than a decade ago, then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali pledged that the UN would not make the same mistake in Mozambique as it had in Angola. Disarmament during the second UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) had not been meaningfully implemented in the lead-up to the country's 1992 national elections. Recognizing that the election results had not gone his way, the UNITA rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi, plunged the country back into civil war using arms he had never turned in.

Boutros-Ghali made clear that the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), unlike UNAVEM II, would destroy significant quantities of arms and ammunition. Moreover, it would engage the civilian population as well as the protagonists' armed forces. In the end, however, the UN made negligible progress in accounting for arms circulating throughout the country (Berman 1996). Fortunately, the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) rebel leader, Afonso Dhlakama, in addition to replacing his fatigues with Italian-tailored suits, gracefully accepted electoral defeat. In both cases, the international community failed to take full advantage of an opportunity to address the issue of small arms proliferation decisively.

Despite widespread recognition of the inadequate approaches to weapons collection adopted by UN peace operations, the situation remains dire. In that context, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the so-called *Brahimi Report*, underscored the importance of ensuring consistent funding for DDR (UNSC, 2000a; paras. 42 and 47). Two years into the 'post-Brahimi era', the UN nevertheless failed to implement the report's recommendations concerning DDR of ex-combatants in DRC when the mandate for MONUC was amended (Durch et al., 2003, p. 28).

In Liberia, however, UNMIL received funds to rehabilitate former combatants as part of the regular assessed peacekeeping budget (Durch et al., 2003), but not in a sustainable manner. The initial funds set aside for the DDR programme were based on an estimate of 38,000 ex-combatants. In the end, however, 107,000 individuals entered the programme and were eligible to receive benefits. Donors are reportedly unwilling to make up the shortfall and the programme has run into problems. Whether the fundamental problem lies with loose eligibility criteria or a gross underestimation of absolute numbers, it is clear that operational and logistical demands exceeded the donor community's store of political and financial will (Berman, 2005).

Former combatants hand over their weapons to the UN in exchange for money during UNMIL's disarmament programme in December 2003. The UN grossly underestimated how many ex-fighters would be eligible for DDR.
Author: Eric Berman

Liberia, a reintegration industry has been spawned in Mindanao, Philippines, where international agencies, such as UNDP and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), continue to support tens of thousands more Moro National Liberation Front ex-combatants and dependents than are believed to exist (Muggah, 2004c). In many cases, combatant numbers are inflated in order to claim benefits. In such scenarios, DDR and weapons reduction may not only turn into 'reward' programmes, but they can also fuel an illegal and transnational weapons market.[50] Local entrepreneurs—themselves often power brokers or former combatants—frequently hijack such initiatives and consolidate

a domestic or regional trade in small arms and light weapons. The emergence of black markets in the wake of DDR and weapons reduction projects has been witnessed most recently in, among other places, Guinea, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and the Solomon Islands (Milner, 2004; Nichols, 2004; Muggah, 2005c).

Institutional barriers

DDR and weapons reduction face considerable institutional challenges. For example, despite the recent theoretical gains made in linking development activities with practical disarmament outlined above, 'turf' battles persist between agencies on the ground. Approaches to organizing and implementing DDR and weapons reduction vary from the assignation of a 'lead agency' to oversee the process in its entirety to an emphasis on better 'coordination' among a range of separate agencies. Alarmingly, a number of development agencies are still reluctant to accept the relevance of programmes to reduce armed violence, particularly where small arms and light weapons are viewed as either external to their mandate or too sensitive an issue. As a result, DDR and weapons reduction are frequently not integrated into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and other post-conflict recovery mechanisms.

Financing

Due in part to conflicting interpretations of success, and different objectives and perceptions of the target group, DDR and weapons reduction activities are regularly under-funded. The matter is complicated by a poor appreciation among donors of the various dimensions of DDR and weapons reduction programmes. Another contributing factor is institutional disagreements between development actors over specific roles and responsibilities. Funding for reintegration activities is often deficient from the outset. Instead, resources are directed towards more 'visible' interventions, such as the collection of firearms, as was the case with former combatants with UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) (Hitchcock, 2004).[51] Alternatively, financing of disarmament is sometimes inadequate due to mandate constraints and organizational reticence to take on 'hard' security issues. In still other cases, funding is simply poorly targeted. Producing a doctrine for, and clarifying the objectives of, DDR and weapons reduction activities would go some way toward resolving many of these problems.

Incentives

Because of these and other lingering disagreements, DDR and weapons reduction initiatives are often difficult to design. A common sticking point concerns whether to keep incentives as broad or as narrow as possible. Whenever DDR is conceived as a means of eliminating spoilers, and the combatant is consequently viewed as an impediment to stability, the programme is structured around reducing the capacity of ex-combatants to contribute to further destabilization. DDR interventions are thus targeted exclusively at high-risk groups and assistance is provided not as a 'reward' but as a clear 'incentive' to lay down weapons. By contrast, if the programme is conceived as an opportunity for longer-term development, then combatants and their dependents are potentially cast as *prima facie* storehouses of human capital. DDR activities are thus designed with incentives built in to encourage their widest possible participation in economic development.

The future of DDR and small arms control

Over the past few years, DDR and weapons reduction initiatives, whether pursued bilaterally or through regional and multilateral organizations, have been tested and refined by both the development and the security sectors (US GAO,

2000; UNDP, 2004a; 2005). There is acknowledgement that DDR and weapons reduction represent something new and must be regarded as actions taking place at the intersection of security and development. Moreover, there appears to be consensus that DDR and weapons reduction cannot be pursued independently of broader structural reforms in the governance and security sectors. Many developed countries, such as Germany and Sweden, have launched comprehensive programmes to review ways of strengthening approaches to DDR and weapons reduction.[52] In some instances, developing countries are experimenting with DDR and weapons reduction without international prodding or donor assistance.

The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations carried out a major review of peacekeeping operations in transitional and post-conflict contexts (UNGA, 2000). Its final product, known as the *Brahimi Report,* warns of deploying troops under the auspices of ambiguous mandates and identifies specific risks of conducting disarmament in such environments. Importantly, it stresses the importance of having clear chains of command, ensuring that adequate funds are made available for DDR in peacekeeping operation budgets, establishing a common doctrine, obtaining funding for reintegration from the assessed budget of the UN, and appreciating the dangers of contrasting objectives (see Box 10.6). In addition to UN mechanisms, smaller coalitions of states and regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States, the EU, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), have started to ensure coherence in their approach to DDR and weapons reduction (Small Arms Survey, 2003).[53]

The *Brahimi Report* helped produce clear institutional and organizational shifts in relation to DDR and weapons reduction. Bilateral development donors, the World Bank, UNDP, and various other UN agencies and NGOs are increasingly supporting—and even replacing—the traditional security sector as core backers of DDR and weapons reduction. These same actors are also increasingly backing a combination of community police programmes, cross-border initiatives to repatriate foreign ex-combatants, and SSR more generally. UNDP, for example, has set up a global Weapons Collection, Management and Destruction (WCMD) project and provides technical assistance for disarmament.[54] For its part, the World Bank has established a Post-Conflict Unit, which focuses on, among other things, advancing demobilization and reintegration programmes, landmine clearance, community-based rehabilitation, and meeting the special needs of children (World Bank, 2003b). Ensuring coordination between the UN and the World Bank in DDR and weapons reduction remains a major challenge and a massive opportunity.

In the past few years, DDR and weapons reduction have become progressively entrenched in the new post-conflict recovery orthodoxy. The UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change describes disarmament and demobilization as a 'priority for successful peace implementation' in post-conflict contexts (UNGA, 2004).[55] Particular emphasis is placed on ensuring continuous funding for the 'reintegration' aspects of DDR from the assessed budget of the UN. In addition, while core small arms concerns do not figure prominently in the Panel's final recommendations,[56] DDR and weapons reduction continue to enjoy widespread support and have been identified as one of the top priorities for Africa in the New Partnership for Africa's Development, or NEPAD. Importantly, the Millennium Project also draws attention to the importance of collecting and destroying weapons: '[m]uch greater international commitment is needed to collect and destroy weapons in the aftermath of conflict. Too often, collected weapons later come back into circulation' (Millennium Project, 2004, p. 189).

The UN is again revisiting its approach to DDR. Under the leadership of an Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, it is developing an ambitious set of policy guidelines on DDR in 'post-conflict' environments in order to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of the organization's efforts.[57] These guidelines are to be based on lessons learnt and best practice identified in past and current DDR operations in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America, with a partic-

There appears to be consensus that DDR and weapons reduction cannot be pursued independently of broader structural reforms.

Box 10.7 Reducing Haiti's arms: a legacy of failure

Armed violence reached new heights on the streets of Port-au-Prince in 2004. Between September 2003 and December 2004, at least 700 people were fatally wounded by small arms fire. At least 50 per cent of these deaths, and many hundreds of non-fatal gun injuries, occurred following the departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February 2004. MINUSTAH was mandated to bring peace and security to the country in April 2004 (UNSC, 2004). By the end of the year, some 6,700 peacekeepers and more than 1,600 civilian police had been dispatched. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of several armed groups—from ex-army combatants to popular political organizations—forms a central plank of the strategy of the UN and the Interim Government of Haiti in the run-up to presidential and legislative elections on 13 November 2005.

It is important to remember that Haiti has been the site of several DDR and weapons reduction initiatives over the past century. Disarmament was attempted as far back as 1915, following the arrival of a US occupation force. International and national actors have launched other small-scale efforts since the early 1980s—mostly coercive endeavours, although some have involved buy-back schemes and voluntary strategies (see Table 10.1). Slightly more than 19,500 weapons have been collected since the mid-1990s, of which 2,435 (fewer than 12.5 per cent) have been destroyed (Muggah, 2005c).

Practical DDR and weapons reduction efforts have been spectacular failures. One of the largest followed from the US-led Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994. A large-scale buy-back initiative was undertaken between September 1994 and March 1995 ostensibly to reduce risks presented to US marines, to promote stability, and to reduce the number of weapons in circulation.[59] The US 10th Mountain Division collected more than 10,000 items, of which 3,684 were reportedly small arms and light weapons. Few weapons were destroyed, and many are believed to be back in the hands of the armed groups in the slums of Port-au-Prince. Some were even recycled into police training programmes administered by the US Department of State. US military commanders described the disarmament programme as a 'dismal failure' in terms of reducing the number of weapons in circulation or achieving a secure and stable environment (US GAO, 2000). Similarly unsuccessful were efforts made by the Organization of American States and the UN in the late 1990s to institutionalize regulations and disarmament through parliamentary action, public awareness campaigns, and attempts to establish national focal points.

Table 10.1 Reported weapon reduction activities, 1995–2004

Operation	Date	Type	Reach	Weapons collected	Weapons destroyed
US military	1994-95	Coercive	National	15,236*	2,088
US military	1995-95	Buy-back	National	3,684**	n/a
Sweeps by Haitian National Police (HNP)	1995	Coercive	National	n/a	n/a
HNP Operations	2002	Coercive	Port-au-Prince	51	n/a
HNP Operation Hurricane	2002	Coercive	National	5	n/a
HNP Operations	2002	Coercive	Port-au-Prince	37	n/a
HNP and Organization of American States	2003	Coercive	National	233	233
UNDP	2003	Voluntary	Port-au-Prince	55	55
Multinational Interim Force (MIF)	2004	Coercive	National	135	39
MINUSTAH	2004	Coercive	National	65	20
Total				**19,501**	**2,435**

Notes: * This figure comprises 7,450 rifles, 2,961 assault rifles, 2,413 handguns, 1,446 sub-machine guns, 604 shotguns, 5 M5 tank artillery, 1 M3A1 tank grease gun, and various others weapons of undetermined origin. Also seized was as an assortment of V150, anti-tank, mortar, howitzer, AAA, RR, B399, and automatic ammunition. ** Some 10,196 'items' were collected; 3,684 were classified as small arms and light weapons (US Army War College, 1996).

Source: Muggah (2005c)

ular focus on guaranteeing context specificity. Moreover, they intend to advance a framework for integrated planning and operations within the UN, thus ensuring that the different competencies and capacities of individual agencies, funds, and programmes can be harnessed to achieve the shared goal (MDDRWG, 2005). Efforts are already under-

way to develop integrated DDR operations in post-conflict Burundi, Sudan, and Haiti (see Box 10.7). Although DPKO and UNDP have traditionally taken the lead on DDR and weapons reduction, agencies as diverse as IOM, the International Labour Organization, and UNHCR are also increasingly becoming involved.[58]

CONCLUSION

Human security regularly deteriorates in the delicate period after wars are officially declared over. As a result, so-called post-conflict realities rarely bare much resemblance to what is implied by their definition. Rather, death and injury rates often remain comparatively high even after an armed conflict has come to an 'end'. The post-war contagion effects of armed violence can impact on the surrounding region.

Encouragingly, donors and multilateral agencies are today promoting DDR and weapons reduction as core pillars of the transition from armed conflict to peace. The World Bank has backed at least 16 demobilization and reintegration projects since the early 1990s. UNDP has overseen at least 45 weapons reduction initiatives and DDR interventions in more than 30 countries. The development sector has adopted a prominent role in violence reduction among combatants and civilians.

Just as there are many types of armed conflict, however, there are also many kinds of post-conflict contexts. In addition, while the transition from war to peace is influenced by the dynamics of an original armed conflict, the relief, development, and security-oriented strategies introduced in its wake similarly affect its shape. Lessons learnt from past DDR and weapons reduction interventions highlight the importance of articulating clear objectives and specifying clear benchmarks, as well as remaining cognisant of cultural, institutional, and communication barriers. When these are not adequately considered in advance, DDR and weapons reduction endeavours can have only a limited impact.

Despite their popularity among donors, policy-makers, and various multilateral agencies, DDR and weapons reduction frequently target the wrong people. Voluntary schemes that build primarily on rational self-interest and do not take into consideration the local context (such as buy-back programmes without adequate security guarantees) tend to enjoy only limited success and can do more harm than good. By contrast, interventions that endorse normative compliance—by building on existing customary institutions—advance a process that engenders ownership and more sustainable weapons reduction. Such approaches must acquire greater appreciation of the values and standards of particular societies so that appropriate disarmament incentives and deterrents can be elaborated.

For DDR and weapons reduction to be successful in generating security, they must be initiated at the earliest possible moment in the post-conflict period. Integrated and flexible interventions that bring together the combined expertise of multidisciplinary actors are increasingly favoured. It is also evident that 'successful' DDR is usually a discrete intervention with clear timetables, rather than a substitute for full-scale political or developmental reform. 'Joined-up' DDR and weapons reduction interventions, *together* with SSR, are increasingly regarded as fundamental to the positive transformation of the security sector. Ultimately, DDR and weapons reduction must be institutionalized within a normative framework—one that includes SSR.

Concrete and durable achievements are now regularly expected from DDR and weapons reduction. This is the case whether they are construed as interventions designed to reduce the number of firearms in a given post-conflict context, to improve safety, to contribute to community and economic development, or to diminish the prospects of

renewed conflict. Their effectiveness in any of these areas remains unknown, however. There is also a persistent danger that DDR and weapons reduction schemes will continue to be viewed exclusively as an 'entitlement' for former soldiers instead of as a mechanism to improve security and development levels in traumatized communities. Unless their objectives become clearer and their capacity to enhance security is irrefutably demonstrated, DDR and weapons reduction may prove to be little more than another flash in the pan.

ANNEXE 10.1

A sample of DDR and weapons reduction initiatives in post-conflict countries, 2000–04

Project name	Countries involved	Primary agency	Project duration	DDR	Weapons reduction
Regional programmes					
Operation Rachel	Mozambique, South Africa	Police sector and donors	1995–2003		Phase 1 and 2 weapons reduction activities and destruction of arms caches
Multi-Donor Reintegration Programme	Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Namibia, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe	World Bank	2002–06	A combination of DDR programmes, including special projects targeting 'vulnerable groups'	
Small Arms Control in Central America	Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama	El Salvador office of UNDP	June 2003– May 2004		Pilot initiatives, building of UNDP capacities
Small Arms Control in the Mano River Union	Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone	Liberia office of UNDP	September 2004– August 2005		Pilot initiatives, action plans, dialogue
South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC)	Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro	Belgrade office of UNDP	March 2002– February 2005		Assistance with implementing the Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan
Small Arms Collection, Repatriation and Reintegration of DRC Ex-Combatants	DRC, Republic of Congo	IOM	2002	A combination of DDR projects, including interventions targeted at 'children'	
National programmes					
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa					
Weapons Collection in Angola	Angola	UNDP	2001–02		Voluntary weapons collection activities throughout the country
DDR in Angola	Angola	UNDP	2002–03	DDR activities for UNITA troops	
Insecurity Reduction in the CAR and Reintegration and Community Support Projects	CAR	United Nations Peace-building Office (BONUCA) in the CAR and UNDP	March 2004– February 2007	Community-based DDR—focus on social reintegration of ex-combatants	
Support for Socio-economic Reintegration in the Comoros	Comoros	UNDP and the Government of Comoros	2001–02, 2003–05	Create the framework for economic reintegration of ex-combatants	

A sample of DDR and weapons reduction initiatives in post-conflict countries, 2000–04 (continued)

Project name	Countries involved	Primary agency	Project duration	DDR	Weapons reduction
Community Recovery for DDR in DRC	DRC	UNDP/BCPR	November 2003–October 2006	Recovery of communities to permit them to absorb returning IDPs and ex-combatants	
DDRRP in Liberia	Liberia	Liberia office of UNDP	2004–06	DDR activities for government forces and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) rebels, including weapons reduction, demobilization, and livelihood assistance	
Collection of illicit small arms and support for development in Niger	Niger	Niger office of UNDP	July 2001–August 2004		Pilot initiative to collect weapons through the National Commission for Control and Collection of Illicit Arms
Reintegration and arms collection in the Republic of Congo	Republic of Congo	IOM and Republic of Congo office of UNDP	May 2000–November 2002	DDR activities, including livelihood assistance and arms collection	
UNAMSIL (United Nations Assistance Mission for Sierra Leone) DDR programme	Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL	2001–02	Demobilization and reintegration of Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fighters and former members of the Sierra Leone Army and the Civil Defence Force (CDF)	
Community Weapons Collection and 'Arms for Development' Programme	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone office of UNDP	2002–05		Establishment of arms registries, licensing arrangements, and pilot projects to collect weapons
Weapons Control and Reduction Project	Somalia	Somalia office of UNDP	January 2003–March 2004		Support for a National Advisory Council, stockpile management, and community-based weapons control
Puntland Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Project	Somalia	Somalia office of UNDP and GTZ	January 2003–June 2004	Register militia members, establish armouries for storage, train new police recruits, reintegration programmes	
Asia, Middle East, and the South Pacific					
New Beginnings Project in Afghanistan	Afghanistan	UN	2003–04	DDR activities focusing on ex-combatants and militia groups	
DDR of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)	Indonesia (Aceh)	Indonesian government	2004	DDR activities being prepared for combatants with the (GAM)	
Weapons seizures and reduction in Iraq	Iraq	Coalition of States	2004		Weapons reduction activities throughout the country, focusing on collection and, in some cases, destruction

A Sample of DDR and weapons reduction initiatives in post-conflict countries, 2000–04 (continued)

Project name	Countries involved	Primary agency	Project duration	DDR	Weapons reduction
Violence Reduction and Peace Consolidation in Papua New Guinea (PNG)	PNG (Bougainville)	UNDP, United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and the United Nations Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB)	May 2004–December 2005		Arms reduction pilot projects and building capacity in the PNG government
Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Vulnerable Groups	Solomon Islands	Fiji office of UNDP	2000–03	DDR activities with Special Constables and ex-militia members	
Support to the Weapons Free Village Campaign	Solomon Islands	Fiji office of UNDP and National Peace Council	January 2003–December 2004		Community-based weapons reduction and reconciliation projects
Balkans and the Caucasus					
Albania weapons control project	Albania	Albania office of UNDP	February 2002–February 2004		Public awareness, capacity-building, weapons reduction, and development investment
Operation Harvest and assorted small arms projects	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosnia and Herzegovina office of UNDP	1999–2005		Baseline assessment, capacity-building, and weapons reduction pilot initiatives, focusing on both ethnic Albanian ex-combatants and civilians
Weapons collection in Croatia	Croatia	Government	2001		Voluntary weapons reduction initiatives targeting civilians
Weapons reduction in Georgia	Georgia	OSCE	2002		Voluntary weapons reduction activities in communities
Illicit Small Arms Project	Kosovo	Kosovo office of UNDP	August 2002–December 2003		Community policing, strengthening regulatory framework, weapons in exchange for development
Operation Essential Harvest	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)	Macedonia office of UNDP	2003–05		Capacity-building for Government of FYROM, safer-community strategies, public awareness, community policing
SEESAC	Serbia and Montenegro	Belgrade office of UNDP	2002–03		Weapons reduction and customs control—focus on civilian disarmament
Small Arms control in Serbia and Montenegro	Serbia and Montenegro	Belgrade office of UNDP	May 2004–June 2005		Capacity-building for the Governments of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, surplus weapons destruction
Latin America and the Caribbean					
Strengthening Mechanisms for Small Arms Control	El Salvador	El Salvador office of UNDP	February 2001–December 2003		Strengthening regulatory controls, public awareness, and demand reduction
Support for national disarmament and community-based arms reduction	Haiti	Haiti office of UNDP	May 2003–December 2004		Strengthening regulatory controls and community-based disarmament pilot projects

A sample of DDR and weapons reduction initiatives in post-conflict countries, 2000–04 (continued)

Project name	Countries involved	Primary agency	Project duration	DDR	Weapons reduction
Community-based DDR	Haiti	Haiti office of DPKO and UNDP	2004-06	Community-based DDR and strengthening of regulations	
Strengthening Small Arms Control	Honduras	Honduras office of UNDP	April 2003– December 2004		Capacity-building toward designing a national strategy for disarmament, public awareness, training, and forensics support

Sources: World Bank (2002; 2003a; 2003b); UNDP (2004a; 2004b); Small Arms Survey (2003); MDRP (2005)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAR	Central African Republic
CDC	Centers for Disease Control
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HNP	Haitian National Police
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PUH	Pristina University Hospital, Kosovo
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
RUF	Revolutionary United Front, Sierra Leone
SEESAC	South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SSR	Security sector reform
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDDA	United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WCMD	Weapons Collection Management and Destruction
WED	Weapons in Exchange for Development
WHO	World Health Organization

ENDNOTES

[1] The World Bank, for instance, claims that 'a structured DDR process, which demobilizes combatants in stages and emphasizes their ability to reintegrate into society, may reduce the risk of ex-combatants turning to violent crime or rejoining rebel groups in order to survive' (2003b, p. 159).

[2] See Lacina and Gleditch (2004). Though often inaccurate, mortality estimates are regularly selected because they are more easily captured than other indicators, particularly those that have to contend with competing definitions and cultural interpretations (Keely et al., 2000). In the post-conflict period, longitudinal research generally focuses on 'excess' mortality or involves direct surveillance of mortality over time. Methods include retrospective probability surveys as well as pre- and post-analysis of census data (Heuveline, 2001).

[3] Ghobarah et al. find that the effects of armed conflicts in contiguous countries are substantial. In their sample, about 75 per cent of states plagued by civil war at home were affected by civil wars in neighbouring states. Of the 83 countries exposed to civil wars in neighbouring states, more than half were embroiled in a civil war at home (Ghobarah et al., 2004).

[4] See, for instance, GTZ (2004) and the Web site of the World Bank's Post-Conflict Unit, <http://www.worldbank.org/essd/essd.nsf/Post-Conflict/home> (accessed February 2005).

[5] The 'reconstruction' dimension quickly disappeared following the introduction of the Marshall Plan after the Second World War. The World Bank then swiftly turned to 'development efforts', particularly in the former colonies of European countries.

[6] Daponte argues that, in fact, '[t]here were relatively few deaths (approximately 56,000 to military personnel and 3,500 to civilians) from direct war effects. Post-war violence accounted for approximately 35,000 deaths. The largest component of deaths in this reconstruction derives from the 111,000 attributable to post-war adverse health effects. Of the total excess deaths in the Iraqi population, approximately 109,000 were ... men, 23,000 ... women, 74,000 ... children' (Daponte, 1993). See the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) Web site: <http://www.ippnw.org/MGS/PSRQV3N2Daponte.html> (accessed February 2005).

[7] To put the public health costs in perspective, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that some 269,000 people died and 8.44 million years of productive life were lost to death and disability due to the direct and immediate effects of all international and civil wars in 1999 (WHO, 2001, p. 168). By comparison, Ghobarah et al. calculate that as many as 15 million 'excess' lives were lost in 1999 due to death and disability indirectly—because of related diseases in war-affected and neighbouring societies, and the lingering ramifications of war over the previous eight years (Ghobarah et al., 2004).

[8] The World Bank, for example, often introduces a transitional support strategy for short-to-medium-term involvement in a country (up to 24 months). It can only be administered if the 'active conflict' has diminished sufficiently to allow World Bank staff to travel, if there is a reasonable expectation of continued stability, if there are effective counterparts, and if there is evidence of strong international cooperation and the potential for a well-defined role. The World Bank has also established Post-Conflict Progress Indicators to determine whether International Development Association resources can be allocated to eligible countries. These 12 indicators are grouped in three clusters: security and reconciliation; economic recovery; and social inclusion and social development. Countries considered 'post-conflict' according to this rating system include Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, East Timor, Eritrea, Republic of the Congo, and Sierra Leone. These nine states were eligible for some USD 500 million in Fiscal Year 2004 on top of regular performance-based assistance (World Bank, 1998; 2003b; 2003e).

[9] Together with the World Bank and the UNDP, the GTZ appears to view the 'two-year' period following the end of an armed conflict as a 'transition' or as 'post-conflict' (GTZ, 2004).

[10] See, for instance, World Bank (1998; 2003b) and post-conflict countries reviewed in Small Arms Survey (2004).

[11] As the primary referral hospital for traumatic injuries, the PUH recorded some 98 incidents in 2002. In 2001, there were an estimated 125 reported firearm-related injuries, and more than 100 between June and December 1999, immediately following the conflict (Khakee and Florquin, 2003).

[12] Ethnic Serbs also receive treatment and care at Camp Bondsteel, the US KFOR brigade headquarters in the south-east (Khakee and Florquin, 2003).

[13] The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), PAHO, and the WHO have demonstrated this point. Together they have supported the establishment of post-conflict injury surveillance programmes in El Salvador, Honduras, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Sri Lanka.

[14] An earlier case study by the ICRC, carried out between January and March 1995 (conflict) and between September 1995 and March 1996 (post-conflict), found that the annual incidence of weapon injuries decreased by only 33 per cent between the 'conflict' and 'post-conflict' periods. The ICRC also discovered, however, that mortality rates for weapon injuries increased from 2.5 per cent to 6.1 per cent during the post-conflict period (ICRC, 1999). Despite the decline in overall weapon injuries, therefore, more people died per month from weapon injuries during the post-conflict period.

[15] In a survey of 863 weapon injuries, the ICRC found that injury rates fell while the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was in the country (71 firearm injuries per 100,000). Nevertheless, after the force departed, they rose to levels higher

than those registered prior to the conclusion of the peace deal (from 147 per 100,000 to 163 per 100,000) (ICRC, 1999, pp. 33–38).

16 In East Timor, for instance, before 1999, the health force numbered 3,500—of which 2,632 were Timorese. After the armed conflict, only 31 qualified Timorese doctors and fewer than 23 medical students were prepared to return to work. In Cambodia, in 1975, there were 487 doctors; by 1979, this number had fallen to 43. While massive increases in the size of the health force were reported by the mid-1990s, many employees were not necessarily suited to meet the needs of Cambodian society (Smith, 2003). See also Guha-Sapir and van Panhuis (2002b).

17 These populations are widely dispersed: some 3.3 million refugees are in Central Asia and the Middle East, 2.8 million in Africa, 2.4 million are in Europe, more than 600,000 are in the Americas, and more than 800,000 in Asia and the Pacific. IDPs are distributed across at least 52 countries in Africa (12.7 million), Asia and the Pacific (3.6 million), the Americas (3.3 million), Europe (3 million), and the Middle East (2 million). See <www.unhcr.ch> (Accessed March 2005).

18 The UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has acknowledged that '[p]articularly egregious violations, such as occur when armed groups militarize refugee camps, require emphatic responses from the international community, including from the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Although the Security Council has acknowledged that such militarization is a threat to peace and security, it has not developed the capacity or shown the will to confront the problem' (UNGA, 2004, p. 63).

19 In a 2004 cohort survey of US soldiers and marines returning from Iraq (1,709) and Afghanistan (1,962), for instance, between 66 and 97 per cent claimed to have been shot at. Furthermore, as many as 95 per cent of respondents were exposed to dead bodies and human remains and as many as 28 per cent claimed responsibility for killing a non-combatant (Hoge et al., 2004).

20 The CDC, for example, has observed how, in recent years, an increased number of rape and sexual violence cases have been reported in conflict and post-conflict settings—much of the abuse perpetrated at gunpoint. See <http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ierh/Research&Survey/WarRelated.htm> (accessed March 2005).

21 For a discussion of participatory research and armed violence, see, for example, Banerjee and Muggah (2002); Moser and Muggah (2003); and LeBrun and Muggah (2005, forthcoming).

22 Knight et al. find that an additional 2.2 per cent of GDP spent on the military, sustained for seven years (the typical length of an armed conflict), would lead to a permanent loss of about 2 per cent of GDP (Knight et al., 1996).

23 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, for example, have established the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative and the Post-Conflict Unit of the World Bank has instituted small-scale grant and credit provisions for other conflict-affected nations. Pre-arrears arrangements to support early recovery efforts have also been introduced in specific circumstances (World Bank, 2003e).

24 The World Bank notes that the first post-conflict decade often demonstrates robust macroeconomic progress: average annual per capita growth is around 1.1 per cent faster than normal (World Bank, 2003b, p. 153).

25 On Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, see Muggah (2004c) and Nelson and Muggah (2004). On South Africa, see Kirsten et al. (2004).

26 See, for example, the work of Collier and Hoeffler (2002), which shows how a history of armed conflict is a predictor of the onset of conflict. See also World Bank (2003b).

27 As Tschirgi observes, '[d]espite over ten years of practice, there is no commonly agreed post-conflict peace-building policy or doctrine'. Peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building are viewed as 'instruments in the UN's toolkit to respond to conflicts at the end of the Cold War'. Although peace-building was originally introduced to consolidate peace in 'post-conflict' countries, Tschirgi notes that the concept was expanded in the 1990s to encompass conflict prevention, conflict management, and post-conflict reconstruction (Tschirgi, 2004, p. i).

28 See, for example, GTZ (2004); World Bank (1998; 2003b); Collier and Hoeffler (2002); Tschirgi (2004).

29 The World Bank reports, however, that where armed conflicts end with a negotiated settlement, rebel reintegration occurs in about 50 per cent of cases. Without a treaty, reintegration is rarer, taking place in approximately 14 per cent of cases (World Bank, 1998).

30 Much of this literature continues to analyse DDR in terms of its constituent parts rather than as an overarching concept. See, for example, CERI (2004); Kingma (2000; 2002); GTZ (1996; 2001; 2004); Jensen and Stepputat (2001); Berdal (1996); and Ginifer et al. (2004).

31 Ball describes the 'security sector' in broader terms, including 'the security forces (military, paramilitary, police), the agencies of government and parliament responsible for oversight of these forces, informal security forces, the judiciary and correction system, private security firms and civil society' (Ball, 2001, p. 47).

32 The World Bank has assessed the relationship between DDR and SSR in the context of the Great Lakes Region. It notes that the linkage between the two must be made explicit in order for countries to take part in the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). The paper underlines the importance of conducting defence reviews, establishing clear benchmarks for the 'appropriate' size of the armed forces and police, absorbing ex-combatants into the military, and earmarking requisite funds—all factors essential in DDR planning. It also claims that 'the window of opportunity for SSR and DDR in many post-conflict countries may be relatively narrow. The timetables for SSR and DDR can be under pressure from the overall peace process' (World Bank, 2003a, p. 4).

33 See, for example, the report of the Millennium Project (2004, ch. 12), which considers strategies for countries affected by conflict.

34 This factor is now acknowledged in the *Guidelines on Conflict Prevention,* produced by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC, 2001), and highlighted in the report of the UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UNGA, 2004).

35 See, for example, Cooper et al. (2003); Douma (2001); and Le Billon (2000).

36 These acronyms refer to Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (DDRR); Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRRR); and Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (DRP).

37 After demobilizing, combatants often lose their power to bargain with the government. In cases where post-war peace is premised on a voluntary agreement, the drastic change in the parties' relative bargaining capabilities makes the agreement difficult to ensure over time. The government, which retains its military capacities, can renege on its promise after the rebels have disarmed. The government has both the power and the incentive to renegotiate the settlement or to defect from it unilaterally. This is particularly common in situations where an armed conflict had no definitive outcome, but rather, the violence ended with a ceasefire, truce, or negotiated compromise. One way that parties have attempted to protect themselves against violations of a peace deal has been to integrate parts of a rebel force into the national military. See, for example, World Bank (2003b; 2003c).

38 DPKO has observed that 'disarmament, demobilization and reintegration form a continuum. Demobilization is only possible when there is some kind of disarmament' (DPKO, 1997).

39 The World Bank identifies two events of the mid-1990s as catalysts for a new approach to conflict and post-conflict situations. The first came in 1994, when the agency was asked to preside over the multi-donor Holst Fund for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The second came in 1995, when it was asked by the European Commission to plan and coordinate international investment in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the late 1990s, it was active in Afghanistan,

East Timor, the Great Lakes Region of Africa, Kosovo, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone (World Bank, 1998; 2003b).

[40] The US Department of State's recently formed Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, for example, intends to reduce 'threats to public health and social stability in nations affected by persistent landmines, freely available small arms and light weapons, abandoned ordnance, excess man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and poorly secured munitions stockpiles'. It will do so by curbing illicit trafficking and indiscriminate use of small arms and pursuing 'post-conflict cleanup of such weapons'. See <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra> (accessed March 2005).

[41] Moreover, in the case of El Salvador, there was explicit recognition that destroying a marginal surplus of weapons was less important than focusing on the political, social, and legal aspects of weapons possession and availability.

[42] For more information, see Small Arms Survey (2002; 2003).

[43] See Faltas and Paes (2004); Small Arms Survey (2003); Faltas et al. (2001); Meek (1998).

[44] At least 50–60 people were fatally injured in 2003 alone. Non-fatal firearm injuries have not been counted, but epidemiological estimates suggest a ratio as high as three non-fatal shootings to each lethal gun injury, or as many as 150–180 wounded. Coupled with the 257 people injured between 1998 and 2002, one arrives at an estimate of at least 400. Armed crime, particularly extortion, kidnapping, and intimidation, eased considerably after the arrival of RAMSI (Muggah, 2003).

[45] Key informants in the Australian Department of Defence anticipated some casualties due to the proliferation of four (still unrecovered) 50mm cannons. The decision not to deploy armoured personnel vehicles was largely based on the possible misuse of these weapons.

[46] There is growing recognition of the need for effective baseline studies and evidence-based approaches. For example, knowledge of distribution, type of weapons, and ownership patterns can inform efforts to provide realistic reintegration support (Kingma, 2002).

[47] In wealthy nations, the return of erstwhile soldiers to civilian life is usually a fairly well-managed and predictable process. In 2003 BICC announced that the number of government soldiers in uniform worldwide declined for the twelfth successive year. There are now an estimated 21 million soldiers: some 10.9 million are in Asia. The only region where the number of soldiers increased was Africa: by 17 per cent between 1997 and 2001 (BICC, 2003, p. 64). DDR initiatives conducted in industrialized nations are often exceptionally well financed and generally undertaken within a framework of appropriate checks and balances.

[48] DDR is often criticized for being 'gender blind'. The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has repeatedly observed that women ex-combatants, despite the essential roles they play in postconflict DDR processes, are frequently excluded. Because of the focus on men, the needs of women ex-combatants are often inadequately addressed during the demobilization phase, often resulting in untenable situations of deteriorating health and poverty (UNIFEM, 2004).

[49] A matter of considerable debate is how to determine whether an individual seeking DDR- or weapons reduction-related assistance is a combatant. In the absence of credible registries and lists, the World Bank claims that such criteria can include: 'self-identification, proven affiliation with a known armed group, and/or proof of military ability, such as weapons handling. Especially for special projects involving irregular forces, particular attention needs to be paid to avoiding the creation of perverse incentives (i.e. individuals or groups arming themselves in order to subsequently benefit from a program of demobilization)' (World Bank, 2003a). But designation of status is often exceedingly difficult in practice.

[50] UNDP has expressed particular concern about the dangers of DDR being perceived as an 'entitlement' for armed elements. For a more detailed discussion, see UNDP (2005).

[51] In other cases, reintegration is often emphasized at the expense of disarmament. In Rwanda, for instance, DDR morphed into a de facto relief operation rather a transitional programme to promote security (World Bank, 2003b).

[52] See, for example, the preliminary findings of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration, <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4890> (accessed March 2005).

[53] At the request of the European Parliament and the European Commission, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has initiated a study entitled 'European Action on Small Arms, Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War'. The findings will be released at the end of 2005.

[54] In addition to supporting workshops and seminars on arms control and evidence-based policy-making, the WCMD project has produced standard operating procedures and weapons reduction tools for activities involving governments, country offices, NGOs, and other international actors.

[55] The Panel asserts that 'demobilizing combatants is the single most important factor determining the success of peace operations. Without demobilization, civil wars cannot be brought to an end and other critical goals—such as democratization, justice and development—have little chance for success. In case after case, however, demobilization is not accorded priority by funders. When peace operations are deployed, they must be resourced to undertake the demobilization and disarmament of combatants' (UNGA, 2004, p. 61).

[56] See UNGA (2004, p. 36, paras. 95–97).

[57] The Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR includes UNICEF, UNDDA, DPKO, UNIFEM, UNDP, UNHCR, and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

[58] In 2004, DPKO took the lead on DDR activities in Afghanistan, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, and Sudan. DDR initiatives launched by DPKO and UNDP are ongoing in Haiti (2004), CAR (2003), Liberia (2003), DRC (2002), Sierra Leone (2002), Solomon Islands (2002), Somalia (2002), Niger (2001), Republic of Congo (2001), and elsewhere.

[59] IOM and USAID also launched a demobilization initiative between 1994 and 1996, which resulted in the demobilization of almost 5,500 former members of the army (Muggah, 2005c).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Addison, Tony, ed. 2003. *From Conflict to Recovery in Africa.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, Mary. 1999. *How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Archer, David and Richard Gartner. 1976. 'Violent Acts and Violent Times: A Comparative Approach to Post-War Homicide Rates.' *American Sociological Review,* 41, pp. 937–63.

Ball, Nicole. 2001. 'Transforming Security Sectors: The IMF and World Bank Approaches.' *Conflict, Security and Development,* 1(1), pp. 45–60.

—. 2002. *Dilemmas of Security Sector Reform: Response to 'Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries.* Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management. Accessed December 2004.
<http://www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/ssr_ball.pdf>

Banerjee, Dipankar and Robert Muggah, eds. 2002. *Human Security in South Asia: Participatory Research on Small Arms.* Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies.

Barbara, Joanna Santa. 1997. 'The Psychological Effects of War on Children.' In Barry S. Levy and Victor W. Sidel, eds. *War and Public Health*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press and the American Public Health Association.

Bendana, Alejandro. 1999. *Demobilization and Reintegration in Central America: Peace-building Challenges and Responses*. Managua: Centro de Estudios Internacionales.

Berdal, Mats, 1996. *Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars*. Adelphi Paper No. 303. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Berman, Eric. 1996. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

—. 2005. 'Field Research on Small Arms and Its Importance for Peace Operations: A Practitioner's View.' In Martin Carment and David Rudner, eds. *Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries*. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. Forthcoming.

BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion). 2003. *Conversion Survey 2003: Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Demobilization*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Bilukha, Oleg, Muireann Brennan, and Woodruff Bradley. 2003. 'Death and Injury from Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance in Afghanistan.' *The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA),* 290 (5), pp. 650–53.

Bradley, Sean, Philippe Maughan, and Massimo Fuasto. 2002. 'Sierra Leone: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).' *World Bank Findings: African Region,* 81. October.

Brauer, Jurgen and Paul Dunne. 2004. *Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and Cases in Arms Trade Offsets*. London: Routledge.

Braveman, Paula et al. 1997. 'Public Health and War in Central America.' In Barry S. Levy and Victor W. Sidel, eds. *War and Public Health*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press and the American Public Health Association.

Butler, Declan. 1997. 'Admission on Gulf War Vaccines Spurs Debate on Medical Records.' *Nature*, 390, pp. 3–4.

Carballo, Manuel. 2001. 'Reflections.' In James Keely and Holly E. Reed, eds. *Forced Migration and Mortality*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Cardozo, Barbara et al. 2003. 'Mental Health, Social Functioning and Feelings of Hatred and Revenge of Kosovar Albanians One Year After the War in Kosovo.' *Journal of Traumatic Stress,* 16(4), pp. 351–60.

CDC (Centers for Disease Control). 1988. 'Health Status of Vietnam Veterans: Psychological Characteristics.' *Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA),* 259 (18), pp. 2701–07.

CERI (Centre for International Studies and Research). 2004. *The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs*. Paris: CERI.

Chachiua, Martinho. 1999. 'Arms Management Programme: Operations Rachel 1996–1999.' *ISS Monograph Series,* No. 38, June. Accessed 23 March 2005. <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No38/TitleAndContents.html>

CICS (Centre for International Cooperation and Security). 2004. 'Assessing and Reviewing the Impact of Small Arms Projects on Arms Availability and Poverty.' Draft Synthesis Report. Bradford: CICS, University of Bradford. July.

Cole, Thomas. 2003. 'Taking Aim at Gun Violence: Tracing Bullets and Guns to Sideline Scofflaw Dealers.' *Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA),* 290 (5), p. 583–85.

Colletta, Nat, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer. 1996. *Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Accessed 23 March 2005. <http://www-wds.world bank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1996/06/01/000009265_3961214183011/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf>

Collier, Paul. 1994. 'Demobilization and Insecurity: A Study in the Economics of the Transition from War to Peace.' *Journal of International Development,* 6. pp. 343–51.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. *Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars*. Working Paper. Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University.

— and Måns Söderbom. 2001. *On the Duration of War*. Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University.

Cook, Phil. 2001. 'The Cost and Benefits of Reducing Gun Violence.' *Harvard Health Policy Review,* (2)2, pp. 23–28.

Cooper, Neil, Jonathan Goodhand, and Michael Pugh. 2004. *War Economies in their Regional Context: The Challenges of Transformation*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Cruz, José Miguel and María Antonieta Beltrán. 2000. *Las Armas en El Salvador: Diagnóstico Sobre su Situación y su Impacto*. San Salvador: University Institute for Public Opinion (IUDOP), Central American University.

Cuadra, Elvira. 2004. *El trinomio del fuego*. Managua: Centro de Estudios Internacionales.

Daponte, Beth. 1993. 'A Case Study in Estimating Casualties from War and Its Aftermath: The 1991 Persian Gulf War.' *Medicine and Global Survival,* 3(2). Accessed January 2005. <http://www.ippnw.org/MGS/PSRQV3N2Daponte.html>

De Beers, David. 2002. *An Integrated Approach to Small Arms Management: The EU ASAC Programme on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia*. Presentation to the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Berlin, 19 December.

Demetriou, Spyros, Robert Muggah, and Ian Biddle. 2001. *Small Arms Availability and Trade in the Republic of Congo*. Study prepared by the Small Arms Survey for the International Organization for Migration and United Nations Development Programme. September. Accessed April 2005. <http://www.undp.org/bcpr/smallarms/docs/roc_small_arms_study.pdf>

DFID (Department for International Development). 2003. *Tackling Poverty by Reducing Armed Violence: Recommendations from a Wilton Park Workshop*. London. 14–16 April.

Diamond, Larry. 2004. 'What Went Wrong in Iraq.' *Foreign Affairs,* 9(1). Accessed March 2005. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040901faessay83505/larry-diamond/what-went-wrong-in-iraq.html>

Douma, Pyt. 2001. *Political Economy of Internal Conflict: A Review of Contemporary Trends and Issues*. Conflict Research Unit Working Paper No. 1. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Doyle, Martin and Nicholas Sambinis. 2004. *Making War and Building Peace: The United Nations after the Cold War*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Duffield, Mark. 2001. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London: Zed Books.

Durch, William et al. 2003. *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center.

ECHA (Executive Committee on Humanitarian Assistance). 2000. 'Harnessing Institutional Capacities in Support of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants.' Paper prepared by ECHA Working Group, New York. 19 July.

Faltas, Sami, Glenn McDonald, and Camilla Waszink. 2001. *Removing Small Arms from Society: A Review of Weapons Reduction and Destruction Programmes*. Occasional Paper No. 2. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

Faltas, Sami and Joseph Di Chiaro III, eds. 2001. *Managing the Remnants of War: Micro-disarmament as an Element of Peace-building*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Faltas, Sami and Wolf-Christian Paes. 2004. E*xchanging Guns for Tools*. Brief No. 29. Bonn: BICC.

Garfield, Richard and Alfred Neugut. 1991. 'Epidemiologic Analysis of Warfare: A Historical Review.' *Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA),* 226 (68), pp. 688–91.

Ghoborah, Hazem, Paul Huth, and Bruce Russett. 2003. 'Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long After the Shooting Stops.' *American Political Science Review,* 97, pp. 189–202.

—. 2004. 'The Post-War Public Health Effects of Civil Conflict.' *Social Science and Medicine,* 59, pp. 869–84.

Ginifer, Jeremy, Michael Bourne, and Owen Greene. 2004. *Armed Violence in Small Arms and Light Weapons, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Initiatives*. Briefing Paper for DFID. Bradford: CICS, University of Bradford.

Ginifer, Jeremy and Christiana Solomon. 2004. *A Review of DDR and Arms Reduction Activities*. Background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

Godnick, Bill, Robert Muggah, and Camilla Waszink. 2003. *Balas perdidas: el impacto del mal uso de armas pequeñas en Centroamérica*. Geneva and London: Small Arms Survey and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA).

—. 2005. 'Firearm Death and Injury Rates in Central America.' Background Paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

Gomes Porto, João and Imogen Parsons. 2003. *Sustaining the Peace in Angola: An Overview of Current Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration*. Bonn: BICC. Paper 27. Accessed 24 March 2005. <http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper27/paper27.pdf>

Grillot, Suzette, Shelly Stoneman, Hans Risser, and Wolf-Christian Paes. 2004. *A Fragile Peace: Guns and Security in Post-conflict Macedonia*. Special Report No. 4. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

GTZ (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit). 1996. *Concepts and Experiences of Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Guidelines and Instruments for Future Programmes*. Division 4334, Emergency and Refugee Aid. Eschborn: GTZ.

—. 2001. *Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Post-War and Transition Challenges of External Support*. Eschborn: GTZ.

—. 2003. *Activity Area: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants*. Accessed November 2004. <http://www.wedoit.net/dea/demoblisationandreintegrationofex-combatants.asp>

—. 2004. *Practical Guide to Multilateral Needs Assessments in Post-Conflict Situation: A Joint UNDG, UNDP and World Bank Guide, prepared by GTZ with the support of BMZ*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Guha-Sapir, Debbie and Willem van Panhuis. 2002a. *Armed Conflict and Public Health: A Report on Knowledge and Knowledge Gaps*. Brussels: Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters.

—. 2002b. *Mortality Risks in Recent Civil Conflicts: a Comparative Analysis*. Brussels: Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters.

Hampson, Fen and Mark Zacher. 2003. *Human Security and International Collaboration: Some Lessons from Public Goods Theory*. Background paper for the Commission on Human Security. Ottawa. Accessed November 2004. <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu>

Hansch, Steve. 2001 'Five Illustrations of Uncertainty: Mortality in Afghanistan, Bosnia, North Korea, Rwanda and Sierra Leone.' In James Keely and Holly E. Reed, eds. *Forced Migration and Mortality*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Heuveline, Paul. 2001. 'The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises: the Case of Cambodia: 1970–79.' In James Keely and Holly Reed, eds. *Forced Migration and Mortality*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Hitchcock, Nicky. 2004. *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: The Case of Angola*. Peacekeeping Note. Durban: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). Issue 1. Accessed 31 March 2005. <http://www.trainingforpeace.org/pubs/accord/ct104pg36.pdf>

Hoeffler, Anke and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2003. *Measuring the Costs of Conflict*. Mimeo. Oxford: University of Oxford.

Hoge, Charles, et al. 2004. 'Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and Barriers to Care.' *New England Journal of Medicine,* (351) 1, pp. 13–22.

Humphreys, Macartan. 2002. *Economics and Violent Conflict*. Mimeo. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

— and Jeremy Weinstein. 2004. *What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone: June–August 2003*. A survey carried out by Columbia University and Stanford University in partnership with the Post-conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment (PRIDE). Accessed February 2005. <http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/SL>

ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross). 1999. *Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict*. Geneva: ICRC.

IMMAP (Information Management and Mine Action Programs). 2004. *Rapid Humanitarian Assessments: How Rational?* Navigating Post-Conflict Environments. New York: IMMAP.

Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad de Centroamérica. 1991. 'La Salud en Tiempos d Guerra.' *Estudios Centroamericanos,* 46, pp. 653–71.

IRC (International Rescue Committee). 2004. *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from a Nationwide Survey*. New York: IRC.

IISS (International Institute of Strategic Studies). 2004. *Armed Conflict Database*. Accessed March 2005. <http://www.iiss.org/showpage.php?pageID=25>

Jensen, Steffen and Finn Stepputat. 2001. *Demobilising Armed Civilians*. Centre for Development Research (CDR) Policy Paper. Copenhagen: CDR.

Kaldor, Mary. 1999. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Keely, Charles, Holly Reed, and Ronald Waldman. 2001. 'Understanding Mortality Patterns in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies.' In Charles Keely and Holly Reed, eds. *Forced Migration and Mortality*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Khakee, Anna and Nicolas Florquin. 2003. *Kosovo and the Gun: A Baseline Assessment of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kosovo*. Special Report. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

Kingma, Kees, ed. 2000. *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Development and Security Impacts*. Houndmills: Macmillan.

—. 2002. 'Demobilization, Reintegration and Peace-building in Africa.' *International Peacekeeping,* 9(2), pp. 181–201.

Kirsten, Adele et al. 2004. *Islands of Safety in a Sea of Guns: Gun-Free Zones in Fothane, Diepkloof & Khayelitsh*. Background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

Knight, Michael, Loayza Norman, and Dadvid Villanueva. 1996. 'The Peace Dividend: Military Spending Cuts and Economic Growth.' *IMF Staff Papers,* 43(1), pp. 1–37.

Lacina, Bethany and Neils Gleditch. 2004. *Measuring War: A Typology and a New Dataset of Battle Deaths*. Oslo: Center for the Study of Civil War.

Le Billon, Philippe. 2000. *The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know*. Network Paper No. 33. London: Overseas Development Institute.

LeBrun, Emile and Robert Muggah, eds. 2005. *Participatory Research on Armed Violence in the Pacific*. Occasional Paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Forthcoming.

Levy, Barry and Victor Sidel, eds. 1997. *War and Public Health*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Macrae, Joanna. 1999. *Aiding peace ... and war: UNHCR, returnee integration, and the relief–development debate*. Working Paper No. 14. Geneva: Centre for Documentation and Research, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Mazurana, Dyan and Khristopher Calson. 2004. *From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone*. Washington, DC: Women Waging Peace and the Policy Commission.

McIlwaine, Cathy and Caroline Moser. 2001. 'Violence and Social Capital in Urban Poor Communities: Perspectives from Colombia and Guatemala.' *Journal of International Development* (13), pp. 965–84.

MDDRWG (Multi-Agency Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Work Group). 2005. *Rationale and Guiding Principles for IDDR*. New York: MDDRWG, UN.

Measure DHS. 2000. *Cambodia Demographic and Health Survey*. Phnom Penh: National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Health.

Meek, Sarah. 1998. *Buy or Barter: The History and Prospects of Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes*. ISS Monograph Series No. 22. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

Millennium Project. 2004. *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*. New York: United Nations.

Milner, James. 2004. *The Militarization and Demilitarization of Refugee Camps and Settlements in Guinea: 1999–2004*. Background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

Moser, Caroline. 2004. *Urban Violence and Insecurity: An Introductory Roadmap*. Environment and Urbanization Brief No. 10. London: International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).

— and Andy Winton. 2002. *Violence in the Central American Region: Toward an Integrated Framework for Violence Reduction*. Working Paper No. 171. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua and Robert Muggah, eds. 2003. *Whose Security Counts? Participatory Research on Armed Violence in Southeast Asia*. Bangkok: Free Press and Nonviolence International.

Muggah, Robert. 2003. *Reconsidering Small Arms in the Solomon Islands*. UNDP Background Paper. Honiara/Geneva: United Nations Development Programme. August.

—. 2004a. 'The Anatomy of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Republic of Congo.' *Conflict, Security and Development,* 4(1), pp. 21–37.

—. 2004b. *The Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front*. Manila. Study commissioned by UNDP and the World Bank. Manila: UNDP.

—. 2004c. *Diagnosing Demand: Motivations and Means of Firearms Acquisition in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands*. Discussion Paper 7 (1). Canberra: State Society and Governance in Melanesia (SSGM) project, Australian National University (ANU).

—. 2005a. *A Crisis Turning Inwards: Refugee and IDP Militarisation in Uganda*. Humanitarian Exchange No. 29. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

—. 2005b. 'No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on DDR and Weapons Reduction in Post-Conflict Contexts'. *Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs,* 94 (379), pp. 237–50. Forthcoming.

—. 2005c. *Securing Haiti's Transition: Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*. Occasional Paper 14. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

— and Peter Batchelor. 2002. *Development Held Hostage: The Socio-Economic Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Human Development*. New York: UNDP.

— and Jurgen Brauer. 2004. 'Diagnosing Demand: An Economic Framework to Assessing the Demand for Small Arms.' Discussion Paper 50. Department of Economics. Durban: University of Kwazulu-Natal..

—, ed. 2005. *Refugee Militarization in Africa*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey and BICC. Forthcoming.

— with Martin Griffiths. 2002. *Reconsidering the Tools of War: the Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons*. ODI Network Paper No. 39. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

—. Philippe Maughan, and Christian Bugnion. 2003. *A Joint Independent Evaluation for the European Commission, UNDP and the MDRP Secretariat*. 13 February to 6 March. Accessed 23 March 2005.
<http://www.undp.org/bcpr/smallarms/docs/DDR_evalcongo_e.pdf>

MDRP (Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program in the greater Great Lakes region). 2005. *Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: A regional approach to support the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in the greater Great Lakes region of Africa*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Accessed 23 March 2005. <http://www.mdrp.org/>

—. 2003. 'Guidelines and Procedures for Special Projects for Potential Implementing Partners.' 15 April. Accessed 23 March 2005. <http://www.mdrp.org/special_project_procedures.pdf>

Murray, Christopher and Alan Lopez, eds. 1996. *The Global Burden of Disease*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University School of Public Health, WHO, and World Bank.

Nelson, Carol and Robert Muggah. 2004. *Disarming the Solomons: An Evaluation of Weapons-Free Villages*. Independent study commissioned by the Small Arms Survey. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

Nichols, Ryan. 2004. *DDR in Liberia*. Background paper. (unpublished). Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

OECD DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee). 2001. *Guidelines on Helping Prevent Deadly Conflict*. Paris: OECD DAC. Accessed January 2005. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/54/1886146.pdf>

Ozanne-Smith, Joan, et al. 2004. 'Firearm-Related Deaths: the Impact of Regulatory Reform.' *Journal of Injury Prevention,* 19, pp. 289–86.

PAHO (Pan American Health Organization). 1986. *Health Conditions in the Americas 1981–1984*. Vol. II. Scientific Publication 500/1986. Washington, DC: PAHO.

Pearce, Jenny. 1999. 'Peace-Building at the Periphery: Lessons from Central America.' *Third World Quarterly,* 20(1), pp. 51–68.

Pedersen, Douglas. 2002. 'Political Violence, Ethnic Conflict and Contemporary Wars: Broad Implications for Health and Well Being.' *Social Science and Medicine,* 55, pp. 175–90.

Roberts, Les. 2002. *Mortality in Eastern DRC: Results from 5 Mortality Surveys*. New York: International Rescue Committee.

—. 2004a. 'Mortality Before and After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey.' *The Lancet*. 364, pp. 1857–64. Accessed February 2005. <http://image.thelancet.com/extras/04art10342web.pdf>

—. 2004b. *Small Arms Survey in Iraq*. Background paper. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

Sabin, Miriam, Barbara Lopes Cardozo, Larry Nackerud, Reinhard Kaiser, and Luis Varese. 2003. 'Guatemalan Refugees Twenty Years Later: Factors Associated with Poor Mental Health Outcomes.' *Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA),* 290, pp. 635–42.

SaferAfrica. 2003. *Operations Rachel*. Pretoria: SaferAfrica. Accessed 23 March 2005. <http://www.saferafrica.org/DocumentsCentre/Monographs/Rachel/Rachel.pdf>

Sambanis, Nicholas. 2002. 'A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Literature on Civil War.' *Defence and Peace Economics,* 15, pp. 215–44.

—. 2003. 'Using Case Studies to Expand the Theory of Civil War.' Paper prepared for 'The Political Economy of Civil Wars.' World Bank and Yale University case study project. New Haven: Yale University.

Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore. 2003. *Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations*. CPR Working Paper 6. Washington, DC: World Bank.

SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Institute). 2004. *SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Small Arms Survey. *Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—. 2002. *Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—. 2003. *Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—. 2004. *Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—. and UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research). 2005. *Listening for a Change! Participatory Evaluations of DDR and Arms Reduction in Mali, Cambodia, and Albania*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey and UNIDIR. Forthcoming.

Smith, Chris. 2001. 'Security-Sector Reform: Development Breakthrough or Institutional Engineering?' *Conflict, Security and Development,* 1(1), pp. 5–19.

Smith, Joyce. 2003. 'Human resources for health: identifying opportunities to provide direction and coherence to inescapable change in a post-conflict environment.' Paper prepared for AusAid Post-Conflict Symposium. Sydney. September.

Stewart, Frances and Valpy Fitzgerald, eds. 2001. *War and Underdevelopment: Volume 1: The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—. Cindy Huang, and Michael Wang. 2001. 'Internal Wars in Developing Countries: An Empirical Overview of Economic and Social Consequences.' In Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald, eds. 2001.

Tschirgi, Necla. 2004. 'Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations and Challenges.' Report of the WSP International/IPA Peace-building Forum Conference. October.

UN (United Nations). 1998. *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*. A/RES/53/92.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2001. *Defining UNDPs Role in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Durable Solutions (D3)*. Mission Report—UNDP/Donor Mission to DRC and the Great Lakes Region. New York: UNDP/Emergency Reponse Division. 6 August–13 September. Accessed 31 March 2005. <http://www.undp.org/bcpr/pubinfo/transitions/2001_10/d3_mission_report.pdf>

—. 2003. *Guatemala: una agenda para el desarrollo humano. Informe sobre el desarrollo humano 2003*. Guatemala City: UNDP.

—. 2004a. *A Compilation of SADU Missions*. Geneva: Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery.

—. 2004b. 'Arms for Development: UNDP Recovery and Peace Building Unit: Sierra Leone.' Progress report.

—. 2005. *Guidelines for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration.* UNDP practice note. Geneva: Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery. Forthcoming.

UN DPKO (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations). 1997. *Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent Experience.* Accessed January 2005. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/handbuk.htm>

—. 1999. *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines.* New York: Lessons Learned Unit, DPKO.

UNF (United Nations Foundation). 2004. *Issues Before the UN's High-Level Panel: Small Arms and Light Weapons.* New York: UNF and the Stanley Foundation. 29–30 March.

UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). 2004. *Note by the Secretary-General.* A/59/565 of 2 December. Also referred to as the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Accessed March 2005. <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf>

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2004. *Protracted Refugee Situations.* EC/54/SC/CRP.14.

UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women). 2004. *Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.* New York: UNIFEM.

University of Uppsala. 2004. *Uppsala Conflict Database.* Accessed 23 March 2004. <http://www.pcr.uu.se/database>

UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 1999a. *Statement by the President of the Security Council.* S/PRST/1999/21 of 8 July.

—. 1999b. *Statement by the President of the Security Council.* S/PRST/1999/28 of 24 September.

—. 2000a. R*eport of the Secretary-General: The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.* S/2000/101 of 11 February.

—. 2000b. *Report of the Secretary-General: Methods of Destruction of Small Arms, Light Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives.* S/2000/1092 of 15 November.

—. 2004. *Resolution 1529.* S/RES/1542.

UNSG (United Nations Secretary General). 1998. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONU-MOZ).* S/24892. New York: United Nations. 3 December.

US Army War College. 1996. *United Nations Observer Mission in Haiti (UNMIH): A Working Bibliography.* Accessed March 2005. <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usacsl/new_site/divisions/pki/military/casestudies/studydocs/unmih.htm>

US GAO (United States General Accounting Office). 2000. *Conventional Arms Transfers: U.S. Efforts to Control the Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons.* Washington, DC: GAO.

Walter, Barbara. 1997. 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.' *International Organization,* 51(3), pp. 335–65.

De Watteville, Nathalie. 2003. 'Demobilization and Reintegration Programs: Addressing Gender Issues.' *World Bank Findings,* 227. June.

Wilkinson, Adrian. 2004. *Integrated SALW Control in SEE.* Presentation to the UNIDIR Weapons for Development Conference, 14–15 September.

World Bank. 1998. *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: the Role of the World Bank.* Washington, DC: World Bank. Accessed 23 March 2005. <http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1998/04/01/000009265_3980624143531/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf>

—. 2002. *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration.* Report No. 23869-AFR. 25 March. Accessed 23 March 2005. <http://www.mdrp.org/gl_dr_regional_strategy.pdf>

—. 2003a. *Position Paper: Linkages between Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Security Sector Reform.* MDRP Secretariat Paper. Washington, DC: World Bank and MDRP Secretariat. Accessed 23 March 2005. <http://www.mdrp.org/ssr-paper.pdf>

—. 2003b. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy.* Washington, DC: World Bank. Accessed 23 March 2005. <http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/06/30/000094946_0306190405396/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf>

—. 2003d. 'Development Cooperation and Conflict: Operational Policies 2.30.' *World Bank Operational Manual.* Washington, DC: World Bank.

—. 2003e. *World Bank Group Work in Low-Income Countries Under Stress: A Task Force Report.* Washington, DC: World Bank.

WHO (World Health Organization). 2001. *World Report on Violence and Health.* Geneva: WHO.