Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Niger examines the measurement of illicit arms flows in Niger in the context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically SDG 16. 
 

More than 100,000 police and military personnel are currently deployed as United Nations peacekeepers (known as  Blue Helmets) in 16 UN peacekeeping operations, with one in four of these peacekeepers deployed in South Sudan or Sudan. Between 2004 and 2014 there were at least 22 notable incidents of diversion or loss of weapons and ammunition during peacekeeping operations in these countries. These incidents, each of which involved the loss more than 10 weapons or more than 500 rounds of ammunition, have occurred during patrols, during attacks on convoys, and on fixed sites.

The looting of Libya’s massive stocks of weapons and ammunition was one of the most significant arms proliferation events of the 21st century. Anti-government forces seized tens of thousands of small arms, light weapons and other munitions, and thousands more were left unguarded in abandoned storage facilities. These weapons have fuelled crime and conflict in Libya and throughout North Africa.

A significant reduction in the trafficking of illicit arms is one of the targets being proposed as part of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the new development framework to come into effect after the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

In 2013, the Small Arms Survey  estimated that there are around 440,000 civilian firearms in circulation in Nepal, only 55,000 of which are legally registered. The availability of firearms in the country is moderate by international standards, but the concentration of small arms in the hands of criminal groups poses a threat to law and order that has yet to be fully assessed and addressed.

Since the start of Syria’s civil war, the country has become a hotbed of arms trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons. Images and accounts reveal that armed groups have acquired a variety of small arms and light weapons, some of which are recent-generation systems rarely encountered outside of government control elsewhere. Among the most sensitive of these are numerous man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) looted from Syrian government depots and acquired elsewhere, many of which are newer and more technologically sophisticated than illicit MANPADS in other countries.

For decades, armed groups around the world have converted rockets intended for use with large, vehicle-mounted launchers into improvised light weapons. Indiscriminate and lethal, these weapons have killed and injured thousands of people in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

Yet, despite the demonstrated threat posed by artillery rockets, they have received significantly less attention from policy-makers than conventional small arms and light weapons do.

International and regional instruments to control the illicit trade of small arms specifically call for states to designate individuals and administrative processes to help them attain established objectives. For example, both the 2001 Programme of Action on Small Arms (PoA) and the 2005 International Tracing Instrument (ITI) include provisions for each UN member state to establish or designate a national point of contact (NPC) to act as a liaison with other states concerning their implementation (UNGA, 2001, art. II.5; 2005, art. VI.25).

More than a decade of instability and armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire has resulted in the proliferation of weapons and ammunition held by both the government and the Forces Nouvelles rebel movement.

These two publications, from the Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project, offer insight into the situation in Syria, investigating the variety and availability of small arms ammunition documented in the country, and the presence and role of foreign fighters in the ongoing hostilities.